People v. Reed
Cases that cite this one
1 later published case cites this decision.
- People v. Harris (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)
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Opinion
*775 ¶ 1 After an evidentiary hearing, the Macon County circuit court denied postconviction relief to defendant, Demario D. Reed, who is serving a prison sentence of 15 years for armed violence ( 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a), 33A-3(a) (West 2014)). He appeals, arguing that newly discovered evidence he presented to the court in the postconviction hearing proved, clearly and convincingly, that he actually was innocent of armed violence despite his earlier negotiated guilty plea to that offense.
¶ 2 Because the validity of defendant's guilty plea is undisputed on appeal, we hold,
de novo
, that he remains bound by his guilty plea and that his claim of actual innocence cannot be entertained. See
People v. Pendleton
,
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In count I of the information, the State alleged that on September 23, 2014, defendant committed armed violence in that while armed with a shotgun, he knowingly possessed cocaine (an amount less than 15 grams).
¶ 5 In April 2015, defendant appeared with appointed defense counsel, who announced:
"MR. WHEELER: Judge, the defendant is going to offer to enter a plea of guilty to Count I of [Macon County case No. 14-CF-]120[5], be sentenced to the Illinois Department of Corrections for a period of 15 years. * * * The remaining charges [ (in Macon County case Nos. 14-CF-903 and 14-CF-1206) ] will be dismissed.
THE COURT: [Defendant], you heard what your attorney said. Is that your understanding of the plea agreement?
*776 *482 THE DEFENDANT: Yes."
¶ 6 The circuit court then recited count I to defendant and told him the minimum and maximum punishments for the offense it alleged, armed violence. The court further admonished him:
"THE COURT: If you plead guilty, you would be giving up your right to a trial of any kind by a judge or a jury . You would be giving up the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who would testify against you in court during your trial. By pleading guilty, you would be giving up the privilege against self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence. You would be giving up the right to subpoena witnesses to come into court to testify for you and to present any defenses you might have to this charge , and by pleading guilty, you would be giving up the right to require the [ S ] tate to prove you committed this offense beyond a reasonable doubt . Do you understand the rights you are giving up by pleading guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about your rights this morning?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: Are you telling me you wish to give up your rights and plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes." (Emphases added.)
Then, at the court's request, defendant signed a jury waiver.
¶ 7 Next, the circuit court requested a factual basis. The prosecutor responded:
"MS. DOMASH: The [S]tate would present the testimony of Officer Daniels of the Decatur Police Department. Officer Daniels would testify that he observed this defendant on September 23rd of 2014 on a porch in Decatur, Illinois. He observed the defendant flee upon sight of him. The defendant was running oddly. When he entered the house, he located a shotgun and cocaine. The defendant was located in a bedroom, and the shotgun had the defendant's DNA [ (deoxyribonucleic acid) ] on it."
¶ 8 After the prosecutor provided that factual basis, defendant confirmed to the circuit court that no one had forced him, in any way, to plead guilty and that the plea agreement was the only promise ever made to him in return for his proposed guilty plea. He also denied having any questions about his "rights, the possible sentences, or anything else." The court then asked defendant a final time:
"THE COURT: Are you telling me you wish to continue to plead guilty this morning?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes."
¶ 9 Finding a factual basis for the guilty plea to count I and further finding the guilty plea to be knowing and voluntary, the circuit court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced defendant to imprisonment for the agreed-upon term of 15 years. (The parties also had agreed to proceed immediately to sentencing, to waive a presentence investigation report, and to have the pretrial bond report stand as a prior history of criminality.)
¶ 10 In January 2016, with the circuit court's permission (see 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2016)), defendant filed a successive postconviction petition, in which he claimed to be innocent of count I, armed violence, the offense to which he had entered the negotiated guilty plea. He submitted, as proof of his innocence, an affidavit by his codefendant, Davie Callaway. In the affidavit, which was dated October 15, 2015, Callaway averred that he alone was the one who had possessed the cocaine referenced *483 *777 in count I and that defendant had been unaware the presence of the cocaine.
¶ 11 The State moved to dismiss the postconviction petition. One of the reasons the State gave for its motion was waiver. The State argued that by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty to armed violence, defendant had waived all nonjurisdictional errors, including errors of a constitutional nature.
