No. 1-16-1068 September 30, 2020

FIRST DIVISION

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) Of Cook County. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 03 CR 12481 v. ) ) The Honorable CHRISTOPHER PEOPLES, ) Arthur F. Hill, Jr., ) Judge Presiding. Defendant-Appellant. )

JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hyman concurred in the judgment. Justice Pierce dissented.

ORDER

¶1 Held: A postconviction petition with its supplement and documents supporting the claim that defense counsel failed to impeach a witness with available evidence of crimes states the gist of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶2 A jury found Christopher Peoples guilty of murder and home invasion committed in 2002.

In a postconviction petition, Peoples alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his attorney failed to impeach a detective who falsely testified that Peoples confessed to

participating in the murder. The trial court dismissed the petition without holding an No. 1-16-1068

evidentiary hearing. We find that Peoples has made a substantial showing that his attorney

provided objectively unreasonable assistance by failing to impeach the detective. We also find

that Peoples has substantially shown a reasonable probability that he would have achieved a

better result if the attorney had used available evidence to impeach the detective. We reverse

the dismissal of the postconviction petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 8, 2002, around 8:30 p.m., Ninner Powers escorted two guests to her front door.

As she closed the door behind them, a push on the door knocked her back. Three men entered

her home. She recognized Marcel White and James Mitchell, but she did not recognize the

third man. The three men accused her and her fiancé, Brian Campbell, of selling drugs for a

rival gang. Campbell heard the men and came to see what they wanted. The man Powers did

not recognize drew a gun and fired three shots at Campbell. The man then aimed at Powers

and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not discharge. Powers picked up a revolver from the

floor and pointed it at the three men. They ran off. Powers asked neighbors to call the police.

Campbell died from the gunshot wounds.

¶5 Powers told police about White and Mitchell, and she later identified photographs of them

at the police station. She described the third man as a medium complexion Black man, with a

stocky muscular build and an afro. She also stated that he was between 5 foot 10 and 6 feet

tall, around 200 to 220 pounds, with a gap between two of his teeth. Police showed Powers an

array of photographs some months later, in August 2002. She chose a photograph of Peoples

as a picture of the shooter. She again identified Peoples as the shooter in a lineup in September

2002. Peoples, a 6 foot tall bald Black man with a goatee and a mustache, weighed 170 pounds

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and had a gold tooth but no gap. Prosecutors charged Peoples with first degree murder and

home invasion.

¶6 At the jury trial held in December 2004, Powers again identified Peoples as the shooter.

Peoples, his girlfriend, and two family members testified that Peoples stayed at his mother's

home working on his car all evening on May 8, 2002. The defense witnesses testified that

Peoples had long worn a goatee and a mustache, kept his hair very short or bald, and he never

weighed close to 200 pounds. Peoples testified that he did not make any statements to police

about the murder.

¶7 Detective John Halloran testified that he spoke with Peoples in September 2002, following

his arrest, and Peoples said that on May 8, 2002, Mitchell asked Peoples to "provide him with

some muscle" for a confrontation with people selling drugs for a rival gang. According to

Halloran, Peoples said Powers let them in the front door and they confronted Campbell. When

Peoples heard gunshots, he started running. According to Halloran, Peoples said he did not

fire any shots. Halloran further testified that Peoples refused to speak to an Assistant State's

Attorney, and he refused to make a video recorded statement.

¶8 The jury found Peoples guilty of home invasion and first-degree murder. The court

sentenced him to 75 years in prison for murder, plus 10 years for home invasion, with the

sentences to run consecutively. The appellate court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

People v. Peoples,

(2007).

