NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

SECOND DIVISION September 29, 2020 No. 1-19-1896 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

BRYAN CHEATEM, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Petitioner-Appellant, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 18 CH 7437 ) COOK COUNTY STATE’S ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, ) The Honorable ) Neil H. Cohen, Respondent-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Cobbs concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Petitioner’s prior felony convictions did not prevent him as a matter of law from obtaining relief from the restrictions that prohibit him from possessing firearms or from acquiring of a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, as granting such relief would not necessarily be “contrary to federal law.” 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018). Reversed and remanded.

¶2 The petitioner, Bryan Cheatem, appeals the judgment of the circuit court denying his petition

for relief from restrictions that prohibit his eligibility for a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID)

Card and for the issuance of an order directing the Illinois Department of State Police to issue a

FOID Card to him. No. 1-19-1896

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Petitioner’s amended petition for relief states that he has been convicted of four felonies. Two

of these convictions occurred on April 16, 1997, when he was convicted of robbery and receiving

stolen property. These were Class 2 felonies, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of seven

years in the Illinois Department of Corrections with a recommendation for boot camp. On

September 22, 1998, he was convicted of retail theft, a Class 4 felony for which he was sentenced

to a term of one year and six months imprisonment. Finally, on June 7, 1999, he was convicted of

forgery, a Class 3 felony for which he was sentenced to two years and six months of probation.

¶5 As a result of having these felony convictions on his record, petitioner is prohibited from

possessing a firearm by section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a)

(West 2018)) (felon-in-possession statute). He is also prohibited from obtaining a FOID Card

because of the felony convictions themselves (430 ILCS 65/8(c) (West 2018)) and because of the

prohibition on his possession of firearms under the felon-in-possession statute (id. § 8(n)).

Additionally, federal law prohibits the shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving of any

firearm or ammunition by a person who has been “convicted” of a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.

(g)(1) (2018). Federal law defines

“conviction” in such a way that this federal firearm prohibition does not apply to a conviction that

has been “expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights

restored * * * unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides

that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”

§ 921(a)(20).

¶6 In 2017, petitioner submitted an application for a FOID Card to the Illinois Department of

State Police. In his application, he acknowledged that he had been convicted of a felony in the

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past. The Department of State Police sent him a letter denying his application on the basis that he

was “prohibited from firearms” as a person who had been convicted of a felony.

¶7 Following this denial, petitioner filed the present action under section 10(c) of the Firearm

Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act). 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018). Section 10(c)

authorizes a person who is prohibited from possessing a firearm under the felon-in-possession

statute or from acquiring a FOID Card to apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit

court, depending on the applicable circumstances, requesting relief from the applicable

prohibition. Id. The statute authorizes such relief to be granted if the petitioner establishes to the

satisfaction of the court or the Director of State Police that: (1) he or she has not been convicted

of a forcible felony within 20 years of the FOID Card application, or at least 20 years have passed

since the end of any period of imprisonment related to such conviction; (2) the circumstances

regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the applicant’s criminal history, and his or her

reputation are such that he or she will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety;

(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and (4) granting relief would not be

contrary to federal law. Id.

¶8 Petitioner’s amended petition for relief stated that his convictions between 1997 and 1999

were the result of poor decisions he made as a young man who had experienced a difficult

upbringing. He explained that in the two decades since his convictions, he had maintained

consistent employment as a union carpenter, been involved in his community, owned his own

home, and raised a daughter. He submitted affidavits from several individuals who attested to his

good reputation in the community and to the fact that he was unlikely to pose any danger if he

were allowed to possess a firearm. Petitioner stated in his affidavit that he wanted to become a

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licensed locksmith, as his union work involved installing doors and locks, but his inability to obtain

a FOID Card prevented him from obtaining such a license.

