No. 1-17-2106

SECOND DIVISION June 9, 2020

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ____________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 12 CR 18153 ) ALAN PADILLA, ) ) The Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Thomas J. Byrne, ) Judge Presiding.

____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The judgment of the trial court is reversed, where the defendant was a juvenile offender, and the trial court imposed a discretionary de facto life sentence without making a finding that the defendant was beyond rehabilitation so that he was among the rarest of juveniles whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.

¶2 Alan Padilla was convicted in a jury trial for first degree murder, and was sentenced to 65

years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that his discretionary de facto life sentence violates the

eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11), where he 1-17-2106

was 17 years old at the time of the offense and the trial court failed to make a determination as to

whether he was “among the rarest of youth whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” We

reverse and remand with instructions.

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Padilla was charged by indictment with six counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-

1(a)(1), (2) (West 2012)), following an incident in Chicago, Illinois, on August 31, 2012. Prior to

trial, the State nolle prossed four of the six counts.

¶5 Also prior to trial, Padilla brought a motion to declare the sentencing scheme for his charges

unconstitutional as applied to Padilla, where Padilla was a minor at the time of the offense and his

charges carried a statutory minimum of 45 years and a maximum sentence of natural life in prison.

Padilla requested that the trial court (1) hold that the sentencing scheme for Padilla’s charges is

unconstitutional and (2) “consider a sentence that comports, at a minimum, with the sentencing

scheme under the Juvenile Court Act *** to a maximum of thirty-nine years.” Padilla’s

constitutional challenge to the sentencing scheme was not addressed until after Padilla’s jury trial.

¶6 Because the issue on appeal concerns the constitutionality of Padilla’s sentence, we set

forth a brief summary of the facts adduced at trial, which commenced on December 13, 2016. The

record shows that the victim of the murder, Jalen Stogner, was a 17-year-old African American

teenager, and the State presented evidence regarding Padilla’s motive in order to show that Jalen

was targeted in the murder specifically because of his race, as we will describe.

¶7 Jalen’s mother, Marla Stogner, testified that on August 31, 2012, around 4 p.m., she drove

to a laundromat on 47th Street and Ashland Avenue with Jalen and two of her other four children.

She parked her vehicle in front of the laundromat, and Jalen took a laundry bag from the vehicle

and stood in the laundromat doorway. Padilla, whom Marla had never seen before, walked 12 to

-2- 1-17-2106

15 feet from Jalen and “said something” to Jalen. Jalen asked Padilla what he said. Marla testified

that Jalen did not “reach for anything,” have a firearm, or “go after” Padilla. Rather, Marla told

Jalen not to argue, and told Padilla that Jalen “wasn’t here for any trouble.”

¶8 Padilla then lifted his shirt, pulled out a firearm, and aimed it at Jalen. Jalen turned and ran

inside the laundromat, and Padilla shot the firearm three times. Marla “scream[ed],” “begg[ed],”

and told Padilla, “That’s my son.” Padilla stared and pointed his firearm at Marla, but turned

around and ran down an alley near the laundromat. Marla entered the laundromat and saw Jalen

unresponsive and “falling on the floor.” She turned Jalen to his side, and “blood *** spilled out of

his mouth.” Police officers took Jalen to the hospital in an ambulance, and Marla learned that Jalen

had died. At the police station, Marla identified Padilla from a lineup. Marla also testified regarding

video footage recovered from the laundromat that depicted the incident.

¶9 DeShawn Sims, one of Marla’s children, testified in corroboration with Marla. The State

also presented the testimony of two customers, who both testified that they saw Padilla walking

around the laundromat “nervous.” The two customers both heard gunshots, and saw Jalen enter

the laundromat bleeding and fall to the ground. A laundromat employee corroborated this

testimony, but added that she also saw Padilla argue with another man outside the laundromat prior

to the incident. She also added that when Padilla was walking around the laundromat and looking

nervous, he did not wash or carry any laundry during his visit. The two customers and the

laundromat employee all identified Padilla from a lineup. The witnesses who were at the scene all

consistently testified that Padilla was wearing a white shirt and blue, or jean, shorts.

