Opinion filed January 23, 2017 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2017

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-14-0165 v. ) Circuit No. 09-CF-684 ) WILLIAM A. MALONE, ) Honorable ) David A. Brown, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices O’Brien and Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion. _____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The defendant, William A. Malone, appeals from the dismissal of his postconviction

petition, arguing that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance by failing to

amend the postconviction petition or withdraw as counsel.

¶2 FACTS

¶3 The defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12-

14(a)(1) (West 2008)), home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12-11(a)(2) (West 2008)), aggravated

robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-5(a) (West 2008)), and failure to register as a sex offender (730 ILCS 150/10 (West 2008)). He was sentenced respectively to natural life imprisonment, 30 years’

imprisonment, 30 years’ imprisonment, and 10 years’ imprisonment. The home invasion,

aggravated robbery, and failure to register as a sex offender sentences would all run concurrent

and would be consecutive to the sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault. On appeal, this

court affirmed his convictions, reduced his aggravated robbery sentence to 15 years, and vacated

a DNA testing fee. People v. Malone,

, ¶ 20.

¶4 The defendant subsequently filed a pro se postconviction petition, claiming: (1) his rights

were violated when the State filed multiple counts charging the same crime under different

theories, and home invasion was a lesser included offense of aggravated robbery; (2) one of the

jurors worked at the same hospital as the victim and another knew the judge; (3) the prosecutor

made improper comments to discredit the defendant and improperly vouched for the State’s

witnesses; and (4) he was not eligible for a natural life sentence because his prior sex convictions

were for criminal sexual abuse.

¶5 The trial court appointed counsel to represent the defendant, and the State filed a motion

to dismiss, arguing that none of the issues the defendant raised in his pro se petition had merit.

Postconviction counsel did not amend the defendant’s postconviction petition nor add any

affidavits or any other supporting documentation. At the hearing on the State’s motion to

dismiss, the State chose to rest on the arguments contained in their motion to dismiss.

Postconviction counsel stated that they disagreed with the argument set forth in the State’s

motion to dismiss, but would also stand on the arguments set forth in the pro se postconviction

petition. The defendant made a statement at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, which

expounded on his argument about the prosecutor’s improper comments and potential bias of the

jurors. The trial court gave the defendant the opportunity to submit further documentation of his

2 claims should he so choose. It does not appear from the record that the defendant submitted any

further documentation. The trial court took the matter under advisement and ultimately granted

the State’s motion to dismiss. Postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate. Ill. S. Ct. R.

651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).

¶6 ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, the defendant argues that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable

assistance as counsel’s representation amounted to representation “in name only.” Specifically,

the defendant argues that postconviction counsel should have either amended the postconviction

petition or moved to withdraw as counsel if he found the petition to be meritless.

¶8 A defendant’s right to postconviction counsel is wholly statutory, and, under the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2010)), a petitioner is only

entitled to reasonable assistance of counsel. People v. Mason,

.

Reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel is premised on counsel’s compliance with

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c).

Rule 651(c) provides that postconviction counsel must

file a certificate stating:

“that the attorney has consulted with petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means

or in person to ascertain his or her contentions of deprivation of constitutional

rights, has examined the record of the proceedings at the trial, and has made any

amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are necessary for an adequate

presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013).

¶9 Here, postconviction counsel did not amend the defendant’s pro se postconviction

petition. Neither the State nor the defendant’s postconviction counsel presented oral arguments at

the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, both solely relying on the arguments in their written

3 documents. Postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate, which stated that he consulted

with the petitioner, examined the record, and made any necessary amendments to the petition.

¶ 10 The defendant contends that postconviction counsel should have amended the pro se

petition. Postconviction counsel, however, is not required to amend a defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition. People v. Pace,

(2008). Ethical obligations

prevent counsel from doing so if the claims are frivolous.

If the claims are frivolous,

postconviction counsel has the option of standing on the allegations in the pro se petition or to

withdraw as counsel.

Further, the defendant does not make any recommendation as to how

counsel could have improved the petition, other than stating that counsel did not attach any

affidavits supporting the claims. “[T]here is no showing of the existence of any facts or evidence

on which such affidavits could have been founded. Absent a showing of available material for

supporting affidavits, a failure to present affidavits obviously cannot be considered a neglect by

the attorney.” People v. Stovall,

(1970). Counsel is not required to go on a

“fishing expedition” to find facts and evidence outside the record that might support the

defendant’s claims. See People v. Vasquez,

(2005).

¶ 11 Postconviction counsel filed a compliant Rule 651(c) certificate, giving rise to the

presumption that counsel complied with the rule and provided reasonable assistance. See Profit,

. The defendant has failed to rebut that presumption.

Therefore, we accept that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance in that he

reviewed the record and could not or did not need to make any amendments to the petition to

adequately present the defendant’s claims.

¶ 12 In coming to this conclusion, we reject the defendant’s contention that if postconviction

counsel could not amend the pro se petition, he should have withdrawn as counsel. Though

4 People v. Greer,

(2004), allows postconviction counsel to withdraw when

the allegations of the petition are without merit and frivolous, it does not compel withdrawal

under such circumstances.

(“the Act presents no impediment to withdrawal of counsel”).

Whether postconviction counsel stood on the pro se petition or withdrew as counsel is a

distinction without a difference. Further, we note that the trial court gave the defendant the

opportunity to present a statement at the hearing, which the defendant did. The court also

allowed the defendant to provide any further documentation prior to the court making its

decision, which the defendant failed to do. Therefore, the defendant was given the opportunity to

explain his constitutional deprivations to the trial court, as he claims he could have done had

postconviction counsel withdrawn.

¶ 13 We also reject the defendant’s reliance on People v. Shortridge,

. Postconviction counsel in Shortridge did not just fail to amend the pro se postconviction

petition or withdraw as counsel, but instead actually “confess[ed] the motion to dismiss” filed by

the State. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 6. We find Shortridge distinguishable on this

fact alone.

¶ 14 CONCLUSION

¶ 15 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 16 Affirmed.

5