THIRD DIVISION September 30, 2020

No. 1-17-1200

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 05 CR 6983 ) DANIEL RODRIGUEZ, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Stanley J. Sacks, ) Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Howse and Justice Burke concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Denial of defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition reversed and remanded for further proceedings where defendant presented a colorable claim of actual innocence.

¶2 Defendant, Daniel Rodriguez, was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 45

years’ imprisonment in connection with the July 26, 2003 stabbing death of the victim, Alberto

Marinez. This appeal arises from the circuit court’s denial of his motion for leave to file a

successive postconviction petition. No. 1-17-1200

¶3 The evidence elicited at trial was set out extensively in the Rule 23 order filed in

defendant’s direct appeal. We will summarize that evidence below to the extent relevant to this

appeal.

¶4 The evidence at trial established that on July 26, 2003, at approximately 3:00 a.m., multiple

Chicago police personnel were assigned to investigate a homicide outside a restaurant known as

“Raymond’s Tacos” at 2653 West Cermak Street. The body of the victim was found at that location

with multiple stab wounds. The parties stipulated that the medical examiner would testify that the

cause of death was multiple stab wounds and the manner of death was homicide.

¶5 Also at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 26, 2003, Chicago police officers were following

a grey Chevy Lumina that traveled at a “high rate of speed” through a stop sign at the intersection

of 22nd Place and California Street. As the officers prepared to “head off” the vehicle, the driver

jumped out and fled on foot, and the car crashed into a fence. One officer pursued the driver of the

vehicle but ultimately lost sight of him. The three other suspects in the vehicle were detained, and

they included two male suspects, Carlos Estrada and Andreas Bahena (also known as Antonio

Abarca) (hereinafter “Abarca”), and a female suspect, Anali DeLeon. After speaking to the three

suspects, a detective issued an investigative alert for “Daniel Rodriguez.” Defendant was

eventually arrested on February 16, 2005.

¶6 Estrada, who had pled guilty to the second-degree murder of the victim and was serving a

sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, testified at defendant’s trial, and his videotaped statement

made on July 27, 2003, was entered into evidence.

¶7 In the videotaped statement, Estrada was advised of his rights, and thereafter told

investigators that in the early morning hours of July 26, 2003, Estrada was robbed by a man after

Estrada left a party. After the robbery, Estrada got into his car and went to get his “brother Daniel

2 No. 1-17-1200

Rodriguez,” who he identified in a photograph. Estrada told defendant about the robbery, and

defendant became upset and asked Estrada if he wanted to find the person who had robbed him.

Estrada stated that he did and then he and defendant, along with defendant’s girlfriend and Abarca,

entered Estrada’s car. Estrada drove while defendant sat in the front passenger seat and the others

sat in the rear.

¶8 As they were driving, defendant saw the victim near Raymond’s Taco Restaurant and asked

Estrada if that was the person who robbed him. Estrada responded affirmatively, and he and

defendant then exited the vehicle and approached the victim. As he got out of the car, Estrada

grabbed his “club,” which he used to lock the steering wheel of the car, from the rear floor of the

car.

¶9 Estrada saw defendant hitting the victim in the stomach and Estrada began to hit the victim

in the shoulders with the club. Estrada then noticed that the victim had blood on his hands, that

defendant had a knife, and that the victim did not have a weapon in his hands. Estrada returned to

his vehicle carrying the club and got into the driver’s seat while defendant got into the front

passenger seat. Estrada drove down Washtenaw Street to 22nd Place and, after Estrada almost

collided with another car, defendant told Estrada that he would drive. Estrada and defendant

switched places and defendant drove down 22nd Place and turned into an alley when they were

approached by a police car. Defendant jumped out of the car while it was still moving and ran

away, and the car crashed into a fence.

¶ 10 Near the conclusion of the videotaped statement, Estrada stated that he had been treated

“okay” by the detectives and the assistant state’s attorney (ASA), that he had eaten, and that he

had been allowed to use the restroom. Estrada also stated that he was not under the influence of

3 No. 1-17-1200

drugs or alcohol and that no threats or promises had been made to him in order to obtain his

statement.

