Korner v. Madigan

Appellate Court of Illinois
Korner v. Madigan, 2016 IL App (1st) 153366 (2016)
69 N.E.3d 892

Korner v. Madigan

Opinion

2016 IL App (1st) 153366

No. 1-15-3366

December 20, 2016

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

LINDY KORNER, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) Of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellant, )

)

v. ) No. 14 CH 3223 ) LISA MADIGAN, in her official capacity as ) The Honorable Attorney General of Illinois; MANUEL ) Mary L. Mikva, FLORES, in his official capacity as Acting ) Judge Presiding. Secretary of the Illinois Department of ) Financial and Professional Regulation; JAY ) STEWART, in his official capacity as Division ) Director of the Illinois Department of ) Professional Regulation; and SARAH PRATT, ) In her official capacity as Public Access ) Counselor for the Illinois Attorney General’s ) Office, ) ) Defendants-Appellees. )

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Lindy Korner sent the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation

(IDFPR) a Freedom of Information Act request for documents in June 2013. After IDFPR No. 1-15-3366

denied the request, Korner, in February 2014, filed a complaint, naming several individual

state officials as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that

Korner failed to name a public body as a defendant. The trial court denied the motion, but

entered judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of a statutory amendment, effective

December 31, 2013, that instructed IDFPR not to release information of the kind Korner

sought. Korner claims on appeal that the amendment does not apply to her request.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Korner sent complaints to IDFPR, accusing Michael Podell, William Fischer, and Laurie

McCauley, all veterinarians, of unprofessional conduct in the course of their treatment of

Korner’s dog. IDFPR acknowledged receipt of Korner’s complaints in February 2010. On

April 24, 2012, IDFPR informed Korner that it had dismissed the complaint against Podell.

¶4 On June 24, 2013, Korner sent IDFPR a request under the Freedom of Information Act

(Illinois FOIA) (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2012)) for the “entire investigative file” for the

proceedings on her complaints. IDFPR denied the request.

¶5 In August 2013, the Illinois General Assembly passed an act that amended the Veterinary

Medicine and Surgery Practice Act of 2004 (Veterinary Practice Act) (225 ILCS 115/1 et

seq. (West 2014)). The amendment provided:

“All information collected by the Department in the course of an examination or

investigation of a licensee or applicant, including, but not limited to, any

complaint against a licensee filed with the Department and information collected

to investigate any such complaint, shall be maintained for the confidential use of

2

No. 1-15-3366

the Department and shall not be disclosed” Pub. Act 98-33 § 10 (adding 225

ILCS 115/25.2a).

The amendment made December 31, 2013, its effective date.

¶6 On February 24, 2014, Korner filed a complaint naming as defendants, “LISA

MADIGAN, in her official capacity as Attorney General of Illinois; MANUEL FLORES, in

his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the Illinois Department of Financial and

Professional Regulation; JAY STEWART, in his official capacity as Division Director of the

Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation; and SARAH PRATT, in her

official capacity as Public Access Counselor for the Illinois Attorney General’s Office.”

Korner asked the court to issue a judgment declaring that the defendants violated Korner’s

rights under the Illinois FOIA by withholding the documents she sought. The defendants

moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds that the Illinois FOIA applies only to public

bodies, and not to individual public officers. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

¶7 Korner filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that under the law in effect when

she requested the documents from IDFPR, the defendants had a duty to send her the

documents she sought. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing

that the amended statute applied and validated the denial of Korner’s request. The trial court

held that the amended version of the Veterinary Practice Act applied to Korner’s request.

Korner conceded that if the amended statute applied, it required the court to deny her request.

The trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Korner now appeals.

3

No. 1-15-3366

¶8 ANALYSIS

¶9 The appellate court reviews de novo the order granting the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Hall v. Henn,

208 Ill. 2d 325, 328

(2003). Korner argues that the trial

court should not have applied the amended version of the Veterinary Practice Act to her

request. The defendants contend that the trial court correctly applied the amendment in force

at the time of the ruling, and that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint because

it failed to name any public body as a defendant.

¶ 10 The Illinois General Assembly patterned the Illinois FOIA after the federal FOIA, and

Illinois courts use case law construing the federal FOIA for guidance in interpreting the

Illinois FOIA. Cooper v. Department of the Lottery,

266 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1012

(1994).

¶ 11 The Illinois FOIA provides that “[e]ach public body shall make available to any person

for inspection or copying all public records.” 5 ILCS 140/3(a) (West 2012). Federal courts

have consistently held that “the Freedom of Information Act authorizes suit against federal

agencies, not against individuals.” Morpurgo v. Board of Higher Education,

423 F. Supp. 704

, 714 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Petrus v. Bowen,

833 F.2d 581

(5th Cir. 1987); Laughlin

v. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service,

117 F. Supp. 2d 997, 1000

(S.D. Cal.

2000). Because Korner named as defendants only individuals, and not any public body, the

trial court should have dismissed the complaint on the basis of the failure to name a proper

defendant. See Quinn v. Stone,

211 Ill. App. 3d 809, 811

(1991). Therefore, we hold that the

trial court did not err when it granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint.

¶ 12 Affirmed.

4

Reference

Cited By
3 cases
Status
Unpublished