¶ 12 The circuit court denied the State's motion for dismissal, and the petition advanced to the third stage of the postconviction proceeding, in which the parties adduced evidence for the court to weigh as the trier of fact. See
People v. Harris
,
¶ 13 On January 20, 2017, after hearing the evidence, including Callaway's testimony, the circuit court denied defendant's successive petition for postconviction relief. Although the court held that Callaway's affidavit and testimony "qualified as new evidence based on his unavailability at trial in view of his Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination" (see U.S. Const., amend. V ;
People v. Edwards
,
"The court * * * does not find that testimony of Mr. Callaway to be credible as Mr. Callaway did not come forward with this information until after he pled and he and the petitioner were in prison together. As such, the court does not find the petitioner has established a colorable claim of actual innocence."
¶ 14 This appeal followed.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the validity of his negotiated guilty plea to armed violence; he does not claim that his guilty plea was uninformed or involuntary. Rather, he claims that his guilty plea was false. He claims he really was innocent of armed violence when he solemnly declared to the circuit court that he was guilty of that offense. He cites
People v. Shaw
,
¶ 17 That leaves only one Illinois case,
People v. Barnslater
,
¶ 18 The quoted sentence is, in
Cannon
, an
obiter dictum
, an inessential remark on a point not argued by counsel (
Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital
,
¶ 19 After rejecting that sole argument by the defendant, the supreme court in Cannon added:
"We have examined the claims advanced by the defendant in his postconviction petition which were not argued in this court . They amount basically to an unsupported assertion that the accusation against him was false and that his daughter and two of his sons were coerced by threats from their mother, the defendant's wife, to refrain from asserting the defendant's innocence [to the charge of indecent liberties with a child]. Before his plea of guilty was accepted, the defendant, represented by appointed counsel, was fully and carefully admonished by the trial judge, and in the light of that admonition, the defendant's present claim cannot be entertained." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 321,263 N.E.2d 45 .
Although the quoted paragraph from
Cannon
describes the defendant's claim of actual innocence as being "unsupported," the paragraph is not, in the end, an evaluation of that claim on its evidentiary merits. Rather, the paragraph concludes that because the defendant was (1) was represented by counsel in the guilty-plea hearing and (2) fully and carefully admonished by the trial judge, his postconviction claim of actual innocence "cannot be entertained."
*779
*485
¶ 20 There is, however, a slight complication. Because the quoted paragraph of
Cannon
could be "sloughed off without damaging the analytical structure of the opinion" and because it is an aside on a point not argued by counsel, it is, as we said, an
obiter dictum
. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Exelon Corp. v. Department of Revenue
,
¶ 21 The question, then, is whether there is a "contrary decision" of the supreme court-a decision holding that a postconviction claim of actual innocence
can
be entertained after a valid guilty plea.
Exelon
,
¶ 22 While so concluding, we acknowledge that in
People v. Washington
,
"We believe that no person convicted of a crime should be deprived of life or liberty given compelling evidence of actual innocence. * * * We therefore hold as a matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that a claim of newly discovered evidence showing a defendant to be actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted is cognizable as a matter of due process."
"It is fundamental, however, that the precedential scope of a decision is limited to the facts before the court."
People v. Palmer
,
¶ 23 But then, at the end of Washington , the supreme court added:
"Procedurally, such claims should be resolved as any other claim brought under the [Post-Conviction Hearing] Act. Substantively, relief has been held to require that the supporting evidence be new, material, noncumulative[,] and, most importantly, of such a conclusive character as would probably change the result on retrial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Id.
¶ 24 Those final words of guidance in
Washington
demonstrate how closely the holding of a case can be tethered to the facts of the case. If the facts in
Washington
were changed so that, instead of a trial ending in a guilty verdict, there had been a guilty plea, it would have made no sense to forecast the probable result of a "retrial."
¶ 25 The guilty-plea waiver rule poses an equally formidable obstacle. "A guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defenses or defects."
People v. Horton
,
¶ 26 Defendants cannot knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty in the trial court and then turn around and complain to a reviewing court that the trial court found them guilty. That would be paradoxical if not duplicitous. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant's conviction of armed violence is a constitutional error because he really is innocent, it is an error he himself invited by pleading guilty to armed violence.
People v. Kane
,
¶ 27 In sum, until the supreme court makes an exception to the well-established doctrines of waiver and estoppel, we must faithfully apply those doctrines. See
In re Shermaine S.
,
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court's judgment, and we award the State $ 50 in costs against defendant. See 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016).
¶ 30 Affirmed.
Justices DeArmond and Turner concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.