¶ 10 The State also presented testimony that police officers investigated the scene just after 4

p.m., and found Padilla about four blocks away from the laundromat, on the railroad tracks on top

of a viaduct. Padilla was holding black socks in his hand, and he wore a different “blueish black”

-3- 1-17-2106

shirt, and denim jeans. Padilla also held a cell phone with the battery removed. An officer asked

Padilla what he was doing on the tracks, and Padilla stated, “Just chilling.” The police recovered

Padilla’s cell phone, arrested Padilla, and took him to the police station.

¶ 11 The State also submitted testimony that Jalen had a bullet wound entering the right side of

the back of his chest, and the bullet lodged in his lower right lung cavity.

¶ 12 An inmate at the Cook County jail testified that he heard Padilla rapping “[a]bout killing a

n***.” The inmate remarked on the song, and asked Padilla why he was in prison. Padilla stated

he had been in an altercation with a black man on 48th and Ashland and left to retrieve his firearm.

Padilla returned to the area “[t]o kill a n***,” but did not see that black man, so he “look[ed] for a

n*** to kill” and “found him.” Padilla then told the inmate he killed a “n***” who was “walking

his laundry into the [l]aundromat” by shooting him twice. Afterwards, Padilla left the scene and

urinated on his hands. Padilla additionally told the inmate he was going to “[b]eat the murder rap”

and plea insanity. The court admonished the jury, and stated that the inmate’s testimony regarding

any of Padilla’s conduct not included in Padilla’s charges was received on the issue of motive

only. The court told the jury it was their role to determine whether that conduct occurred.

¶ 13 The State rested, and Padilla testified.

¶ 14 Padilla stated that at the time of the incident, he was 17 years old and homeless, his father’s

location was unknown, and his mother had been deported to Mexico. Thirty minutes before the

incident, a man punched Padilla and tried to rob him, and Padilla ran into the laundromat. Padilla

left the laundromat and passed Jalen, who said to Padilla, “ ‘What are you looking at?’ ” Padilla

did not say anything, and Jalen told Padilla, “ ‘I’m going to kill you.’ ” Padilla stated he believed

Jalen’s threat due to the prior altercation he had experienced. Padilla walked away from Jalen, but

-4- 1-17-2106

Jalen called, “Yo, yo.” Padilla turned around and saw Jalen reach into his waistband. Padilla

thought Jalen had a firearm, shot Jalen twice, and ran into an alley.

¶ 15 On cross-examination, Padilla confirmed that he never saw Jalen with a firearm, and that

Jalen was holding a laundry bag when they interacted. Padilla also confirmed that he initially gave

the police an alibi, saying he was at a McDonald’s when the shooting occurred.

¶ 16 The jury found Padilla guilty of first degree murder, and found that during the commission

of the offense of first degree murder, Padilla personally discharged a firearm that proximately

caused death to another person.

¶ 17 Before Padilla’s sentencing hearing, the trial court heard arguments regarding Padilla’s

motion to declare the sentencing scheme of Padilla’s charges unconstitutional. The trial court

observed that a change in the law had altered the “crux” of Padilla’s motion, since the applicable

firearm enhancement was no longer mandatory.

¶ 18 Defense counsel argued that any sentence over 39 years is a de facto natural life sentence,

and that “regardless of whether the 25 to life imposition is discretionary, *** any enhancement for

a juvenile beyond the 25 years would be unconstitutional.” The State responded that the United

States Supreme Court only held that a life sentence for a juvenile offender should not be

mandatory. A court may still impose a discretionary natural life sentence, as long as the judge had

considered the juvenile offender’s youth and its attendant circumstances.

¶ 19 The trial court denied Padilla’s motion to declare the sentencing scheme unconstitutional,

and proceeded to Padilla’s sentencing hearing.

¶ 20 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court initially noted that Padilla was previously

diagnosed with a mental disorder, and that it had ordered an evaluation of Padilla’s fitness. A

forensic psychologist concluded that Padilla was fit to stand trial, but “was unable to render an

-5- 1-17-2106

opinion with any degree of psychiatric certainty” due to Padilla’s lack of cooperation, which “was

not the result of any mental illness.”

