FIFTH DIVISION DECEMBER 11, 2020

No. 1-18-2100

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 12 CR 3246 ) SAMMY CANO, ) Honorable ) Diane G. Cannon, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. _________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The defendant’s conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment are affirmed; the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence; and the trial court conducted a proper Krankel inquiry.

¶2 Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County, the defendant-appellant, Sammy

Cano, was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child and sentenced to 18 years’

imprisonment. The defendant now appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of

the circuit court of Cook County. 1-18-2100

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 In 2012, the State charged the defendant with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child

and aggravated sexual abuse for an incident that occurred in 2002 with his female cousin, J.G.,

who was six years old at the time. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to quash arrest and

suppress evidence on the basis that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and

subsequently arrest him.

¶5 Motion to Quash Hearing

¶6 At a hearing on the motion, the defendant testified 1 that on January 17, 2012, he went to

Home Depot to buy a sponge. When he exited the store, he saw a group of five or six men standing

outside. He was familiar with the men and knew they were standing outside the store to look for

work. The defendant admitted that he had stood outside Home Depot and approached cars to solicit

work before, but he was not doing so on that day, although he did join the group to chat with the

other men.

¶7 The defendant testified that he was preparing to say goodbye to the other men and head to

his job when two police officers approached the group. One of the police officers began speaking

in Spanish and asked for the defendant’s identification. According to the defendant, he did not feel

free to leave and he handed over his identification card with his name, Sammy Cano, on it. The

defendant denied providing the police officers with a false name or false date of birth. The police

officers then placed the defendant in handcuffs, searched him, and took him to the police station.

¶8 Chicago Police Officer Dennis Conway testified that, on January 17, 2012, he and his

partner traveled to the parking lot of Home Depot to respond to “numerous complaints of loitering”

1 The defendant testified at the motion to quash hearing and at the trial through a Spanish interpreter.

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that had been filed in the previous six months; although there had not been a complaint for anything

in particular on that day. The two officers saw the defendant approach several different cars in the

Home Depot parking lot. They approached the defendant’s group and Officer Conway’s partner

began speaking to them in Spanish. Officer Conway testified that the purpose of approaching the

defendant’s group was “[j]ust a general field interview.”

¶9 Detective Conway’s partner asked the defendant for his name and date of birth. Detective

Conway testified that the defendant gave them the same name of “Sammy Lopez” twice, as well

as two different dates of birth. The police officers ran the name “Sammy Lopez” with both dates

of birth through the computer in their police car but “[t]hey didn’t come back to any individual.”

The officers then placed the defendant into custody for obstructing identification. The defendant

was subsequently searched and an identification document with the name “Sammy Cano” was

recovered from him. The officers ran the name “Sammy Cano,” which revealed an active

investigative alert. Detective Conway explained that “[a]n investigative alert is an alert issued

usually by the detectives when they would like to speak to an individual in regards to a crime.”

¶ 10 Chicago Police Detective Manuel De La Torre testified that he interviewed the defendant

later that evening after Officer Conway and his partner had brought him to the police station. The

defendant then gave an inculpatory statement. Detective Manuel De La Torre testified that the

investigative alert for the defendant had been created based on allegations of sexual abuse by the

defendant’s younger cousin, J.G. He did not know when the investigative alert was submitted and

did not testify to the alert’s contents.

¶ 11 At the conclusion of the hearing, the defendant argued that the police officers were not

investigating a crime when they stopped him and asked his name. He averred that this meant he

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had not been legally detained, and in turn, it was not a crime for him to give the police officers a

false name. The defendant argued that, consequently, his subsequent arrest for obstructing

identification and the inculpatory statement he provided at the police station were improper and

should be suppressed.

¶ 12 Before the State could counter, the trial court rejected the defendant’s argument. The trial

court stated:

“In this case Officer Conway testified that he saw a crime. The defendant

and his friends were soliciting business in the Home Depot parking lot. I believe he

saw what he saw. [The defendant] said he was out there with friends who stopped

cars and looked for work. Admirable but *** Home Depot did not appreciate it. It

is trespassing. It is illegal solicitation of business. [The police officers] had a right,

maybe not to throw them all in jail, but to at least approach and say what are you

guys doing here and what are your names. [The defendant] gave them two separate

names and two separate dates of birth, and they had a right to arrest him.

