NOTICE This Order was filed under

FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 8, 2021 not precedent except in the NO. 4-19-0260 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Livingston County BRIAN KOBIELA, ) No. 17CF19 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Mark A. Fellheimer, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The trial court did not err in the manner it questioned the prospective jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012).

(2) Defendant failed to establish he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness.

(3) Defendant was not unlawfully denied his right to counsel in the trial court after he was sentenced.

¶2 In May 2018, a jury found defendant Brian Kobiela guilty of four counts of delivery

of a controlled substance (heroin) (one gram or more). The jury also found the State proved the

heroin contained fentanyl. On December 4, 2018, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent

20-year sentences on the four counts with credit for time served. The court ordered the sentences

in this case to run consecutive to the sentences imposed in Will County case No. 17-CF-672 and

Cook County case No. 17-CR-080901. Defendant appeals, making the following arguments: (1) the trial court erred by grouping the Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)

questions together and asking the potential jurors the questions as a group instead of asking each

potential juror each question; (2) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel from his trial

attorney because his attorney elicited previously excluded and highly prejudicial evidence of prior

drug transactions between defendant and the State’s confidential informant; and (3) the trial court

denied defendant his constitutional right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceeding because

the court failed to appoint counsel to represent defendant to assist with the preparation of

defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 The State charged defendant with four counts of delivery of a controlled substance

(heroin) (720 ILCS 570/401(c) (West 2016)) to a confidential source working with the police on

January 6, 11, 20, and 24, 2017. In May 2018, defendant’s trial was held. During the jury selection

process, the trial court admonished the prospective jurors as a group as follows:

“With regards to this trial, [f]olks, it is a criminal trial, so there are certain

criminal propositions. We call them propositions of law or principles of law that

apply to this case. I am going to read those propositions to you, four in number. I

will then have a follow-up question to you. First will be whether or not you

understand those principles of criminal law. And then second is whether or not you

accept those principles of criminal law. The way we handle this is just by a show

of hands, kind of like kindergarten all over again. When I have a question to the

entire group, I will first deal with the folks that I call in the box. I will go to the

right side pews and to the left side pews. So the question will be the same. If you

have an answer to give, you will just raise your hand. I typically work back to front.

-2- If I happen to blow past you like kindergarten, just keep the hand up and say, hey,

Judge, you forgot me. And I will get to your answer.

***

The four principles of criminal law that applies to this case are as follows:

That Mr. Kobiela is presumed innocent of all charges against him.

Two, that before Mr. Kobiela can be convicted, the State must prove him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Three, that Mr. Kobiela is not required to offer any evidence on his own

behalf.

And, number four, that if Mr. Kobiela chooses not to testify on his own

behalf, that cannot be held against him.

So, first, to the folks here in the box, raise your hand if you understand those

principles of criminal law.

All hands are raised.

Follow up. By a show of hands here, do you accept those principles of

criminal law? If so. Please raise your hand.

All hands are raised.

To the folks I am calling the right pews here, by a show of hands here, do

you folks understand those principles of criminal law? If so, raise your hand.

All hands are raised.

Second question then is do all of you accept those principles of criminal

law?

All hands are raised.

-3- The left side pews, same thing. As to those four principles of criminal law,

do you understand those principles?

All hands are raised.

And then the follow-up is do all of you accept those principles of criminal

law?

Once again, all hands are raised there.”

¶5 During the trial, James Nathan Rodriguez testified he worked with Inspector Brian

Maier of the Livingston County Pro-Active Unit and made controlled buys of heroin

approximately eight or nine times, including the four charged controlled buys from defendant at

issue in this case. Rodriguez testified he served time in prison for delivery of heroin. He also had

a pending charge for delivery of heroin but had not been promised anything in exchange for his

testimony. He admitted being a heroin addict and had last used the drug in July 2017.

