Opinion filed July 26, 2017 _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2017

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Rock Island County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-15-0085 v. ) Circuit No. 14-CF-442 ) DARRON L. WARREN, ) Honorable ) F. Michael Meersman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE WRIGHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice McDade dissented, with opinion. _____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 Following his conviction for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver,

defendant, Darron L. Warren, filed a notice of appeal on January 27, 2015. The notice of appeal

identified the judgment order entered on January 27, 2015, as the only order subject to

defendant’s notice of appeal.

¶2 On March 27, 2015, the circuit clerk prepared a written summary of the monetary

consequences resulting from defendant’s conviction. In this appeal, defendant requests our court

to review and vacate portions of the circuit clerk’s data entries placed in the record on March 27, 2015, subsequent to the notice of appeal filed in this case. Appeal dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction.

¶3 FACTS

¶4 A jury found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver

(720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2014)) on October 31, 2014. On January 27, 2015, the trial court

sentenced defendant to serve a term of four years’ imprisonment and ordered defendant to pay

costs only. When discussing whether to set a pay date for the costs of the proceedings, the court

stated: “All monies in this case are reduced to judgment because I find you don’t have [the]

ability to pay, and Rock Island County is not a [place] where we track you down for the rest of

your life in relation to making you pay these fines and fees and costs.” Defendant filed a notice

of appeal the same day.

¶5 The written judgment order sentencing defendant to the Department of Corrections was

signed by the court on January 29, 2015, and file-stamped by the circuit clerk’s office on

January 30, 2015. The written judgment order does not address any monetary considerations.

¶6 The court signed a second written order on January 29, 2015, which was also file-

stamped by the circuit clerk’s office on January 30, 2015. The second order set out in a

preprinted form reads as follows: “It is further ordered that the defendant is ordered to pay the

costs of prosecutions herein. These fees, costs and restitution are reduced to judgment against the

defendant and are declared a lien against the defendant’s property.” Aside from a potential $250

DNA analysis fee, the second court order does not include any determination of the amount for

court costs or designate either a pay date or a date certain for the court to review defendant’s

ability to pay costs, undetermined as of the date of sentencing, after his release.

2 ¶7 Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 27, 2015, indicating that “An appeal is

taken from the Order of Judgment and Sentence” dated January 27, 2015.

¶8 A document labeled as the “Record of Judgment” in defendant’s case appears on the

record after the notice of appeal. That document, which bears a circuit court file stamp of

February 6, 2015, shows a “Total Amount of Judgment” of $729.01 and a “Judgment Entered”

date of February 6, 2015. The document does not bear a judicial signature or include a

breakdown of the amounts incorporated into the $729.01 sum total. A similar “Record of

Judgment” document appears later in the record, following this court’s scheduling order. This

document bears a stamp from the Rock Island County Recorder, which indicates a recording date

of February 9, 2015.

¶9 The final page of the common law record, entitled “Payment Status Information,”

documents the fines, costs, and fees comprising the sum total of $729.01. The top of this

document bears the computer-printed date of March 27, 2015. The fines mistakenly incorporated

into the total amount of costs include a $50 court system fine (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(c) (West

2014)), a $20 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine (725 ILCS 240/10(b) (West 2014)), a

$10 medical costs fine (730 ILCS 125/17 (West 2014)), a $5 youth diversion fine (55 ILCS 5/5-

1101(e) (West 2014)), a $5 drug court fine (55 ILCS 5/5-1101(f) (West 2014)), a $10 State

Police Services Fund fine (730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.17(b) (West 2014)), and a $15 State Police

Operations Assistance Fund fine (705 ILCS 105/27.3a(1.5), (5) (West 2014)). 1

¶ 10 To date, defendant has not voluntarily paid any portion of the $729.01 sum total of the

judgment, as determined by the clerk, or been compelled to do so. Similarly, to date, defendant

1 Though the itemized breakdown lists each assessment in shorthand without statutory references, for the convenience of the reader, we have referenced the above assessments with their full names and statutory citations for the sake of clarity.

