No. 1-15-2504 Opinion filed March 18, 2016

FIFTH DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

In re N.H., a Minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. ) ) No. 14 JD 2722 N.H., ) ) The Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Terrence V. Sharkey, Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Lampkin specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION No. 1-15-2504

¶1 Respondent N.H. 1 appeals an adjudication of delinquency and

dispositional order of probation. The State charged him with robbery,

aggravated battery, battery, theft from person and theft; the trial court found

him guilty after an adjudication hearing of all charges, and sentenced him to

five years of probation.

¶2 On this direct appeal, respondent claims: (1) that the State failed to prove

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery, battery or robbery,

and, thus, this court should reverse his aggravated battery and battery

convictions and reduce his robbery conviction to theft; (2) that subjecting

juveniles who have been adjudicated delinquent of a forcible felony to a

mandatory minimum sentence of five years of probation violates the equal

protection clause, where juveniles who are adjudicated delinquent of other

felonies are not subject to the same mandatory sentence; (3) that the trial court

abused its discretion by ordering respondent to maintain a "C average" in school

as a condition of his probation; and (4) that the trial court's order should be

corrected to reflect adjudications for robbery and aggravated battery, as the

adjudications for the lesser offenses of theft and battery violate the one act, one

crime rule.

1 Since respondent has an unusual first name, this opinion refers to him only by his initials. People v. Burgess,

(we referred to a minor only as "the minor" in order to protect his anonymity). 2 No. 1-15-2504

¶3 With respect to respondent's fourth claim, the State observes that the trial

court merged the theft and theft from person counts with the robbery conviction

and also merged the battery count with the aggravated battery conviction,

leaving only the offenses of robbery and aggravated battery existing. After

merging the counts, the trial court stated: "So the only convictions will be—

now, will be the robbery and *** the aggravated battery." However,

adjudications of delinquency were entered on all counts in the trial court's

written order. 2 People v. Maxey,

(when the

written order and the oral pronouncement of the trial court conflict, the oral

pronouncement becomes the judgment of the court, and the mittimus must be

corrected to reflect it); People v. Jones,

(2007)

("When the oral pronouncement of the court and the written order are in

conflict, the oral pronouncement controls."). The State joins respondent in

asking us to vacate respondent's adjudications for theft and battery and to

correct the order. Thus, we correct the trial court's written order to reflect

adjudications solely for robbery and aggravated battery. People v. J.F.,

(appellate court ordered a juvenile's adjudication order

corrected); Maxey,

(appellate court ordered the

2 The trial court's written order, entered June 29, 2015, stated that respondent was "[g]uilty of count(s) 1-5 of the petition," which were all the counts in the State's petition for adjudication of wardship, filed July 10, 2014. 3 No. 1-15-2504

mittimus corrected); People v. Lattimore,

(same); People v. Jones,

(2009) (same).

¶4 However, we do not find respondent's other claims persuasive for the

reasons explained below. We affirm and order the adjudication order corrected.

¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 I. Petition for Wardship

¶7 In the States' petition for adjudication of wardship. the State charged

respondent with aggravated battery and robbery, among other charges.

¶8 With respect to the aggravated battery charge, the State alleged that,

while the victim was "on a public way, the above-named minor knowingly

made physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature to [the victim], in that

he pushed her in the upper body."

¶9 With respect to the robbery charge, the State alleged that "the above-

named minor knowingly took property, to wit: wallet 3 and United States

currency, from the person or presence of [the victim], by the use of force or

threatening the imminent use of force."

3 The victim testified at the adjudication hearing that defendant grabbed her wallet out of her hand. She did not testify that she had a purse or that the wallet was in her purse. Respondent's stepfather also testified concerning a wallet. However, respondent testified at the hearing that he observed "a male [who] grabbed the victim's purse and ran off into the alley." Thus, we use the term "wallet" when describing the victim's and the stepfather's testimony, but "purse" when describing respondent's testimony. 4 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 10 II. Evidence at the Adjudication Hearing

¶ 11 At the adjudication hearing, the State's case in chief included the

testimony of the victim and two police officers. Respondent offered an alibi

defense, which he supported with his own testimony and that of his stepfather.

In rebuttal, the State recalled police officer Povsner. We summarize this

evidence below.