¶6 Rodriguez claimed he had known defendant for approximately 15 years and had

purchased heroin from him in the past before working with the police. Defense counsel did not

object to Rodriguez’s answer. Later, when the State asked Rodriguez how many times he had

purchased heroin from defendant, defense counsel objected. During a bench conference, defense

counsel argued defendant’s conduct before the first charged sale was completely prejudicial and

irrelevant. The trial court sustained the objection as it related to any drug transaction before the

four charged offenses. The court instructed the jury to disregard Rodriguez’s earlier testimony he

had purchased heroin from defendant prior to the four charged incidents.

¶7 According to Rodriguez, he and Inspector Maier met before each controlled buy.

Maier searched Rodriguez and his car before each controlled buy and provided Rodriguez money

to make each buy. The State also gave Rodriguez money to pay part of a prior debt Rodriguez

-4- owed defendant. The State did not ask Rodriguez why he owed defendant money. Maier provided

Rodriguez with directions how to drive to the arranged location for each controlled buy. After

each buy, Rodriguez met Maier, gave Maier the drugs he purchased from defendant, and Maier

would then search Rodriguez and his car again.

¶8 During Rodriguez’s cross-examination, defense counsel asked whether he had

missed any rent payments. Rodriguez said he missed several from February to June in 2017.

Counsel then asked if the money Rodriguez owed defendant was money defendant loaned

Rodriguez for his rent. Rodriguez denied this. Defense counsel then asked Rodriguez about

money the police gave him to pay off a prior debt to defendant, which led to the following

exchange:

“Q. Correct? They gave you some money, though, to pay off a debt?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was not connected with what you say was otherwise a drug deal?

A. It was.

Q. Is that correct?

A. It was connected to drug deals.

Q. It happened during that—during at least one of those incidents, but you

told the officers that you owed money to [defendant]?

A. For drugs.

Q. And they gave you that money?

A. Yeah. So I could get more drugs.”

Defense counsel also asked how Maier searched Rodriguez and his vehicle before and after the

controlled buys. Rodriguez testified Maier emptied his pockets and patted him down. As for the

-5- vehicle, Rodriguez stated Maier “went from the front to the back, through the seats, the console,

[and] floor mats,” searching everything designed to move.

¶9 On redirect examination, the State argued it should be able to introduce evidence

Rodriguez could not buy more drugs from defendant until he paid off his prior drug debt because

defense counsel opened the door to this line of questioning. The trial court allowed the State to do

so. Rodriguez then testified the debt he owed defendant was for drugs and he could not purchase

more drugs from defendant if he did not pay off the prior debt.

¶ 10 Inspector Maier testified he was employed by the Dwight Police Department and

assigned as a narcotics investigator to the Livingston County Pro-Active Unit, a narcotics task

force. According to Maier, both before and after the controlled buys he performed a thorough

search of both Rodriguez and his vehicle to ensure Rodriguez was not bringing anything to or

taking anything from each controlled buy. Maier did not promise Rodriguez anything other than

making the state’s attorney’s office aware of his cooperation. Before each controlled buy, Maier

provided Rodriguez with pre-recorded bills to use and a specific route to take to the pre-arranged

location for the buy. Maier observed Rodriguez during the informant’s drive to and from the

controlled buys. During two of the buys where defendant and Rodriguez were in their respective

vehicles, Maier was able to see Rodriguez the entire time. During the other two buys, which took

place in defendant’s home, Maier was able to see Rodriguez the entire time except when he was

in the residence. After each controlled buy, Maier would meet Rodriguez, who would turn over

the drugs he purchased and tell Maier how he obtained the drugs. Maier would then search

Rodriguez’s person and his vehicle. Although Rodriguez was carrying a recording device, Maier

was unable to understand what was being said on the recording.

¶ 11 After the four controlled buys, the police obtained a search warrant for defendant’s

-6- residence and executed the warrant on January 24, 2017, not long after the final controlled buy.