3 has not been compelled by any supplementary order signed by the trial court compelling

defendant to pay any portion of the clerical data entries tabulating court costs.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the trial court’s order of judgment dated

January 27, 2015, the subject of the notice of appeal filed on the same date. Instead, defendant

asserts that the monetary amounts, compiled by the clerk on March 27, 2015, should be reduced

by $115. In contrast, the State argues that this court should not exercise our jurisdiction to correct

clerical entries based on the unique procedural posture of this appeal.

¶ 13 We conclude that the State’s concern about the jurisdiction of this court merits further

consideration. Defendant’s notice of appeal focuses on the court’s judgment dated January 27,

2015, but the issues presented for our review relate to the actions of the circuit clerk on

March 27, 2015. Although notices of appeal are to be construed liberally, a notice of appeal does

not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court unless it “fairly and adequately sets out the

judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the successful litigant of the nature

of the appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Smith,

(2008). In

Smith, our supreme court held that the defendant’s notice of appeal was deficient where it

referenced only the final judgment of conviction, but the claimant was attempting to appeal a

different judgment (a judgment denying the defendant’s “motion to correct sentence”) that was

entered approximately 15 months after the judgment of conviction.

. We have

serious concerns regarding whether the notice of appeal in this case allows our review of the

clerical data entries dated March 27, 2015.

4 ¶ 14 Next, we respectfully observe that the purported clerical errors at issue seem attributable

to a common misunderstanding of what constitutes a true court cost. 2 In fact, both sides to this

appeal agree that this defendant owes $115 less than the unpaid balance of court costs contained

in the clerk’s data entries.

¶ 15 With this consensus in mind, we note that an actual controversy is a necessary

prerequisite for the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. La Salle National Bank v. City of

Chicago,

(1954). Although an “actual controversy” involves multiple

variables, the United States Supreme Court astutely stated as follows:

“A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference or dispute of a

hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. [Citation.]

The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of

parties having adverse legal interests. [Citations.] It must be a real and substantial

controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character,

as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a

hypothetical state of facts.” Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,

(1937).

¶ 16 We must also consider whether “the harm that a [party] claims is merely speculative or

contingent” and if so, the case law provides “the claim is unripe and a court should not decide

it.” Smart Growth Sugar Grove, LLC v. Village of Sugar Grove,

(2007). The existence of an actual controversy incorporates a number of interconnected

principles of justiciability, such as standing, ripeness, mootness, advisory opinions, and political

2 It is apparent to this court that the circuit clerk’s staff simply misunderstood that some of the amounts included as court costs have been judicially determined to be fines. When this sentence was imposed in early 2015, neither the trial court nor the circuit clerk had guidance from this court as contained in People v. Johnson,

(appendix), identifying allowable costs.

5 questions. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v. Blagojevich,

(2008). “The related doctrines of

standing and ripeness ‘seek[ ] to insure that courts decide actual controversies and not abstract

questions.’ ” Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital,

(2010) (quoting People

v. $1,124,905 U.S. Currency & One 1988 Chevrolet Astro Van,

(1997)).

¶ 17 The quest to ascertain the precisely correct but unpaid balance of costs in this case

involves an abstract exercise of limited judicial resources that is meaningless. Even if we reduce

the clerical balance due by $115 as defendant requests, this defendant has no present ability to

pay any part of the corrected amount. Further, the trial court emphasized at the time of

sentencing that “Rock Island County is not a [place] where we track you down for the rest of

your life in relation to making you pay these fines and fees and costs.” We do not dispute the

truth of this judicial observation.

¶ 18 Significantly, as predicted by the trial judge at the time of sentencing, no one is

attempting to collect any portion of the monetary component of the sentence announced by the

trial court on January 27, 2015. When this defendant wins the lottery or inherits a large sum of

money, the correct amount of defendant’s unpaid balance may become an issue that is ripe for

our review once defendant has the ability to pay something towards the judgment. At this point,

it is entirely a matter of speculation whether defendant may develop the ability to pay and

whether the State will pursue collection efforts at that time.