¶ 12 A. The Victim

¶ 13 Regina Warren, an 18-year-old student, testified that, on July 9, 2014, at

8 p.m., she and a friend were walking near 54th Street and Ashland Avenue in

Chicago on the way to her sister's birthday party. Respondent was walking

behind her with three other people and attempting to make conversation with

her. Warren and her friend did not respond, but Warren turned around and

observed respondent who was a few feet behind her. Respondent followed

Warren and her friend for about a block and a half, when he then stated: "I

know you hear me." A few seconds later, respondent pushed Warren in her

upper back from behind which caused her to stumble. Warren then turned

around for a second time and observed respondent as he grabbed her wallet out

of her hand and ran. Respondent's friends also fled, and one of them was on an

electric scooter.

5 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 14 Warren testified that she asked a person on a nearby porch to call the

police, who arrived in a few minutes. She told the police what had occurred,

and a police officer drove her around in a police vehicle looking for the

offender. Warren described the offender to them as a 15- year-old African-

American male in jeans. After driving around for a few minutes, Warren

observed respondent on a scooter and told the officers that he was the "main

one that did it." When asked what her wallet contained, Warren testified: "I had

ten dollars, a seven-day and a couple of other things." 4 She explained: "A

seven-day is a bus pass that I use to get around." Warren made a positive

identification of respondent in court.

¶ 15 B. Chicago Police Officer's Testimony

¶ 16 Chicago police officer Povsner5 testified that, on July 9, 2014, he and his

partner, Officer Tracey Knightly, were flagged down near 53rd Street and

Racine Avenue by a friend of the victim. Warren then told him that someone

had pushed her from behind and stolen her wallet. Warren described the

offender as a young, short black male teenager, wearing a multi-colored shirt.

After touring the area, Officer Povsner observed a young black male on a

4 As Chicago police officer Weber subsequently testified, no proceeds from the incident were recovered from respondent's person. 5 Officer Povsner did not state his first name.

6 No. 1-15-2504

scooter who matched this description a block and a half from where Povsner

was originally flagged down, so Povsner stopped him and started talking to

him. Povsner testified:

"What happened next was a squad car pulled up, two officers and the

victim in the back seat of the squad car, the victim that we had just talked

to, and while we were talking to him, they told us that's—that's him;

that's the offender."

¶ 17 Chicago police officer Weber 6 testified that, on July 9, 2014, he

responded to a call concerning a theft or robbery near the 5400 block of Racine

Avenue. The victim provided a description of a male on a scooter, but Weber

did not recall the description. Weber placed the victim in the back of his police

vehicle and started touring the area looking for the offender. He stopped when

he observed that other officers had detained a suspect, whom the victim

identified.

¶ 18 C. The Testimony of Respondent's Stepfather

¶ 19 After the State rested, respondent's motion for a direct finding was

denied. Respondent's stepfather7 testified on his behalf. The stepfather testified

6 Officer Weber also did not state his first name. 7 In order to protect the minor's privacy, we refer to this witness only as the respondent's stepfather, rather than by his name. We also decline to provide the 7 No. 1-15-2504

that, on July 9, 2014, at 8 p.m., he was outside his house with respondent and

two other children and the stepfather was placing gas in respondent's motorized

scooter. He observed two black males and two black females walking together

down the street toward 54th Street and passing his house. One of the females

was the victim, Regina Warren. One of the males grabbed Warren's wallet and

ran through an alley. The stepfather did not observe the male push Warren. He

described the offender as an African American 5 feet 9 inches tall, weighing

130 pounds, wearing a white shirt and blue pants. The stepfather's neighbor

called the police. When the police arrived, the stepfather informed the police

officers what he had observed and gave them a description of the offender. The

respondent began riding his scooter and remained within the sight of the

stepfather. The officers detained respondent and brought him back to his

stepfather.

¶ 20 The stepfather testified that he observed the offender later and took a

photograph of the offender on his cell phone two weeks after the incident. The

stepfather then went to the police station but an officer "told [him] to leave the

street address of the stepfather's home. Burgess,

("The minor's relatives are referred to by their familial connection to the minor, such as 'the father' or 'the uncle.' This is done because the initials of the family members could be used to identify the victim, if viewed by someone familiar with the family."). 8 No. 1-15-2504

investigation alone," so he deleted the photograph from the cell phone a few

days later.

¶ 21 D. Testimony of Respondent

¶ 22 Respondent testified that he was 13 years old on July 9, 2014. At 8 p.m.,

he was outside his house with his stepfather working on his scooter, when he

observed a group of two males and two females walking past them. One of the

males grabbed a purse from one of the females and ran into the alley. The

victim ran toward the house of a neighbor who called the police. Respondent

did not recognize any members of the group. After the incident, respondent was

riding on his scooter when police officers stopped and searched him. After

another police vehicle arrived, he was handcuffed and arrested. Respondent

denied robbing the victim and testified that he told Officer Povsner who the real

offender was but that the officer did not listen.

