NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme NO. 4-18-0276 October 8, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County MARQUISE T. BURNETT, ) No. 17CF759 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Roger B. Webber, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the trial court did not err in its Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. Jul. 1, 2012) admonishments.

¶2 In January 2018, a jury found defendant, Marquise T. Burnett, guilty of first

degree murder, a Class M felony (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2016)), and found the statutory

enhancement alleging defendant personally discharged a firearm causing the death of another

proved as well (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016)). In February 2018, defendant filed a

posttrial motion, contending inter alia the State’s failure to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, along with various evidentiary and instructional errors during trial. The trial court denied

defendant’s motion in May 2018 and sentenced him to 55 years in the Illinois Department of

Corrections (DOC)—30 years for the offense plus the 25-year enhancement. Defendant’s motion

for reconsideration claimed his sentence was excessive and not considerate of his rehabilitative potential, his age, and various other personal and family circumstances. The motion was denied,

and defendant appeals.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was originally charged by information with four counts of first degree

murder based on each of the four mental states provided by statute. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2)

(West 2016). In each count, the State alleged defendant was eligible for the additional 25-year

enhancement to be added to whatever sentence he may otherwise receive based on the personal

discharge of a firearm that proximately caused the death of Darien Carter. 730 ILCS 5/5-

8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2016).

¶5 The charges arose from an incident in June 2017 where Darien Carter was killed

when two or more shooters opened fire on Carter and his brother Jeshaun Manning near Douglas

Park in Champaign. The victim had been riding a bicycle in the vicinity of 508 Eureka Street,

across from the park, at the time. The shooting occurred around 6 p.m. and was witnessed by

several people and captured on a surveillance camera in the area. The victim died from multiple

gunshot wounds, with five to the left side of his body including his back, chest, face, forearm,

and superficially to the ear. He also had one gunshot wound to the right side of the abdomen.

From six of the shell casings recovered at the scene, police were able to determine Carter had

been shot by a .380-caliber semi-automatic pistol. They also found three .40-caliber casings lying

in a line consistent with the path of flight taken by Jeshaun Manning when the shooting started.

He was not hit. The surveillance camera showed Carter riding his bicycle in front of 508 Eureka

Street when an individual, unidentifiable from the video, emerged from behind a car. The person

began shooting Carter from behind at close range and continued firing and running after him as

Carter attempted to flee toward 508 Eureka Street. Although the shooting can be seen on the

-2- video, due to the quality of the video and the distance from the camera, the shooter could not be

identified other than as “a black male wearing dark clothing.” The individual shooting at the

victim in the video can be seen standing in the street in the vicinity of where the .380-caliber

shell casings were found. Manning testified he saw defendant standing in the vicinity of where

police later retrieved the six .380-caliber shell casings.

¶6 Two people identified defendant as the person seen standing in the street near

where six .380-caliber shell casings were found, including one who initially told the police he

saw defendant shooting. Jeshaun Manning, the victim’s brother, testified that before he began

running from Isaiah Hunt, the individual shooting at him, Hunt had been standing with a group

of people that included defendant on the park side of Eureka Street. James Mosley, who lived at

506 Eureka Street, testified that while he was in his garage, he heard gunshots and went inside

the house to check on other family members. When he looked outside, Mosley saw defendant,

whom he identified in open court as “G-Quise,” running in the middle of Eureka Street. He said

defendant entered his house with two others, and Mosley told them all to leave. He estimated

they were inside the house for “five seconds, ten seconds” before he “coerced” them to leave.

During his testimony, Mosley denied being able to identify his own handwriting and markings he

placed on a map while talking to police later the same day which placed “G-Quise” in the middle

of the street, testifying instead he was in a different location than he told police previously. At

trial he did not recall having spoken to a detective, being shown the map, or placing his

markings, including his name, on it to identify where he had seen defendant during the shooting.

Mosley also denied telling an investigating detective he saw the shooting, testifying instead he

“heard” the shooting. He denied telling the detective on the night of the shooting, “[t]he only

thing I seen [sic] was the one person in the middle of the street shoot two more times” after

-3- hearing “seven to eight shots” before that. He also denied telling the detective, “[t]he only person

I really got to see, his name is G-Quise. I don’t necessarily know his real name or anything, but I

know I seen him fire shots.”