Thereafter, the investigative alert popped up. They have to follow police

procedure and send him on to the detective. Does that mean automatic charges? No.

But they passed him on to the detective who issued the investigative alert.”

The trial court accordingly denied the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

¶ 13 The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. In so ruling, the

trial court stated that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had a right to

approach the defendant and inquire as to what he was doing in the Home Depot parking lot. The

trial court further noted that the defendant was only detained very briefly before he gave a false

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name, and “the investigation grew from there.”

¶ 14 Trial

¶ 15 A jury trial commenced. J.G., who was 18 years old at the time of trial, testified. She

testified that in 2002, she was six years old and lived in an apartment with her family. Her older

cousin, Dany, lived in the same building with her three children, including her oldest daughter,

G.G., who was four years old at the time. J.G. went to Dany’s apartment five days a week, before

and after school, while her mother was working. The defendant is Dany’s brother, and he also

spent time at Dany’s apartment in 2002. The defendant was 28 years old at the time.

¶ 16 J.G. testified that one day in 2002, she was in the living room of Dany’s apartment. The

defendant and two of Dany’s children were also there, but J.G. could not remember if Dany was

home at the time. The defendant called J.G. and G.G. into the bedroom that was just off the living

room. Once the two girls were inside the bedroom, the defendant closed the door and took them

behind a bunk bed. He made J.G. lay down on the floor and he pulled down her underwear. He

then “used his tongue to lick between [her] lips of [her] vagina” for a couple of minutes. She felt

uncomfortable and tried to pull away from the defendant. Afterwards, she did not tell anyone about

the incident because she felt scared and thought she had done something wrong.

¶ 17 Two years later, in 2004, J.G. was eight years old and told her teacher what had happened

with the defendant. The school called J.G.’s mother, who picked up J.G. and brought her home.

There, J.G. told her mother that the defendant had touched her vagina with his fingers. She told

her mother that he had used his fingers and not his tongue because she was “still uncomfortable”

and was scared that she did something wrong. She testified at trial that the defendant never touched

her vagina with his fingers, only his tongue. After she told her mother about the incident, they

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notified the police and she never saw the defendant again.

¶ 18 In January 2012, J.G. was sixteen years old and was notified by detectives to come speak

with them at the Chicago Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC). She spoke with a detective and an

assistant state’s attorney and told them that the defendant used his tongue to touch her vagina in

2002. J.G. testified that she felt “more comfortable” telling them the truth about what happened

because she was older and “understood what really happened.”

¶ 19 On cross-examination, J.G. testified that she could not remember if Dany ever left her and

the other children alone with the defendant. When the defendant brought her and G.G. into the

bedroom and touched her vagina with his tongue, she could not remember if the defendant also

interacted with G.G. in any way. She recalled speaking with an investigator from the Department

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in 2004 and telling him that the defendant had also

touched G.G. at the same time. J.G. further stated that, in 2004, she told her mother that the

defendant had threatened her but then told the DCFS investigator that the defendant did not

threaten her.

¶ 20 Gloria G., J.G.’s mother, testified that in 2004, she received a call from the social worker

at J.G.’s school. Gloria picked up J.G., who was eight years old at the time, and brought her home.

At home, J.G. told Gloria that the defendant had touched her “pee-pee,” which Gloria understood

to mean her vagina. J.G. told Gloria that the incident had occurred when she was six years old in

the bedroom at Dany’s apartment while Dany and her children were home. Gloria asked J.G. why

she never said anything before, and J.G. told her that the defendant had threatened to harm Gloria

if she told anyone. Gloria then took J.G. to DCFS where she was examined by a doctor. On cross-

examination, Gloria testified that J.G. also told her that the defendant “had done something

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similar” to G.G.

¶ 21 Julia Camacho Monzon testified that she works for DCFS, specifically at the CAC. In April

2004, she was a child abuse investigator and was assigned to J.G.’s case. J.G. was interviewed by

Emily Nunez, a forensic interviewer. Ms. Camacho Monzon observed the interview behind a one-

way glass wall, along with Assistant State’s Attorney Alvin Renteria and Detective Margaret

Engstrom.