¶ 23 In rebuttal, the State recalled Officer Povsner who testified that he spoke

with respondent but did not recall whether respondent told him that someone

else robbed the victim. Officer Povsner also did not recall speaking with

respondent's stepfather.

¶ 24 III. Adjudication and Sentencing

¶ 25 The trial court adjudicated respondent delinquent on all counts. The trial

did not find the testimony of respondent and his stepfather credible and

9 No. 1-15-2504

believed the victim's testimony. Respondent filed a posttrial motion to

reconsider which the trial court denied.

¶ 26 At sentencing, the trial court stated that the robbery count (count I) would

merge with the theft and theft from person counts (counts II and III) and that the

aggravated battery count (count V) would merge with the battery count (count

IV). The trial court stated: "So the only convictions will be—now, will be the

robbery and *** the aggravated battery." The court sentenced respondent to five

years of probation, which the statute made mandatory when a conviction is for a

forcible felony. 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 2014) ("the period of probation

for a minor who is found to be guilty for an offense which is *** a forcible

felony shall be at least 5 years"). Respondent's conditions of probation

included: 25 hours of community service; no gang, gun or drug contact;

participation in any Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC)

evaluation recommendations; mandatory school attendance and the

maintenance of a "C average" in school. Only the last condition of the sentence

is at issue on this appeal.

¶ 27 Respondent filed a timely notice of appeal, and this direct appeal

followed.

10 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 28 ANALYSIS

¶ 29 On this direct appeal, respondent claims: (1) that the State failed to

prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated battery, battery and

robbery, and thus this court should reverse his aggravated battery conviction

and reduce his robbery conviction to theft; (2) that subjecting juveniles who

have been adjudicated delinquent of a forcible felony to a mandatory minimum

sentence of five years of probation violates the equal protection clauses of the

federal and Illinois constitutions, where juveniles who are adjudicated

delinquent of other felonies are not subject to the same mandatory sentence; (3)

that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering respondent to maintain a "C

average" in school as a condition of his probation; and (4) that the trial court's

order should be corrected to reflect adjudications for only robbery and

aggravated battery.

¶ 30 For the reasons already stated above, we correct the trial court's

adjudication order to reflect adjudications for robbery and aggravated battery.

However, for the reasons stated below, we do not find respondent's other claims

persuasive and affirm his adjudication and sentence.

¶ 31 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 32 Respondent's first claim is that the State's evidence was insufficient to

convict him of aggravated battery or robbery beyond a reasonable doubt.

11 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 33 When a minor respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, our

standard of review is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. People v. Davison,

(2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

(1979)).

When considering a challenge to an adjudication of a minor based on the

sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the role of the appellate court to retry a

minor respondent. Cf. People v. Hall,

(2000). Only

where the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable

doubt of the minor's guilt will a finding of guilty be set aside. Cf. Hall,

.

¶ 34 To prove respondent guilty of battery, the State is required to prove

respondent knowingly and without legal justification either (1) caused bodily

harm to another individual or (2) made physical contact of an insulting or

provoking nature. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a) (West 2014). To prove aggravated

battery on a public way, the State's required to prove either respondent or the

victim was "on or about a public way," when the battery was committed. 720

ILCS 5/12-3.05(c) (West 2014).

¶ 35 To prove robbery, the State is required to prove that respondent

knowingly took property from the person or presence of another by the use of

12 No. 1-15-2504

force or by threatening the imminent use of force. See 720 ILCS 5/18-1(a)

(West 2014). The required force or threat of force must either precede or be

contemporaneous with the taking of the victim's property. People v. Johnson,

(quoting People v. Dennis,

, 101-

02 (1998)).

¶ 36 Respondent argues that the State failed to prove either: (1) the physical

contact required for aggravated battery; or (2) the use of force required for

robbery. For both these crimes, respondent argues that the State's evidence was

insufficient because the victim testified that she was pushed from behind and

thus did not observe who was pushing her at the moment of contact. As a

result, respondent argues that her identification of respondent as her assailant

was inherently incredible.

¶ 37 It is the job of the fact finder to make the determinations concerning the

credibility of the witnesses who testify, and the fact finder's credibility

determinations are entitled to great deference and rarely will be disturbed on

appeal. People v. Siguenza-Brito,

(2009); People v.