¶9 The Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office filed an objection to petitioner’s petition. It

argued that petitioner’s application for a FOID Card had been properly denied because petitioner

was prohibited by his felony convictions from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1) of the

Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended (

(g)(1) (2018)), and therefore he could never

prove to the court’s satisfaction that “granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” See

430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018). The State’s Attorney argued that petitioner did not qualify for

any of the exemptions to the federal prohibition on the possession of firearms because his

convictions had not been expunged or set aside, and he had not been pardoned or had his “civil

rights restored.” See

(a)(20) (2018). Concerning this last exemption, the State’s

Attorney argued that petitioner’s civil right to possess a firearm had not been restored, because the

felon-in-possession statute continued to prohibit him from possessing a firearm unless he was

granted relief by the Director of State Police. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018).

¶ 10 In response to the State’s Attorney’s objection, petitioner argued that he had in fact had his

“civil rights restored” following his convictions, and therefore granting him relief would not be

contrary to federal law. He cited Logan v. United States,

(2007), for the proposition

that the relevant “civil rights” that must be restored following a conviction are the rights to vote,

hold office, and serve on a jury. He argued that these three rights had all been restored to him after

he served his sentences for his convictions. He also argued that the right to possess a firearm is not

a “civil right” that must be restored following a conviction for purposes of the federal statute.

¶ 11 On April 4, 2019, the trial court held oral argument on the matter. In response to petitioner’s

argument set forth in the preceding paragraph, the State’s Attorney argued at the hearing that even

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if petitioner’s civil rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were restored, Illinois’s felon-

in-possession statute meant that they were only restored subject to an express prohibition on the

possession of firearms by felons; because of this, petitioner still had “convictions” prohibiting his

possession of firearms under federal law, and he was therefore ineligible for a FOID Card. The

trial court requested further briefing on whether and how Illinois law allowed a person in

petitioner’s position to have his second amendment right to possess a firearm restored, and whether

the second amendment was violated if in fact Illinois law did not allow restoration of firearm rights.

¶ 12 In petitioner’s supplemental briefing, he continued to argue that Illinois law allowed for the

restoration of firearm rights through section 10 of the FOID Card Act, provided that, consistent

with Logan, the civil rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were restored following a

conviction. The State’s Attorney contended that the only way in which Illinois law provided for

the restoration of firearm rights was through a full pardon that did not include any restrictions on

firearm rights. It contended that, unless a person was pardoned, Illinois provided no other means

by which a person who had been convicted of a felony could have the civil right to possess a

firearm restored. Neither party’s supplemental briefing made any constitutional arguments.

¶ 13 Following this supplemental briefing, the trial court held further oral argument. The trial court

expressed concern about the circular nature in which section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act

incorporated federal law, while the federal law in turn incorporated state law. The trial court

ordered the parties to submit further supplemental briefing on the legislative history of the 2013

amendment in which the General Assembly added the requirement that relief not be contrary to

federal law. Neither party submitted any pertinent legislative history, with the State’s Attorney’s

brief acknowledging that the legislative history of the 2013 amendment “does not elucidate the

legislature’s intent with regard to the restoration of civil rights in the context of firearm rights.”

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¶ 14 On August 23, 2019, the trial court entered judgment denying petitioner’s amended petition

for relief. Its written order contains only the finding that “relief would be contrary to federal law.

430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) [(West 2018)].” The record on appeal does not include any transcript of the

court proceedings from that day reflecting any further explanation by the trial court of the reasons

for its ruling. Petitioner then filed this appeal.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 The issue before this court is whether, as a matter of law, petitioner could ever establish that

granting him relief from the prohibition on his possession of firearms under Illinois’s felon-in-

possession statute or on his acquiring of a FOID Card “would not be contrary to federal law.” 430

ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018). This involves a question of statutory interpretation that we review

de novo. Dew-Becker v. Wu,

. The fundamental rule of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best indicator of that

intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.

A court may also consider

the reason for the statute, the problem the legislature sought to remedy, the purposes to be

achieved, and the consequences of interpreting the statute one way or another. Sperl v. Henry,

. Also, a court has an obligation to interpret statutes in a manner that avoids

absurd, unreasonable, or unjust results that the legislature could not have intended. Palm v.

Holocker,

.