¶ 21 In aggravation, the State presented Chicago police officer Dwayne Gross, who testified

that on August 31, 2012, at about 10:50 p.m., he searched and processed Padilla following Padilla’s

arrest. As Gross “took [Padilla] over” to be fingerprinted, Padilla “got into a verbal altercation”

with Gross’s partner, Officer Lawrence Foote. Padilla told Foote that Padilla “wanted to fight him,

and *** was going to f*** him up.” On September 1, 2012, at about 11:15 p.m., Padilla “became

agitated” when he saw Foote and yelled that he “wanted to f*** [Foote] up.” Gross attempted to

guide Padilla towards a cell, and Padilla punched Gross in the chest. Gross then claimed that he

and Padilla “used direct mechanics.” Officers moved Padilla to his cell, and Padilla tried to “squirm

away.” Gross suffered a fractured left hand due to the incident.

¶ 22 On cross-examination, Gross confirmed that “direct mechanics” meant punching, and that

he broke his hand punching Padilla.

¶ 23 Chicago police officer Deborah Jovanovich corroborated Gross’s account of this

altercation, and added that she suffered a cut on her wrist and a jammed finger assisting Gross.

¶ 24 Chicago correctional officer Richard O’Connor testified that on September 21, 2012, at

about 9 p.m., he worked in the Cook County Department of Corrections, when Padilla sprayed a

substance onto O’Connor’s right side and face. O’Connor believed the substance was a mixture of

urine and feces based on its smell and color. Chicago correctional officer Arcenio Pizana testified

that on February 8, 2016, at about 9 a.m., Padilla refused to reenter his cell, and staff members

physically “escorted” him to his cell. Two hours later, Padilla threw a liquid substance onto

Pizana’s back. The next day, Padilla called Pizana a “b***” and told Pizana, “I should beat your

ass.” Padilla advanced towards Pizana, and Pizana deployed pepper spray at him. Chicago

-6- 1-17-2106

correctional officer Thomas Maciunas testified that on March 15, 2016, at about 10 a.m., he saw

Padilla fight with another inmate and ordered Padilla to stop. Padilla did not stop, so Maciunas

“[u]tilized [pepper] spray.”

¶ 25 Lieutenant Michael Hallihan, a “Watch Commander” with the Cook County Sheriff’s

Department, testified that Padilla’s inmate discipline reports, which reflected about 20 instances

in which Padilla was disciplined for misconduct, which included fighting with inmates, refusing

to comply with orders, attempting to escape, assaulting staff, damaging property in his cell, or

possessing contraband, specifically shanks and batches of “hooch,” which was described as

“inmate made alcohol, using lunch products.”

¶ 26 Mark Washington, Jalen’s father, read a victim impact statement describing the hardship

he faced after his son died, and stating that he had lost his only son “to the historical ongoing

racism and gun violence in America.” Washington stated, “This cowardice murderer sitting here,

should know what it’s like to get life without parole for his racist senseless first degree murder.”

¶ 27 The defense presented in mitigation Dolci Vasquez, Padilla’s mother, who stated that she

was 14 years old when she met Padilla’s father and became pregnant with Padilla. Two years later,

Padilla’s father left for Mexico. Vasquez’s own father then assumed a father figure role for Padilla.

Vasquez met another man, with whom she had a daughter, but the second man “was very abusive”

and “would beat [Vasquez] up” and “humiliate” her. Vasquez then returned to her parents with her

daughter and Padilla. After “[s]ome time,” Vasquez met her boyfriend, Luis, and lived with him.

¶ 28 Padilla attended school and was diagnosed with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder

(ADHD). Vasquez stated that they changed Padilla’s medication dosage “all the time,” and Padilla

“had no stability in his emotions.” Vasquez then sent Padilla to a “Masonic School for his

behavior,” and “[e]verything changed,” as Padilla put more effort into his studies. Vasquez’s father

-7- 1-17-2106

then died, and Padilla “was devastated,” “did not accept the loss,” and “became more rebellious.”

Padilla received “stronger medicine so that he could be at peace.”

¶ 29 Vasquez stated that she later moved to Mexico with Luis, Padilla, and her daughter. Luis

became abusive, beat Vasquez, and “use[d] drugs.” Vasquez testified that Padilla once tried to

defend Vasquez from Luis, became upset, and left for a party. When Padilla returned from the

party, Padilla told Vasquez he had fallen asleep and was “almost raped by a man.”

¶ 30 Vasquez then returned to Chicago and sent Padilla to be with her family. She grew

dependent on alcohol, enrolled in a self-help group, and took her children to Alcoholics

Anonymous meetings so they could see she “wanted to give them the best possible life for them.”