Cerda,

; People v. Williams,

; People v. Bowie,

(1976). This

deferential standard of review exists because the fact finder is in a superior

position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe

13 No. 1-15-2504

witnesses' demeanor and resolve conflicts in their testimony. People v. Jones,

(2005); Cerda,

; People v.

Lomax,

.

¶ 38 In the case at bar, the victim testified that she observed respondent twice:

once when he was following behind her; and once after she was pushed as he

was taking her wallet from her hand. She testified that respondent was

attempting to make conversation with her and her friend and, when they did not

respond, respondent stated "I know you hear me." Then the victim felt a shove

in her upper back, she turned and observed respondent grabbing her wallet out

of her hand. Based on this testimony and that of the police officers, and viewing

it in the light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier of fact

could have found the elements of force and contact beyond a reasonable doubt.

Davison,

(quoting Jackson,

). The trial court,

who had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses and to hear their

testimony, found the victim credible but did not find respondent or his

stepfather credible.

¶ 39 Thus, we conclude that there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt that

respondent pushed the victim and grabbed her wallet out of her hand, which

satisfies: (1) the physical contact required for aggravated battery; and (2) the

use of force required for robbery.

14 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 40 Defendant claims that the one act of pushing cannot satisfy the physical

act required in two different offenses because it violates the one-act, one-crime

rule. In Rodriguez, the Illinois Supreme Court quoted the appellate court case of

People v. Lobdell, stating: " '[a] person can be guilty of two offenses when a

common act is part of both offenses.' " Rodriguez, 169 Ill. 2d at 188 (quoting

People v. Lobdell,

(1983)). In Lobdell, the appellate

court found that one act of entry into a victim's home could satisfy the element

of a dwelling entry for both home invasion and residential burglary. Lobdell,

. The Lobdell court explained: "A person can be

guilty of two offenses when a common act is [(1)] part of both offenses or [(2)]

part of one offense and the only act of the other offense." Lobdell,

. Applying this rule to the facts before it, the Lobdell court reasoned:

"Since entry into the victim's home was only part of the home invasion offense

and the sole act of the residential burglary offense, the two offenses were not

carved from the same physical act." Lobdell,

. The

Lobdell court further observed that a wound inflicted upon a victim could serve

both as the bodily harm needed for aggravated battery and the injury needed for

home invasion. Lobdell,

-52 (citing People v. Tate,

(1982)). Similarly, in the case at bar, the push received by the

victim could be both the physical contact needed for battery (720 ILCS 5/12-

15 No. 1-15-2504

3(a) (West 2014)) and the use of force needed for robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1(a)

(West 2014)), since the use of force was only "part of" the robbery offense.

Lobdell,

. Thus, the State's use of a single push to satisfy

an element in two different offenses does not violate the one act, one crime rule;

and the evidence is sufficient for both offenses. However, in the case at bar,

there were two separate physical acts, one act was the push and the other was

physically taking the wallet out of the victim's hand.

¶ 41 II. Equal Protection Claim

¶ 42 Respondent's second claim is that subjecting juveniles who have been

adjudicated delinquent of a forcible felony to a mandatory minimum sentence

of five years of probation violates the equal protection clauses of the United

States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§ 2. See also Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores,

(our

state constitution guarantees its citizens equal protection and due process of law

in article I, section 2, in clauses that are "nearly identical to their federal

counterparts").

¶ 43 A. Forfeiture

¶ 44 Respondent admits that he raises this issue for the first time on appeal.

Normally, to preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review, an offender must

object both at the sentencing and in a subsequent posttrial motion. People v.

16 No. 1-15-2504

Pryor,

("To preserve a sentencing issue for

appellate review, a defendant must both object at sentencing and raise the issue

in a postsentencing motion." (citing People v. Hillier,

(2010), and People v. Easley,

)).

¶ 45 However, a minor respondent is excused from the requirement of raising

an issue in a posttrial motion and thus is required to object only at the

sentencing itself in order to preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review. In

re Samantha V.,

, 368 (2009) ("a minor must object at trial to

preserve a claimed error for review," although "minors are not required to file a

postadjudication motion"). In the instant case, respondent failed to object even

at sentencing.

¶ 46 Nonetheless, the issue is not forfeited for our review. As respondent

correctly observes, a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any

time. In re J.W.,

(2003); see also People v. Thompson,

(a facially unconstitutional statute may be challenged at any

time). In J.W., a minor respondent was adjudicated delinquent and raised a

constitutional challenge to certain statutorily-mandated aspects of his probation,

for the first time on appeal. In re J.W.,

. The State argued

that he had forfeited any challenges to his probation by failing to raise them

before the trial court. In re J.W.,

. Our supreme court rejected

17 No. 1-15-2504

this argument, finding that a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised

at any time. In re J.W.,

.