¶ 22 At the beginning of the interview, Ms. Nunez conducted a test to ensure that J.G. was able

to understand the difference between a truth and a lie. Ms. Camacho Monzon testified that, during

the interview, J.G. told Ms. Nunez that the defendant had “touched her on her private part.” J.G.

told Ms. Nunez that the defendant had called her and G.G. into the bedroom and J.G. thought he

was going to give them money. But instead, the defendant closed the bedroom door, took J.G.

behind the bed, and touched “her front part with his hands and nails.” Ms. Camacho Monzon

stated:

“[Ms. Nunez] asked [J.G.] what part was that and she kind of pointed to it

and she asked her what the name was and she said a name but I can’t remember it

right now but she asked her, well, what do you use that part for and she said I used

that part to pee.”

J.G. told Ms. Nunez that she was screaming for the defendant to stop while he was touching her.

She also said he did the same thing to G.G. When Ms. Nunez asked J.G. if she had told anyone

else about the incident, J.G. said that the defendant told her she could not tell anyone, and that “she

was afraid because he was a big man and she was also afraid about her mom getting mad.” Ms.

Camacho Monzon subsequently attempted to locate the defendant to interview him but was unable

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to find him.

¶ 23 Sergeant Margaret Engstrom testified that, in 2004, she was working as a detective in the

special investigation unit for sex crimes involving children at the CAC. Following J.G.’s interview

with Ms. Nunez, Sergeant Engstrom searched for the defendant. She looked for him at three or

four known addresses, but was never able to locate him. Sergeant Engstrom did make contact with

his sister, Dany, though, in April 2004. Dany told Sergeant Engstrom that she had not seen the

defendant since November 2003 and did not give her any other information. Sergeant Engstrom

then entered an investigative alert for the defendant.

¶ 24 Chicago Police Officer Rogelio Ocon testified that he was working on January 12, 2017,

with his partner, Officer Conway. At approximately 10:45 a.m., they drove to the Home Depot

parking lot and saw the defendant. Officer Ocon testified that he stopped the defendant for a field

interview and asked him for his identification. Officer Ocon asked the defendant his name and date

of birth, to which he provided “Sammy Lopez” with a date of birth of September 4, 1974. Officer

Ocon explained: “We have a computer that we have access to in the car. We ran the name, and

nothing came back.” They again asked the defendant for his name and date of birth, and the

defendant again gave the name Sammy Lopez but with a date of birth of September 5, 1974.

Officer Ocon then placed the defendant in custody and ran the name with the second date of birth.

Nothing came back. After the defendant was in custody, the police officers found an identification

document on the defendant which stated that his name is Sammy Cano with a date of birth of

September 5, 1973. They ran that information in their system and learned that the defendant had

an investigative alert. They then took the defendant to the police station and notified the detective

associated with the investigative alert.

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Detective De La Torre testified that he is assigned to the special investigations unit which

investigates criminal sexual abuse of children. On January 17, 2012, he was assigned to an

investigative alert regarding the defendant. That evening, after the defendant was brought into the

police station, Detective De La Torre mirandized and interviewed him with another detective

present. Detective De La Torre told the defendant that they were investigating some allegations

against him. The defendant responded that he was aware of the allegations through a family

member. Detective De La Torre testified that he mentioned J.G.’s name but did not give the

defendant any specifics of the allegations. In response, the defendant said that about ten years

prior, he regularly visited his sister’s apartment and would play with her children, along with J.G.

The defendant continued talking. Detective De La Torre testified: “He said that at one point, he

was playing with [J.G.], that he took her clothes off, and that he placed his tongue in between her

vagina lips and kissed it.”

¶ 25 On cross-examination, Detective De La Torre testified that his interview with the defendant

was not recorded and the defendant did not give a handwritten statement. Detective De La Torre

further testified that the defendant did not tell him that J.G. screamed when he touched her and did

not state that he threatened J.G. or her mother. The defendant did not tell Detective De La Torre

that he used his fingers or fingernails to touch J.G. The defendant also said that Dany and G.G.

were present in the apartment at the time.

¶ 26 The State rested. The defendant moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied.

