No. 1-21-0279 Opinion filed December 15, 2021 THIRD DIVISION

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT

BRANDON WATSON, Individually and on ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, ) of Cook County. ) Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 2019 CH 03425 ) LEGACY HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL ) The Honorable SERVICES, LLC, d/b/a Legacy ) Pamela McLean Meyerson, Healthcare; LINCOLN PARK ) Judge, presiding. SKILLED NURSING FACILITY, LLC, ) d/b/a Warren Barr Lincoln Park, ) a/k/a The Grove Lincoln Park; and ) SOUTH LOOP SKILLED NURSING ) FACILITY, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr ) South Loop, ) ) Defendants ) ) (Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, ) LLC, d/b/a Legacy Healthcare, and Lincoln ) Park Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a ) Warren Barr Lincoln Park, a/k/a The Grove ) at Lincoln Park, ) ) Defendants-Appellees). )

PRESIDING JUSTICE GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McBride and Burke concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION No. 1-21-0279

¶1 On this interlocutory appeal, plaintiff Brandon Watson appeals the trial court’s order

dismissing two of the defendants in this case: (1) Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC,

d/b/a Legacy Healthcare (Legacy); and (2) Lincoln Park Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC d/b/a

Warren Barr Lincoln Park a/k/a The Grove at Lincoln Park (Lincoln Park). The remaining

defendant, South Loop Skilled Nursing Facility, LLC, d/b/a Warren Barr South Loop (South

Loop), was not dismissed and is not a party to this appeal.

¶2 The trial court’s order dismissed Legacy and Lincoln Park pursuant to section 2-

619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2018)), which

permits dismissal if “the action was not commenced within the time limited by law.” The trial

court found (1) that a person’s claim under the Biometric Information Privacy Act (Act) (740

ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2018)) accrues the first time that his or her biometric information is

obtained by a particular entity, (2) that the statute of limitations for the Act is five years; and

(3) that more than five years had elapsed between when Legacy and Lincoln first obtained

plaintiff’s biometric information and when he filed suit, thereby requiring their dismissal from

his suit.

¶3 On appeal, neither side contests the trial court’s finding that the statute of limitations is

five years. Defendants ask us to affirm the trial court’s dismissal without challenging that

finding, and plaintiff asks us to reverse the dismissal while preserving that finding. Thus, this

issue, of the applicable term of years of the statute of limitations, is not before us on this

interlocutory appeal.

¶4 For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

2 No. 1-21-0279

¶5 BACKGROUND

¶6 I. The Complaint

¶7 Since a section 2-619 motion admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint, we describe

below the complaint’s allegations regarding the parties and events giving rising to the suit. See,

e.g., DeLuna v. Burciaga,

(2006).

¶8 On March 15, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging that he had worked as a certified

nursing assistant for defendants at different locations in Chicago. The complaint alleges that

Legacy provides health care services at 26 facilities throughout the State of Illinois, and that it

is “the sole member and owner” of both Lincoln Park and South Loop. Both Lincoln Park and

South Loop provide residential health care services. Lincoln Park does so at its facility at 2732

Hampden Court, Chicago, while South Loop does so at its separate facility at 1725 South

Wabash Street, Chicago. The complaint alleges that plaintiff worked at Lincoln Park from

December 27, 2012, through February 21, 2019, and at South Loop from May 2017 through

November 2017.

¶9 The complaint alleges that from the start of plaintiff’s employment with defendants in

2012 through the end of his employment in 2019, he was “required to have his fingerprint

and/or handprint collected and/or captured so that Defendants could store it and use it moving

forward as an authentication method.” 1 Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was “required to

place his entire hand on a panel to be scanned in order to ‘clock in’ and ‘clock out’ of work”

each day.

1 Plaintiff alleges: “Due to the fact that Plaintiff had to place his entire hand on Defendants’ biometric scanner, and because Defendants provided no information about the device, Plaintiff is not certain whether Defendants took scans of only his fingerprints, only his handprint, or of both his fingerprints and handprints.” 3 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 10 Plaintiff alleges that defendants committed four “distinct” types of violations under the

Act. The Act requires an entity that utilizes biometric data (1) to publicly provide a written

policy governing the retention and permanent destruction of biometric information, (2) to

inform any subject in writing that his or her biometric information is being collected or stored,

(3) to inform the subject in writing of the specific purpose and length of time for which his or

her biometric information is being stored and used, and (4) to obtain his or her written consent.

740 ILCS 14/15(a), (b) (West 2018). The complaint alleges that defendants violated the Act

by failing to satisfy all four of these requirements.

