No. 1-15-2402 Opinion filed November 2, 2016

Third Division ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

LAURETTA GRADY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 14 CH 20233 ) THE ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF ) Honorable HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES ) Mary L. Mikva, and JULIE HAMOS, Its Director, ) Judge, presiding. ) Defendants-Appellees. ) ) ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff Lauretta Grady appeals from the dismissal with prejudice of her complaint

seeking judicial review of an administrative decision nominally rendered by the Illinois

Department of Human Services (DHS) regarding her eligibility for a Medicaid program. In

her complaint, plaintiff named the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services

(DHFS) and its director, Julie Hamos, as defendants but not DHS or that agency’s head. On

appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her complaint for failure to 1-15-2402

name required parties, arguing that DHFS has the statutory authority to determine questions

of Medicaid eligibility and consequently was the proper defendant. Alternatively, she

contends that if she failed to name the proper parties she was entitled to amend her complaint

to correct the error, pursuant to subsection 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law (735

ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014)). For the reasons that follow, we find plaintiff failed to name

the proper defendant in her complaint but was entitled to amend her complaint. We reverse

and remand.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Plaintiff participates in the Home Services Plan, a program intended to prevent

unnecessary institutionalization of individuals, pursuant to the Traumatic Brain Injury

Medicaid Waiver Program. As part of the plan, participants take part in regular reassessments

to determine their continued eligibility and needs. Following a reassessment in June 2014,

plaintiff was assigned a plan that granted her 155 hours of medical services per month.

¶4 Subsequently, plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of the plan, seeking additional

hours for an assistant to aid with certain therapies prescribed by her doctor. An

administrative hearing was held before an officer of DHS, and the officer recommended a

new service plan with marginally increased hours. The caption atop the officer’s written

decision stated “STATE OF ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,” and the

decision’s first paragraph indicated that the officer was a hearing officer for “the Department

of Human Services *** Bureau of Hearings.” The officer later noted that “the Department of

Human Services has jurisdiction” over the administrative appeal. The decision’s final page

was signed by Michelle R.B. Saddler, the secretary of DHS at the time, and indicated that

Saddler was adopting the findings and recommendations of the hearing officer. The decision

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was sent to plaintiff with a cover letter, signed by Saddler and indicating that the “Illinois

Department of Human Services reviewed” her appeal.

¶5 Alleging that the increased hours were still insufficient, plaintiff appealed the

administrative decision in a complaint filed in the Cook County circuit court on December

18, 2014. The complaint did not name DHS or Saddler as defendants; instead, it named

DHFS and its then-director, Hamos. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint without

leave to amend, arguing that DHS was a necessary party because it had issued the decision to

be reviewed. Plaintiff responded that DHFS was the agency responsible under the law for

rendering the decision to be reviewed and thus was the correct party. She also argued

alternatively that the court was required to grant her 35 days to serve the correct defendant

and that any mistake should be excused as a “good faith” error.

¶6 Before the trial court made its ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Appellate Court,

Fourth District, rendered its decision in Mannheim School District No. 83 v. Teachers’

Retirement System,

, holding that subsection 3-107(a) of the

Administrative Review Law does not require leave to amend a complaint “to include the

agency that rendered the final decision as a defendant when an individual member of that

agency was not named.” Id. ¶ 28. Defendants were granted leave to cite Mannheim as

additional authority, and plaintiff responded that the case was wrongly decided. In a written

order, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, stating that plaintiff’s failure to

name DHS was fatal to her claim. The court also denied plaintiff leave to amend, explaining

that although it agreed that Mannheim was wrongly decided, it was bound by the Fourth

District’s holding.

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¶7 ANALYSIS

¶8 Plaintiff first contends that defendants were properly named in her suit because the

Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2014)) requires the agency

“having power under the law to make administrative decisions” to be named as defendant.

Citing Gillmore v. Illinois Department of Human Services,

(2006), she argues

that “power under the law” refers solely to power under the relevant statute and that DHFS

has the statutory authority to determine Medicaid eligibility. Defendants respond that the

Administrative Review Law requires that the agency that actually issued a ruling be named

as defendant. They argue that it is clear from the record that DHS issued the determination in

question and thus DHS should have been named as defendant.