¶ 27 G.G. testified on behalf of the defendant. She stated that she was 16 years old at the time

of trial and that the defendant is her uncle. G.G. recalled that when she was around four and five

years old, J.G. would come over to her house often and play with her and her siblings. Whenever

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J.G. came over, G.G.’s mother, Dany, would watch them. G.G. had no recollection of ever being

left alone with the defendant. She further had no recollection of the defendant ever touching her

“private parts.” When asked if she had any recollection of J.G. telling her that the defendant had

touched her private parts, G.G. responded, “No.” She also never saw the defendant touch J.G. and

never heard J.G. scream because the defendant was touching her.

¶ 28 Dany Cano, the defendant’s sister, testified next. In 2002, she babysat J.G. after school.

The defendant sometimes visited them, but Dany never left J.G. or any of her children alone with

the defendant. She testified that the bedroom was right off the living room, and if someone had

been screaming in the bedroom, she would have heard it from the living room.

¶ 29 The defendant testified in his defense. He testified that at the time of trial, he was 39 years

old, had been married for six years, and had two young children. He denied ever touching J.G.’s

vagina with his tongue, fingers, or fingernails. He denied ever touching J.G. in any way that she

did not want him to. On cross-examination, the defendant denied telling Detective De La Torre

that he had put his tongue on J.G.’s vagina. He further testified that in 2002, he was never alone

with J.G.

¶ 30 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of predatory criminal

sexual assault of a child and aggravated sexual abuse. The trial court subsequently merged the

aggravated sexual abuse count into the predatory criminal sexual assault of a child count.

¶ 31 Posttrial Motion

¶ 32 Following the guilty verdict, the defendant filed a pro se posttrial motion alleging, inter

alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court asked the defendant to

expound on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the following exchange ensued:

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“THE DEFENDANT: He was not -- he was not pending. He didn’t defend

me the way he should have.

THE COURT: How so, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: In regards to the police officer, the officer said that I

had said some things to him; that I was only supposed to say yes and no without

going into any details of other things where I could say and explain things that were

in my favor, too.

THE COURT: You had an opportunity to testify, sir. I questioned you at

length as to whether or not you wanted to testify. You indicated you did not. Oh,

you did testify. You had a right to testify and you did testify.

In terms of what the officers had to say, the officers were cross examined

as to their testimony, vigorous cross examination of all the witnesses by your

attorney. He is not responsible for the words that come out of the witnesses’ mouth.

Any impeachment or, you know, possible mistakes were brought out by your

attorney.”

The defendant’s trial counsel, who was privately retained, then moved to withdraw from the case

and have a public defender appointed. The trial court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, noting

that he had been on the case for years and that the defendant’s issue was with what Detective De

La Torre had said during his testimony. The defendant’s trial counsel nonetheless insisted that the

defendant have an opportunity to explore his ineffective assistance of counsel claim with new

counsel. The trial court responded: “He can always explore your ineffectiveness to a higher court.

If someone doesn’t like the way the jury returns a verdict, it doesn’t go away. The verdict was

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based on the law and evidence.” The trial court concluded:

“Every right of the defendant has been protected through representation by

able-bodied attorneys for over a year, over the years. Just because he didn’t like

*** the answers a police officer gave at his trial are not a basis not only for new

trial but for you to attempt to leave prior to sentencing and argue the motion that

you have prepared.”

¶ 33 Sentencing

¶ 34 The case proceeded to the sentencing hearing. The State introduced a victim impact

statement from J.G., which read, in part:

“[T]his whole case has changed my life. *** I did not grow up as a normal

child like others did like those girls who had sleepovers and were able to go to their

friends’ house. I never had that because my parents were so afraid that something

would happen to me. I just thought that this never would have happened to me.

I always say things happen for a reason and it [sic] they do, but I will never

wish this on my worst enemy. I had to carry this with me for 12 years. The

flashbacks of what happened will never go away. I will have to carry that with me

for the rest of my life.”

The State requested a harsh sentence based on the psychological impact on J.G., the seriousness

of the offense, and the possibility of recidivism.

¶ 35 In mitigation, the defendant argued that for the past decade, he had been living a productive

life and had “zero contact with law enforcement.” He introduced letters from his wife, mother, and

sister describing the defendant as an active father who supported his household. He also introduced

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letters from his friends in Alcoholics Anonymous noting that the defendant had become a sober

and productive member of society.