One night, while Vasquez was driving her children back from a “spiritual retreat,” the police

detained Vasquez, and Padilla yelled at the police not to “beat [her] up.”

¶ 31 Vasquez was deported to Mexico. She testified that she knew this event was traumatic for

Padilla, and decided her children would stay with her sister, Wendy Fernandez, because Padilla

“was extremely upset and started to get involved with problems.” However, the Department of

Children and Family Services took custody of Vasquez’s children away from Fernandez, and

Padilla “lived at a school.” Vasquez stated, “I know that my Son felt the abandonment on my part,

because he always felt it relative to his Father.” According to Vasquez, Padilla was “looking for

love,” but found it “with the wrong kinds of people, such [as] gangs.” Vasquez stated that Padilla

was a child who did not have his mother or father, and that “the only thing he could do was to

survive on the streets.” Vasquez asked that the trial court “have compassion and comprehension.”

¶ 32 The defense also presented a letter from Fernandez, Vasquez’s sister, who stated that

Padilla is a “good person,” and that “life has *** treated him very badly.” Fernandez stated, “I am

certain that there has been much suffering in spite of his young age.” Fernandez further stated that

-8- 1-17-2106

Padilla’s lack of a father figure affected him. Padilla suffered from “an impediment” from a young

age, and while he liked to play, “feel free,” and “do everything that [a] young child likes to do,”

his medication “paralyze[d]” and “sedated” him. He was a “highly intelligent child” who “always

had perfect grades,” but would behave differently when he did not take his medication. Fernandez

stated that Padilla “was a very good boy,” who would tell her “he was going to study very hard to

become someone in life” and to “return to his [m]other everything that she had done for him and

for his [s]ister.” Unfortunately, Padilla made “questionable friends,” and “started to *** behave

badly.” When his mother was deported, Padilla frequently cried and “was always sad.” Fernandez

acknowledged that what Padilla did could not be “justified,” but stated that he was simply “in a

moment and place that were wrong for him.” Fernandez concluded that Padilla was “only an

adolescent” and was “extremely remorseful” for what he did.

¶ 33 The defense also presented a letter from Padilla’s grandmother, Maria Vasquez, who stated

that Padilla was “very respectful,” “applied himself,” and “had a wonderful attitude.” Maria

Vasquez stated that Padilla had “bad friends who turned him like this,” and that he lacked “the

love of his [f]ather.” She stated that Padilla “is in the flower of his youth, full of life,” and asked

that the circuit court “show him clemency, because we would assume charge, and take care of him,

to guide him on a right and correct path, so that he can become an honest man.”

¶ 34 Additionally, the defense submitted Padilla’s school records, which showed that Padilla

got “A’s and B’s.” The defense presented a report from Sullivan High School, in which Padilla’s

English teacher stated that Padilla had an A in English and had completed 90% of his assignments

and had attended class. The teacher further reported that Padilla “likes to participate in class,”

works well in groups, “learn[s] well through discussion,” and “tend[s] to curse a lot in in class”

-9- 1-17-2106

but “always apologizes and stops.” The teacher further voiced concern that Padilla’s “outside

friendships may be affecting his focus.”

¶ 35 The trial court also considered the presentencing investigative report (PSI), which stated

that Padilla’s birth date was October 4, 1994, confirming that Padilla was 17 years old at the time

of the offense. The PSI also stated that Padilla’s father’s location was unknown, that his mother

was in Aurora, Illinois, and that he had one maternal sibling. Padilla was raised by his mother and

maternal grandparents, and he had a “ ‘good’ ” relationship with his mother, a close relationship

with his sister, and no relationship with his father. He described his childhood as “ ‘bad’ ” after his

grandfather passed away, and denied ever being abused or neglected. At age 15, Padilla was placed

in a “group home” after his mother’s deportation. Padilla denied that his family had a history of

drug or alcohol abuse, or that he had family members in prison or on probation.

¶ 36 According to the PSI, Padilla’s highest level of education was ninth grade, and he reported

he received A’s and B’s and participated in the basketball team. Padilla was “expelled and

suspended for fighting.” Padilla denied having any monthly income or expenses prior to

incarceration, but stated he sold drugs to support himself. The PSI also stated that Padilla was a

member of the gang La Raza from 2010 to the present date and went by the street name

“ ‘Dangerous,’ ” and he ranked as a “foot soldier.” Additionally, the PSI reflected that Padilla had

received probation for possessing a stolen automobile, but violated the probation, and was

previously convicted of battery. An additional case was opened against Padilla for aggravated

battery to a peace officer, arising from the incident in which Padilla purportedly punched Gross,

and Gross broke his own hand punching Padilla.