¶ 17 Petitioner’s argument is that the trial court erred by concluding that granting him relief from

the restrictions that prohibit his eligibility for a FOID Card would be contrary to federal law. He

contends that he does not have a “conviction” of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year, which would result in his being prohibited from possessing firearms under

federal law, because he is or could qualify as a person who “has had civil rights restored” with no

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further restriction on his right to possess firearms. See

(a)(2), 922(g)(1) (2018).

He argues that his three relevant civil rights—voting, holding office, and serving on a jury—were

all restored to him once he served his sentence for his conviction. He also argues that, although his

right to possess a firearm was not automatically restored to him once he served his sentence,

Illinois law contemplates that a person convicted of a felony can regain the right to possess a

firearm and acquire a FOID Card. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018); 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West

2018). He therefore argues that the trial court could grant him the relief contemplated by these

statutes and restore his civil right to possess a firearm, at which point granting him relief would

not be contrary to federal law.

¶ 18 In response, the State’s Attorney does not dispute that petitioner’s civil rights to vote, hold

office, and serve on a jury have been restored to him following his convictions. Rather, it argues

that the restoration of those three rights is insufficient to exempt petitioner’s convictions for

purposes of the federal firearm prohibition. This is because the restoration of those three civil rights

exempts a conviction “unless such *** restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person

may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms” (see

(a)(20) (2018)), and

Illinois’s felon-in-possession statute expressly prohibits the possession of firearms by a convicted

felon notwithstanding the restoration of other civil rights. Because of this, it argues, petitioner has

“convictions” that bar him from possessing a firearm as a matter of federal law (see

§

922(g)(1)), and therefore he cannot overcome the fact that granting him relief under section 10(c)

of the FOID Card Act would be contrary to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018). It argues

that the only way petitioner’s firearm rights could be restored in a way that would be consistent

with federal law is if his felony convictions were pardoned and if that pardon included no

restriction on his right to own firearms.

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¶ 19 The Illinois felon-in-possession statute, section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012,

provides as follows:

“It is unlawful for a person to knowingly possess on or about his person or on his land

or in his own abode or fixed place of business any weapon prohibited under Section 24-1

of this Act or any firearm or firearm ammunition if the person has been convicted of a

felony under the laws of this State or any other jurisdiction. This Section shall not apply if

the person has been granted relief by the Director of the Department of State Police under

Section 10 of the [FOID] Card Act.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018).

The plain language of the second sentence of this statute contemplates situations where the

prohibition on a convicted felon’s possession of a firearm “shall not apply.” It expressly provides

that a person may be granted relief from the prohibition by the Director of the Department of State

Police under section 10 of the FOID Card Act (430 ILCS 65/10 (West 2018)).

¶ 20 Section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act is the subsection that specifically addresses the granting

of relief to a person prohibited from possessing a firearm under the felon-in-possession statute, as

well as the granting of relief to a person prohibited from acquiring a FOID Card. Section 10(c)

states in pertinent part as follows:

“Any person prohibited from possessing a firearm under Section[ ] 24-1.1 *** of

the Criminal Code of 2012 or acquiring a [FOID] Card under Section 8 of this Act may

apply to the Director of State Police or petition the circuit court in the county where the

petitioner resides, whichever is applicable in accordance with subsection (a) of this Section,

requesting relief from such prohibition and the Director or court may grant such relief if it

is established by the applicant to the court’s or Director’s satisfaction that:

***

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(1) the applicant has not been convicted of a forcible felony under the laws of this

State or any other jurisdiction within 20 years of the applicant’s application for a [FOID]

Card, or at least 20 years have passed since the end of any period of imprisonment imposed

in relation to that conviction;

(2) the circumstances regarding a criminal conviction, where applicable, the

applicant’s criminal history and his reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely

to act in a manner dangerous to public safety;

(3) granting relief would not be contrary to the public interest; and

(4) granting relief would not be contrary to federal law.” Id. § 10(c).

Again, the plain language of section 10(c) contemplates a situation in which a convicted felon may

be granted relief from the prohibition on his or her possession of firearms under the felon-in-

possession statute. It also contemplates a situation in which relief may be granted to a person

prohibited from acquiring a FOID Card under section 8 of the FOID Card Act (id. § 8).

