No. 1-18-0735 Order filed November 8, 2019 Fifth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 16 CR 7352 ) KATHERINE MOORE, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Rochford and Delort concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction for arson is affirmed where a rational trier of fact could have found that the testimony of the victim who identified her as the offender was not unworthy of belief.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Katherine Moore was found guilty of arson and

criminal damage to property. The trial court merged the criminal damage to property count into

the arson count, sentenced defendant to two months’ probation for arson, and ordered her to pay

a total of $1200 in restitution. Defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient No. 1-18-0735

because the victim’s testimony implicating her as the offender was “inherently unbelievable.”

We affirm.

¶3 Defendant was charged by information with arson (720 ILCS 5/20-1(a) (West 2016)) and

criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1) (West Supp. 2015)) based on an incident in

which she was alleged to have set fire to a vehicle belonging to Jasmine Campbell, the sister of

defendant’s ex-boyfriend, George Campbell. 1

¶4 At trial, Jasmine testified that she was convicted of forgery in 2009 and received two

years’ probation. Jasmine knew defendant, whom she identified in court, because defendant lived

with Jasmine and George while the couple was dating in the “early months” of 2016. In January

or February 2016, Jasmine purchased a Lincoln Navigator for $2300. On April 22, 2016, after

George and defendant had broken up, Jasmine went outside to walk her dog at approximately 1

a.m. At that time, her Navigator was parked beneath a streetlight in front of her house.

¶5 As Jasmine was “[a] couple houses away” on her return home, she saw defendant and

another woman standing near the gas tank on the driver’s side of the Navigator. Jasmine

approached the women and asked them, “What the f*** are you doing.” As Jasmine got closer,

she saw the “flickering of a lighter” in defendant’s hand and flames coming from the gas tank.

¶6 Jasmine “sicked” her dog at the women and ran toward them. However, they entered a

black minivan that was parked in the street next to the Navigator and drove away. Defendant was

laughing as she entered the van. Jasmine testified that she recognized the van as defendant’s

because she had previously seen defendant driving the vehicle and noticed the last four digits of

its temporary license plate as it drove away.

1 Because Jasmine and George share a surname, we will refer to them by their first names.

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¶7 Once the offenders left, Jasmine extinguished the flames with water from her house. She

then called the police, who arrived shortly thereafter. Jasmine examined her vehicle and

discovered burns on the gas tank and surrounding area. She identified photographs of the

damage, which the State introduced into evidence. She later paid approximately $3000 in repair

costs.

¶8 On cross-examination, Jasmine denied any previous “altercations” with defendant. She

did not speak to George on the night before the fire and did not know whether he broke into

defendant’s apartment. On redirect examination, Jasmine stated that she did not learn that

defendant had accused George of breaking into her home until the day of defendant’s trial in the

present case.

¶9 Chicago police detective Jeong Park testified that he traveled to Jasmine’s address and

examined the Navigator, which was adequately illuminated by street lamps. Park noticed that the

gas cap had been removed and that a “paper product” had been stuffed into the opening of the

gas tank. The paper had ignited and caused fire damage to the “gas cap area and the body of the

vehicle.” Park photographed the damage and recovered the paper as evidence. He determined

that the origin of the fire was an open flame held to the paper.

¶ 10 Park also interviewed Jasmine, who named defendant as the perpetrator. Park searched

defendant’s name in a database and discovered that she had reported a burglary two or three

hours before the fire. He created an investigative alert, and defendant was arrested several days

later.

¶ 11 On cross-examination, Park testified that he did not see defendant at the scene or discover

her fingerprints on the Navigator.

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¶ 12 The State rested, and defense counsel sought to introduce a certified copy of Jasmine’s

forgery conviction. However, the court ruled that a certified copy was unnecessary because

Jasmine had already “admitted to it.” Defense counsel then moved for a directed finding on the

criminal damage to property charge, which the court denied.

¶ 13 Defendant testified that she returned home between 9 and 10 p.m. on the night before the

fire and found “trash all over the place.” She immediately called the police, and noticed that

some of her property was missing. While defendant was waiting for the police to arrive, she

discovered George’s identification card (ID), which was not there when she left her apartment.

The couple had broken up approximately two months prior.

¶ 14 When an officer arrived, defendant reported the missing items and gave him George’s

Defendant also asked the officer to “send somebody out to dust for fingerprints,” and he agreed

to do so. After the officer left, defendant called George to inform him that she had filed a police

report against him. Defendant did not leave her apartment until after the time of the fire because

she was waiting for an evidence technician to arrive. She denied having any problem with

Jasmine or attempting to set her vehicle on fire.

¶ 15 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged owning a black minivan with temporary

license plates at the time of the fire. She also acknowledged that she did not return any of the

phone calls from the detective who was assigned to investigate the burglary. The detective came

to defendant’s apartment while she was not home, but defendant did not follow up with the

detective.

¶ 16 Chicago police officer Salvador Mondragon testified that he arrived at defendant’s

apartment, which was “a little messy,” at around 10 p.m. on the night before the fire. Defendant

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handed him George’s ID and told him that she suspected George was the burglar. Mondragon

told defendant that there was a “possibility” that an evidence technician would come to process

the scene. Mondragon then left and returned to the police station.

¶ 17 On cross-examination, Mondragon estimated that he was at defendant’s apartment for 20

to 30 minutes. He explained that defendant was initially unable to produce George’s ID, but

came outside with it as he was returning to his vehicle to leave. He did not interview George or

make an arrest for the burglary.

