SECOND DIVISION May 2, 2017

No. 1-15-0500

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County, Illinois. ) v. ) No. 14 CR 49

)

ISRAEL VEAL, ) Honorable

) Arthur F. Hill, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Hyman and Justice Pierce concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a 2014 bench trial, defendant Israel Veal 1 was convicted of several counts

arising out of his possession of a handgun, all of which merged into his armed habitual criminal

conviction, for which he was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment. Veal’s sole argument on

appeal is that the trial court erroneously denied his pretrial motion to quash arrest and suppress

evidence of the gun. Finding no error, we affirm.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Veal was charged with four counts of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, two counts of

aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and one count of armed habitual criminal after an officer

recovered a gun on Veal’s seat during a traffic stop on December 5, 2013, in Chicago. Prior to

trial, Veal moved to quash his arrest and suppress evidence of the gun.

1 The defendant’s name is alternately spelled “Israel” and “Isreal” throughout the record and the briefs. We refer to him as “Israel” as that is the name used in the notice of appeal. No. 1-15-0500

¶4 At the suppression hearing and at trial, Officer Wojciech Kanski testified to the events of

that night. Officer Kanski was assigned to the area north saturation team, which was dispatched

to violent neighborhoods where there were high incidences of shootings and gang conflicts.

Officer Kanski was on routine patrol with his partner, Officer Pelayo, in the area of 4258 West

Washington Boulevard. Officer Pelayo pulled up next to a Honda Civic at a red light, at which

time Officer Kanski observed that the rear two passengers of the car were not wearing seatbelts.

After the light changed, Officer Pelayo executed a traffic stop of the Civic. The officers pulled to

the side of the Civic after it had come to a stop, and Officer Kanski, who was next to the rear

passenger on the driver’s side, exited his vehicle and approached the Civic. As Officer Kanski

was 5 to 10 feet away from the car, he observed the rear passenger closest to him, identified in

court as Veal, making movements toward his waist, as though he was trying to cover something.

Specifically, Officer Kanski testified that Veal moved his hands towards his waist on the right

side of his body and pushed his waist down.

¶5 Upon observing Veal’s movements, Officer Kanski ordered the car’s occupants to raise

their hands for reasons of officer safety. While three of the occupants immediately complied,

Veal did not. Officer Kanski testified that Veal instead moved his hands up and down. Officer

Kanski did not did not see anything in Veal’s hands.

¶6 Officer Kanski initially ordered the driver out of the car, whereupon he patted him down,

handcuffed him, and had him stand outside behind the Civic. 2 He then ordered Veal out of the

car and opened the door for him. As Veal exited the car, Officer Kanski saw a handgun

underneath where Veal had been sitting, and he immediately secured Veal and took possession

of the weapon.

2 Officer Kanski testified that the driver was ticketed for the passengers’ seatbelt violations, but the record does not indicate if that was also the reason for the driver’s arrest.

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¶7 The trial court denied the motion to quash and suppress, finding that the seatbelt

violation, coupled with Veal’s furtive movements and his failure to comply with the officer’s

request to raise his hands, justified ordering Veal out of the car.

¶8 At trial, Officer Kanski was the sole State witness. His trial testimony echoed his

testimony at the suppression hearing. At the close of the State’s evidence, the court denied

Veal’s motion for a directed finding. Veal rested without putting on evidence, and the court

found Veal guilty on all counts, which were merged into the most serious charge of armed

habitual criminal. Following the denial of his posttrial motion, Veal was sentenced and timely

appealed.

¶9 ANALYSIS

¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is the court’s ruling on Veal’s motion to quash and suppress. A

ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to a mixed standard of review. People v. Pitman,

(2004). The trial court’s factual findings are entitled to deference, given that the

trial court is in a superior position to weigh the credibility of witnesses, and we will uphold such

findings unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

However, the

ultimate legal question of suppression is subject to de novo review.

¶ 11 Pursuant to the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, people have the right

to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; see also

People v. Jones,

(2005). Ordinarily, a search and seizure is reasonable under

the fourth amendment if supported by a warrant showing probable cause. Jones,

(citing Katz v. United States,

(1967)). But there are several exceptions to

the warrant requirement, including the circumstance where a police officer briefly stops a person

for questioning when the officer reasonably believes that person has committed, or is about to

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commit, a crime—colloquially known as a Terry stop. People v. Duran,

(citing Terry v. Ohio,

(1968)).

¶ 12 A motor vehicle stop is akin to a Terry stop (Knowles v. Iowa,

(1998)),

and as such, we analyze the reasonableness of such stops under Terry principles (Jones,

). A traffic stop is reasonable when the police have probable cause to believe that a

traffic violation has occurred. 3 People v. Reedy,

, ¶ 20 (quoting Whren

v. United States,

(1996)).