Hypodermic needles were found throughout the residence. The police also found Dormin bottles

in defendant’s bedroom. Dormin can be used as a cutting agent for heroin. Several empty capsules

were found in the bottles. When the warrant was executed, defendant was in the driver’s seat of

his vehicle and taken into custody. Inside the vehicle, the police found a bundle of cash, including

money used in the controlled buy earlier that day, and an identification card belonging to

defendant.

¶ 12 After the search, Maier interviewed defendant, who said he had been addicted to

heroin for some time and shared heroin with people on occasion. When Maier confronted

defendant with evidence of the police investigation, defendant said he was going to prison for a

long time. Defendant claimed he used the Dormin to help him sleep.

¶ 13 The jury found defendant guilty on all counts and also found the State established

the presence of fentanyl with the heroin. On October 2, 2018, at the scheduled sentencing hearing,

the trial court noted defendant had not provided information for the PSI. Defense counsel said he

suspected defendant did not believe his trial counsel had done anything to assist defendant in this

case. The court then asked if defendant wished to communicate information to court services to

assist with preparing his PSI. Defendant’s counsel noted he intended to introduce evidence

through a third-party witness. Defendant spoke up on his own behalf and expressed his displeasure

with the representation he was receiving from the attorney he hired to represent him in this case.

The court then asked defendant whether he had compiled the information he wanted to submit to

court services for the PSI. Defendant said he had not because he was waiting to hear from his

lawyer and did not know what he was supposed to do. The court then asked defendant if he wanted

to continue with his current counsel and gave defendant time to decide. Defendant told the court

-7- he wanted to discharge his attorney, needed time to determine whether to hire private counsel or

proceed pro se, and asked for a continuance, which the court granted.

¶ 14 The trial court allowed defendant to discharge his privately retained attorney and

set the case for a status hearing on November 6, 2018, to determine if defendant had hired new

counsel or wanted a public defender. The court told defendant he would need to inform the court

at the status hearing whether he had hired a new attorney, needed a public defender, or wanted to

proceed pro se. The court also told defendant he could hire private counsel after November 6 but

the sentencing hearing would not be continued. Defendant complained he could not get to the

prison law library before the status hearing, but the court responded the status hearing would be

held on November 6. The court told defendant it would set the sentencing hearing four to six

weeks after the status hearing.

¶ 15 Based on this exchange, defendant told the trial court he would choose to go pro se

right then, bypassing the status hearing, if the court would not have the sentencing hearing for at

least six weeks. Defendant said this would make it easier for him to get into the prison law library.

The court told defendant he would give him a date for sentencing. The court offered to appoint a

public defender to represent defendant, but defendant declined the offer. The court then warned

defendant it would not continue the sentencing hearing if defendant said he needed a public

defender when the sentencing date arrived, which defendant said he understood. After a brief

recess, the court noted defendant told the court he wanted to discharge his trial counsel and waive

his right to counsel for purposes of sentencing and anything else going forward. The court declared

this would not affect defendant’s right to counsel on appeal. Defendant verified he was not asking

for a public defender and acknowledged he understood a public defender would represent him at

no cost and assist him with posttrial motions and the sentencing hearing.

-8- ¶ 16 The trial court then questioned defendant to determine whether he had the capacity

to waive his right to counsel. The court also told defendant presenting his arguments in posttrial

motions and at the sentencing hearing would not be as simple as telling his side of the story.

Instead, defendant would be required to adhere to technical rules governing posttrial matters and

sentencing. When defendant said he was not sure he understood what this meant, the court

provided an additional explanation and warned defendant of the potential ramifications of

representing himself as shown in the following exchange:

“THE COURT: Do you *** understand that if you elect here to represent

yourself, we sometimes call it ‘going pro se,’ that you will not be allowed to

complain on appeal about the competency of your representation from this point

forward.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Now, anything that may have occurred up ‘til today, that is

an issue any defendant has. But as far as if you decide to represent yourself, on

appeal you can’t complain about the fact that your representation was not adequate

because you represented yourself.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also, do you understand, sir, that the effectiveness of

advocating for your position with regards to post-trial motions and sentencing could

be diminished by the dual role of yourself, one, as the defendant; and, two, as the

attorney?