¶ 11 At defendant’s trial, Estrada essentially recanted the above videotaped statement. Estrada

testified that during the early morning hours of July 26, 2003, Estrada was robbed by three men,

one of whom was the victim. Estrada then testified that he did not remember anything that

happened after the robbery because he was “very drunk.” Estrada did not remember if he went to

get defendant after the robbery, if he saw defendant punching the victim while holding a knife in

his hands, or if he gave a videotaped statement. Estrada did not remember being arrested at 3:00

a.m. on July 26, 2003, but he did remember that he was “captured” by the police and that the police

“beat [him] up” at the police station. Before Estrada spoke to an ASA and a detective, the police

hit him in order to “tell [him] what to say” and the ASA told him he was going to be charged with

first-degree murder. Estrada testified that he lied in his videotaped statement because the police

had accused him of stabbing the victim and he was worried he would get “in a lot of trouble for

that.” Estrada did not try to correct the false statement, because his attorney told him the statement

could be used to convince someone that he committed only second-degree murder. Estrada

explained that he “came up” with the story because he was the only person being charged with the

crime and was therefore willing “to say whatever [he] needed to say in order to get the deal.”

¶ 12 During his testimony at defendant’s trial, Estrada described the relevant events in a variety

of ways. He testified that defendant was not his brother and that he had never seen defendant

before, but later stated that he knew defendant from “the street.” Estrada then acknowledged that

he lied on direct appeal when he said he did not remember what happened during the murder, and

he thought he could get through his testimony by claiming that he did not remember what

happened. Estrada then testified that he, Estrada, was the one who actually robbed and stabbed the

4 No. 1-17-1200

victim. Estrada further testified that he joined a gang prior to his incarceration, that Abarca was

also a member of that gang, and that people in that gang would be upset if he talked about someone

else in the gang having committed a crime. Finally, Estrada testified that the police did not tell him

to name defendant as the person who stabbed the victim, that the police simply told him to name

someone else as having stabbed the victim, and that it was his idea to name defendant as that

person.

¶ 13 The court found defendant guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced him to 45 years’

imprisonment. The court noted that the Estrada gave a “pretty detailed account of what

happen[ed]” in his videotaped statement, and concluded that Estrada was not “smart enough to

make up” that account.

¶ 14 On direct appeal, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt and that trial counsel was ineffective for eliciting damaging identification

evidence during his cross-examination of Estrada. This Court affirmed, finding the evidence was

sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt and the testimony defense counsel elicited on cross did not

impact the outcome of the trial. People v. Rodriguez, No. 1-06-3525 (June 27, 2008) (unpublished

pursuant to Rule 23).

¶ 15 Thereafter, in January 2010, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. In

that petition, defendant alleged, among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to investigate and present various alibi witnesses. In support, defendant attached unsigned

“affidavits” attributed to six named witnesses, asserting that defendant had been living with them

in Mexico on July 26, 2003. Defendant also included his own signed statement, which explained

that, due to the circumstances of his incarceration, he had limited phone contact with an individual

who had contact with the witnesses in Mexico, and that defendant had been unable tell the

5 No. 1-17-1200

witnesses where to mail their signed affidavits. On March 5, 2010, the court dismissed defendant’s

petition as frivolous and patently without merit, on the basis that the purported witness statements

were not affidavits “in compliance with the postconviction act.” This Court affirmed the summary

dismissal of defendant’s post-conviction petition. People v. Rodriguez,

-

U.

¶ 16 On August 3, 2011, while the first post-conviction appeal was pending, defendant filed a

pro se motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging actual innocence,

ineffective assistance of counsel, and a due process violation based on the State’s knowing use of

perjured testimony to secure his conviction. The motion purported to attach an affidavit from

Abarca, however, there was no affidavit attached to the petition. The trial court denied defendant

leave to file a successive petition, and this court granted counsel’s Finley motion to withdraw from

the appeal of that order and affirmed the judgment below. People v. Rodriguez,

.