¶ 13 Here, Veal does not challenge the legality of the stop based on the fact that both Veal and

his fellow rear-seat passenger were not wearing seatbelts. See 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(a) (West

2014) (generally requiring rear-seat passengers to wear safety belts). And both parties agree that

following a lawful traffic stop police may, as a matter of course, order the driver and any

passengers out of the vehicle pending completion of the stop. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

(1977); Maryland v. Wilson,

(1997); see also People v.

Sorenson,

(2001). However, the parties dispute whether Officer Kanski’s

command for Veal to exit the car occurred while the stop was in progress. Specifically, Veal

contends that following the arrest of the driver, the stop had concluded and he was free to leave.

Thus, according to Veal, the order to step out of the car constituted a new police-citizen

encounter requiring separate justification under the fourth amendment. We disagree.

¶ 14 We have considered the question of when a traffic stop “ends” for purposes of

determining the legality of a later search of the automobile or the defendant. As a general matter,

we have held that the return of paperwork—e.g., a driver’s license, vehicle registration, or proof

of insurance—signifies the conclusion of the stop as it conveys to the driver that he is free to

3 A traffic stop may also be justified under the less exacting Terry standard of reasonable suspicion. People v. Reedy,

, ¶ 20 n.1 (collecting cases).

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leave, and any ensuing search must be supported on grounds independent of the initial violation

prompting the stop. See, e.g., People v. Cosby,

(2008); People v. Kats,

; People v. Al Burei,

(2010); People v. Miller,

(2004).

¶ 15 But Illinois courts have not squarely confronted the issue presented in this case, which is

whether a traffic stop ends when, instead of returning papers to the driver, the officers arrest or

restrain him. The closest case on point is People v. Bunch,

(2003), where,

following the arrest of the driver for failing to produce a valid driver’s license, the police asked

defendant, the front-seat passenger, to exit the car and then proceeded to question him. Although

the defendant argued that the questioning violated his fourth amendment rights, he conceded that

the officer could lawfully order him out of the vehicle.

As a result, the supreme court did not

analyze the issue here.

.

¶ 16 In considering this question, we find instructive the Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona

v. Johnson,

(2009). There, three police officers pulled over a vehicle after a

license plate check revealed that the vehicle’s registration was suspended.

. While one

officer attended to the driver and asked him to exit the vehicle, another officer questioned the

defendant, the rear-seat passenger, and eventually asked him to exit the car where she could

question him regarding his gang affiliation outside of the presence of the front-seat passenger.

. After the defendant exited, the officer patted him down and recovered a weapon; at

issue was the lawfulness of the pat down.

. The Court rejected the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ conclusion that the pat down was a separate encounter from the traffic stop and

explained that a “traffic stop of a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she is

not free to terminate the encounter with the police and move about at will.”

at 333 (citing

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Brendlin v. California,

(2007)). Accordingly, the stop does not “end” until the

police no longer need to control the scene and inform the driver (or passengers) that they are free

to leave. Johnson,

. The Court concluded that nothing occurred to convey to the

defendant that, prior to the pat-down, the stop had ended or that he was free to depart without

police permission.

.

¶ 17 We do not read Johnson to say that no traffic stop can be considered complete unless and

until the police so inform the occupants of the vehicle. Rather, we must consider the

circumstances of each case and determine whether, under those circumstances, a reasonable

person would understand that they were free to leave and the police no longer needed to control

the scene.

¶ 18 In this case, we do not believe the arrest of the driver would lead a reasonable person in

Veal’s position to believe that he was free to leave. Significantly, the stop was prompted by the

fact that neither Veal nor the other rear-seat passenger was wearing a seatbelt, which is a petty

offense subject to a fine. 625 ILCS 5/12-603.1(d) (West 2014). While Officer Kanski began the

encounter by restraining the driver, that alone did not suggest that Veal would escape ticketing.

In other words, Officer Kanski’s action of handcuffing the driver did not convey to the

passengers that they were then free to leave, particularly where two of those passengers had also

committed traffic violations.

¶ 19 In sum, because we conclude that the stop was ongoing at the time Officer Kanski

ordered Veal out of the car and because an officer may routinely order a passenger out of a car

during a lawful traffic stop (Sorenson,

), we hold that Veal’s search and seizure

did not run afoul of the fourth amendment. For this reason, we need not address the State’s

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argument in the alternative that the officer’s order to exit the car was independently supported by

a reasonable suspicion that Veal had committed a crime based on his furtive movements.

¶ 20 CONCLUSION

¶ 21 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

¶ 22 Affirmed.

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