¶9 Peoples filed a postconviction petition in 2008. He alleged that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to impeach Halloran with evidence of crimes Halloran

committed as a member of the Chicago Police Department. Peoples alleged that his attorney

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could have found evidence that between 1990 and 2000, Halloran participated in the abuse of:

(1) John Plummer, a mentally unstable juvenile, beaten by police; (2) Kilroy Watkins, who

signed a false confession under police duress; (3) Harold Hill, a mentally retarded man who

confessed after police beat him; (4) Dan Young, beaten and force fed by police until he falsely

confessed; (5) Tyrone Reyna, struck, threatened, and tricked into signing a false confession;

(6) Antoine Holiday, William Hughes, and Richard Anthony, who confessed to multiple

murders after police beat them, threatened them, and deprived them of food, sleep, and use of

a toilet; (7) Fred Ewing and Darnell Stokes, mentally retarded juveniles tortured into

confessions; (8) Michael Taylor, beaten by police and denied access to food, his family, and

his lawyer; (9) Derrick Flewellen, a mentally retarded man who falsely confessed to two

murders after police beat him; (10) Eric and Oscar Gomez, beaten by police and denied food,

sleep, and use of a toilet for 30 hours; (11) Kylin Litte, beaten until he gave a false statement

implicating Eric Gibson in a murder; (12) Jason Miller, beaten until he gave a false statement

implicating William Ephraim in a murder; (13) Andre Brown, psychologically coerced into a

false confession; (14) Reginald Cole, shot dead inside police headquarters during an

interrogation; (15) Peter Williams, beaten until he falsely confessed; and (16) Nicholas

Escamilla, beaten and threatened with harm to his wife and child.

¶ 10 Peoples supported his petition with court complaints filed in several cases naming Halloran

and other police officers as defendants, and records of complaints made to the Office of

Professional Standards.

¶ 11 A public defender supplemented Peoples's petition with more detail concerning the

allegations that Halloran abused the victims Peoples listed, and added allegations concerning

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other victims of Halloran's abuse. According to the supplement to the postconviction petition,

in 1994 Halloran threatened to have the Department of Children and Family Services take

Sheila Crosby's children if she did not make the identifications he sought in a homicide case.

Halloran and fellow officers beat Abel Quinones and instructed him to sign a false statement

Halloran dictated. Halloran fabricated a statement prosecutors used to obtain a conviction of

Robert Wilson in 1997.

¶ 12 The public defender supported the postconviction petition and the supplement with several

complaints detailing allegations of Halloran's crimes against the listed victims, transcripts of

the testimony of several victims, and newspaper articles concerning long term investigations

into the crimes committed by Halloran and his fellow officers, starting with their acts under

the direction of Commander Jon Burge at Area 2 and Area 3 police headquarters.

¶ 13 The trial court held that even if Peoples could prove the allegations of the petition and its

supplement, “[i]t is unclear exactly how Detective Halloran would have been impeached.” The

court held that Peoples had not made a substantial showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

The court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Peoples now appeals.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 When the trial court denies a postconviction petition without holding an evidentiary

hearing, we review the decision de novo. People v. Childress,

(2000). At

this stage of postconviction proceedings, we make no credibility determinations and review

the record only to decide whether the petitioner has made a substantial showing of a

constitutional violation. People v. Domagala,

. Peoples argues only that

he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial when his counsel failed to present available

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evidence that would have impeached Halloran. We must determine whether Peoples made a

substantial showing that his counsel provided objectively unreasonable assistance, and whether

he made a substantial showing of a reasonable probability that he would have achieved a better

result but for the error. Domagala,

, ¶ 36

¶ 16 The Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 147/1 et

seq. (West 2000)) defines "streetgang" as "[A]ny combination, confederation, alliance,

network, conspiracy, understanding, or other similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or more

persons with an established hierarchy that, through its membership or through the agency of

any member engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity." 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2000).

The allegations in the postconviction petition and its supplement, along with evidence adduced

in a number of other cases involving officers working under the direction of Commander Jon

Burge at Area 2 and Area 3 police headquarters, support the conclusion that Burge and some

of the officers he directed formed a violent criminal gang. They used a variety of methods,

including torture, beatings, threats, and perjury, to obtain criminal convictions against their

victims. See Hobley v. Burge, No. 03 C 3678 (N.D. Ill. September 16, 2004); United States v.