¶ 36 In sentencing the defendant, the trial court stated it believed that the defendant did want to

change his ways, but that “the court [was] left with a hard, cold fact that [he] committed a sexual

act upon [his] six-year-old [relative], someone who she trusted.” The trial court then said, “for the

protection of society,” it was sentencing the defendant to 18 years’ imprisonment. This appeal

followed.

¶ 37 ANALYSIS

¶ 38 We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The trial court sentenced

the defendant on October 4, 2013. At that time, the defendant indicated his desire to appeal and

the trial court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender to represent him on appeal.

However, the defendant’s trial counsel never filed a notice of appeal. On September 20, 2017, the

defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to perfect his appeal. That petition advanced to the second stage of postconviction

proceedings, where, on May 21, 2018, the parties agreed that trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to perfect the direct appeal. The trial court accordingly granted the defendant leave to file

a late notice of appeal from the October 4, 2013, judgment. Therefore, we have jurisdiction to

consider the merits of this appeal. See People v. Ross,

(2008) (when a

postconviction petitioner demonstrates that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a notice of

appeal, the trial court may allow the petitioner leave to file a late notice of appeal).

¶ 39 The defendant presents the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the State proved the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; (2)

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whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress

evidence; (3) whether the trial court conducted a proper Krankel inquiry; and (4) whether the

defendant’s sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment is excessive. We take each issue in turn.

¶ 40 The defendant first argues that the State failed to prove him guilty of predatory criminal

sexual assault of a child. Specifically, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to convict him

where J.G. originally said that the defendant touched her vagina with his fingers but later said that

he touched her vagina with his tongue. The defendant points to other inconsistencies in J.G.’s

statements, such as whether Dany was in the apartment at the time, whether the defendant also

touched G.G., and whether the defendant threatened J.G. He further stresses that J.G.’s testimony

is contradicted by G.G.’s testimony and is not supported by any physical evidence. The defendant

also claims that Detective De La Torre’s testimony about the defendant’s inculpatory statement is

incredible because he did not record his interview with the defendant.

¶ 41 The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of an offense.

People v. Gray,

. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.

In doing so, “a court of review will not substitute its judgment for

that of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the

witnesses.”

A criminal conviction will not be reversed for insufficient evidence unless the

evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of

the defendant’s guilt.

¶ 42 The operative offense is predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12–

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14.1(a)(1) (2002)). To sustain a conviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, the

State must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, who was 17 years of age or

older, committed an act of sexual penetration upon the victim, who was younger than 13 years old

at the time the act was committed.

“Sexual penetration” means “any contact, however slight,

between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth, or anus of another

person.” 720 ILCS 5/12–12(f) (2002).

¶ 43 It is undisputed that, in 2002, the defendant was over 17 years old and J.G. was under 13

years old. However, the defendant contends that the State failed to establish that sexual penetration

occurred because of the discrepancies in J.G.’s statements regarding whether he touched her vagina

with his fingers or his tongue. Yet, J.G. was unequivocal in her testimony at trial that the defendant

touched her vagina with his tongue, and the unequivocal testimony of a single witness is sufficient

to convict. People v. Wells,

. The fact that J.G. initially stated that

the defendant touched her vagina with his fingers instead of his tongue does not take away from

her testimony as a whole. As this court has previously said:

“ ‘[A] complainant’s testimony need not be unimpeached, uncontradicted,

crystal clear, or perfect in order to sustain a conviction for sexual abuse. [Citations.]

Where minor inconsistencies or discrepancies exist in a complainant’s testimony

but do not detract from the reasonableness of her story as a whole, the

complainant’s testimony may be found to be adequate to support a conviction for

sexual abuse. [Citations.]’ ” People v. Garcia,

(quoting People v. Soler,

(1992)).