¶ 19 Fighting for a victory of record, defendant relies on People v. Gutierrez,

,

to demonstrate that our supreme court exercised its judicial resources to resolve a clerical error

after rejecting a similar jurisdictional challenge by the State. We recognize the court in Gutierrez

vacated the cost of a public defender’s fee fixed by the clerk rather than the court. In so doing,

our supreme court made a reference to “void orders of the circuit clerk” (id. ¶ 14). However,

6 unlike the case at bar, the erroneous clerical “order” addressed by the court in Gutierrez appeared

of record on the same date as the judgment order subject to the notice of appeal in that case. This

fact alone distinguishes Gutierrez from the case at bar. Respectfully, it does not appear to this

court that our supreme court had an opportunity to consider ripeness or the broader issue of

justiciability in Gutierrez.

¶ 20 In addition, we are acutely aware that our supreme court has issued a fairly recent

decision clarifying the nature of truly “void” orders and judgments. See People v. Castleberry,

. Importantly, in another subsequent opinion, our supreme court carefully

explained that the holding in Castleberry narrowed the “universe” of void orders allowing fewer

decisions to become “subject to attack in perpetuity.” See People v. Price,

.

Perhaps the reference to a “void” clerical “order” in Gutierrez should be treated with caution by

reviewing courts until we receive guidance from our supreme court on Castleberry’s impact, if

any, on clerical errors that arise after the notice of appeal.

¶ 21 We also consider whether the clerical data entries dated March 27, 2015, qualify as an

order of any kind. Black’s Law Dictionary defines an order as “[a] command, direction, or

instruction,” or, alternatively, “[a] written direction or command delivered by a government

official, esp. a court or judge.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1270 (10th ed. 2014). Here, the printout

of the clerk’s tabulations does not direct, command, or instruct defendant to pay or to do

anything. Respectfully, we are unable to conclude that the data entries created by the circuit

clerk’s staff on March 27, 2015, qualify as a true order, void or otherwise.

¶ 22 Finally, we observe the “Order of Judgment,” dated January 27, 2015, which is identified

in defendant’s notice of appeal, is similar to other orders routinely signed by trial judges facing

the daily challenges of sentencing offenders lacking a present ability to pay any part of

7 skyrocketing fines and costs enacted by lawmakers to generate funds. We would be remiss if we

ignored that the sentencing order, presumably prepared by the State’s Attorney for the court’s

signature, gives a wink and a nod to the trial court’s solution to a difficult and recurring problem

by ignoring the legislatively-mandated fines when imposing a sentence on an indigent defendant

with no present ability to pay. Until the prosecutor requests a judge to sign a supplementary

order in the circuit court that specifies the precise monetary consequences of the court’s

sentence, we lack a concise judicial order that we are capable of reviewing for the first time on

appeal without considerable speculation regarding the sum total the court intended to impose.

¶ 23 This does not mean defendant is without avenues for relief to clarify his financial

obligations to the court system. Clerical miscalculations may be corrected by the circuit clerk

without any court order or directive from this court. See In re Derrico G.,

. However, to date, no one has taken any steps requesting the circuit clerk to recalculate the

amount of costs based on directions from the State’s Attorney, the county’s legal advisor. For

situations such as this, we provided guidance in People v. Johnson,

(appendix), to assist those confused about the difference between fines and costs.

¶ 24 In this appeal, defendant does not challenge any component of the court’s “Order of

Judgment” dated January 27, 2015. Hence, this appeal was initiated by the rare appellant that

was unable to find fault with the judgment order identified in the notice of appeal. In other

words, defendant is happy with the court’s written order that includes no fines, an undetermined

amount of costs for purposes of the judgment, and no firm deadline for payment of the monetary

consequences in any amount.

¶ 25 Therefore, we conclude there is no justiciable issue subject to our review at this time for

the reasons discussed at length above. Appeal dismissed.

8 ¶ 26 CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal is dismissed.

¶ 28 Appeal dismissed.

¶ 29 JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting.

¶ 30 The majority dismissed the present appeal, holding that this court does not have

jurisdiction to address the issue raised by defendant. I would find, however, that this court has

jurisdiction to vacate the fines added by the circuit clerk under the voidness doctrine. I therefore

respectfully dissent.

¶ 31 At the outset, I note the majority holds that this court lacks jurisdiction on two distinct

grounds: lack of a ripe controversy and deficiency in the notice of appeal. 3 I disagree with each

of these conclusions and will address them in turn. However, I will begin by discussing the issue

of voidness, which puts the jurisdictional analysis into a proper context.