Burge, No. 08 CR 846 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009); United States ex rel Maxwell v. Gilmore,

(N.D. Ill. 1999); Elliott Riebman, How and Why a Code of Silence

Between State's Attorneys and Police Officers Resulted in Unprosecuted Torture, 9 DePaul J.

for Soc. Just. 1, 20 (2016) (hereinafter, "Riebman") (at:

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol9/iss2/3). The allegations in the petition, along with

evidence in a number of cases, indicate that Halloran participated in the gang's criminal

activities. See People v. Tyler,

; People v. Weathers, 2015 IL

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App (1st) 133264, ¶ 14. "Evidence indicating the defendant was a gang member or involved

in gang-related activity is generally held to be admissible to show common purpose or design,

or to provide a motive for an otherwise inexplicable act." People v. Patterson,

(1992).

¶ 17 The State argues that Halloran's alleged fabrication of Peoples's confession in 2002 does

not match closely enough to the crimes alleged and were not proven in other cases involving

Halloran. The State also contends that those cases mostly centered on torture and physical

abuse rather than simple perjury, and most of the other cases occurred before 1999. "The

amount of time separating the incidents is a relevant consideration when determining

admissibility. [Citations.] Even incidents that are remote in time can become relevant,

however, if the party presenting the evidence can present evidence of other incidents that

occurred in the interim. Thus, a single incident years removed has little relevance. However, a

series of incidents spanning several years can be relevant to establishing a claim of a pattern

and practice of torture." People v. Patterson,

(2000).

¶ 18 We find that the acts alleged in the petition show a pattern and practice of fabricating

evidence to obtain criminal convictions against the victims of crimes committed by the police.

Peoples has made a substantial showing that the trial court should have admitted evidence of

the acts alleged in the petition to undercut Halloran's credibility by showing his participation

in the criminal activities of a streetgang operating out of Area 2 and Area 3 police headquarters

under the direction of Burge.

¶ 19 The documents appended to the postconviction petition support the inference that defense

counsel should have tried to find evidence impeaching Halloran. Although most of the other

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victims filed their complaints well after Peoples's trial took place, a number of newspaper

articles about the criminal operations under Burge appeared before 2004 (see, e.g., Maurice

Possley, "Veteran Detective's Murder Cases Unravel," Chicago Tribune, Dec. 17, 2001), and

several victims had informed the public defender's office about the crimes committed by

Burge's gang. A public defender said physical abuse by officers acting under Burge was

"common knowledge." Riebman at 20. Another, in a 2004 interview, reported that when he

told his supervisor of a client's allegations that police suffocated him with a plastic bag, the

supervisor answered, "Oh, that would be Area 2." Riebman at 21. The documents Peoples

presented support the inference that Peoples's attorney, a public defender, should have known

that he could find witnesses to impeach Halloran with evidence that Halloran participated in

numerous crimes. We find the public defender provided objectively unreasonable assistance

by failing to look for such impeaching evidence.

¶ 20 Prosecutors presented an exceptionally thin case against Peoples. No physical evidence

tied Peoples to the crime, and Powers is the only witness who identified Peoples., Powers. No

other witness saw Peoples at the scene or by Powers's home. Powers did not know Peoples.

Her initial description of the shooter differed markedly from Peoples. She did not remember

any facial hair, but Peoples wore a mustache and a goatee. She remembered an afro hair style,

but Peoples kept his head almost bald. She described the shooter as stocky, and she guessed a

weight 30 to 50 pounds greater than Peoples's weight. Apart from Powers, the State presented

only the testimony of Halloran, who said Peoples refused to record his statement or speak with

an assistant State's Attorney after he confessed to participating with the murderers in the

confrontation with Campbell. If the jury had known of Halloran's extensive criminal history

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of fabricating evidence to obtain convictions against his victims, the jury may well have

decided that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peoples participated in

the murder and home invasion.

¶ 21 Peoples has substantially shown that his attorney’s unreasonable failure to impeach

Halloran with available evidence of Halloran’s crimes prejudiced Peoples. We reverse the

dismissal of Peoples’s postconviction petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the

allegations of Peoples’s petition.

¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 23 Peoples's postconviction petition, with its supplement and supporting documents,

sufficiently alleged facts showing that his attorney committed unprofessional errors by failing

to use available evidence to impeach Halloran's testimony that Peoples confessed to

participating in the murder of Brian Campbell. The record supports the inference that Peoples

could have achieved a better result at trial if not for his attorney's errors. We reverse the

dismissal of his postconviction petition and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the

allegations of the petition.

¶ 24 Reversed and remanded.

¶ 25 JUSTICE PIERCE, dissenting.

¶ 26 Peoples argues there that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial where his

trial counsel failed to present available evidence that would have impeached Detective

Halloran’s testimony that Peoples confessed to participating in the murder of Brian Campbell.

The majority has decided that Peoples is entitled to a third stage evidentiary hearing because

Peoples petition, with supporting documents, sufficiently alleges that counsel was ineffective 9 No. 1-16-1068

for failing to “look for such impeaching evidence” and for failing to successfully impeach

Halloran with evidence of prior wrongdoing. I respectfully dissent. Defendant’s petition, and

supporting documents, does not sufficiently allege that counsel was ineffective.

¶ 27 The defendant was convicted in this case on the testimony of Powers, an eyewitness, and

Detective Halloran, who spoke with defendant after his arrest. Powers identified Peoples in a

photo array, in a subsequent lineup and later identified Peoples as the shooter at trial. Detective

Halloran testified that he spoke with defendant after he was arrested and defendant told him

that he was acting as “muscle” for a confrontation with people selling drugs for a rival gang,

but that he ran when the shooting began and did not fire any shots. Detective Halloran stated

that Peoples refused to speak to an Assistant State’s Attorney and refused to make a video

recorded statement. Peoples denied making any statements to the police about the murder.

Peoples did not file any pretrial motions alleging that Detective Halloran, or any other member

of the Chicago police department mistreated him in any way or coerced a confession, nor did

defendant testify as such when he took the stand at trial.

¶ 28 With respect to any claim made in a postconviction petition, section 122-2 of the Act

instructs that a postconviction petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other

supporting evidence, or shall state why the same are not attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West

2014). The purpose of section 122-2 of the Act is to establish that the verified allegations in

the petition are capable of objective or independent corroboration. (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) People v. Delton,

(2008). A petitioner’s failure to either attach

the necessary “affidavits, records, or other evidence or explain their absence is fatal to a

postconviction petition [citation] and by itself justifies the petition’s summary dismissal.”

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(Internal quotation marks omitted.)

. All well-pled facts in the petition and affidavits

are taken as true, but assertions that are really conclusions add nothing to the required showing

to trigger an evidentiary hearing under the Act. People v. Coleman,

(1998).

¶ 29 To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance at the second stage of postconviction

proceedings, defendant was required to make a substantial showing that his counsel's failure

to present available evidence that would have impeached Detective Halloran was objectively

unreasonable and that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have

been different had this evidence been presented. People v. Domagala,

, ¶¶ 35-

36. Matters of trial strategy generally are immune from claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. People v. Dupree,

.

¶ 30 Although the majority states that the documents appended to the postconviction petition

support the inference that defense counsel should have “tried to find evidence impeaching

Halloran,” there is nothing appended to People’s postconviction petition that shows defense

counsel did not attempt to obtain evidence that could be used for Halloran’s impeachment.

Defendant similarly failed to provide any evidence to support his claim that counsel’s failure

to impeach Halloran with whatever evidence was available at trial, was not a matter of trial

strategy. No affidavit from petitioner's trial counsel was attached to the post-conviction

petitions averring that trial counsel was unaware of or failed to investigate allegations of

misconduct by Detective Halloran, and petitioner has failed to explain the absence of such

documentation. Section 122-2 is clear that a petitioner who is unable to obtain the necessary

affidavits, records, or other evidence must at least explain why such evidence is unobtainable.