¶ 44 Further, J.G.’s testimony was corroborated by Detective De La Torre’s testimony that the

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defendant told him that he touched J.G.’s vagina with his tongue. The defendant takes issue with

the fact that Detective De La Torre did not record the defendant’s statement. Importantly, the

defendant does not challenge the admissibility of Detective De La Torre’s testimony; he merely

argues that his testimony is incredible. But it is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine

the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. People v. Green,

. The jury in this case found J.G.’s testimony credible notwithstanding the

discrepancies in her statements. They also found Detective De La Torre’s testimony credible

notwithstanding the fact that he did not record the defendant’s statement. The jury clearly gave

Detective De La Torre’s and J.G.’s testimony more weight than the defendant’s and G.G.’s

testimony. We find no reason to disturb that determination. See

(on the issue of credibility, a

reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of a jury).

¶ 45 Contrary to the defendant’s argument, it is irrelevant that J.G.’s testimony is not supported

by any physical evidence. See People v. Morgan,

(1986) (it is not

necessary that corroborating medical evidence be admitted to prove that penetration did occur).

Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find that the State

proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of predatory criminal sexual assault of a

child and we affirm his conviction for that offense.

¶ 46 The defendant next argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to quash arrest

and suppress evidence because his seizure by the police officers was unconstitutional. He claims

that the police officers saw him and his friends just standing in the parking lot of the Home Depot

store and approaching cars, which was an insufficient reason to stop and detain him. He further

claims that even if he gave the police a false name and date of birth, that was not a crime because

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he was not lawfully detained at the time. The defendant accordingly argues that the subsequent

statement he gave to Detective De La Torre was “the fruit of [his] unconstitutional arrest” and

should have been suppressed.

¶ 47 In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence, this

court applies a two-part standard of review. People v. Dailey,

.

“We accord great deference to the trial court’s factual findings and will reverse them only if they

are against the manifest weight of the evidence; however, we review the trial court’s ultimate

ruling on the motion de novo.”

¶ 48 The defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence argued that the police did

not have enough reasonable suspicion to stop him and subsequently arrest him. The United States

Constitution and the Illinois Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and

seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. “[T]he touchstone of the fourth

amendment is reasonableness, which is measured objectively by examining the totality of the

circumstances surrounding a police officer’s encounter with a citizen.” People v. Lake,

. It is well settled that not every encounter between the police and a private

citizen results in a seizure. Id. ¶ 35. Encounters between police and citizens are divided into three

tiers: (1) arrests, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) brief investigative detentions,

commonly referred to as “Terry stops,” which must be supported by reasonable, articulable

suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) consensual encounters, which involve no coercion or

detention and thus do not implicate the fourth amendment. Id. Pursuant to a Terry stop, “a police

officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes

that the person has committed, or is about to, commit a crime.” People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL

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118181, ¶ 9. “Reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause,

but an officer’s suspicion must still amount to more than just a “hunch” of criminal activity. Id.

When this court evaluates the validity of a Terry stop, we consider the totality of the circumstances

surrounding the stop. Id.

¶ 49 During the hearing on the defendant’s motion, Officer Conway testified that he and his

partner, Officer Ocon, went to the parking lot of the Home Depot store because of “numerous

complaints of loitering” that had been filed with the police in the previous six months. Upon their

arrival, they saw the defendant standing in the parking lot and approaching various cars. The

defendant himself testified that the group of men he was standing with were soliciting work in the

parking lot. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had reasonable,

articulable suspicion that the defendant was engaging in criminal activity, specifically trespassing

and/or soliciting unlawful business. In turn, it was reasonable for the police officers to briefly stop

the defendant and ask him some preliminary questions.

¶ 50 Because the defendant was then lawfully detained pursuant to a Terry stop, it was illegal

for him to provide a false name and a false date of birth. See 720 ILCS 5/31-4.5(a)(2) (West 2012)

(“A person commits the offense of obstructing identification when he or she intentionally or

knowingly furnishes a false or fictitious name, residence address, or date of birth to a peace officer

who has *** lawfully detained the person”). So once the defendant provided the police officers

with a false name and a false date of birth, the police officers had enough probable cause to arrest

the defendant for obstructing identification. People v. Grant,

(“Probable

cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest are sufficient to

lead a reasonably cautious person to believe that the arrestee has committed a crime.”). The

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defendant’s proper arrest ultimately led the police officers to discover the defendant’s investigative

alert and bring him to the police station to meet with Detective De La Torre, where he gave an

inculpatory statement. Consequently, there was no justification for suppressing the defendant’s

statement to Detective De La Torre. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying

the defendant’s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.