¶ 17 In November 2011, defendant filed a second pro se motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition. Defendant alleged that he was actually innocent based on the “voluntary

declaration” of Abarca. Defendant attached an unnotarized “voluntary declaration” of Abarca, in

which Abarca stated generally that that on July 26, 2003, he was a passenger in a car with Estrada;

DeLeon; and Estrada’s brother, Daniel “Dreamer” Estrada (”Dreamer”). Estrada further stated that

it was Estrada and Dreamer who exited the car at Raymond’s Tacos and Estrada returned with a

bloody knife. Abarca stated that it was Dreamer who was driving the car and fled from police.

¶ 18 Abarca further stated that he was not cooperative at the police station, so the police

physically abused him. Eventually, the police showed him a picture of the person DeLeon “said

did it,” so Abarca agreed to identify that person. Later, the police told him that they had “picked

6 No. 1-17-1200

up the guy from the picture,” and they knew he “wasn’t the one that did it.” The police then showed

Abarca a statement that DeLeon signed and showed him pictures of defendant, who Abarca stated

that he knew from the neighborhood. The police threatened to charge Abarca with murder if he

did not agree with DeLeon’s story that defendant did it. According to Abarca, the police “said that

[defendant] was a piece of s***” who they suspected of “committing another previous gang

murder,” and that they had “been wanting to get him off the streets.” Due to the threats and the

physical abuse, Abarca agreed to implicate defendant.

¶ 19 Abarca stated, however, that “[o]ver the last couple of years of [his] incarceration,” Abarca

had been trying to “get closer to God by reading the bible,” and wanted to tell the truth. Abarca

reiterated that defendant was not in the car with him, Estrada, Dreamer, and DeLeon. Abarca stated

that he would have been willing to testify at trial to these facts if only a lawyer had contacted him,

and that he would still be willing to so testify.

¶ 20 On December 2, 2011, the circuit court denied defendant leave to file his second successive

petition, noting that Abarca’s non-notarized “voluntary declaration” was not an affidavit within

the meaning of the Post-Conviction Act. Defendant did not appeal that denial.

¶ 21 Thereafter, on June 20, 2012, defendant filed a third pro se motion for leave to file a

successive post-conviction petition, which is the subject of the instant appeal. As grounds for relief,

defendant claimed that he is actually innocent based on newly discovered evidence. In support,

defendant attached a notarized affidavit of Abarca. Defendant asserted various difficulties in

locating and obtaining an affidavit from Abarca, who was “in the federal prison system.”

Defendant stated that prison rules prohibited defendant from communicating with Abarca without

the warden’s permission, which he sought to no avail. Additionally, defendant maintained that the

7 No. 1-17-1200

Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) had provided him with inadequate forms, and denied

him the services of a notary.

¶ 22 In Abarca’s affidavit, he averred to substantially the same sequence of events described in

his “voluntary declaration” submitted as part of defendant’s second pro se petition for leave to file

a successive post-conviction petition. Abarca, however, added that when Estrada pulled the car up

to Raymond’s Tacos, Estrada told Dreamer “let’s go talk to [the victim].” Estrada and Dreamer

got out of the car, and Abarca drove to a nearby parking lot and then walked back toward Estrada,

Dreamer and the victim. Abarca saw the victim holding a knife. Estrada told Dreamer to hit the

victim and Dreamer complied. The victim dropped the knife, and Estrada grabbed it and stabbed

the victim. Abarca stated that he could not stop any of this because he did not know it was going

to happen and he did not want Estrada or the victim to kill him. When he returned to the car,

Estrada was holding the bloody knife. Estrada told DeLeon he would kill her if she told, and

instructed Abarca to get in the car. Abarca got in because he was scared Estrada would kill him.

Estrada initially drove, but then pulled over and told Dreamer to drive. Estrada wiped off the

bloody knife and threw it out the window. After they were blocked in by the police in the alley,

and Dreamer got out and ran away, Estrada told Abarca and DeLeon not to tell the police anything.