¶ 18 After arguments, the court found defendant guilty of arson and criminal damage to

property. In so ruling, the court noted that the case amounted to “a question of credibility along

with the additional factor of the motive why [defendant] would want to start [Jasmine’s] car on

fire.” More specifically, the court stated that it credited Jasmine’s testimony that she was

unaware of the alleged burglary until long after the fire, and that defendant’s motive for the arson

“takes the case out of the situation where it’s just she said, she said.”

¶ 19 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that she was not proven guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The court denied the motion. Following a hearing, the court merged the

criminal damage to property count into the arson count, sentenced defendant to two years’

probation, and ordered her to pay Jasmine a total of $1200 in restitution.

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove her guilty of arson beyond a

reasonable doubt because Jasmine’s testimony was unbelievable. 2 In particular, defendant

2 Defendant also argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove her guilty of criminal damage to property beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as the trial court did not enter a sentence on that count, there is no final judgment from which an appeal can be entertained. See People v. Goodwin,

.

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contends that the court ignored certain “objective indicators” that Jasmine was not credible, and

instead attributed a “speculative and unreasonable motive” to defendant.

¶ 21 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must

determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Belknap,

. It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicts

in the testimony, weigh the evidence, and decide which inferences to draw therefrom. People v.

Bradford,

. Notably, a reviewing court must not retry the defendant or

substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact on matters of witness credibility and the

weight of the evidence. People v. Gray,

, ¶ 35. This is in part because, having

seen and heard the witnesses testify, the trier of fact is in a superior position to assess their

credibility. People v. Jordan,

(2006). Thus, although not binding on a

reviewing court, the trial court’s determinations of witness credibility are entitled to great

deference. People v. Brown,

, ¶ 21.

¶ 22 Moreover, the credible testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient to sustain a

conviction. People v. Siguenza-Brito,

(2009). When a case depends on an

eyewitness’s testimony, the reviewing court must determine whether any reasonable trier of fact

could accept the testimony as true. Gray,

, ¶ 36. Under this standard, eyewitness

testimony is insufficient “only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no

reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham,

(2004). A conviction will not be reversed simply because the defendant contradicts the

eyewitness’s account or claims that the witness is not credible. Siguenza-Brito,

.

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Instead, a conviction will be reversed only where it depends on testimony that is “improbable,

unconvincing, and contrary to human experience” (People v. Vasquez,

(1992)), or where the evidence is otherwise “so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory” that

a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt remains (People v. Newton,

, ¶ 24).

¶ 23 Relevant here, in order to convict defendant of arson, the State was required to prove that

she damaged personal property with a value of at least $150 by means of fire or explosives. 720

ILCS 5/20-1(a) (West 2016).

¶ 24 Defendant does not contest that Jasmine’s vehicle was damaged as a result of arson, but

argues only that the evidence did not prove her to be the perpetrator beyond a reasonable doubt

because no rational trier of fact could have credited Jasmine’s testimony. According to

defendant, Jasmine’s testimony was unbelievable because she had a previous forgery conviction,

and because her account was “simply too good to be true” in that (1) she “happed to be outside”

while defendant committed the offenses, and (2) defendant started the fire even after Jasmine

confronted her. Defendant also contends that Jasmine’s testimony that she “record[ed] the

numbers of the license plate” on the offenders’ vehicle was “not what would [be] expected from

someone who *** already knew who committed the crime.”

¶ 25 However, it was the trial court’s role to determine the witnesses’ credibility and resolve

any conflicts in the testimony. We cannot say that the court’s decision to credit Jasmine over

defendant was wholly unreasonable. A witness’s testimony is not rendered unbelievable solely

because the witness is a convicted felon, even where, as here, the witness’s conviction involved

making false representations. See People v. Walton,

(1977) (upholding a

conviction based on the testimony of an “essential witness” who was serving a prison term for

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forgery); see also People v. Phillips,

(trier of fact is responsible for weighing

the credibility of felons). Moreover, a rational trier of fact could find nothing unusual or contrary

to human experience in Jasmine’s testimony that she was walking her dog near her house or that

defendant completed her crime and immediately fled upon being discovered. Additionally, we

note that defendant misstates the testimony in suggesting that Jasmine “record[ed]” part of the

getaway van’s license plate. Rather, Jasmine testified that she merely recognized the last four

digits of the license plate because she had seen defendant driving the van on previous occasions.

In fact, Jasmine testified that she immediately extinguished the flames and then called the police.

Thus, contrary to defendant’s assertion, Jasmine’s account of her actions after the fire was not

inherently unworthy of belief and did not discredit her identification testimony.

¶ 26 Notwithstanding, defendant argues that it was unreasonable for the trial court to find that

she had a motive for the arson while ignoring Jasmine’s own motive to falsely implicate her.

Initially, we note that “it is not necessary to establish motive in an arson case.” People v.

Musitief,

(1990). In any event, we cannot say that it was unreasonable

for the trial court to believe that defendant’s testimony revealed a motive. Although defendant

asserts that she had no quarrel with Jasmine, her testimony established that she believed

Jasmine’s brother George, who lived in the same house as Jasmine, had broken into her

apartment just hours before the fire. This suggests that defendant had a motive to damage the

Navigator, which was parked in the street in front of Jasmine’s home.

¶ 27 Although defendant contends that her accusation against George also established

Jasmine’s motive to falsely accuse her of the arson, the trial court credited Jasmine’s testimony

that she was unaware of the alleged burglary at the time of the fire. As noted, the trial court was

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not required to reject Jasmine’s testimony simply because defendant claims it is not credible.

Siguenza-Brito,

. Furthermore, despite defendant’s speculation on appeal, there

is no evidence that Jasmine blamed defendant in order to recoup the repair costs for her vehicle.

¶ 28 In sum, Jasmine’s testimony was not so unbelievable that no rational trier of fact could

have accepted it. Consequently, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

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