-9- THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you also understand that you will receive no special

consideration from the court if you represent yourself one way or the other?

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don’t treat defendants any differently whether or not they

represent themselves or not.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Also, you understand that a lawyer can render important

assistance by (a) determining any additional information that should be presented

at the sentencing hearing or your post-trial motions; (b) through consultations with

the prosecutor regarding any sentencing considerations that need to be presented as

well.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And, also, in the event that I accept your decision

here to represent yourself, you will not be given the opportunity to change your

decision during the sentencing hearing subject to you having the right to hire a

lawyer. But that lawyer, you understand, will be expected to be prepared on the

day we set for the hearing.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.”

- 10 - Defendant stated (1) he was not being forced or threatened with regard to his decision to represent

himself and (2) no one had promised him anything relating to the outcome or sentence in the case.

¶ 17 The trial court also told defendant his sentences on the counts in this case would

run concurrently. However, his sentence would run consecutive to sentences he received in other

pending cases. In addition, the court admonished defendant he was not eligible for probation and

his sentencing range was 7 to 33 years in prison.

¶ 18 The trial court found defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to

counsel pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1, 1984), noting it had no reason to

believe defendant was not competent or did not have the requisite capacity to make an intelligent

and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. The sentencing hearing was set for approximately two

months later on December 4. The court told defendant the sentencing hearing would not be

continued even if defendant hired a lawyer.

¶ 19 The State’s motions to revoke and forfeit defendant’s bond were then discussed.

Defendant complained he did not know about the State’s motion and thought he was just coming

to court for the sentencing hearing. The court noted the bond forfeiture motion was already part

of the record in the case, and defendant replied his former counsel never told him about it. The

court told defendant the bond forfeiture motion would be addressed on December 4. Defendant

did not ask for the appointment of a public defender even though he claimed the case had become

more complicated than what he expected.

¶ 20 On November 26, 2018, defendant filed a posttrial motion, asking to set aside the

jury verdict. That same day, he filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel. Defendant

stated he did not “know the law” and believed he had the right to counsel. On November 29, 2018,

defendant filed another posttrial motion requesting a new trial, arguing his trial counsel failed to

- 11 - file pretrial motions, talk with defendant, and be prepared for trial.

¶ 21 At the December 4, 2018, sentencing hearing, defendant told the trial court he only

decided to proceed pro se because he thought his case would be over after he was sentenced,

claiming he did not know posttrial motions were necessary and could affect his appeal rights. The

court reminded defendant it offered many options to defendant, including the appointment of a

public defender, which defendant rejected, and a continuance so defendant could hire a new

attorney, which defendant said he did not need. The court told defendant he chose to proceed

pro se, said he would be ready on December 4, and knew the sentencing hearing would not be

continued. Further, the court noted the sentencing hearing had been continued multiple times,

defendant was told he would be treated the same whether he had a lawyer or proceeded pro se, and

defendant knew he would have to prepare for the sentencing hearing while in prison.

¶ 22 The trial court denied defendant’s motion to appoint counsel, his motion to

continue, and his two posttrial motions. The court then sentenced defendant to 20 years in prison

with two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR) and granted the State’s bond forfeiture

motion. After defendant told the court he would not be able to use the prison law library before

the 30-day deadline ran, the court gave defendant an extended period of time, until February 4,

2019, to file a motion to reconsider his sentence or notice of appeal. The court explained to

defendant he would need to file a motion to reconsider his sentence before he filed his notice of

appeal if he wanted to challenge his sentence. The court then explained defendant would need to

file a notice of appeal by February 4 if he did not file a motion to reconsider his sentence. The

court also explained defendant could request the appointment of the Office of the State Appellate

Defender (OSAD) to assist him with his appeal. Defendant said he understood.