¶ 47 In the instant case, as in J.W., respondent is a minor who was adjudicated

delinquent and who is now raising a constitutional challenge to a statutorily-

mandated aspect of his probation for the first time on appeal. As our supreme

court held in J.W., this issue is not forfeited, and the State does not argue

otherwise. See also People v. Wright,

(2000) ("a challenge to

the constitutionality of a criminal statute may be raised at any time"); People v.

Rush,

; People v. Bailey,

(2009) ("While it is true, and defendant concedes, that he did not preserve

this issue accordingly, we note that we are dealing with a constitutional

challenge involving the validity of a statute. Such an argument may be

presented at any time, regardless of a violation of technical waiver rules.").

¶ 48 B. Standard of Review

¶ 49 Although this constitutional issue is not forfeited for our review,

respondent still bears the burden of proof to establish its validity. In re J.W.,

; People v. Dinelli,

(2005) (the burden is

"on the party challenging the validity of the statute" (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Wright,

.

18 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 50 All statutes are presumed to be constitutional. Dinelli,

;

In re J.W.,

; People v. Wright,

(2000). A court

must construe a statute so as to affirm its constitutionality, if reasonably

possible. Dinelli,

. The question of whether a statute is

constitutional is a question we review de novo. Dinelli,

; In re

J.W.,

. De novo consideration means that we perform the same

analysis that a trial judge would perform. Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP,

(2011).

¶ 51 C. Respondent's Claim

¶ 52 In the instant case, respondent challenges section 5-715 of the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 (Act), which provides in relevant part:

"The juvenile court may terminate probation *** and discharge the minor

at any time if warranted by the conduct of the minor and the ends of

justice; provided, however, that the period of probation for a minor who

is found to be guilty for an offense which is *** a forcible felony shall be

at least 5 years." 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 2014).

¶ 53 Respondent claims that subjecting minor respondents who have been

adjudicated delinquent of a forcible felony to a mandatory five-year probation

violates the equal protection clauses of both the United States and Illinois

Constitutions.

19 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 54 "The guarantee of equal protection requires that the government treat

similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." Jacobson v. Department of

Public Aid,

(1996). See also In re M.A.,

; People v. Breedlove,

(2004). While the United States

and the Illinois Constitutions contain separate equal protection clauses (the

fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution states that no "State"

shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws" (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1)), and article two of the Illinois

Constitution states that "[n]o person shall *** be denied the equal protection of

the laws" (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2)), the Illinois Supreme Court applies the

same analysis to Illinois constitutional claims that is used by federal courts to

assess federal constitutional claims. In re M.A.,

("this

court applies the same standard under both the Illinois Constitution and the

United State Constitution when conducting an equal protection clause

analysis"); Jacobson,

. While the equal protection guarantee

does not preclude a state from enacting legislation that draws distinctions

between different categories of people, a state is prohibited "from according

different treatment to persons who have been placed by a statute into different

classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the purpose of the

20 No. 1-15-2504

legislation." Jacobson,

. See also In re M.A.,

; Breedlove,

.

¶ 55 In his opening brief to this court, respondent argues that the mandatory

probation requirement violated equal protection guarantees because the

purposes of the Act were not furthered by drawing a distinction between (1)

juveniles who committed forcible felonies and (2) juveniles who committed

other offenses. The State argued in its brief that this distinction did not violate

equal protection and that equal protection was not violated when comparing

juveniles who committed forcible felonies to adults. However, respondent

argues that his mandatory five-year probation term violates equal protection by

treating juvenile offenders more harshly than adult offenders, since the

probation term for robbery is less than five years for an adult offender.

¶ 56 Thus, in this appeal, respondent asks us to consider two different

distinctions drawn by statute: (1) the distinction between juveniles convicted of

forcible felonies and juveniles convicted of other crimes; and (2) the distinction

between juvenile robbers and adult robbers. Respondent acknowledges that this

court has considered both of these arguments previously and found them not

persuasive, but he argues that these cases were wrongfully decided. People v.

J.F.,

(rejecting a minor defendant's

argument that the five-year mandatory probation requirement violates equal

21 No. 1-15-2504

protection (1) by drawing a distinction between forcible and nonforcible

juvenile offenders or (2) by imposing a longer probationary term on juvenile

robbers than on adult robbers); In re Edgar C.,

, ¶¶

145-52 (same). Having reviewed this issue again, we see no reason to depart

from our recent precedent, as we explain below.