¶ 32 I. Voidness

¶ 33 The appellate court has consistently held that fines imposed by a circuit clerk are void.

E.g., People v. Wade,

(“Because we find that some of the

assessments imposed by the circuit clerk were fines and therefore void, we vacate said fines.”);

People v. Larue,

(“Because the imposition of a fine is a judicial

act, and the circuit clerk has no authority to levy fines, any fines imposed by the circuit clerk are

void from their inception.”); People v. Carter,

; see also

Gutierrez,

.

3 The majority also makes repeated reference to defendant’s indigency and his inability to pay fines, even going so far as to suggest that defendant will need to “win[ ] the lottery or inherit[ ] a large sum of money” to pay the $115 in disputed fines. I respectfully submit that appellate court jurisdiction does not turn on an individual defendant’s financial circumstances.

9 ¶ 34 The majority suggests—without explicitly holding—that clerk-imposed fines might no

longer be considered void in light of our supreme court’s decision in Castleberry,

. In Castleberry, the court abolished the void sentence rule, holding that voidness turns

not on compliance with statute, but on whether a court has jurisdiction. Citing People v. Price,

, the majority posits that because Castleberry narrowed the “universe” of void

orders, this court ought to proceed with caution in finding voidness until the supreme court may

offer further guidance. See supra ¶ 20.

¶ 35 With all due respect to the majority, there is not an open question as to whether clerk-

imposed fines are void. Castleberry abolished the void sentence rule; it did not call on courts to

reconsider the very concept of voidness. See Price,

(“Castleberry

eliminated [a single] type of void judgment, thus narrowing the universe of judgments subject to

attack in perpetuity.”). Indeed, the appellate court has continued to hold clerk-imposed fines void

even in the aftermath of Castleberry. Wade,

; Carter,

; People v. Hible,

. As this court explained in

Wade, “[t]he fines in this case were void, not because they failed to conform with statutory

requirements, but because they were imposed not by the trial court, but by the circuit clerk.

Castleberry’s abolition of the void sentence rule, therefore, is of no consequence to the issue of

whether the fines are void.” Wade,

, ¶ 12.

¶ 36 It is well settled that a “void order may be attacked at any time or in any court, either

directly or collaterally.” People v. Thompson,

(2004). The only limit upon a

court’s ability to correct void actions is jurisdiction. As our supreme court has stated, while “a

void order may be attacked at any time, the issue of voidness must be raised in the context of a

proceeding that is properly pending in the courts. If a court lacks jurisdiction, it cannot confer

10 any relief, even from prior judgments that are void.” People v. Flowers,

(2003). The circuit clerk’s imposition of $115 in fines in this case was void. However, this court

may only confer relief—i.e., order that those fines be vacated—if this is a “proceeding that is

properly pending in the court[ ].” See

Thus, we must consider our jurisdiction.

¶ 37 II. Jurisdiction

¶ 38 The majority holds that this court does not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s

argument that the fines imposed in this case are void. The majority appears to reach that

conclusion on two distinct grounds. First, the majority finds that the matter is unripe and

therefore nonjusticiable, contending that any harm to defendant is merely speculative and

contingent until such time that he pays the fines in question or the State attempts to collect those

fines. Separately, the majority implies that a deficiency in defendant’s notice of appeal deprives

this court of jurisdiction. The implication is that because the notice of appeal predates the

imposition of fines, this court is precluded from consideration of that issue. I respectfully

disagree with each of the majority’s conclusions.

¶ 39 A. Ripeness

¶ 40 I respectfully suggest that the majority’s ripeness-based jurisdictional conclusion is

directly contradicted by our supreme court’s conclusion in Gutierrez,

. In that

case, the court explicitly held that a reviewing court has jurisdiction to address monetary

assessments that have been imposed by the circuit clerk without authority.

¶ 41 In Gutierrez, the circuit court declined to impose any fines or fees. People v. Gutierrez,

(2010). Nevertheless, the circuit clerk imposed a number of

assessments, including a $250 public defender fee.

. Though labeled a fee, it was and

is well-settled that the public defender’s fee may only be imposed by a court following notice

11 and a hearing at which the court determines the amount of the fee. E.g., People v. Love,

(1997); 725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2014) (dictating that “the court may order

the defendant” to pay reimbursement for representation (emphasis added)). The appellate court

vacated the public defender fee and remanded so that the necessary hearing could be held.