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725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2016). Here, petitioner does not even attempt to explain this critical

omission.

¶ 31 While People’s failure to attach independent corroborating documentation from his

attorney may be excused (People v. Collins,

(2002)), petitioner was able to

provide an affidavit from his co-defendant James Mitchell averring that Detective Halloran

falsely testified that Mitchell gave an oral confession. Yet, Mitchell did not contend that

petitioner's trial counsel failed to contact him or that he was willing to speak to petitioner's

counsel. In addition, Peoples did not provide an affidavit from Mitchell's counsel averring that

he was never contacted by petitioner's counsel. Furthermore, Peoples could have attached to

his postconviction petition affidavits from the individuals named in the attached documents,

or their attorneys, averring that they were never contacted by trial counsel, but petitioner failed

to do so. In short, the documentation Peoples provided in support of his petition does not

support his broad conclusion that trial counsel failed to investigate Halloran’s alleged prior

misconduct. People v. Johnson,

(affirming dismissal of

a second-stage post-conviction alleging, in part, that trial counsel failed to investigate a

detective's pattern of coercion where the petitioner "presented no evidence that his attorneys

failed to investigate the abuse listed in the newspaper articles or were even made aware of the

allegations in the newspaper articles"). Therefore, petitioner failed to make a substantial

showing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate where his claim is

unsupported.

¶ 32 Petitioner's broad claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

"available" evidence of Halloran’s alleged prior acts of physical abuse and coercion at trial

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should also be rejected as it lacks the required support. Peoples has directed this court to

"newspaper articles and other information" attached to the post-conviction petition, without

any real discussion of how these attached documents support his claim of ineffective

assistance. After a lengthy discussion of the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention

Act (740 ILCS 147/1 et seq. (West 2000)), the majority accepts these documents as conclusive

evidence that Halloran “participated in [Burge’s] gang’s criminal activities.” This far-fetched

analysis does nothing to overcome the fact that Peoples failed to specify which, if any, of the

documents or articles may have provided his counsel with relevant and admissible evidence at

trial, especially given the fact that many of the documents themselves clearly rebut petitioner's

claim that such evidence was "available" to petitioner's counsel at the time of trial. Many of

the documents petitioner relies on to support his claim were prepared or created after

petitioner's December 2004 trial, as the majority acknowledges.

¶ 33 The remaining attached documents prepared before People’s trial allege Detective Halloran

engaged in physical abuse and coerced individuals to falsely confess. The relevant question

when determining whether evidence of prior allegations of police misconduct is admissible

is: do the prior allegations involve the same officer and the similar methods, and are they close

in time to the allegations in the case before the court. People v. Porter-Boens,

. When the allegations are not similar or unduly remote, they will not be

allowed in.

¶ 34 The documents provided by Peoples contain allegations against Detective Halloran that are

dissimilar to the allegation in petitioner's case. Peoples never alleged any physical abuse on

the part of Detective Halloran, nor did he allege that he was coerced into falsely confessing.

13 No. 1-16-1068

Rather, Peoples claims that Detective Halloran fabricated petitioner’s oral confession. The

allegations are too different and therefore, these documents would not be admissible.

¶ 35 Assuming for the sake of argument that counsel’s failure to obtain or introduce evidence

of Halloran’s prior misconduct was unreasonable, Peoples still could not establish the prejudice

to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Powers identified defendant in a photo

array and a subsequent lineup. She also identified him in open court. A single eyewitness

identification can support a conviction if the witness is credible and viewed the accused under

circumstances permitting a positive identification. People v. Lewis,

(1995).

Powers was a credible witness and viewed Peoples in circumstances allowing for a positive

identification. Powers identified Peoples three separate times following the offense in

question. Her testimony alone was sufficient to convict Peoples.

¶ 36 Peoples has failed to show that his attorney’s failure to investigate or impeach Halloran

with “available” evidence resulted in any prejudice to him. For that reason, I would affirm the

court’s denial of People’s postconviction petition.

14