Abarca stated that Estrada was a “gang Chief” and Estrada’s family could have easily murdered

Abarca’s family in Mexico. Abarca did not tell the police any of this because he did not want to

get charged with murder or put himself or his family in danger.

¶ 23 Defendant also attached his own notarized affidavit, in which he averred to a telephone

conversation he had with DeLeon, in which she stated that the police coerced her into identifying

another individual, and thereafter, defendant, after it was determined that the first man was not

8 No. 1-17-1200

involved. DeLeon also related to defendant that Estrada is a “powerful gang member” who

threatened to kill her if she talked, and that he was capable of having her family in Mexico killed.

¶ 24 In addition to his claim of actual innocence, defendant also raised claims that the State

committed a Brady violation by failing to disclose evidence that Abarca and DeLeon initially

identified a different person as the assailant, and evidence that the police used improperly coercive

tactics. Defendant also contended that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel where,

among other things, counsel did not sufficiently investigate Abarca as an eyewitness.

¶ 25 Thereafter, defendant filed supplements to his petition on September 6, 2013, December

18, 2013, and May 9, 2014. Among other claims, defendant reiterated his claim of actual innocence

and presented two signed and notarized affidavits from Jorge Flores and Jose Salinas.

¶ 26 Flores averred that he saw Estrada stab someone in front of Raymond’s Tacos and Flores

did not see defendant anywhere in the area at the time of the murder. The man who was with

Estrada at the time showed up at Flores’s house later that day and told Flores not to say anything.

Flores had since learned that defendant was convicted of the murder that he saw Estrada commit,

and Flores knew that defendant was not involved in the crime. Flores stated that he would be

willing to testify to the above, and he did not come forward sooner because he was afraid Estrada

would kill him.

¶ 27 Salinas averred that he was present for the murder of the victim on July 26, 2003. Salinas

saw Dreamer hit the victim with an object and saw Estrada stab the victim. Dreamer later showed

up at Salinas’s house with some of the “Insane Deuces” from Aurora and threatened to kill Salinas

if he said anything. Salinas further averred that he did not see defendant anywhere in the area on

the night of the victim’s murder. Salinas stated that he did not come forward with this information

9 No. 1-17-1200

sooner because Dreamer threatened him and because he knew Estrada would have gotten his fellow

gang members to kill Salinas or his family.

¶ 28 On February 11, 2016, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of defendant. Defendant,

through counsel, filed another supplement to his petition on December 6, 2016, expanding on the

claims in defendant’s earlier pro se filings. Defense counsel also attached police records showing

that on July 26, 2003, police initially arrested a different individual, who was also named David

Rodriguez, based on DeLeon’s identification of him as the victim’s assailant, but the police ended

up releasing that individual without any charges.

¶ 29 On March 9, 2017, the circuit court ruled on defendant’s motion for leave to file a

successive post-conviction petition without argument from the parties. The court found that

Abarca’s affidavit was not newly discovered evidence where he was listed in the police reports

and his testimony could have been obtained sooner through due diligence. The court further found

that Abarca’s testimony was not so conclusive that it would have changed the result on retrial

where, had he testified, he would have been impeached by his previous statements to police naming

defendant as the person who stabbed the victim. The court also pointed out that the affidavit was

internally inconsistent where Abarca stated he would not tell police what really happened because

he feared Estrada, but also stated that he would have been willing to testify had he been contacted

to do so.

¶ 30 The circuit court further found that the affidavits of Flores and Salinas were not material

to defendant’s guilt or innocence because they only indicated they did not see defendant at the

scene, which did not rule out his involvement. The court additionally found the proposed testimony

was not so conclusive as to probably change the result on retrial where they provided only vague

10 No. 1-17-1200

observations, or generalized information, about the events, which did not outweigh the evidence

presented at trial.

¶ 31 With regard to the Brady violation, the circuit court found that defendant’s claim that the

police withheld Abarca’s and DeLeon’s initial statements and identifications of someone else was

not exculpatory or impeaching, and defendant’s claim was unsupported and conclusory. Finally,

the court found defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel meritless where there

was no basis for counsel to believe that Abarca had any relevant information that would aid in

defendant’s defense when he named defendant as the perpetrator in his statements to police, and

even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Abarca’s testimony would not have changed the

outcome of the trial.