-10- 1-17-2106

¶ 37 The PSI further stated that Padilla was seen by a psychiatrist, was diagnosed with bipolar

disorder, and received treatment in the Cook County Department of Corrections, and that he had

been previously diagnosed with behavioral and learning disorders.

¶ 38 Padilla drank alcohol every weekend and “limited his drinking to half a gallon of alcohol.”

He also used cannabis from the age of 13 to present, cocaine from ages 13 to 14, and codeine

cough syrup from ages 15 to 17.

¶ 39 The parties presented arguments on Padilla’s sentencing.

¶ 40 In aggravation, the State argued that Padilla was “unsafe,” should receive a sentence

enhancement for committing first degree murder with a firearm, and should remain in prison for

natural life. The State observed that throughout the entire case, Padilla boasted about his

membership with the La Raza gang and said they called him “Dangerous.” The State also argued

that there was no evidence showing Padilla had remorse or rehabilitative potential.

¶ 41 Then, the State outlined the factors regarding Padilla’s youth. The State asserted, “[I]t’s

not like the Defendant just turned 17. He was actually less than two months from his 18th birthday

when he killed Jalen in cold blood.” As to “outside peer pressure or negative influences,” the State

stated that Padilla boasted about being a member of the gang La Raza, and that Padilla “even has

a new tattoo” on his face “from when he first came in here.” However, the State reminded the court

that Padilla’s current offense had nothing to do with “gang war” or “peer pressure,” but rather,

Padilla willfully killed a 17-year-old boy out of racist motives, bragged about it, and rapped about

it in prison.

¶ 42 The State next addressed Padilla’s family home environment and noted Padilla’s close

relationships with his mother and sister. Additionally, the State observed the lack of substance

abuse or criminal history in Padilla’s family, and Padilla’s denial that he was ever abused or

-11- 1-17-2106

neglected. The State emphasized that Padilla was expelled from high school for fighting, and he

sold drugs to support himself. The State also argued that Padilla was able to meaningfully

participate in his defense, as the trial evidence showed Padilla attempted to cover up the murder

when he changed his clothes, discarded his firearm, and urinated on his hands. Padilla also changed

his story multiple times, initially telling the detectives that he was at a McDonald’s, then pleading

insanity, then asserting self-defense. In discussing Padilla’s prior juvenile or criminal history, the

State observed that Padilla received probation for possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and

violated his probation multiple times, before he killed Jalen 22 days later. Then, less than 24 hours

after the murder, Padilla “pick[ed] up a new case” for aggravated battery for “what he did to

Detective Aid Gross and ** Debora.” The State referenced the various behavioral issues Padilla

exhibited while in prison, stated that Padilla had spent at least “398 days in segregation” as a result,

and asked, “How in the world can that be rehabilitative?” The State concluded that a natural life

sentence was “the only just sentence.”

¶ 43 In mitigation, the defense also addressed the factors regarding Padilla’s youth, first arguing

that Padilla suffered “cognitive disabilities, ADHD.” The defense argued that Padilla was

“psychotic” in prison, that he had a history of being medicated, and that he “was impulsive and

had difficulty controlling impulsivity.” Defense counsel also asserted that Padilla experienced

outside peer pressure and negative influences, having had a father who abandoned him, a mother

who struggled with alcoholism and was deported, and a grandfather who had provided stability

but died. Padilla became involved with gangs “because that’s who replaced his family that was no

longer there.” Additionally, defense counsel argued that Padilla had suffered trauma at a young

age, having had to defend his mother from domestic abuse at a young age, and having been

“nearly” or “possibly” raped as a child.

