No. 1-18-0616 Order filed February 13, 2020 Fourth Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 15 CR 3691 ) LAURENCE STEPNEY, ) Honorable ) Neera Walsh, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant violated section 3 of the Sex Offender Registration Act where the evidence was insufficient to show he (1) had a duty to register and (2) established a residence or temporary domicile within Chicago.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant Laurence Stepney was convicted of violating section 3

of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1) (West 2014)) and sentenced

to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to show No. 1-18-0616

he was required to register under SORA or that he established a residence or temporary domicile

in Chicago for at least three days. For the following reasons, we reverse.

¶3 Defendant was charged by way of indictment with one count of violating section 3(a)(1)

of SORA in that on or about February 2, 2015, and continuing on through February 11, 2015, he,

“having been previously convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault under case number 95

CR 885801, knowingly failed to report, in person, with the Chicago Police Department within 3

days of establishing a residence or temporary domicile in the city of Chicago.” The indictment

further specified that the State would seek to sentence defendant “as a Class 2 offender in that he

was previously convicted of failure to register as a sex offender under case number 10 CR

08229901.”

¶4 At trial, Aneta Bowie, the former property manager for Villa Capital Management (Villa)

in Chicago from September 2009 through April 2015, testified that in July 2014, Villa took

receivership of a property located on the 7600 block of South Evans Avenue (Evans property).

Bowie was assigned to manage the Evans property. As property manager, she let the existing

residents know that Villa was the receiver of the property and would collect rent and make

necessary repairs. Bowie visited the Evans property on July 16, 2014, to gain access and make

contact with the residents. She also “would have given” notice of the receivership to any tenant

who was home or allowed her access. For tenants who were not home, Bowie “would have” left

notice on their door, the common door, and on the doors of any unit dwellings in the property. The

notice requested that the tenants register their tenancy with Bowie’s office. No one registered as a

tenant of the basement “to her recollection.” Bowie did not know defendant.

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¶5 Bowie described the Evans property as a two-story building with four entrances and units

on the first and second floors. There were no units in the basement, which was used for storage or

“areas for building mechanicals.” Although the basement was vacant in July 2014, Bowie

acknowledged there were personal belongings within it. She changed the locks on the common

areas of the Evans property and secured the basement door. In January or February 2015, that door

was “no longer secured.” As a result, Bowie boarded it with plywood and nailed it shut.

¶6 Chicago police detective Germaine Dubose testified she was assigned to investigate

defendant’s “failure to register” case in January 2015. Dubose “ran” defendant’s name to

determine if he was incarcerated and called a phone number she obtained from a sex offender

registration card to reach defendant on February 1, 2015. She spoke to a person who identified

himself as defendant and stated that he had been illegally locked out of his apartment. Dubose

advised him to find another place to live and instructed him to register.

¶7 On February 5, 2015, Dubose went to the Evans property, which was the address listed on

the “hard card.” The hard card indicated that defendant lived in the basement unit; however,

Dubose did not go into the basement unit because it had been boarded shut with plywood and nails.

Debose also knocked on the doors of other units in an effort to speak with someone to determine

whether they knew defendant. She observed curtains and newspapers in the first-floor unit’s

windows. She then issued an investigative alert on February 9, 2015. On February 12, 2015,

defendant was arrested based on the alert.

¶8 Chicago police detective Mark J. Wiedenski testified he was a registering official for the

criminal registration unit in January 2015. On January 20, 2015, Wiedenski registered defendant,

whom he identified in court. As part of the registration process, Wiedenski asked for defendant’s

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identification and whether he had changes to make to his registration form. Defendant’s

identification showed that he lived at the Evans property in the basement apartment. Defendant

did not make any changes and signed the registration form or “hard card,” showing the Evans

property as his address. Wiedenski also went through the “the requirements that defendant had to

register, given different circumstances.” Defendant initialed each requirement and indicated he

understood them. One such requirement was that defendant had to personally register with the law

enforcement agency with whom he last registered within three days of changing his address.