¶ 32 Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that defendant failed to raise a cognizable claim

of actual innocence, or to satisfy the cause and prejudice test necessary to advance his claims. The

court denied defendant leave to file his successive post-conviction petition.

¶ 33 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider on April 7, 2017, which was denied on April 26,

2017. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal from that denial.

¶ 34 In this appeal, defendant argues that he made a colorable claim of actual innocence, and

asks this court to reverse the denial of his motion for leave to file a successive petition and remand

for second stage proceedings. We initially note that by limiting his challenge to his actual

innocence claim, defendant forfeited review of the remaining claims in his petition. Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018); People v. Guest,

(1995); People v. Enis,

(2000) (a reviewing court will “consider only those claims that defendant raised

on appeal”).

11 No. 1-17-1200

¶ 35 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) allows a defendant who is imprisoned in a

penitentiary to challenge his conviction or sentence on the grounds that it was the result of a denial

of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 2016); see also People v. Robinson,

(“The Act provides a statutory remedy to criminal defendants who assert claims for

substantial violations of their constitutional rights at trial.”). The Act ordinarily contemplates the

filing of a single postconviction petition (id.) and a defendant must obtain leave of court before

filing a successive petition (725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2018)). A court should grant leave where

a defendant can show either (1) cause and prejudice for failure to raise the claim earlier, or (2) a

“fundamental miscarriage of justice” based on actual innocence. Robinson,

;

People v. Edwards,

. We review de novo a trial court’s denial of leave

to file a successive postconviction petition. People v. Bailey,

.

¶ 36 Here, defendant maintains that leave should have been granted based on his actual

innocence claim. A request for leave to file a successive petition should be denied only where it is

clear from a review of the petition and supporting documentation that, as a matter of law, the

petition cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence. Robinson,

.

Accordingly, leave of court should be granted where the petitioner’s supporting documentation

raises the probability that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

the petitioner in light of the new evidence.

The determination of whether a postconviction

petition sets forth a colorable claim of actual innocence is a question of law that we review de

novo. Id. ¶ 40.

¶ 37 At the pleading stage of postconviction proceedings, all well-pleaded allegations in the

petition and supporting affidavits that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken

as true, and the court is precluded from making factual and credibility determinations, which can

12 No. 1-17-1200

“be made only at a third-stage evidentiary hearing.” Id. ¶¶ 45, 61. Moreover, evidence is not

“positively rebutted simply because it was contradicted by the evidence presented at trial.” Id. ¶

60. “For new evidence to be positively rebutted, it must be clear from the trial record that no fact

finder could ever accept the truth of that evidence, such as where it is affirmatively and

incontestably demonstrated to be false or impossible ***.” Id.

¶ 38 The supreme court recently explained the standard for actual innocence claims in Robinson,

, as follows:

“To establish a claim of actual innocence, the supporting evidence must be (1)

newly discovered, (2) material and not cumulative, and (3) of such conclusive

character that it would probably change the result on retrial. [Citations.] Newly

discovered evidence is evidence that was discovered after trial and that the

petitioner could not have discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence.

[Citation.] Evidence is material if it is relevant and probative of the petitioner’s

innocence. [Citation.] Noncumulative evidence adds to the information that the fact

finder heard at trial. [Citation.] Lastly, the conclusive character element refers to

evidence that, when considered along with the trial evidence, would probably lead

to a different result. [Citation.] The conclusive character of the new evidence is the

most important element of an actual innocence claim. [Citation.]

Ultimately, the question is whether the evidence supporting the

postconviction petition places the trial evidence in a different light and undermines

the court’s confidence in the judgment of guilt. [Citation.] The new evidence need

not be entirely dispositive to be likely to alter the result on retrial. [Citation.]