¶7 Samaria Loatman, who lived with Mosley at 506 Eureka Street, testified that on

the night in question she heard gunshots and lay down on the hallway floor with her brother. She

identified defendant as one of three men who ran into their home that night. She described how

they looked “panicking,” and she testified she heard defendant say, “yeah b***, now you dead

b***. Got that n***.” She also heard defendant and another one of the three men, whom she

identified as “Trap,” say they “needed to get rid of the gun.” Loatman described how, after the

men left, she went next door to check on the woman who lived there and found the decedent,

Darien Carter, lying on the kitchen floor. She remained with him for what she estimated to be 20

minutes, and when the police arrived, she returned to her own residence.

¶8 Detective Jim Bednarz, a 23-year veteran with the Champaign Police Department,

was the lead investigator in the case. He interviewed defendant on June 7, 2017, five days after

the shooting, because he could not be located before then. The interview was both audio- and

video-recorded and eventually admitted into evidence without objection. Using an overhead map

of the area where the shooting occurred, Detective Bednarz testified defendant placed himself in

the middle of the street, where the .380-caliber shell casings were located, when asked where he

was at the time of the shooting. Prior to this, defendant gave Bednarz several different versions

of how he happened to be in the area. Initially, defendant claimed prior to the shooting “he was

in traffic.” When asked to identify whose car he was in, defendant then said he walked to the

area. When asked where he walked from, defendant said he was “dropped off,” but he could not

remember who dropped him off.

-4- ¶9 Detective Bednarz also testified about his video-recorded interview with James

Mosley, acknowledging Mosley identified a location also in the middle of the street where he

said he saw defendant at the time of the shooting and marked it on the map. On

cross-examination, Bednarz said Mosley described the clothes defendant wore on the night of the

shooting as “a white shirt, blue jeans and gym shoes” and said he saw defendant “in the street

with a gun.” Bednarz testified that during the course of the interview, Mosley said “he saw

[defendant] fire two rounds from the middle of the street.” Bednarz reported there were six

.380-caliber shell casings and four to five .40-caliber shell casings recovered from the scene.

¶ 10 The State presented testimony from forensic scientists about the caliber of the

shell casings found. Since there were no firearms of the same caliber found, no ballistic testing

was conducted. Likewise, there were no fingerprint or deoxyribonucleic acid comparison tests

conducted. The testimony of a forensic pathologist established Darien Carter died of multiple

gunshot wounds, and a stipulation from a forensic scientist indicated the bullet retrieved from his

body was a .380/38-class caliber and all of the .380-caliber shell casings found were fired from

the same gun.

¶ 11 Defendant presented no evidence. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree

murder and found defendant personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused the death

of another person.

¶ 12 Defendant filed a posttrial motion contending the State failed to prove him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion also alleged the trial court erred in denying defendant’s

motions for a directed verdict after the State’s case and at the close of all the evidence, and it

further erred by allowing certain instructions proposed by the State. Defendant also argued

various infirmities with the verdict, the State’s proof, rulings by the court, and lastly, claimed a

-5- denial of due process “in that he was tried for First Degree Murder as both a principal and an

accessory.”

¶ 13 After a presentence investigation and report, the trial court first heard and denied

defendant’s posttrial motion and proceeded to sentencing. At sentencing, the State presented

evidence in aggravation through several written victim impact statements and testimony from

Detective Bednarz. The latter identified a Facebook page he discovered approximately one

month prior to the hearing, which contained photographs of defendant displaying a weapon and

making what Bednarz identified as hand gestures “usually associated with gang, gang

membership.” He testified to defendant’s known involvement with the “Roc Block Gang” based

on an internal Champaign police database. Detective Bednarz also described how, on the date of

the shooting, the park across the street contained a number of children and several of the houses

hit by stray gunfire during the shooting were inhabited at the time. Defendant presented no

evidence in mitigation beyond that contained in the presentence investigation report. The State

recommended a sentence totaling 85 years in DOC. Defendant’s trial counsel recommended a

sentence at or near the minimum of 45 years. The trial court discussed the relevant factors in

aggravation and mitigation and sentenced defendant to 55 years—30 years on the murder count

plus the statutory 25-year add-on for the firearm enhancement.