¶9 Where the circuit court has granted a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to section 2-619 of

the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2014)), as occurred in this case, our

review is de novo. Rodriguez v. Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n,

(2006). Plaintiff

raises matters of statutory interpretation, which are similarly reviewed de novo. Skaperdas v.

Country Casualty Insurance Co.,

.

¶ 10 When construing a statute, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent through giving the statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning.

People v. Lloyd,

. If the language is clear and unambiguous, a court

may not deviate from that language by inferring exceptions or conditions that the General

Assembly did not set forth. Wilkins v. Williams,

. However, statutory

interpretation “cannot always be reduced to ‘the mechanical application of the dictionary

definitions of the individual words and phrases involved.’ ” People v. Wood,

(2008) (quoting Whelan v. County Officers’ Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d

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555, 558 (1994)). A court should not read language in an excessively literal fashion such that

it produces an absurd construction. See

.

¶ 11 The Administrative Review Law governs all proceedings in which a party seeks judicial

review of an administrative eligibility decision under article V of the Illinois Public Aid Code

(305 ILCS 5/5-1 (West 2014)). Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d at 314; see also 305 ILCS 5/11-8.7 (West

2014). Subsection 3-107(a) of the Administrative Review Law requires that “in any action to

review any final decision of an administrative agency, the administrative agency and all

persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the

administrative agency shall be made defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014).

¶ 12 Section 3-101 of the Administrative Review Law sets forth the applicable definitions.

735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2014). “Administrative agency” is defined as “a person, body of

persons, group, officer, board, bureau, commission or department (other than a court or

judge) of the State, or of any political subdivision of the State or municipal corporation in the

State, having power under law to make administrative decisions.” Id. The Administrative

Review Law defines an “administrative decision” as “any decision, order or determination of

any administrative agency rendered in a particular case, which affects the legal rights, duties

or privileges of parties and which terminates the proceedings before the administrative

agency.” Id.

¶ 13 The Administrative Review Law clearly requires that when an individual seeks review of

an administrative agency decision, that agency must be named as a defendant. The only

natural reading of subsection 3-107(a) indicates that the phrase “the administrative agency”

that is the subject of the subsection’s requirement refers to the same entity as the phrase “an

administrative agency,” which occurs in the prepositional phrase immediately preceding it.

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See 305 ILCS 5/11-8.7 (West 2014). We must therefore conclude that “the administrative

agency” required by statute to be named a defendant is the agency that issued the challenged

decision. We note that a contrary conclusion could lead to the highly impractical result of an

agency being required to defend a decision which it took no part in making.

¶ 14 It is clear from the record that the decision plaintiff seeks to review was issued by DHS

and not DHFS. The proceedings were held before a DHS hearing officer, and the decision

itself clearly designated the DHS as the issuing body. The decision was sent to plaintiff along

with a letter indicating that her case had been reviewed by DHS. There is nothing in the

record that suggests that DHFS took any part in the challenged decision. Accordingly, DHS

was required to be named as defendant.

¶ 15 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Review Law defines an administrative agency as

an entity “having power under the law to make administrative decisions” and therefore the

administrative agency referred to in subsection 3-107(a) must be an agency having power

under the law to make the challenged administrative decisions. She then discusses at length

the legislative history of DHFS in arguing that the agency has the power under the law to

issue Medicaid eligibility decisions. In so arguing, plaintiff relies on our supreme court’s

opinion in Gilmore.

¶ 16 In Gilmore, the plaintiff sought review of a DHS decision finding her eligible for

Medicaid benefits but imposing a penalty based upon a rule promulgated by the Illinois

Department of Public Aid (DPA), the state Medicaid agency at the time. Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d

at 304-06. The decision was signed by the DHS secretary and the DPA director and included

a cover letter stating that it was the decision of DHS and DPA. Id. at 310. Before addressing

the merits of plaintiff’s appeal, the supreme court briefly addressed DHS’s contention that

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the case must be dismissed because plaintiff had not served a copy of the complaint on DPA.

Id. at 313-15. The supreme court reviewed the Illinois Public Aid Code (305 ILCS 5/12-1 et

seq. (West 2002)) applicable at the time and held that DHS had the power under the law to

determine eligibility issues. Gilmore, 218 Ill. 2d at 313-15. The court explained that where

two agencies share the power to render an administrative decision, both must be made

defendants in a suit for judicial review. Id. at 314. However, noting that only DHS “had the

power to decide” plaintiff’s Medicaid eligibility, the court ruled that DPA had only endorsed

DHS’s decision pursuant to federal regulations and was therefore not a required party. Id. at

314-15.