¶ 57 Where the challenged statute does not affect a fundamental right or

involve a suspect class, courts review the statute only under the rational basis

test. Breedlove,

; Jacobson,

. See also In re

M.A.,

. Whether a rational basis exists for a classification

presents a question of law which we consider de novo. Jacobson,

. Under the rational basis test, a court asks only if "the method or means

employed in the statute to achieve the stated goal or purpose of the legislation is

rationally related to that goal." Jacobson,

. See also

Breedlove,

. The legislation carries a strong presumption of

constitutionality, and if any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify

the classification, then it must be upheld. Breedlove,

;

Jacobson,

.

¶ 58 To apply the rational basis test, a court must first identify the "stated goal

or purpose" of the statute in question. Jacobson,

. See also In

re M.A.,

(equal protection claims generally require "an

22 No. 1-15-2504

analysis of the purpose of the legislation at issue"). In our case, article V of the

Act governs delinquent minors, and it sets forth its goals in its opening section.

Section 5-101 of article V provides:

"It is the intent of the General Assembly to promote a juvenile justice

system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a

system that will protect the community, impose accountability for

violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with competencies to live

responsibly and productively. To effectuate this intent, the General

Assembly declares the following to be important purposes of this Article:

(a) To protect citizens from juvenile crime.

(b) To hold each juvenile offender directly accountable for his or her

acts.

(c) To provide an individualized assessment of each alleged and

adjudicated delinquent juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent

further delinquent behavior through the development of competency in

the juvenile offender. As used in this Section, 'competency' means the

development of educational, vocational, social, emotional and basic life

skills which enable a minor to mature into a productive member of

society.

23 No. 1-15-2504

(d) To provide due process, as required by the Constitutions of the

United States and the State of Illinois, through which each juvenile

offender and all other interested parties are assured fair hearings at which

legal rights are recognized and enforced." 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1) (West

2014).

¶ 59 The purpose and policy section, quoted above, was amended effective

January 1, 1999, and our supreme court has acknowledged that this amendment

"represent[ed] a fundamental shift from the singular goal of rehabilitation to

include the overriding concerns of protecting the public and of holding

juveniles accountable for violations of the law." In re J.W.,

(citing In re A.G.,

(2001)).

¶ 60 "Given the shift in purpose and policy of [the Act] to include the

protection of the public from juvenile crime and holding juveniles accountable,

as well as the serious problems" (In re J.W.,

) presented by

juvenile offenders who commit forcible felonies, we cannot find that drawing a

distinction between forcible and nonforcible offenders does not further the Act's

rational purpose of protecting the public and holding juveniles accountable.

See In re M.A.,

(finding constitutional a statutory

requirement that a 13-year-old juvenile defendant register as a violent offender

for 10 years after turning 17 years old); In re J.W.,

(finding

24 No. 1-15-2504

constitutional a statutory requirement that a 12-year- old juvenile defendant

register as a sex offender for life).

¶ 61 The mandatory probation requirement still leaves the trial court with the

tools to craft an individualized sentence and thus fulfill the Act's twin goal of

rehabilitation. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c) (West 2014) ("To provide an

individualized assessment *** in order to rehabilitate ***."). In respondent's

case, the specific conditions of his sentence included: 25 hours of community

service; no gang, gun or drug contact; participation in any TASC evaluation

recommendations; mandatory school attendance and the maintenance of a "C

average" in school. Thus the mandatory probation requirement is rationally

related to the twin goals of the Act because it protects the public, while still

allowing for an individualized sentence. See J.F.,

; Edgar C.,

, ¶¶ 145-50.

¶ 62 Secondly, respondent argues that the mandatory probation requirement

violates the equal protection clause by treating minors more harshly than adults.

Respondent argues that an adult who commits robbery, which is a Class 2

felony (720 ILCS 5/18-1(c) (West 2014)), would be subject to a maximum of

only four years of probation (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(d) (West 2014)), rather than

the mandatory five years imposed on a minor for the same offense. However,

what respondent overlooks is that, while an adult offender may receive a four-

25 No. 1-15-2504

year probation term instead of a prison term (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-15(a)(1) (West

2014)), the adult offender still faces the possibility of three to seven years of

incarceration, followed by a mandatory supervised release term of two years

upon release from imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a), (l) (West 2014).