¶ 14 Defendant’s appeal raises two issues. First, the State’s evidence was insufficient

to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt due to its circumstantial nature and what he

characterizes as the “implausible, contradictory statements” of two witnesses. Next, defendant

contends the trial court plainly erred in its Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)

admonishments.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

-6- ¶ 16 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 17 “When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case,

the relevant inquiry is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hinthorn,

,

. “The trier of fact has the responsibility to

determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve

conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from that evidence.” Hinthorn,

, ¶ 89. When considering the sufficiency of the State’s evidence, the

reviewing court does not retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp,

,

(2011). “A conviction will be reversed only where the evidence is so unreasonable,

improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People

v. Belknap,

,

.

¶ 18 To sustain a conviction for first degree murder as charged in this case, the State

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant, or one for whom he was legally

accountable, performed the acts which caused the death of the victim with either the intent to kill

or do great bodily harm, and had knowledge his acts would cause death to the victim or

knowledge his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim. Since

the State sought the 25-year statutory enhancement, it also had to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that during the commission of the murder, defendant personally discharged a firearm that

proximately caused the death of the victim.

¶ 19 Defendant contends the fact that he was both circumstantially and by his own

admission not only present at the scene of the crime but at the location where the six .380-caliber

-7- shell casings were found, was seen firing two rounds from that location, and was overheard

immediately after the shooting saying, “[y]eah b***, now you dead b***. Got that n***” and

stating they “needed to get rid of the gun,” is insufficient because it is circumstantial and based

on what defendant describes as “implausible, contradictory statements of two witnesses.”

“Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, provided that such

evidence satisfies proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crime charged.” People

v. Hall,

,

(2000). “The testimony of a single witness, if

it is positive and the witness credible, is sufficient to convict.” People v. Smith,

,

(1999).

¶ 20 In the case before us, the jury had the opportunity to consider the impeachment or

inconsistencies of the witnesses who testified. The victim’s brother, Jeshaun Manning, placed

defendant at the scene with others, including “Isaiah,” who started shooting at him. James

Mosley, who obviously “flipped” on the State once he was called to testify, previously told

police on the night of the shooting he saw defendant running in the direction of 506 and 508

Eureka Street. During his testimony, he could not recall having marked defendant’s location on a

map which coincided with where the .380-caliber shell casings were found. Although he

previously told police he saw defendant “running in the middle of the street” and saw him fire

the last two shots in the direction of 508 Eureka Street, during his trial testimony he described a

different location and said he “heard” the last two shots he previously attributed to defendant.

When confronted with his earlier statements to police, Mosley said, in some instances, he could

not recall, but he acknowledged his memory of events would have been better on the night of the

incident. The State had his previous statement played to the jury and, without objection, admitted

-8- it as substantive evidence pursuant to statute. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(a) (West 2016)

(admissibility of prior inconsistent statements).

¶ 21 Samaria Loatman said defendant and two others entered her residence at 506

Eureka Street, next door to where the victim was found, immediately after the shooting stopped,

looking like they were “panicking,” “like they were like all shooken [sic] up and they were

looking like—thinking, I guess, what they are going to do now like.” She also testified that while

in the house defendant said, “Yeah, b***, now you dead, b***. Got that n***.” Loatman heard

defendant talking with “Trap” about how “they needed to get rid of the gun.” She also described

how, when defendant and the two others left her residence, they ran into the backyard, which

was consistent with the testimony of her neighbor Cesar Patino, whose backyard abutted 506

Eureka Street. Patino testified, after hearing gunshots coming from behind his house, he looked

out a back window and saw three “young black guys” jumping a fence and running off. Loatman

also told of going to 508 Eureka Street (the residence Mosley had previously identified as the

direction defendant had been running when he fired the two shots), finding the decedent lying on

the kitchen floor, and staying with him until police arrived. She was not cross-examined about

the substance of defendant’s statements or her observations of his demeanor, instead being asked

about the sequence of events.