¶ 23 On February 4, 2019, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence. He did

- 12 - not ask the trial court to appoint counsel to assist him in the trial court. That same day, he filed a

notice of appeal, asking for appointment of counsel to represent him on appeal. On April 17, 2019,

the court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence. The court denied the motion

to reconsider sentence and directed the circuit clerk to prepare a notice of appeal on defendant’s

behalf and, on defendant’s request, appointed OSAD to represent defendant on appeal.

¶ 24 This appeal followed.

¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 26 A. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) Admonishments

¶ 27 Defendant first argues the trial court erred in the way it admonished the potential

jurors pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Defendant acknowledges

he forfeited this issue but asks this court to review the error pursuant to the plain error doctrine.

The supreme court has traditionally identified two situations where it is appropriate to excuse a

forfeiture: (1) when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that

the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the

seriousness of the error, or (2) when a clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious

that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial

process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Sebby,

,

. The first step of any plain error analysis is determining whether a clear or obvious

error occurred. Sebby,

.

¶ 28 According to defendant, the trial court violated Rule 431(b) because the court

admonished all the prospective jurors at one time, grouped the admonishments together, and asked

for everyone to raise his or her hand if he or she understood the propositions and then to raise his

or her hand if he or she accepted the propositions. Defendant argues Rule 431(b) does not allow

- 13 - a court to question potential jurors in this method.

¶ 29 After the parties filed their respective briefs in this case, our supreme court issued

its opinion in People v. Birge,

, finding the trial court in that case neither

erred by grouping the Rule 431(b) admonishments together when it questioned the prospective

jurors nor erred by asking the groups of the prospective jurors to raise their hands, instead of

responding verbally, if they (1) understood and (2) accepted the admonishments. The supreme

court noted Rule 431(b) “plainly states that the court can ask the questions to the potential jurors

as a group, and the rule does not require that their response be conveyed orally rather than by a

show of hands.” Birge,

. As a result, defendant’s argument in this case fails.

¶ 30 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

¶ 31 Defendant next argues his trial counsel was ineffective because he elicited

propensity evidence regarding prior drug transactions between defendant and Rodriguez

previously excluded by the trial court. Defendant categorizes this evidence as highly prejudicial.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show his counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and counsel’s performance

prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington,

(1984). To establish

prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability exists the result of the proceeding would

have been different absent counsel’s errors. People v. Haynes,

,

(2000).

¶ 32 According to defendant, the jurors likely factored in the highly prejudicial

propensity evidence into their decision to convict defendant. Defendant points out his trial counsel

recognized the prejudicial and incriminating nature of the informant’s testimony regarding prior

drug purchases from defendant. Counsel objected to the State asking the informant how many

- 14 - times he had purchased heroin from defendant and argued evidence of prior purchases was

completely prejudicial and irrelevant to the charged offense. The circuit court sustained defense

counsel’s objection and struck the prior testimony.

¶ 33 The State then elicited testimony from Rodriguez regarding money he owed

defendant but did not inquire into the basis for the debt. However, during cross-examination,

defense counsel asked Rodriguez about the money the police gave him to pay off the prior debt,

the basis for the debt, and then did not move to strike the informant’s testimony the debt was for

prior drug transactions. On redirect examination, the informant testified he would not have been

able to purchase more drugs from defendant if he did not pay off his prior debt.

¶ 34 The erroneous admission of other-crimes evidence carries a high risk of prejudice

and will ordinarily require reversal if the erroneously admitted evidence was “so prejudicial as to

deny the defendant a fair trial; that is, the erroneously admitted evidence must have been a material

factor in the defendant’s conviction such that without the evidence the verdict likely would have

been different.” People v. Watkins,

,

. The

other-crimes evidence at issue here is not highly prejudicial based on the circumstances in this

case.

¶ 35 The State had a strong case against defendant. Before each controlled buy, the

police searched Rodriguez and his vehicle and followed and observed Rodriguez on his way to

and from the controlled buys. After each controlled buy, the police met Rodriguez, who turned

over the drugs he purchased, and both he and his vehicle were searched again. Further, in

defendant’s car, the police found some of the money they provided to Rodriguez to make the

controlled buys.