While a juvenile offender may be committed to the Department of Juvenile

Justice for the same time period "for which an adult could be committed for the

same act" (705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2014)), the juvenile offender still does

not face adult incarceration 8 and thus the minor's sentence is inherently less

harsh. Cf. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,

(1971) (White, J.,

concurring) ("the consequences of adjudication are less severe than those

flowing from verdicts of criminal guilt"); In re Rodney H.,

(2006) (unlike an adult proceeding, the purpose of a juvenile proceeding is to

protect, not punish, the minor).

¶ 63 In sum, we are not persuaded that a juvenile robber is treated more

harshly than an adult robber, (1) where the juvenile probation is only one year

longer than the maximum probation for an adult; (2) where a minor cannot be

committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice for a longer term than an adult

could be incarcerated for the same offense, and (3) where juvenile commitment 8 If the State files a petition to designate a juvenile proceeding as an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution, then a minor could face a possible sentence of adult incarceration. 705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2014). However, that was not done in this case and so is not an issue on this appeal. 26 No. 1-15-2504

is inherently less harsh than adult incarceration. J.F.,

(rejecting a minor defendant's argument that the five-year mandatory

probation requirement violates equal protection by imposing a longer probation

term on juveniles than on adults); Edgar C.,

, ¶¶ 151-

52 (same).

¶ 64 For these reasons, we do not find either of respondent's constitutional

claims persuasive.

¶ 65 III. Probation Condition

¶ 66 Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

ordering that respondent maintain a "C average" in school as a condition of his

probation.

¶ 67 A. Forfeiture

¶ 68 As an initial matter, the State argues that respondent forfeited this issue

by failing to raise it in the trial court. In his reply brief, respondent

acknowledged that he failed to raise the issue, but asks this court to consider it

under the second prong of the plain error doctrine.

¶ 69 As we observed above, to preserve a sentencing issue for appellate

review, an adult offender must object both at the sentencing and in a subsequent

posttrial motion. People v. Pryor,

("To

preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review a defendant must both object at

27 No. 1-15-2504

sentencing and raise the issue in a postsentencing motion." (citing People v.

Hillier,

(2010), and People v. Easley,

)).

¶ 70 However, a minor respondent is excused from the requirement of raising

an issue in a posttrial motion and thus is required to object only at the

sentencing itself in order to preserve a sentencing issue for appellate review. In

re Samantha V.,

, 368 (2009) ("a minor must object at trial to

preserve a claimed error for review," although "minors are not required to file a

postadjudication motion"). In the instant case, respondent failed to object even

at sentencing and, unlike his equal protection claim which we discussed above,

this is not a constitutional issue which may be excused from forfeiture. In re

J.W.,

(a constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at

any time). Thus, the State is correct, and the issue is forfeited.

¶ 71 Although the issue is forfeited, we may still consider it under the plain

error doctrine.

¶ 72 B. Plain Error Doctrine

¶ 73 Defendant seeks review under the second prong of the plain error

doctrine.

¶ 74 When a defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, we may still

review the matter for plain error. People v. Piatkowski,

, 562-63

28 No. 1-15-2504

(2007). "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed

although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." Ill. S. Ct. R.

615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967).

¶ 75 "[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider

unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is

so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice

against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of

the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process,

regardless of the closeness of the evidence." Piatkowski,

;

People v. Wright,

.

¶ 76 Defendant challenges the probation condition under the second prong,

which requires us to find that the error is so serious that it challenges the

integrity of the judicial process. Piatkowski,

; Wright,

, ¶ 101. The first step of any plain error review is to

determine whether any error occurred at all. People v. Thompson,

(2010) (citing People v. Walker,

(2009)).

29 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 77 C. Standard of Review

¶ 78 This court will review a trial court's selection of a disposition for a

juvenile offender only for an abuse of discretion. In re Gennell C.,

; In re Seth S.,

(2009).

¶ 79 At a sentencing hearing in a delinquency case, the trial court must

determine whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public for the

minor to be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2014); In

re Seth S.,

. If the minor is to be made a ward of the

court, then the trial court must determine the disposition which best serves the

interests of both the minor and the public. 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2014);

In re Seth S.,

. In making this determination, the trial

court may rely on any evidence that it considers helpful, "to the extent of its

probative value, even though [it is] not competent for the purposes of the trial,"

including any oral or written reports. 705 ILCS 405/5-705(1) (West 2014); In re

Seth S.,

.