¶ 21 We observe that the felon-in-possession statute and sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID Card

Act were enacted as part of the same legislation in 1984. See P.A. 83-1056 (eff. July 1, 1984).

Various amendments were made to section 10(c)(1)-(3) over the years (see e.g., P.A. 85-920 (eff.

920 (eff. Dec. 1, 1987) (amending subsection 10(c)(1) to add 20-year time limit); P.A. 92-442 (eff.

Aug. 17, 2001) (allowing petition to circuit court in certain situations)), but prior to 2013 relief

from the felon-in-possession prohibition was available if a petitioner established that those three

subsections were satisfied. In 2013, the General Assembly amended the statute to add section

10(c)(4), adding the additional requirement that the granting of relief not be contrary to federal

law. See P.A. 97-1131, § 15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013).

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¶ 22 The addition of section 10(c)(4) to the statute brought into play the federal statute that

prohibits the shipping, transporting, possession, or receipt of any firearm or ammunition by any

person who has been “convicted” in any court of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term

exceeding one year.”

(g)(1) (2018). “Conviction” for such a crime is defined for

purposes of that federal statute as follows:

“What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with

the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has

been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights

restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such

pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may

not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” (Emphases added.)

§ 921(a)(20).

As set forth above, petitioner contends he does not have a “conviction” for purposes of this federal

statute because he has had or is eligible to have his civil rights restored, including his right to

possess a firearm. Supra ¶ 17. The State’s Attorney contends that petitioner does have a

“conviction” for purpose of this federal statute because, although Illinois restores certain civil

rights to convicted felons once they serve their sentences, Illinois’s statutory prohibition on the

possession of firearms by convicted felons means that the “restoration of civil rights expressly

provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” Supra ¶ 18.

¶ 23 In Evans v. Cook County State’s Attorney,

, appeal

docketed, No. 125513 (Ill. Mar. 25, 2020), this court noted that the argument advanced here by the

State’s Attorney created “an unending statutory loop.” The felon-in-possession statute prohibits a

convicted felon from possessing a firearm unless he or she has been granted relief under section

10 of the FOID Card Act. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). Section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card

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Act provides that relief from the prohibition on possessing firearms cannot be granted if it is

contrary to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018). And federal law prohibits the

possession of firearms by a person in Illinois who has a felony conviction, because the state’s

statutory prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons means that the State’s post-

conviction “restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport,

possess, or receive firearms.”

(a)(2); see

§ 922(g)(1). In Evans, a majority of

the court found that this “ill-crafted statutory scheme” meant that the petitioner and those in the

same circumstance could never be entitled to relief under section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act.

Evans,

. Nevertheless, the Evans majority held that it must follow

the statute as written, and the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief to petitioner. Id. ¶ 42.

¶ 24 The third district has also considered this issue in a case involving a FOID Card applicant

who previously had been convicted of felony offenses and sentenced to probation and time served.

Pournaras v. People,

. The court considered that Logan had

construed the pertinent civil rights to include the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury.

¶ 9 (citing Logan,

). The court reasoned that petitioner had lost the rights to hold

office and serve on a jury while he was serving his probation, and these rights had been restored

to him after he had done so. Id. ¶ 14-15. The court held that by virtue of completing his sentence,

petitioner had his civil rights restored and therefore came within the exception to remove himself

from the federal firearm disqualification. Id. ¶ 16.

¶ 25 Since the issuance of the opinions in Evans and Pournaras, and during the briefing of this

appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its opinion in Johnson v. Department of State Police,

. Although Johnson did not involve the precise question at issue here, we find that

the supreme court’s analysis provides the controlling framework for resolving this appeal.

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¶ 26 In Johnson, the supreme court considered whether granting relief to a FOID Card applicant

under section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act would be contrary to federal law, where the applicant

had been of convicted of misdemeanor battery against her then-husband. Id. ¶ 3. As with crimes

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, federal law also prohibits the

possession of firearms by any person convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

See id. ¶ 21 (quoting

(g)(9) (2006)). Also, similar to the definition of “conviction”

at issue in this case, federal law defines a “conviction” of a misdemeanor crime of domestic

violence in such a way as to exclude an offense for which the person “has had civil rights restored

(if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense)

unless the pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person

may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” See

¶ 23 (quoting

(a)(33)(B)(ii) (2006)).