¶ 17 We find Gilmore distinguishable from the current case. In that case, the plaintiff had

named only one of two agencies indicated on an administrative decision, and thus our

supreme court considered which of the two agencies was responsible for the decision that

both had clearly approved. In this case, there is no question of which agency rendered the

challenged decision, and therefore the analysis used by the supreme court in Gilmore is

inapposite. Accordingly we need not consider which agency ultimately had the statutory

power to address plaintiff’s eligibility. 1

¶ 18 Plaintiff also argues that her case should not have been dismissed because DHS was

acting as an agent of DHFS based upon an interagency delegation of power. See 735 ILCS

5/3-107(a) (West 2014) (“No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an *** agent ***, where the administrative

agency *** has been named as a defendant ***.”) However, this agency argument was not

raised before the trial court and is therefore forfeited. See Mabry v. Boler, 2012 IL App (1st)

1 We note, as the trial court did below, that if plaintiff truly sought to challenge defendants’ ability to render a decision as to her eligibility, she could have named DHS as defendant and challenged the decision as void. See, e.g., Crittenden v. Cook County Comm’n of Human Rights,

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111464, ¶ 15 (“Generally, arguments not raised before the circuit court are forfeited and

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

¶ 19 Plaintiff contends alternatively that the trial court erred in denying her request for leave to

amend her complaint and add DHS as a defendant, arguing that the language of subsection 3-

107(a) of the Administrative Review Law clearly mandates that plaintiff be allowed to

amend her complaint to add unnamed parties. Acknowledging that this argument is contrary

to the Fourth District’s recent opinion in Mannheim, plaintiff argues that this court should

reject the opinion as wrongly decided. The State responds that Mannheim was correctly

decided and that the complaint could only be amended to add an agency defendant if the head

of that agency was originally named as a defendant.

¶ 20 Subsection 3-107(a) is comprised of three paragraphs. The first, previously discussed,

sets forth the parties that must be made defendants in an action for judicial review of an

administrative decision, as well as the method of service required. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a)

(West 2014). The second paragraph states:

“No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or

her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government

entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has

been named as a defendant as provided in this Section. Naming the director or agency

head, in his or her official capacity, shall be deemed to include as defendant the

administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that the named

defendants direct or head. No action for administrative review shall be dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction based upon the failure to name an administrative agency, board,

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committee, or government entity, where the director or agency head, in his or her

official capacity, has been named as a defendant as provided in this Section.”

Finally, the third paragraph, at issue in the case at bar, indicates:

“If, during the course of a review action, the court determines that an agency or a

party of record to the administrative proceedings was not made a defendant as

required by the preceding paragraph, then the court shall grant the plaintiff 35 days

from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed agency or

party as a defendant. The court shall permit the newly served defendant to participate

in the proceedings to the extent the interests of justice may require.”

¶ 21 The Appellate Court, Fourth District, recently considered subsection 3-107(a)’s third

paragraph in Mannheim under facts similar to the case at bar. In that case, the plaintiff sought

judicial review of a decision by the Board of Trustees of the Teachers’ Retirement System of

Illinois but failed to name the agency or its head as defendant. Mannheim,

. The trial court dismissed the complaint and denied the plaintiff’s motion to

amend it to include the proper defendants. Id. ¶ 7. The Fourth District held that the plaintiff

was not entitled to amend its complaint, finding that the “strict language” of subsection 3-

107(a) specifies that a plaintiff is only allowed to amend in the circumstances laid out in the

subsection’s second paragraph: “(1) the individual employee, agent, or member who acted in

his or her official capacity can be added when the plaintiff has named the administrative

agency, board, committee, or government entity ‘as provided in this section’; or (2) the

administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity can be added when the

plaintiff has named the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, ‘as provided in

this section.’ ” Id. ¶ 22 (quoting 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2012)).

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¶ 22 Plaintiff did not name DHS or its secretary as defendant in her complaint; thus under the

reasoning of Mannheim, she would not be entitled to add either entity as a defendant.