¶ 36 Moreover, regardless of the strength of the State’s case against defendant, the

- 15 - propensity evidence in question here was minimally prejudicial considering the evidence was

coming from the same witness who made the controlled buys. This is not a situation where defense

counsel elicited evidence defendant had previously been convicted of selling drugs or introduced

evidence from additional witnesses regarding drug transactions with defendant. Rodriguez’s

uncorroborated testimony about prior drug deals with defendant would not have made his

testimony regarding the controlled buys any more credible. What made Rodriguez’s testimony

about the controlled buys credible to the jury was the corroborating information provided by the

State through the police officers.

¶ 37 Based on the facts in this case, a reasonable probability does not exist the result of

defendant’s trial would have been different had the jury not heard the informant’s testimony about

the prior transactions. As a result, defendant has failed to establish he received ineffective

assistance of counsel.

¶ 38 C. Denial of Right to Counsel

¶ 39 Both our federal and state constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to

the effective assistance of counsel (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8)

during every “critical stage” of his criminal proceeding (People v. Vernon,

,

(2009)). The critical stages of a criminal proceeding include pretrial,

trial, and sentencing proceedings. Vernon,

,

. However,

a defendant also has a right to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel.

People v. Cleveland,

,

(2009) (overruled in part on

other grounds by People v. Jackson,

,

).

¶ 40 Before accepting a defendant’s waiver of counsel, Illinois Supreme Court Rule

401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984) requires a trial court to inform and make sure a defendant understands

- 16 - the nature of the charges against him, the minimum and maximum sentences the defendant faces,

and the defendant’s right to hire counsel or have counsel appointed if he is indigent. As previously

stated, the trial court extensively reviewed defendant’s options with regard to representation and

the hurdles and risks he faced representing himself. The trial court also made clear defendant

would be held to the same standard as an attorney. After extensive admonishments, defendant

indicated he was going to proceed pro se and understood the sentencing hearing rescheduled for

two months later in December would not be continued again. Defendant does not argue he was

not properly admonished before he waived his right to counsel.

¶ 41 When a defendant waives his right to counsel, the waiver remains in place during

the remainder of the proceedings “unless (1) the defendant later requests counsel or (2) other

circumstances suggest that the waiver is limited to a particular stage of the proceedings.” People

v. Palmer,

,

(2008). Based on our review of the

record, defendant neither indicated his waiver was limited nor did the circumstances of this case

indicate his waiver was limited to just the sentencing hearing. Further, the trial court admonished

defendant he would be representing himself from that point forward in the trial court unless he

chose to hire an attorney.

¶ 42 Defendant did ask for the appointment of another attorney on November 26, 2018,

less than two months after he waived his right to counsel at the scheduled sentencing hearing but

still before his rescheduled sentencing hearing. The next day on November 27, 2018, defendant

filed a motion asking for his December 4, 2018, sentencing hearing to be continued. At the

scheduled sentencing hearing on December 4, 2018, defendant argued he thought he was doing

the trial court a favor by not having the court appoint him a lawyer because he thought the case

would be over after he was sentenced. He claimed ignorance as to his obligation to file posttrial

- 17 - motions to preserve issues for his appeal. However, the court discussed posttrial motions with

defendant before he waived his right to counsel, and defendant filed a posttrial motion. Defendant

claimed he did not understand enough about the law to be held responsible for something affecting

his appeal. After hearing defendant’s arguments, the court denied his request for counsel.

¶ 43 We note defendant does not argue the trial court erred in denying his request for

counsel at the sentencing hearing. Further, defendant never requested counsel again for the

proceedings in the trial court. However, defendant argues the court should have sua sponte

appointed an attorney to represent defendant after the sentencing hearing or readmonished

defendant as to his right to counsel for purposes of preparing and arguing a motion to reconsider

defendant’s sentence. According to defendant, his waiver of counsel was no longer valid after he

requested counsel prior to his rescheduled sentencing hearing.