¶ 27 The issue before the supreme court was whether the applicant had her civil rights restored

within the meaning of the federal statute. The Department of State Police had argued that the

applicant did not come within this exemption because the relevant civil rights under this section

were the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury (see Logan,

), and these were

rights that the applicant had never lost as a result of her misdemeanor battery conviction.

¶¶ 28-

29. She had, however, been found by the trial court to have satisfied the requirements of sections

10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID Card Act, and thus she was eligible to have her FOID Card reinstated but

for her firearm disability under federal law. Id. ¶ 9. Thus, the question the supreme court addressed

was whether the “civil rights restored” included a restoration of firearm rights.

¶ 28 In its analysis, the supreme court stated:

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“The ‘civil rights restored’ provision uniformly has been described as ‘a measure by

which the government relieves an offender of some or all of the consequences of his

conviction,’ and ‘extend[s] to an offender a measure of forgiveness.’ Logan v. United

States,

(2007). The law of the convicting jurisdiction controls whether

civil rights have been restored (Caron v. United States,

(1998)) because

‘Congress sought to accommodate a state’s judgment that a particular person *** is, despite

a prior conviction, sufficiently trustworthy to possess firearms’ (McGrath v. United States,

(2d Cir. 1995)). *** Thus, the provision queries whether an offender’s

legal status has been altered by a state’s dispensation of forgiveness. Logan,

.

“Illinois law provides a path to do exactly that—restore firearm rights under a specific

restoration of rights provision. Sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID Card Act act as a

mechanism to relieve an offender of some of the consequences of his conviction and extend

a measure of forgiveness to certain qualified offenders. Specifically, the State has a process

for determining, after an individualized hearing, that the individual is not likely to act in a

manner dangerous to public safety and that it would not be against the public interest for

the individual to possess firearms. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012). Thus, Illinois

law indeed provides a status altering dispensation by restoring firearm rights.”

¶¶ 26-

27.

¶ 29 The supreme court found that the rights to vote, hold office, and serve on a jury were not the

only three civil rights that could be restored following a conviction, “given Illinois’s mechanism

for restoring civil rights and given the state of the law after District of Columbia v. Heller,

(2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago,

(2010).” Id. ¶ 30. It found that

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“(1) the right to keep and bear arms is a ‘civil right,’ (2) Illinois has a regulatory mechanism to

restore those rights through an individualized determination, and (3) relief granted under section

10 of the FOID Card Act constitutes a sufficient restoration of civil rights as intended by section

921(a)(33)(B)(ii).” Id.

¶ 30 In further support of its decision, the supreme court considered that recognizing firearm rights

as a civil right that could be restored was consistent with the legislative purpose of the federal

statute at issue. The court explained:

“A state regulatory scheme that restores a person’s eligibility for firearm rights by

affirmatively and expressly evaluating that person’s future dangerousness—through

evidence, and not generalization—is entirely consistent with the trustworthiness rationale

that underpins the ‘civil rights restored’ provision. Indeed, such a scheme is a direct and

relevant path for a state to show that a person is rehabilitated and can be trusted to possess

firearms. It reflects a determination by the convicting jurisdiction that the particular

consequence of the conviction should no longer be imposed.

***

Thus, to ignore the express and measured finding under a section 10 hearing that an

individual no longer poses a risk to public safety would frustrate the very legislative

purpose underlying the federal statute.” Id. ¶¶ 41-43.

¶ 31 Ultimately, the supreme court held that the applicant’s firearm rights lost a result of her

conviction “were restored under Illinois’s regulatory scheme (430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West

2012)), which affirmatively provided for a ‘status-altering dispensation.’ ” Id. ¶ 47 (quoting Logan,

). It therefore found that the granting of relief under section 10 of the FOID Card

Act would not be contrary to federal law. Id. ¶ 51.