-12- 1-17-2106

¶ 44 As to rehabilitative potential, defense counsel asserted that Padilla showed potential when

he was in a stable environment. When guards told Padilla to stop fighting, “more often than not,

he listened to them.” Defense counsel explained that Padilla simply “wanted to be in segregation”

because “jail is not a nice place,” and Padilla lacked the “wherewithal to rise above the

circumstances” in prison. Counsel concluded that Padilla had a “very minimal juvenile or criminal

history,” and “given his age of 17, given his background, given his psychological profile,” Padilla

should receive less than 35 years’ imprisonment. Defense counsel claimed that “35 years would

not deprecate the seriousness of the offense,” but would still “give Alan a chance to rehabilitate

and do something useful in his life.”

¶ 45 Padilla stated in allocution that he “didn’t mean for things to happen that day,” and

apologized to Jalen’s family. He explained that all he needed “was a support system to direct me

in the right direction; but things happen.” Padilla then stated, “I live with this nightmare; and it

haunts me daily; and again, I’m sorry to my victim family [sic], as well as I’m sorry for my own

family, as well. And that’s it.”

¶ 46 The circuit court stated that it recalled the facts and circumstances of the case and that,

“like the jury,” it found Padilla’s account of the event “completely incredible.” The court described

the severity of Padilla’s offense, stating, “[T]his was the Defendant’s conscious choice to find a

victim, because he had been in an altercation with somebody else,” and Jalen “just happened to be

in the Defendant’s sights.” The court observed that the murder was not “brought on by sudden and

tense passion or an uncontrollable impulse,” but “was by design.” Further, the court noted that

Padilla saw Jalen with his mother, and decided to shoot Jalen, a 17-year-old boy who “wasn’t

carrying a gun, or a weapon, or gang insignia,” but rather only carried “a bag of laundry for his

family, to help out his [m]other.”

-13- 1-17-2106

¶ 47 The court also described the cruel effect of Padilla’s offense on the victim’s family, stating:

“The unimaginable shock and pain that Jalen’s [m]other suffered at the laundromat

is unspeakable. The effect that his actions, his decisions had beyond the laundromat, is

nothing that can be comprehended.

What he’s done to his own family, and what he’s done to Jalen’s family, and what

he took away from Jalen, 17 years old, is beyond comprehension for us to truly understand

it.”

¶ 48 The court noted that Padilla was 17, so there were “some considerations that the Court

must go through” in determining an appropriate sentence.” As to the factors regarding Padilla’s

youth, the circuit court observed that Padilla chose to commit the murder, and was not “put up to

[it] by older, more mature individuals who [held] sway over the Defendant.” The court also stated

that Padilla should have understood “the bond between a Mother and a Son” when he shot Jalen

in front of his mother, since Padilla had lost his mother and grandfather. Additionally, court

considered Padilla’s “young age at the time of the offense,” Padilla’s “personal history, prior to

the offense,” all the factors in aggravation and mitigation, the PSI, and Padilla’s conduct in prison.

¶ 49 The court raised Padilla’s rehabilitative potential once when it stated the following:

“So, what I’m left with, is to fashion an appropriate sentence that considers the

vicious, horrendous murder of Jalen by the Defendant, another 17-year-old; and I’m

required to consider the Defendant’s youthfulness, his rehabilitative potential in doing that;

and I certainly have.

I’ve considered the fact that the Defendant is loved by his family, and the suffering

that his own family is going to consider.

-14- 1-17-2106

In fashioning a sentence appropriate in this case, I’ve considered the State’s request

for natural life; and that’s an appropriate request, under the circumstances, that you serve

the rest of your life without the possibility of parole.” (Emphasis added.)

However, we note that the court made no express finding as to whether Padilla had rehabilitative

potential.

¶ 50 The trial court found that the discretionary sentencing enhancement for discharging a

firearm was “appropriate under the circumstances of this case.” Thus, the court sentenced Padilla

to 40 years imprisonment, with an enhancement of 25 years, for a total of 65 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 51 Padilla filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. At the hearing on the motion, Padilla’s

counsel adopted the “previous argument at the sentencing hearing” and rested on it. The trial court

found that Padilla’s sentence was “appropriate,” and denied Padilla’s motion to reconsider

“[b]ased on all the statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation as well as the material considered

in the [PSI].” This appeal followed.

¶ 52 ANALYSIS

¶ 53 On appeal, Padilla argues that because he was a juvenile offender, the trial court was

constitutionally prohibited from imposing a de facto life sentence unless it had determined that

Padilla was “among the rarest of youth whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” According

to Padilla, the trial court made no such finding, and so the imposition of a de facto life sentence on

Padilla violated the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend.