However, we decline to follow Mannheim for the following reasons.

¶ 23 First, it is clear that the Fourth District found that the reference to “the preceding

paragraph” in subsection 3-107(a)’s third paragraph was intended to direct the reader to the

subsection’s second paragraph because the court limited the subsection’s mandate to allow

amendment to the circumstances described in that paragraph. Although we acknowledge that

the court’s understanding of the phrase is a plausible reading of the statute, we do not agree

that it is the best or most natural reading. In statutory interpretation, a reviewing court must

view each phrase or part of the legislation in the context of the statute as a whole. Ultsch v.

Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund,

(2007). The phrase “the preceding

paragraph” by itself could be read to mean the immediately preceding paragraph; however,

the statute indicates that the preceding paragraph in question requires that “an agency or a

party of record to the administrative proceedings” be made a defendant. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a)

(West 2014). Of the two paragraphs that precede this language, only the subsection’s first

paragraph details which parties are required to be named defendant.

By contrast, the

second paragraph sets forth no requirements but indicates two situations in which unnamed

parties cannot be the basis for a dismissal and therefore are not required to be named. See

Thus, we find that the legislature intended “the preceding paragraph” to refer to the

subsection’s initial paragraph, despite it not being immediately prior. Consequently, the third

paragraph’s mandate to allow amendments is not limited to the circumstances described in

the second paragraph, as the Fourth District held.

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¶ 24 This reading of “the preceding paragraph” is supported by an examination of the

legislative history of the statute. In 1995, subsection 3-107(a) consisted of only two

paragraphs, with the first paragraph being substantially similar to the current first paragraph’s

description of required parties and the second paragraph being substantially similar to the

current third paragraph. 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 1996). In 1996, the legislature amended

the subsection’s first paragraph, adding the language that currently constitutes the

subsection’s second paragraph; however, the subsection remained as two paragraphs. See

735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 1998). Thus, prior to 2008, the phrase “the preceding paragraph”

clearly referred to the statute’s first paragraph explaining the required parties. However, in

2008, the legislature amended the statute again, adding two sentences regarding service to the

first paragraph and reformatting the subsection into its current three paragraphs. See 735

ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2010). This reformatting resulted in the phrase “the preceding

paragraph” being distanced from its original referent, but there is no indication that this

stylistic restructuring was intended to substantively alter the phrase’s meaning.

¶ 25 Moreover, we note that appellate courts are not permitted to interpret statutory language

in a manner that renders any part of the statute “redundant” or “superfluous.” Citizens

Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A.,

. If the phrase “the

preceding paragraph” is read to limit the ability to amend to the situations found in the

second paragraph, then the third paragraph is rendered superfluous. The second paragraph of

the subsection states that naming the head of an administrative agency as a defendant “shall

be deemed to include as defendant the administrative agency.” 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West

2014). Additionally the second paragraph states that a case cannot be dismissed under either

of the circumstances listed.

Accordingly, it would be unnecessary to add a party already

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“deemed” to be included or to amend the complaint in circumstances that cannot lead to a

dismissal. If the third paragraph is limited by the second paragraph, as the Mannheim court

found, then a plaintiff is only permitted to amend the complaint in situations where

amendment would be unnecessary. Such a reading would impermissibly render the paragraph

superfluous.

¶ 26 Subsection 3-107(a) mandates that if a court determines that a plaintiff has failed to name

an agency or party of record as a defendant “then the court shall grant the plaintiff 35 days

from the date of the determination in which to name and serve the unnamed agency or party

as a defendant.”

As we find this mandate is not limited to the circumstances included in

the subsection’s second paragraph, plaintiff was entitled to amend her complaint within 35

days from the date the trial court determined that DHS was a required party. We therefore

reverse the judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and

remand the case to the circuit court to allow plaintiff 35 days to amend her complaint to

name the required defendants and serve them.

¶ 27 CONCLUSION

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we find that plaintiff failed to name the correct parties as

defendants in her complaint under the Administrative Review Law but was entitled to the

opportunity to amend her complaint to name the proper parties pursuant to subsection 3-

107(a). 735 ILCS 5/3-107(a) (West 2014). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

circuit court of Cook County and remand the case to allow plaintiff to amend her complaint.

¶ 29 Reversed and remanded with directions.

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