Probability, rather than certainty, is the key in considering whether the fact finder

13 No. 1-17-1200

would reach a different result after considering the prior evidence along with the

new evidence. [Citation.]”

¶ 39 In this case, defendant contends that he presented a colorable claim of actual innocence

based on the affidavits of Abarca, Salinas, and Flores. Those affiants generally aver that they were

present for the murder of the victim, that defendant was not present, and that Dreamer was the

second perpetrator along with Estrada. The affiants also aver to their prior unwillingness to come

forward with this information in light of threats by Estrada and/or Dreamer, and fear that they or

their families would be killed if they did so. Abarca also avers that his identification of defendant

was procured by threats, physical abuse, and coercion by the police.

¶ 40 The proposed testimony of Abarca, Salinas, and Flores is material, where all three averred

that they were eyewitnesses to the victim’s stabbing, that it was Estrada and Dreamer who

participated in the murder, and that defendant was not present. See People v. Coleman,

(testimony that witnesses were “present for or involved in the attack” and “that the

defendant was not” is “relevant, and probative of the defendant’s innocence.”); People v. Adams,

(“viewing the facts alleged in [the] affidavits as true, evidence that

someone other than defendant killed the victim and that defendant was not present at the scene is

certainly material”). Moreover, the proposed testimony is not cumulative to any evidence

presented at defendant’s bench trial, as it contradicts the videotaped statement of Estrada and

implicates an alternative perpetrator in the murder of the victim. See People v. Ortiz,

(2009) (where “testimony supplied a first-person account of the incident that directly

contradicted the prior statements of the two eyewitnesses for the prosecution,” it “added to what

was before the fact finder” and was “not merely cumulative.”); Adams,

(affidavits pointing to the identity of an alternate perpetrator for the first time would “add to

14 No. 1-17-1200

what was previously before the jury.”). Accordingly, the proposed testimony here is

noncumulative, and would add to the information that the jury heard at defendant’s trial.

¶ 41 Assuming the truth of all well-pleaded allegations in the petition and supporting affidavits

not positively rebutted by the trial record, as we must do at this stage in proceedings, we also

conclude that the proposed testimony would probably change the result on retrial. To be of such a

conclusive character, the evidence supporting a postconviction petition need not be entirely

dispositive to probably change the result on retrial. Robinson,

. “Probability,

rather than certainty, is the key in considering whether the fact finder would reach a different result

after considering the prior evidence along with the new evidence.”

If a trier of fact on a retrial

believed the testimony that defendant was not present at the murder, and that it was Estrada and

Dreamer who perpetrated the crime, that testimony would be dispositive, as Estrada was the only

eyewitness at defendant’s trial that linked him to murder. There was no other eyewitness testimony

or physical evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

¶ 42 Finally, the proposed testimony of Salinas and Flores meets the standard for newly

discovered evidence because both witnesses indicated in their affidavits that they did not come

forward sooner due to their fears of Estrada. Furthermore, neither was listed by either side as a

possible witness at the time of trial. Thus, there is no basis for concluding that defendant could

have discovered their exculpatory testimony sooner through due diligence. See Adams,

(eyewitness evidence was newly discovered where the witnesses’

proposed testimony identifying a different perpetrator “was not discovered until years after the

offense, when they came forward and signed their affidavits.”).

¶ 43 Abarca, however, was arrested near the scene of the crime and listed as a possible trial

witness by both the prosecution and defense. Accordingly, the State contends that defendant

15 No. 1-17-1200

cannot show that Abarca’s testimony could not have been discovered sooner through due

diligence. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that he carefully detailed the various obstacles

that prevented him from investigating the substance of Abarca’s observations in his petition, and

further argues that he should not be denied relief where it was his trial counsel who did not attempt

to contact Abarca. Nevertheless, this court need not determine whether Abarca’s testimony is

newly discovered, since the affidavits of Salinas and Flores alone are sufficient to require remand

for second stage proceedings.

¶ 44 For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court of Cook County’s denial of the

defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition alleging actual innocence

and remand the case for second stage proceedings.

¶ 45 Reversed and remanded.

16