VIII). The State responds that Padilla’s discretionary de facto life sentence was constitutional

because the trial court considered Padilla’s youth and its attendant circumstances before

determining that he was beyond rehabilitation.

-15- 1-17-2106

¶ 54 The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual

punishments” (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) and applies to the states through the fourteenth

amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Roper v. Simmons,

(2005). In Miller v.

Alabama,

(2012), the United States Supreme Court held that “a sentencing

scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders” violates

the eighth amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that a mandatory life sentence precludes a

trial court from considering the offender’s youth and its “attendant circumstances,” which include

the offender’s “immaturity” and “impetuosity,” the offender’s “failure to appreciate risks and

consequences,” the offender’s family and home environment, the extent to which familial and peer

pressures affected the offender’s conduct, the offender’s “inability to deal with police officers or

prosecutors,” and the offender’s “incapacity to assist his own attorneys.”

. The

Miller Court stated that “a judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating

circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,” and a mandatory

sentencing scheme unconstitutionally precludes this consideration.

. Nonetheless, the

Miller court also noted that “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest

possible penalty will be uncommon,” due to the “great difficulty” of distinguishing at an early age

“between the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the

rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” (Emphasis added and internal

quotation marks omitted.)

.

¶ 55 Since Miller, the Illinois supreme court has clarified that a mandatory, de facto life-

without-parole sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to Miller (People v. Reyes,

), and that a prison sentence of over 40 years is a de facto life sentence implicating Miller.

-16- 1-17-2106

(People v. Buffer,

). In People v. Holman,

, our

supreme court found that Miller applies both to mandatory and discretionary life sentences.

¶ 56 The Montgomery court further stated that “a juvenile defendant may be sentenced to life

imprisonment without parole, but only if the trial court determines that the defendant’s conduct

showed irretrievable depravity, permanent incorrigibility, or irreparable corruption beyond the

possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. ¶ 46. This is a finding that can only be made after considering the

defendant’s youth and its attendant circumstances. Id.

¶ 57 Our legislature has also since codified the considerations required by Miller through

section 5-4.5-105 of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2018)), which sets

forth each factor a sentencing court must consider, including “the person’s potential for

rehabilitation or evidence of rehabilitation, or both.”

¶ 58 Padilla was convicted of first degree murder pursuant to section 9-1(a)(1) of the Criminal

Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2012)). Section 5-4.5-20 of the Code of Corrections

(730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2012) provides that a person convicted under section 9-1 and

sentenced to imprisonment shall receive a term “not less than 20 years and not more than 60 years.”

Further, section 5-8-1(d)(iii) (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2012)) provides that where the

person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused death to another person, “25 years

or up to a natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.” Section

5-4.5-105(c) of the Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(c) (West 2018)) states that, in

addition to considering the factors regarding a juvenile defendant’s youth, the trial court “may, in

its discretion, decline to impose the sentencing enhancements based upon the possession or use of

a firearm during the commission of an offense included in subsection (d) of Section 5-8-1.”

Pursuant to these provisions, the trial court in its discretion imposed a de facto life sentence, when

-17- 1-17-2106

it sentenced Padilla to 40 years’ imprisonment for first degree murder, with a 25-year enhancement

for discharging the firearm that proximately caused Jalen’s death.

¶ 59 It is undisputed that Padilla also received a de facto life sentence without parole. Section

3-6-3(a)(2)(i) of the Illinois Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(i) (West 2012)) provides

that “a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment for first degree murder *** shall receive

no sentence credit and shall serve the entire sentence imposed by the court.” While the Illinois

legislature has since set forth a graduated parole review system for any “person under 21 years of

age at the time of the commission of first degree murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019,”

this provision does not apply to Padilla, who was sentenced on July 10, 2017. P.A. 100-1182, § 5,

eff. June 1, 2019 (730 5/5-4.5-115(b)).

¶ 60 We review de novo whether a sentence is constitutional. People v. Taylor,

.

¶ 61 At the sentencing hearing, the parties spoke at lengths regarding Padilla’s youth and its

attendant circumstances, revealing the circumstances under which Padilla came of age. Padilla did

not have a relationship with his father but was very close to his mother. He watched his mother

suffer physical abuse from the men she dated. Padilla grew up on medication to address his ADHD,

and the PSI showed that Padilla was diagnosed with bipolar disorder and had been previously

diagnosed with behavioral and learning disorders.