¶ 22 Officer Cully Schweska described the arrest of defendant in a vehicle which had

attempted to flee from the police. Detective Bednarz testified no one was able to locate defendant

until five days after the shooting. Defendant’s statement to Detective Bednarz was played for the

jury, and they were able to see and hear defendant’s responses to questions. They heard him say

initially that before the shooting he was “in traffic,” and when asked in whose car, he said

instead that he walked to the location of the shooting. When asked where he walked from, he

-9- said he was “dropped off,” and then that he could not remember who dropped him off. The .380-

caliber shell casings were found near defendant’s described location during the shooting.

¶ 23 The jury heard the inconsistencies in the testimony of Mosley and Loatman and

chose to give them less weight than defendant argues they should. It is arguable the description

of defendant’s clothing on the night of the shooting given by Mosley to the police (white shirt,

blue jeans, and gym shoes) is different than that given by the neighbor, Patino, who saw three

individuals jump his fence (one wearing a gray shirt and jeans, another wearing a black or dark

blue shirt and jeans, the third subject wearing a striped shirt and jeans). It is also arguably

different than what could be observed on the neighborhood surveillance video, described by one

police witness as “grainy” and appearing to show the shooter is a black male wearing dark

clothing. However, the jury had more information than that. It was in the best position to weigh

the credibility of the witnesses and the statement of defendant to police.

¶ 24 The standard of review applicable in this case “does not allow the reviewing court

to substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder on questions involving the weight of the

evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.” People v. Jackson,

,

(2009). Further, the Jackson court said, we are to apply this standard, i.e.,

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt[,]

*** regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, [citation], [because]

circumstantial evidence meeting this standard is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction.”

(Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Jackson,

.

Defendant raises a number of inferences from what he considers the differing testimony of

Loatman and Mosley; however, we are to allow all reasonable inferences from the record in

- 10 - favor of the State. People v. Lloyd,

,

. Testimony may be

found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only “where the record evidence compels the

conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted and emphasis added.) People v. Gray,

,

.

¶ 25 Once we apply the Jackson standard to the facts presented to the jury, we are

unable to conclude no reasonable person could accept them as true. Defendant would like us to

draw different inferences and give greater weight to certain aspects of the testimony than

others—the functions of the trier of fact. “The trier of fact is best equipped to judge the

credibility of witnesses, and due consideration must be given to the fact that it was the trial court

and jury that saw and heard the witnesses.” People v. Wheeler,

,

(2007). “[E]ven the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which

flow normally from the evidence and to search out all possible explanations consistent with

innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt. *** Accordingly, this court is not

required to search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence or be satisfied beyond

a reasonable doubt as to each link in the chain of circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wheeler,

. As a result, we find the record evidence reasonably

supports a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 26 B. Rule 431(b) Admonishments

¶ 27 Defendant also contends the trial court failed to give proper Rule 431(b)

admonishments, which warrants reversal. Defendant raises this issue for the first time on appeal,

contending we should consider it as “plain error.”

- 11 - ¶ 28 As defendant acknowledges, the question of whether the trial court violated Rule

431(b) is reviewed de novo. People v. Wilmington,

,

.

Since defendant asks us to consider the issue as plain error, the first step in a plain error analysis

is to determine whether there was error at all, and the burden rests with the defendant. People v.

Kinnerson,

. The Illinois Supreme Court recently explained

“plain error” thusly:

“A reviewing court will consider unpreserved error when a clear or

obvious error occurs and (1) the evidence is so closely balanced

that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error or (2) the error

is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the

closeness of the evidence. [Citations.] When a defendant fails to

establish plain error, the result is that his procedural default must

be honored.” People v. Jackson,

.

¶ 29 Defendant claims the first of the two—that the trial court’s Rule 431(b)

admonishments were so deficient they failed to ensure the potential jurors understood and

accepted each of the four principles enumerated. What he characterizes as the trial court’s “clear

and obvious error,” “tipped the scales of justice against [defendant] in this closely balanced

case.” We do not necessarily dispute the closeness of the evidence. As defendant accurately

noted, the case was primarily circumstantial, as there was no physical or forensic evidence

connecting him to the shooting. It boiled down to an issue of the identity of the shooter, gleaned

from a “grainy” surveillance video and two witnesses, neither of whom actually saw him

- 12 - shooting at the victim. On the issue of the court’s alleged “clear and obvious error,” let us look at

the record.