¶ 51 Next, the defendant argues that the trial court should have provided him with new counsel

to assess his pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He argues that the trial court

did not conduct a proper Krankel inquiry regarding his ineffective assistance claims, but instead

merely asked “just a few cursory questions.” The defendant avers: “Had the court conducted [a

proper Krankel] inquiry, it would have learned that new counsel was needed to independently

assess and present [the defendant’s] ineffectiveness claims.” He asks us to remand the case back

to the trial court with instructions to appoint new counsel to assess his ineffective assistance claims.

¶ 52 A pro se posttrial claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the

common law procedure developed by our supreme court in People v. Krankel,

(1984). See People v. Jolly,

. The trial court is not required to automatically

appoint new counsel when a defendant raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. People v.

Lawson,

. Instead, when a defendant brings a pro se posttrial

petition claiming that trial counsel was ineffective, the trial court must conduct some type of

inquiry, known as a Krankel inquiry, into the underlying factual basis of the defendant’s claim of

ineffectiveness. People v. Ayres,

. If, based on the Krankel inquiry, the trial

court determines that the defendant’s claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy,

then the court need not appoint new counsel.

However, if the defendant’s allegations show

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possible neglect of the defendant’s case, then the trial court should appoint new counsel to argue

the defendant’s claim. People v. Boose,

. We review de novo

whether the trial court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel inquiry. People v. Jackson,

.

¶ 53 The record in this case reflects that the trial court carefully considered the defendant’s

allegations. When the defendant alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because

his trial counsel “didn’t defend [him] the way he should have,” the trial court asked the defendant

to expound on that allegation in more detail. And when it became clear that the defendant’s issue

with his defense counsel, revolved around the fact that he did not like what Detective De La Torre

testified to, the trial court responded by noting that trial counsel had conducted a vigorous cross

examination of Detective De La Torre and that his trial counsel is “not responsible for the words

that come out of the witnesses’ mouth.” Once the trial court determined that Detective De La

Torres’ testimony was the main issue in the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

this was a sufficient inquiry to determine that the defendant’s allegations were unfounded. See

People v. Moore,

(2003) (a brief discussion between the trial court and the

defendant may be sufficient for a Krankel inquiry).

¶ 54 The trial court consequently found the defendant’s claims to be baseless and determined

that new counsel was not needed to assess them. This was a proper determination based on the

totality of the circumstances. Simply because the defendant did not like the outcome of the trial

does not mean that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We accordingly reject the

defendant’s argument that the trial court did not conduct a proper Krankel inquiry.

¶ 55 Finally, the defendant argues that his sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment is excessive.

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Specifically, he claims that a sentence that is “three times the minimum term” is excessive where,

in the decade since the incident with J.G., he did not commit other crimes and he established

himself as a productive member of society. He asks us to reduce his sentence.

¶ 56 We afford great deference to the trial court’s sentencing decision, as the court is in the best

position to weigh the relevant sentencing factors which include the defendant’s demeanor, criminal

history, and social environment, as well as the nature and circumstances of the crime. People v.

Wyma,

. A sentence that falls within statutory guidelines is

presumptively proper and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bridges,

. An abuse of discretion occurs where the sentence is “at variance

with the purpose and spirit of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.”

People v. Himber,

.

¶ 57 The sentencing range for the crime for which the defendant was convicted was 6 to 30

years. Thus, his sentence of 18 years falls squarely within that range and is therefore presumed to

be proper. Notwithstanding, the record shows that the trial court carefully considered all the

mitigating factors and noted that the defendant did want to change for the better. The record also

shows, however, that the trial court gave greater weight to the seriousness of the crime, which is

the most important factor. People v. Decatur,

(the seriousness of

the crime is the most important factor in determining an appropriate sentence). The trial court’s

sentence is appropriate in light of the heinous nature of this offense, especially considering J.G.’s

victim impact statement in which she described that her life has changed forever because of what

the defendant did to her. The defendant’s preference for a lighter sentence is not a reason to reduce

his sentence. We accordingly affirm the defendant’s sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment.

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¶ 58 CONCLUSION

¶ 59 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 60 Affirmed.

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