Opinion filed April 27, 2016 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2016

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-14-0418 v. ) Circuit No. 13-CF-1893 ) PHILLIP A. STRONG, ) Honorable ) Carla Alessio-Policandriotes, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE O'BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Lytton and McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion. _____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Phillip A. Strong, challenges the imposition of certain monetary assessments

against him following his conviction for aggravated driving while license suspended. We find

that fines totaling $150 were improperly levied against defendant, and vacate those fines.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 Defendant was found guilty by a jury of aggravated driving while license suspended (625

ILCS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2012)). On April 25, 2014, the trial court sentenced defendant to a

term of four years' imprisonment. In announcing defendant's sentence, the trial court made no mention of fines, stating only that "[j]udgment enters for costs of prosecution." Similarly, the

court made no mention of fines in its written sentencing order.

¶4 Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the trial court

denied on May 19, 2014. Defendant filed a notice of appeal the next day. A sheet detailing

various monetary assessments (fines and fees sheet) appears in the record, dated July 17, 2014.

The fines and fees sheet lists 20 monetary assessments imposed against defendant. It does not

bear a judicial signature.

¶5 ANALYSIS

¶6 On appeal, defendant does not challenge his conviction, but disputes the imposition of

fines against him. Specifically, defendant contends that the imposition of those fines is void

because: (1) at the time the fines were apparently imposed, the trial court no longer had

jurisdiction, and (2) the circuit clerk does not have the authority to impose fines.

¶7 Initially, defendant has identified seven assessments from the fines and fees sheet that are

classified as fines. Those assessments are: a $20 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund

assessment, a $50 court systems fee, a $10 arrestee's medical costs fund assessment, a $15 State

Police Operations Assistance Fund assessment, a $15 drug court fee, a $30 Children's Advocacy

Center assessment, and a $10 State Police Services Fund assessment. Each of the assessments

identified by defendant is, indeed, a fine. People v. Johnson,

,

(appendix) (collecting cases). These fines total $150.

¶8 It is well settled that the imposition of fines is a judicial act, and that a circuit clerk

therefore does not have the authority to impose fines. E.g., People v. Alghadi,

. Fines imposed by circuit clerks are "void from their inception." Id.; see also

People v. Nelson,

. A void order may be attacked at any time.

2 People v. Thompson,

(2004). We therefore vacate the $150 in fines imposed

by the circuit clerk.

¶9 We note that the State argues that our supreme court's decision in People v. Castleberry,

, which abolished the void sentence rule, renders the fines in this case merely

voidable, rather than void. Thus, the State argues that defendant has forfeited review of the

present issue by his failure to preserve it at the trial level.

¶ 10 The void sentence rule, abolished by Castleberry, held that a sentence not conforming to

statute was void. Id. ¶ 1. In abolishing the rule, the Castleberry court made clear that the issue

of voidness is purely a jurisdictional question. Id. ¶ 15. In other words, a judgment is only void

where the court entering that judgment has done so without jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 11 In the present case, contrary to the State's argument, defendant does not argue voidness

based upon a theory of nonconformity with statute. The abolition of the void sentence rule,

therefore, is of no import to this case. Instead, defendant correctly argues that the fines are void

because they were not imposed by the trial court at all, but by a circuit clerk acting without

authority. Moreover, even if the fines had been imposed by the trial court, the imposition of the

fines occurred almost two full months after defendant filed his notice of appeal. After 30 days

had elapsed following the court's denial of defendant's motion to reconsider sentence, the trial

court was divested of its jurisdiction to modify the sentence in any way. See People v. Flowers,

(2003).

¶ 12 The voidness in the present case stems from jurisdictional deficiencies—if the trial court

did not have jurisdiction to impose fines, it follows a fortiori that the circuit clerk could not do

so. Accordingly, under Castleberry, the imposition of fines in this case was void. Castleberry,

.

3 ¶ 13 CONCLUSION

¶ 14 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is vacated in part.

¶ 15 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

4