Interstate Funding Corp. v. Meurer (In Re Skidmore)
Interstate Funding Corp. v. Meurer (In Re Skidmore)
Opinion
*64 ¶ 1 Objector, Kenneth J. Meurer, appeals the decision of the circuit court of Lake County granting the petition of petitioner, Interstate Funding Corporation (Interstate), for a tax deed. We affirm.
¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 3 On November 18, 2013, Interstate purchased the delinquent taxes on a property in Lake County, Illinois, identified by property index number (PIN) 12-28-102-099 and commonly known as unit 309, 1301 N. Western Avenue, Lake Forest (the property). The property was a condominium owned by Meurer. The county clerk issued Interstate a certificate of sale pursuant to section 21-250 of the Property Tax Code (Code) ( 35 ILCS 200/21-250 (West 2016) ).
¶ 4 On May 25, 2016, Interstate filed a petition for a tax deed in the circuit court of Lake County. Interstate also filed a notice pursuant to section 22-5 of the Code ( 35 ILCS 200/22-5 (West 2016) ), which advised Meurer of the property's sale for delinquent taxes and the date of the expiration of the redemption period. This notice was a specimen form as prescribed by the Code, and it was prepared by the county clerk. Interstate acknowledges that it approved the notice. The county clerk filled in the PIN on the line requiring a certificate number. Interstate's subsequent notices also contained the PIN on the lines requiring a certificate number.
¶ 5 On November 18, 2016, Meurer filed an objection to the issuance of a tax deed, arguing that Interstate failed to strictly comply with the Code "in numerous instances." Meurer set forth only one vague and conclusory example, that being "the certificate number as identified on [Interstate's] take notices, which is erroneous." Interstate responded that "Lake County is the only Illinois County which does not specifically designate a number for its tax sale certificates." Thus, according to Interstate, it filled in the notices with the PIN, which appeared on the certificate of sale.
¶ 6 On February 24, 2017, the court denied Meurer's objection, and Meurer filed a motion to reconsider. Meurer argued that Interstate's use of the PIN placed "incorrect" information on the notices calling for the certificate number. The court denied that motion on April 21, 2017. Also on April 21, 2017, Interstate filed an application for an order directing the county clerk to issue a tax deed. On that date, Interstate proved up its case, 1 and the court entered the order so directing the county clerk. Meurer filed a timely notice of appeal.
¶ 7 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 8 Meurer contends that writing in the PIN instead of "not applicable" where the forms called for a certificate number was an error that precluded the issuance of a tax deed. Preliminarily, we address the state of the record. Meurer takes issue with findings that the court allegedly made at the hearing on his objection. No court reporter was present, and Meurer has not filed a bystander's report or an agreed statement of facts pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323 (eff. Dec. 13, 2005). Generally, where an appellant fails to furnish a complete record of the proceedings at trial, we will presume that the trial court's order was in conformity
*65
with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.
Foutch v. O'Bryant
,
¶ 9 We now turn to the merits. The tax-deed scheme consists, in relevant part, of a series of complex notice provisions. Section 22-5 of the Code requires a tax-sale purchaser to deliver to the county clerk within 4 months and 15 days after the tax sale a "post-sale" notice. 35 ILCS 200/22-5 (West 2016) ;
In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector
,
¶ 10 The petitioner for a tax deed must demonstrate that it strictly complied with the notice requirements of the Code.
Glohry
,
¶ 11 A reviewing court's primary objective in construing a statute is to give effect to the legislature's intent.
Flamm
,
¶ 12 Meurer argues that Interstate's section 22-5, 22-10, 22-20, and 22-25 notices were defective. He asserts that Interstate should have written "not applicable" in the space where the form requested the certificate number. Interstate responds that it strictly complied with the statute where (1) the county clerk prepared the post-sale notice, (2) it was impossible to include the certificate number on the notices because the county clerk does not issue such numbers, and (3) the notices did not contain incorrect information.
¶ 13 The Lake County State's Attorney filed an amicus brief on behalf of the county clerk and the county collector (collectively Lake County). Lake County argues that every tax-sale purchaser in the county faces this issue because the county clerk does not designate a unique number for a certificate of sale, apart from the PIN. Lake County also asserts that the notices contain no error, because all of the information contained therein is correct. Finally, Lake County urges that strict compliance is not necessary. We hold that Interstate strictly complied with the Code.
¶ 14 We begin our analysis with well-established principles. The primary purpose of Illinois's tax-deed system is to coerce tax-delinquent property owners to pay their taxes, not to assist others in depriving the owners of their property.
In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector
,
¶ 15 Meurer's argument that Interstate placed "incorrect" information on the notices by identifying the PIN as the certificate number assumes, without authority, that a county clerk cannot assign a PIN as a certificate number. Regardless of whether the county clerk expressly adopted the PIN as the certificate number, she effectively did so by placing the PIN in a prominent location on the certificate and supplying no other identifying numbers. That the county clerk filled in Interstate's post-sale notice using the PIN on the line designated for the certificate number indicates that this is the county clerk's practice. We determine that this procedure does not violate the Code.
¶ 16 Section 21-250 requires the county clerk to issue a tax-sale purchaser a "certificate of purchase countersigned by the collector." 35 ILCS 200/21-250 (West 2016). The certificate must (1) describe the property; (2) include the date of sale; (3) include the amount of taxes, special assessments, and interest and the cost for which they were sold; and (4) state that the sale price has been paid.
In re Application of the Kane County Collector
,
¶ 17 County clerks' duties with respect to collecting taxes are purely ministerial.
People ex rel. Carr v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co.
,
¶ 18 In our view, using a PIN as a certificate number is reasonable, even though it might duplicate information called for elsewhere on the notices. A PIN identifies a parcel of property for assessment and taxation purposes. 35 ILCS 200/1-120 (West 2016). Placing the PIN at the top of the certificate conveys more information more immediately than a generic number chosen at random. Using the PIN as the certificate number also provides public access, because the PIN system is open for inspection and available to the public under section 9-45 of the Code. 35 ILCS 200/9-45 (West 2016). Further, section 9-45 provides that the PIN system may be used to automate the office of the recorder. 35 ILCS 200/9-45 (West 2016). Thus, the legislature has approved of using PINs as an administrative tool.
¶ 19 The cases Meurer relies on are inapposite. In
In re Application of the County Collector
,
¶ 20 Meurer further asserts that interpreting the notices to be in strict compliance would be inconsistent with the balancing of interests manifested in the Code. The only argument Meurer advances is to paraphrase boilerplate language in
Midwest Real Estate Investment Co.
relating to the purpose of the tax-deed system. Consequently, Meurer fails to present a cohesive legal argument, and this issue is forfeited. See
Williams v. Danley Lumber Co.
,
¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.
¶ 23 Affirmed.
Justices McLaren and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.
At the prove-up, Interstate indicated that it had assigned the certificate of sale to Galaxy Sites, LLC. The court permitted Galaxy Sites, LLC, to be substituted as the petitioner, but the pleadings were never amended to reflect the change.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.