Gutierrez,

.

¶ 42 Defendant appealed to the supreme court, arguing that the appellate court’s remand was

improper. Gutierrez,

. There, for the first time, the State argued that the

appellate court lacked jurisdiction because “the [public defender] fee was ordered by the circuit

clerk rather than by the court, and the appellate court’s jurisdiction is generally limited to

reviewing final orders of the circuit court.” Id. ¶ 7. Our supreme court rejected that argument,

finding the appellate court had jurisdiction to vacate the public defender fee. Id. ¶ 14. In short,

Gutierrez stands for the proposition that, as a general matter, a defendant may challenge on

appeal assessments imposed by a circuit clerk, regardless of whether they have been adopted in

an order of the circuit court.

¶ 43 With respect to ripeness and justiciability, Gutierrez is identical to the present case in

every substantive way. In each case: (1) the circuit court did not impose the assessment in

question, (2) the circuit clerk did not have the authority to impose the assessment, (3) the circuit

clerk nevertheless imposed the assessment, (4) there was no indication that the State ever

attempted to collect the assessment at issue, and (5) the State argued that the reviewing court did

not have jurisdiction to review the assessment because it was not embodied in an order of the

circuit court. Notably, the Gutierrez court did not find ripeness to be a jurisdictional roadblock to

the defendant’s challenge of his assessments. Simply put, Gutierrez is directly on point, and the

majority’s attempt to distinguish this case from Gutierrez is wholly unconvincing.

12 ¶ 44 In fact, the only distinction the majority is able to draw between Gutierrez and the present

case concerns the timing of the notice of appeal and the imposition of the illegal assessments. In

Gutierrez, the public defender fee was imposed by the circuit clerk on the same day that the court

imposed its sentence; here, the improper fines were apparently imposed 10 days after the court

announced its sentence, 8 days after the court’s written sentencing order. 4 The majority

concludes: “This fact alone distinguishes Gutierrez from the case at bar.” Supra ¶ 19.

¶ 45 The majority’s attempt to distinguish Gutierrez conflates its ripeness-based jurisdictional

conclusion with its notice-of-appeal-based jurisdictional conclusion. To reiterate, the majority’s

first conclusion was that this court lacked jurisdiction because defendant’s claim was not ripe

because any harm based on the erroneous imposition of fines was speculative and contingent

until the State moved to collect those fines. Gutierrez refutes this position. The timing of the

notice of appeal has absolutely no bearing on whether any harm is speculative or contingent or

whether defendant’s claim is ripe. Thus, with respect to the majority’s ripeness-based

jurisdictional conclusion, this is a distinction without a difference.

¶ 46 Gutierrez is substantively identical to the present case. While the majority may disagree

with the result in that case, or wish to see it revisited, this court is nevertheless legally obligated

to follow that precedent and conclude that defendant may challenge the present assessments.

Price v. Philip Morris, Inc.,

(“ ‘Where the Supreme Court has declared the

law on any point, it alone can overrule and modify its previous opinion, and the lower judicial

tribunals are bound by such decision and it is the duty of such lower tribunals to follow such

decision in similar cases.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) (quoting Agricultural Transportation Ass’n

v. Carpentier,

(1953)).

4 The majority often references the “Payment Status Information” sheet dated March 27, 2015, as the subject of this appeal. However, the sum total found on that sheet, $729.01, first appeared on the “Record of Judgment” sheet of February 6, 2015.

13 ¶ 47 B. Notice of Appeal

¶ 48 The majority’s alternative basis for finding that this court does not have jurisdiction in the

present appeal is that defendant’s notice of appeal, filed January 27, 2015, necessarily did not

contemplate the fines that would be imposed 10 days later. Citing Smith,

, the

majority concludes that our jurisdiction is limited to issues related to the judgment cited in

defendant’s notice of appeal. 5 I would find that defendant’s notice of appeal gives this court

jurisdiction to vacate the circuit clerk’s void assessments.