Wiedenski identified a copy of the Illinois SORA registration form or “hard card” that he

completed with defendant.

¶9 Wiedenski identified copies of criminal registration logs from January and February 2015

kept by his office. The logs reflected that defendant registered on January 20, 2015, but did not

register again on or before February 11, 2015.

¶ 10 The State introduced a certified copy of defendant’s conviction in case number 95 CR

0885801, showing he was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 18

years’ imprisonment in May 1996.

¶ 11 Defendant testified that he was previously convicted of a sex offense and required to

register. He acknowledged that he lived in the basement of the Evans property when it went into

receivership in July 2014. Defendant continued to live in the basement after it went into

receivership but did not pay rent. During that time, defendant worked at a “shoe service” at Whole

Foods and would leave the Evans property “about 5:30 or 6” to work out at a gym. He would come

back “about 11:30 or 12:30” during the week. His schedule was “a little different” on the

weekends. Although he acknowledged that he was not in the Evans property for most of the day,

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he “absolutely” slept there. The basement unit had a shower, and defendant kept two queen-sized

beds and his own furniture there. Defendant never moved out of the Evans property and therefore

never changed his registration.

¶ 12 During defendant’s testimony, defense counsel indicated he would stipulate to “any other

convictions.” In response, the assistant State’s Attorney stated, “Your Honor, the prior sex offender

[sic] was already admitted in the [S]tate’s case. *** [T]he defendant does have a prior failure to

register where he served two years in the Illinois Department of Corrections in 2010.”

¶ 13 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that the locks had been changed on the

front and side doors of the basement. However, the building had five outside entrances to the

basement, and he had access to and used the other three entrances to the lower level of the building.

Defendant had a lease for the basement with the original owner before the Evans property went

into receivership. His lease never ended, and he never had contact with anyone from Villa.

Although other tenants of the building had access to their storage units in the basement, defendant

denied that they had access to the areas where his furniture was located. He believed he paid rent

in August 2014 to the prior owner of the building but stopped paying rent after the building went

into receivership. The basement unit had a shower and sink but did not have a toilet.

¶ 14 On redirect, defendant testified that he used a key to enter the building that he received

prior to the receivership. He had a written, open-ended lease for the unit because he was required

to show that he had control of the property in order to register as a sex offender. He was also

required to show proof of address, proof of residency, and a photo identification.

¶ 15 The court found defendant guilty of violating SORA. In finding him guilty, the court noted

defendant had no lease, did not show that he had the right to be at the property, and “conveniently

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makes himself a squatter.” It further stated defendant could not have lived at the Evans property if

he had been locked out.

¶ 16 The court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, noting that it did not find defendant’s

testimony credible. The court sentenced defendant to eight years’ imprisonment as a Class X

offender based on his background.

¶ 17 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

(1) he had a duty to register under SORA and (2) he established a new residence or temporary

domicile in the city of Chicago. 1

¶ 18 On a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we inquire “ ‘whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v.

Davison,

(2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

(1979)). In so

doing, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the State (Davison,

), and we

do not retry the defendant (People v. Collins,

(1985)). The State must prove

each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Siguenza-Brito,

(2009). We will not overturn a criminal conviction “unless the evidence is so improbable or

unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Givens,

(2010).

¶ 19 To sustain defendant’s conviction for failing to register within three days of establishing a

residence or temporary domicile in the city of Chicago as charged, the State was required to prove

1 Defendant also has a pending appeal in case number 1-19-2574, apparently stemming from the trial court’s October 24, 2018, denial of his petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2018)) relating to case number 15 CR 3691.

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that (1) defendant was subject to SORA’s reporting requirements, (2) he had established a

residence or temporary domicile, and (3) he knowingly failed to register in person at the requisite

reporting agency within three days of establishing a residence or temporary domicile. 730 ILCS

150/3(a)(1), (b) (West 2014); People v. James,

.