¶ 62 The evidence also showed that, at a young age, Padilla may have been the victim of either

attempted or actual rape. Also at a young age, he lost his two sources of stability, his mother and

maternal grandfather, as his mother was deported and his grandfather died. The evidence further

showed that upon losing his sources of support and stability, Padilla turned to gang activity. In

imposing its sentence, the trial court considered these factors, as well as the factors regarding

-18- 1-17-2106

Padilla’s youth and how they affected the court’s ultimate decision. The court additionally stated

that it had considered Padilla’s rehabilitative potential. However, the court made no express

finding whether Padilla had rehabilitative potential, or whether his crime reflected permanent

incorrigibility.

¶ 63 Our recent ruling in People v. Paige,

, is instructive. In Paige,

the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, home invasion, and residential burglary when,

at the age of 16, he entered a man’s apartment and stabbed the man with a kitchen knife over 10

times. Id. ¶¶ 5-10. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court considered the defendant’s “age at the

time of the offense and now,” noting that the defendant “has not had an easy life having been raised

a lot with a single parent,” but that the defendant “did have a strong male role model.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 22. The court considered the defendant’s “drug abuse, his mental

condition, and his intellectual abilities,” and considered the defendant was taking “alternative

classes” and “doing well” in them. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 21. The court also

described the brutality of the defendant’s conduct, and stated there was “ample evidence of

premeditation in this crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 64 However, while the trial court in Paige stated that it had “weighed [the defendant’s]

rehabilitative potential,” the court did not expressly make any finding as to whether the defendant

could be rehabilitated. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Nonetheless, the court imposed a

sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment, which consisted of 50 years for first degree murder, along

with a concurrent sentence of 25 years for home invasion, and 15 years for residential burglary,

which was to run concurrently with the first degree murder sentence and consecutively with the

home invasion sentence. Id. ¶ 23.

-19- 1-17-2106

¶ 65 On appeal, this court in Paige noted that while the trial court stated it had considered the

defendant’s rehabilitative potential, the trial court “did not consider whether defendant was beyond

rehabilitation so that he is one of ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect

permanent incorrigibility.’ ” Id. ¶ 39 (quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana,

, ___,

(2016)). We held that “[w]here the trial court focused on the brutality of the crime

and the need to protect the public, with no corresponding consideration given to defendant’s

opportunity for rehabilitation, the imposition of a life sentence on a juvenile defendant was

unconstitutional.”

¶ 66 As in Paige, the trial court here considered Padilla’s youth, and described the brutality of

Padilla’s crime in detail. Also as in Paige, the trial court stated that it had considered Padilla’s

rehabilitative potential, but made no finding as to whether Padilla “was beyond rehabilitation so

that he is one of the rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect permanent

incorrigibility.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

¶ 67 As Illinois courts have recognized, rehabilitative potential is at the heart of the

requirements of Miller, as juveniles specifically exhibit “lesser moral culpability and greater

rehabilitative potential.” People v. Aikens,

, ¶ 24. A life sentence without

parole, however, implies that “under any circumstances” a juvenile offender “is incorrigible and

incapable of rehabilitation for the rest of his life.” People v. Miller,

(2002).

¶ 68 We recognize the brutal nature of Padilla’s offense, as described in the evidence presented

at trial. We also acknowledge the trial court’s thoughtful consideration of the seriousness of the

offense, the evidence presented regarding Padilla’s racist motives, and the impact Padilla had on

the victim’s family. However, Illinois law mandates that the trial court could not impose a de facto

life sentence without parole on Padilla without first making a finding that Padilla was among “the

-20- 1-17-2106

rarest of juvenile offenders *** whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” Montgomery, 577

U.S. at ___, 136 Sup. Ct. at 734. Because this finding was not made, we must reverse the sentence

imposed by the trial court, and remand the case for a hearing on whether Padilla lacks any

rehabilitative potential. Because we are reversing the trial court’s judgment on this ground, we

make no finding as to whether Padilla does or does not have rehabilitative potential, whether his

sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, or whether the

provisions under which he was sentenced are unconstitutional.

¶ 69 CONCLUSION

¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court.

¶ 71 Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

-21-