¶ 80 When we review this determination, we will reverse only for an abuse of

discretion, which occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful

or unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by

the trial court. In re Gennell C.,

.

30 No. 1-15-2504

¶ 81 D. Probation Condition

¶ 82 The Act provides, in relevant part, that the trial court may order the

juvenile offender, as part of his or her probation, to "pursue a course of study,"

to "attend school," and to "comply with other conditions as may be ordered by

the court." 705 ILCS 405/5-715(2)(c), (j), (u) (West 2014). When crafting

these "other conditions," the trial court must strive to:

"provide an individualized assessment of each *** adjudicated delinquent

juvenile, in order to rehabilitate and to prevent further delinquent

behavior through the development of competency in the juvenile

offender. As used in this Section, 'competency' means the development of

educational *** skills which enable a minor to mature into a productive

member of society." 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c) (West 2014).

Pursuant to the above language in the statute, the question is whether the trial

court abused its discretion in determining that this minor's "individualized

assessment" should include maintaining a C average in school, so that he could

develop the "educational *** skills" needed to "enable" him "to mature into a

productive member of society." 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c) (West 2014).

¶ 83 Respondent argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering

him to maintain a C average because, despite the respondent's best efforts and

through no fault of his own, he could violate this condition. Respondent claims

31 No. 1-15-2504

that his case is different from In re M.L.K.,

(1985), where

the appellate court rejected a minor's challenge to having to maintain a C

average as a condition of probation. The M.L.K. court also rejected the

argument that the minor could fail to meet this condition "through no fault of

his own" and "despite his best efforts." M.L.K.,

.

Respondent argues that his case is different because the M.L.K. court

interpreted the condition in M.L.K. as "simply requiring the respondent to make

all reasonable efforts to maintain a 'C' average." M.L.K.,

.

In contrast, respondent argues that there is nothing in his probation order which

limits the condition to "reasonable efforts." M.L.K.,

.

¶ 84 As respondent observed in his briefs to this court, he earns A's and B's in

school, he desires to attend college, and "maintaining good grades has never

been a problem for [him]." In the presentence report, the probation officer

stated that the minor had provided the officer with his grades and that the

"minor has A's and B's." In addition, the officer reported that respondent's

father had shown the officer "multiple medals the minor has earned from honor

roll to the A-Team Scholar and for football and basketball." According to the

minor and his parents, he has no physical or mental health issues, no drug use

and no gang affiliation. In the presentence report, the minor described his

32 No. 1-15-2504

relationship with his parents as "perfect" and "stated that his parents take the

time to talk to him and give him advice."

¶ 85 In light of the minor's reported grades of A's and B's, his lack of mental

or physical health issues, and his supportive family, we cannot say that the trial

court abused its discretion in ordering the minor to maintain a C average, in

order to ensure that he develops the individual skills needed to grow into a

productive adult. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(c) (West 2014). Thus, we do not find

that the trial court committed any error. Even if we were to find an abuse of

discretion, we could not find that ordering an A-and-B student to maintain a C

average challenges the integrity of the judicial process. Piatkowski,

; Wright,

.

¶ 86 Discretion is built into the juvenile system to alleviate concerns that a

minor will be punished "through no fault of his own" and "despite his best

efforts." M.L.K.,

. If a respondent violates a condition of

probation, his probation officer has the discretion, with the concurrence of the

officer's supervisor, to serve the minor instead with a notice of intermediate

sanctions. 705 ILCS 405/5-720(7) (West 2014). The notice will list "the

technical violation or violations involved, the date or dates of the violation or

violations, and the intermediate sanctions to be imposed," which the minor may

accept or reject. 705 ILCS 405/5-720(7) (West 2014). "Upon successful

33 No. 1-15-2504

completion of the intermediate sanctions, a court may not revoke probation

***." 705 ILCS 405/5-720(7) (West 2014). Even if there is a probation

revocation hearing, the minor may ask the trial court to "reduce[]" the condition

and the trial court has the authority to do so. 705 ILCS 405/5-720(5) (West

2014). We understand the M.L.K. court to be referring to provisions such as

these when it stated that "noncompliance on reasonable grounds will be

permitted" and when it "read the court's order as simply requiring the

respondent to make all reasonable efforts to maintain a 'C' average." M.L.K.,

.

¶ 87 CONCLUSION

¶ 88 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the adjudication of wardship and the

sentence and order the adjudication order corrected.

¶ 89 Affirmed; adjudication order corrected.

¶ 90 JUSTICE LAMPKIN, specially concurring.

¶ 91 I concur in the judgment only.

34