¶ 44 The cases defendant relies on to support his argument are distinguishable from the

situation here. In People v. Williams,

,

(2005),

People v. Brasseaux,

,

(1996), and Palmer,

,

, the defendants in those cases requested counsel after they

were sentenced. Further, this is not a situation like in Vernon,

,

, where the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel before he represented himself.

¶ 45 Defendant in this case was well aware of his right to counsel and was properly

admonished before he waived his right to counsel during the sentencing phase of his case. Further,

defendant does not argue the trial court erred in denying his request for counsel, which defendant

made before he was sentenced, and defendant did not request the appointment of counsel to assist

with his motion to reconsider sentence after he was sentenced.

¶ 46 While postsentencing proceedings are a critical part of proceedings in the trial court

- 18 - (Palmer,

,

), this does not mean the court is obligated to

sua sponte appoint counsel or re-admonish a defendant of his right to counsel after (1) the

defendant made a valid waiver of his right to counsel and (2) the trial court later denied the

defendant’s post-waiver request for counsel. The idea the trial court in this case would need to

sua sponte admonish defendant he is entitled to counsel or simply appoint counsel to represent

defendant right after the court denied defendant’s request for counsel—a ruling defendant does not

challenge—is a non sequitur.

¶ 47 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Griffin,

,

(1999), is also misplaced. In Griffin, the defendant waived his right to counsel and two weeks

later entered a guilty plea. Griffin,

,

. After the trial court

sentenced the defendant and admonished him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(b) (eff.

Aug. 1, 1992),

“[the] defendant sought clarification of the Rule 604(d) motion requirements and

asked the court whether he was entitled to the appointment of counsel. Specifically,

defendant asked the court whether a motion to vacate the sentence was required to

perfect an appeal. Defendant also asked, ‘Can I be appointed an attorney to

represent me in this appeal?’ The trial judge responded that he was so entitled, but

the judge declined to advise defendant further, noting that to do so would be to act

as defendant’s attorney.” Griffin,

,

.

The Second District found defendant’s actions amounted to an attempt to revoke his waiver of

counsel. Griffin,

,

. Further, “[w]hen defendant began

asking questions about perfecting an appeal, the trial judge should have asked him whether he

wished to revoke his earlier waiver.” Griffin,

,

. By not

- 19 - doing so, the trial court abused its discretion and effectively denied the defendant his right to

counsel. Griffin,

,

. The Second District also held a trial

judge is required to investigate whether a defendant, who has indicated an intent to file an appeal

after entering a guilty plea, wants counsel appointed to assist with any motions required by Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). Griffin,

,

.

¶ 48 The situation in this case is distinguishable. Defendant filed a motion for the

appointment of counsel approximately one week before his rescheduled sentencing hearing. The

trial court was aware of the motion, considered the motion, and denied the motion. As has been

repeatedly stated, defendant does not contest the court’s ruling. Further, defendant had not entered

a guilty plea in this case.

¶ 49 This case is inapposite to People v. Miller,

, upon which

defendant also relies. The issue in Miller pertained to a Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel,

,

(1984)), which is not at issue here.

¶ 50 Defendant in this case waived his right to counsel in the trial court from the

sentencing phase forward. He does not challenge the denial of his motion for counsel to be

appointed before his rescheduled sentencing hearing or complain he was not properly admonished

before he waived his right to counsel. Further, defendant never made another request for the

appointment of counsel to help him in the trial court with his motion to reconsider sentence. Based

on the record in this case, the trial court did not err when it did not sua sponte appoint counsel to

defendant after the sentencing hearing or readmonish defendant of his right to counsel for purposes

of his motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 51 III. CONCLUSION

- 20 - ¶ 52 For the reasons stated, we affirm defendant’s conviction in this case.

¶ 53 Affirmed.

- 21 -