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¶ 32 Although this case presents a different issue than the one presented in Johnson, we believe

that the supreme court’s analysis there resolves the question of whether petitioner could be granted

relief from his firearm prohibitions in a way that “would not be contrary to federal law.” 430 ILCS

65/10(c)(4) (West 2018). In Johnson, the supreme court was interpreting the meaning of “civil

rights restored” in a subsection of the statute that is, in all material respects, identical to the

subsection of the same federal statute at issue in this case. In concluding that the right to possess

firearms was a civil right for which Illinois law provided a means of restoration following a

conviction, the supreme court recognized that the law of the convicting jurisdiction controlled

whether civil rights had been restored and explained that Illinois “provides a path to do exactly

that—restore firearm rights under a specific restoration of rights provision.” Johnson,

. It then described what that path was: “Specifically, the State has a process for

determining, after an individualized hearing, that the individual is not likely to act in a manner

dangerous to public safety and that it would not be against the public interest for the individual to

possess firearms. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012).” Id. ¶ 27. Multiple times, the supreme

court referred to the individualized evaluation process contemplated by sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of

the FOID Card Act as being the process under Illinois law by which an individual can have firearm

rights restored. See id. ¶¶ 27, 40, 47. And, as the circuit court there had found after an evidentiary

hearing that the statutory factors of sections 10(c)(1)-(3) were satisfied and supported the

reinstating of the applicant’s FOID Card (id. ¶ 9), the supreme court held that “[the applicant’s]

rights were restored under Illinois’s regulatory scheme (430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012)).”

Id. ¶ 47. As such, it held that granting her relief would not be contrary to federal law. Id. ¶ 51

(citing 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2012)).

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¶ 33 Following the reasoning of Johnson, we conclude that it would be possible for petitioner to

establish that granting him relief from his firearm prohibitions “would not be contrary to federal

law.” Importantly, as discussed above (supra ¶¶19-20), it is clear that Illinois contemplates a

situation in which a person convicted of a felony can obtain the restoration of his or her right to

possess firearms. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018); 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018). We do not

believe that the General Assembly intended by its incorporation of federal law to make this right

illusory. Thus, as in Johnson, we conclude that if petitioner establishes through the individualized

evaluation process of sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID Card Act that he is not likely to act in a

manner dangerous to public safety and that it is not against the public interest for him to possess

firearms, then he would be eligible under the state mechanism for relief from the prohibition on

his possessing of firearms under the felon-in-possession statute. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West

2018); 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2018). 1 If the requisite showing can be made under

Illinois’s regulatory mechanism that he is eligible for relief from the prohibition of the felon-in-

possession statute, he would be eligible to have his “civil rights restored” by the State in a way

that no longer expressly prohibits his possession firearms.

(a)(2) (2018). He would

then no longer have a qualifying “conviction” that prohibits his possession of firearms under

federal law (id.; see

(g)(1) (2018)), and he could be granted relief from his firearm

prohibitions in such a way that “would not be contrary to federal law.” 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West

2018).

1 There is no indication in this case that petitioner’s possession of firearms would be contrary to federal law for a reason other than the one at issue in this appeal. Obviously if the possession of a firearm or FOID Card were contrary to federal law for a different reason, relief would not be available based on section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act. 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) (West 2018).

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¶ 34 We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court denying petitioner’s amended petition

for relief on the grounds that relief would be contrary to federal law. We remand this case to the

trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 2

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this

cause for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

¶ 37 Reversed and remanded.

2 Our decision in this case should not be interpreted as considering or deciding that the circuit court, as opposed to the Director of the Department of State Police, has the authority to grant relief from the prohibition of the felon-in-possession statute. The felon-in-possession statute contemplates that such relief must be obtained from the Director of the Department of State Police. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018). However, we acknowledge that section 10(c) of the FOID Card Act contemplates situations in which the circuit court is the “applicable” venue for obtaining relief under that section. 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018). The State’s Attorney did not raise this argument in the trial court or on appeal, and nothing in the record on appeal indicates that petitioner’s failure to seek relief from the Director of the Department of State Police was a factor in the trial court’s decision. As such, we decline to address this issue on appeal.

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