¶ 20 We turn first to defendant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to show he was

subject to the SORA registration requirements.

¶ 21 SORA was designed to assist law enforcement in tracking the whereabouts of sex offenders

and provide the public with information about where they reside. James,

, ¶ 11. Under SORA, a person convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault is classified

as a sex offender, a sexual predator, or both. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a), (B)(1), (E)(1), (E)(7) (West

2014); James,

.

¶ 22 Under SORA, a person convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault prior to July 1,

1999, must register for life as a sexual predator only if the person is convicted of a felony after

July 1, 2011; otherwise, the person is required to register for 10 years following his release from

prison. 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2014); see James,

, ¶ 12. However, the

10-year registration can be extended or tolled. 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2014). “An extension of the

10-year registration period is triggered if there is reconfinement due to a violation of parole or

other circumstances that related to the original conviction.” James,

. Additionally, the 10-year registration period may be extended if the offender violates SORA—

by failing to register, for example—and a new 10-year period begins from the first registration

date after the violation. James,

. “Reconfinement due to an

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unrelated violation or conviction tolls the running of the initial 10-year period until final parole,

discharge, or release.” James,

.

¶ 23 Here, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the

evidence insufficient to prove that defendant was subject to SORA’s reporting requirements

between February 2 and February 11, 2015. The State presented evidence that defendant was

convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault in 1996 and sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment.

However, there was no evidence to show when defendant was released from prison, which would

have triggered the start of the initial 10-year registration period. Nor did the State present evidence

that defendant’s registration period was extended or tolled. While the parties stipulated that

defendant was convicted of failing to register in 2010, the State failed to present evidence showing

defendant was still required to register in February 2015, or that he had a conviction after July 1,

2011, which would have required him to register for life. Given the absence of evidence regarding

defendant’s criminal history, we find the State failed to prove the duty to register element of

defendant’s conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. His conviction, therefore, must be reversed.

See James,

(“ ‘The State is required to prove each element of the

alleged violation of [SORA] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (quoting People v. Harris,

(2002))).

¶ 24 Defendant additionally contends that the State failed to prove he established a new

residence or temporary domicile in Chicago, which would have triggered his duty to report. We

address this contention because, “as our supreme court has noted, SORA ‘leaves something to be

desired, in terms of clarity and consistency’ as it pertains to an offender’s place of residence

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(People v. Pearse,

), and these issues tend to recur in prosecutions for failure

to register under SORA.” James,

, ¶ 18.

¶ 25 Under section 3 of SORA, sex offenders and sexual predators have a duty to register with

the Chicago police department within three days if they have established a residence or temporary

domicile within the city. 730 ILCS 150/3(a), (b) (West 2014). A residence or temporary domicile

is defined as “any and all places where the sex offender resides for an aggregate period of time of

3 or more days during any calendar year.” 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2014). We have previously

found that the location of an offender’s residence is a critical element of the offense of violating

section 3 of SORA because the statute “includes specific language as to the entity with which an

offender must register depending on where his residence or temporary domicile is located.” James,

(citing People v. Gomez,

).

¶ 26 In this case, the evidence was insufficient to prove that defendant had established a new

residence or temporary domicile within Chicago. The State’s evidence arguably showed that

defendant no longer lived at the Evans property, given the testimony that he did not register as a

tenant with Villa, he told Detective Dubose that he had been locked out of his apartment, and one

of the basement doors had been boarded shut. However, the State presented no evidence regarding

where defendant had actually resided during the relevant February 2015 time period, much less

that he resided somewhere other than the Evans property for an aggregate period of three or more

days. Accordingly, the State failed to prove the proof of residence or domicile element of the

offense. See Gomez,

(noting that “a specific location is

contemplated by the statute”); see also James,

.

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¶ 27 Because the State failed to prove defendant had a duty to register under SORA and

established a residence or temporary domicile within Chicago, no rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County

and order that defendant be released from the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections.

¶ 29 Reversed.

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