¶ 30 Before the trial court began questioning the venire, it provided certain preliminary

instructions. These included the following:

“The defendant is presumed to be innocent, and that presumption

remains with him throughout the case and is not overcome unless

from all the evidence, you are convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant is guilty. Before the defendant can be

convicted, the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. The burden of proof is on the State, and that burden never

shifts. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence or to

present evidence. The defendant is not required to testify. If the

defendant does not testify, the fact that he did not testify may not

be considered by you in any way.”

¶ 31 The trial court then began individual questioning of prospective jurors in groups

of four, during which the court stated:

“It is essential that each juror understand and accept the

fundamental principles of law that apply, and I am required to ask

you each individually about them. Those principles are that the

defendant is presumed innocent of the charge against him. Before a

defendant can be convicted, the State must prove the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to

- 13 - offer any evidence on his own behalf. And if a defendant does not

testify, that cannot be used against him.”

¶ 32 The trial court’s inquiry of each individual juror went as follows:

“THE COURT: Juror number 48, do you understand and accept

each of these principles?

JUROR NO. 48: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Juror number 50, do you understand and accept

each of these principles?

JUROR NO. 50: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Juror number 38, do you understand and accept

each of these principles?

JUROR NO. 38: Yes, I do.

THE COURT: And juror 138, do you understand and accept each

of these principles?

JUROR NO. 138: Yes.”

¶ 33 Because of the trial court’s procedure for the exercise of peremptory challenges

by trial counsel, whenever a juror was stricken, the replacement was admonished as follows:

“THE COURT: There are certain fundamental principles of law

that apply in this case so I’m required to ask you each individually

about them. Those principles are that the defendant is presumed

innocent of the charges against him. Before a defendant can be

convicted, the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to offer any

- 14 - evidence on his own behalf. And if a defendant does not testify, it

can not be held against him. Do you understand and accept each of

these principles?

[REPLACEMENT] JUROR: Yes, sir.”

¶ 34 This occurred each time either counsel asked to exercise a peremptory challenge

on any of the four prospective or replacement jurors, which means the three jurors remaining

heard the same four principles and questions regarding “understanding” and “accepting”

numerous times.

¶ 35 The same process outlined above was repeated for each of the two remaining

panels of four prospective jurors, with repetition for any replacement jurors selected after the

exercise of a peremptory challenge by either side. It was repeated again for the selection of two

alternate jurors.

¶ 36 Defendant contends that by reading all four Rule 431(b) principles and then

asking each juror individually whether he or she understood and accepted those principles, the

trial court committed “clear error.” Of course, that must be his allegation to get in the plain error

door. We already know, “[a]lthough compliance with Rule 431(b) is important, violation of the

rule does not necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair or unreliable in determining guilt or

innocence.” People v. Thompson,

,

(2010). Defendant

cites several cases from other appellate districts in support of his claim that merely combining

the four principles alone is plain error. As the State noted in its reply brief, each of the cases

cited suffered from a greater infirmity in that either the principle was misstated or omitted, or the

jurors were not asked if they “understood” and “accepted.”

- 15 - ¶ 37 Contrary to defendant’s claim, this court, and others, have approved (although

perhaps not encouraged) the combining of the four principles. We approved the combining of the

four principles into a single statement of the law, followed by questioning of jurors in smaller

groups, recently in Kinnerson,

. See also People v. Willhite,

,

(2010); People v. Dismuke,

,

. Here, defendant received the further benefit of individual

questioning of prospective jurors on whether they “understood” and “accepted” each of the

principles, which Thompson expressly approved. Thompson,

. In Kinnerson, we

noted even “Thompson does not interpret Rule 431(b) as requiring a process wherein the court

addresses each principle ‘separately.’ Rule 431(b) also contains no such requirement.”

Kinnerson,

. The plain language of the rule does not require “the

trial court to ask jurors individually about each principle or receive their answers one by one.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinnerson,

.

¶ 38 As a result, there was no error, clear or otherwise; and without error, there is no

need to proceed further with a plain error analysis. See People v. Hood,

,

.

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial

court.

¶ 41 Affirmed.

- 16 -