¶ 49 A criminal defendant’s notice of appeal affects appellate jurisdiction in two separate

ways. First, the timely filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction upon the appellate court.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014) (“No step in the perfection of the appeal other than the

filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional.”); see People v. Lewis,

(2009)

(“A reviewing court lacks jurisdiction and is obliged to dismiss an appeal if there is no properly

filed notice of appeal.”).

¶ 50 Even after a notice of appeal has been timely filed and the appeal perfected, the notice of

appeal plays a continuing jurisdictional role. The notice of appeal must list the specific order or

judgment from which an appeal is taken. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). In turn, that

notice of appeal “confers jurisdiction on a court of review to consider only the judgments or parts

thereof specified in the notice of appeal.” Smith,

. In a criminal case, the key

jurisdictional inquiry is whether the defendant’s notice of appeal, “considered as a whole and

liberally construed, adequately identifies the complained-of judgment and informs the State of

the nature of the appeal.” Lewis,

.

5 Coincidentally, the court in Gutierrez also entertained an argument from the State based upon the defendant’s notice of appeal. See Gutierrez,

. The previously discussed distinction between Gutierrez and the present case with regard to the timing of the notice of appeal is, naturally, quite relevant to the particular issue of notice-of-appeal-based jurisdiction. Thus, Gutierrez is not binding with respect to this court’s disposition of that issue.

14 ¶ 51 Initially, I would find that defendant’s notice of appeal in the present case was sufficient

for this court to vacate the void assessments imposed by the circuit clerk. Defendant’s notice of

appeal indicated that he was appealing from the “Order of Judgment and Sentence” dated

January 27, 2015. This notice properly brought up defendant’s entire conviction for review.

Gutierrez,

. Moreover, it is well-settled that a fine is considered part of

a defendant’s sentence. People v. Jones,

(2006).

¶ 52 Considered as a whole and liberally construed, defendant’s notice of appeal would

encompass any challenges to his conviction or sentence, including any fines, that are part of his

sentence. While the circuit court did not impose any fines as part of the sentence, the circuit clerk

improperly and illegally added to defendant’s sentence by imposing fines. Though the clerk only

got around to calculating defendant’s assessments more than a week after he appealed, it would

be unreasonable to construe that against defendant. In other words: the clerk erred once in

imposing illegal fines, and essentially erred again by doing so late; the second error should not

insulate the first error from review. 6

¶ 53 Even if defendant’s notice of appeal was deemed insufficient to bring the circuit clerk’s

illegal imposition of fines under our review, I would still find that this court has jurisdiction to

vacate those fines under the voidness doctrine. That doctrine allows that relief may be conferred

where a “proceeding *** is properly pending in the courts.” Flowers,

. When

defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, the matter was properly pending before this court. Ill.

S. Ct. R. 606(d) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). Thus, we have the authority to vacate as void the fines

6 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the State was clearly not prejudiced by the discrepancy. See Lewis,

(“The failure to comply strictly with the form of the notice is not fatal if the deficiency is nonsubstantive and the appellee is not prejudiced.”). Given the glut of challenges to fines and fees that pass through the appellate court on an annual basis, the State could have been nothing if not prepared to rebut such a challenge on this appeal.

15 imposed by the circuit clerk. See, e.g., In re N.G.,

(declaring

appellant’s criminal conviction void on civil appeal from parental unfitness finding).

¶ 54 The appellate court’s jurisdiction, hinging on the contents of a notice of appeal, is issue-

specific. That is, while the filing of a notice of appeal brings a defendant’s case before this court

generally, the judgment or judgments listed in the notice limit the arguments the court may

entertain when a disposition is made. See, e.g., People v. Shaw,

,

(addressing some issues on the merits while finding a notice-of-appeal based lack of jurisdiction

as to other issues). Voidness doctrine requires only that a proceeding be properly before the

court. Indeed, the sole case the majority relies upon in reaching its conclusion on this issue,

Smith,

, did not contemplate a voidness challenge.

¶ 55 In summary, the circuit clerk’s imposition of fines where the court did not order them

was illegal and void. Gutierrez dictates that ripeness and justiciability are not jurisdictional

hurdles for defendant to challenge those assessments. Further, defendant’s notice of appeal does

not preclude this court from conferring relief. Accordingly, I would vacate the $115 in fines at

issue.

16