¶ 11 In relief, plaintiff seeks, among other things, the statutory damages provided by the Act

(740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2018)) and certification as a class action.

¶ 12 II. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

¶ 13 On May 20, 2019, defendants filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, arguing that

plaintiff’s claim accrued on the first day they collected plaintiff’s biometric information and

that plaintiff’s suit was time-barred. In the alternative, defendants argued that plaintiff’s claim

was preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2018)) and

the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) (

(a) (2018)). In support

of their motion, defendants attached the affidavit of Justin Choi, the human resources director

of Lincoln Park, who averred that plaintiff was employed at Lincoln Park from December 27,

2012, to February 21, 2019, as a certified nursing assistant.

¶ 14 In response, plaintiff argued that his suit was not time-barred because the statute of

limitations was five years and it accrued with each capture of his biometric information that

defendants obtained without providing notice or obtaining consent.

4 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 15 In the alternative, plaintiff argued that, even if the trial court found that his claim

accrued only with the initial scan of his hand, his claims against Legacy and South Loop could

not be dismissed because he did not begin working for South Loop until May 2017. Plaintiff

also argued that his claims were not preempted by either the Workers’ Compensation Act or

LMRA.

¶ 16 On June 10, 2020, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding (1) that

plaintiff’s claim accrued with the initial scan on December 27, 2012; (2) that the statute of

limitations was five years; and (3) that his suit, filed on March 15, 2019, was therefore time-

barred.

¶ 17 The trial court observed: “This holding disposes of the case, but the Court will address

Defendants’ other arguments for the record.” The court then found that plaintiff’s claim was

not preempted by either the Workers’ Compensation Act or LMRA.

¶ 18 III. Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider

¶ 19 On July 9, 2020, plaintiff moved to reconsider on the ground that the trial court erred

by failing to consider separately the accrual dates for each defendant. Specifically, plaintiff

argued that he did not work for South Loop until 2017 and, thus, its first scan of plaintiff’s

hand was within the five-year statute of limitations found by the trial court. Plaintiff alleges

that defendants “captured” and used his fingerprints or handscan during the entire period of his

employment with them, which lasted from (1) December 27, 2012, through February 21, 2019,

for Legacy and Lincoln Park and (2) May through November 2017, for South Loop.

¶ 20 Plaintiff also moved to reconsider on the ground of newly discovered evidence that

showed that Lincoln Park did not exist as a legal entity until July 23, 2015. Plaintiff argued

that, since Lincoln Park did not exist prior to that date, its first scan of plaintiff was within the

5 No. 1-21-0279

five-year statute of limitations. The supporting evidence submitted by plaintiff was a printout

from the Illinois Secretary of State’s website showing that Lincoln Park filed its articles of

organization on July 23, 2015.

¶ 21 Plaintiff conceded in his motion that, after July 23, 2015, he “noticed that certain

changes had occurred, particularly that the name on the logos, uniforms, and building awnings

had changed from *** ‘The Grove’ to ‘Warren Barr Lincoln Park’ ” and that “his paychecks

looked different.” However, he asked the trial court to consider the information about this date

newly discovered because he was “not aware that these changes had any legal significance or

evidentiary relevance *** since his lived experience was simply that he continued working at

the same place and in the same job.”

¶ 22 The trial court found that plaintiff’s evidence was not newly discovered, but it agreed

that it had erred by not considering separately the accrual date for South Loop since plaintiff

had made this argument in his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss. The trial court

granted plaintiff’s motion in part by vacating its decision to dismiss South Loop, but it affirmed

its prior order in all other respects.

¶ 23 IV. Rule 304(a) Finding

¶ 24 On February 23, 2021, the trial court granted plaintiff’s motion for entry of a finding

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8. 2016). The trial court found that

there was no just reason to delay an appeal from its orders entered June 10, 2020, and January

27, 2021, “as to Legacy and Lincoln Park.”

¶ 25 Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March 12, 2021, and this timely appeal followed.

The Restaurant Law Center, the Retail Litigation Center, Inc., and LeadingAge Illinois filed

6 No. 1-21-0279

motions with the appellate court for leave to file amicus curiae briefs in support of defendants.

These motions were taken with the case.

¶ 26 ANALYSIS

¶ 27 I. Standard of Review

¶ 28 As noted, the trial court dismissed Legacy and Lincoln Park pursuant to section 2-619.

“A motion to dismiss, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code, admits the legal sufficiency of

the plaintiffs’ complaint, but asserts an affirmative defense or other matter that avoids or

defeats the plaintiffs’ claim.” DeLuna,

; Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty

Publishing Co.,

(2006). “[T]he movant is essentially saying ‘ “Yes, the

complaint was legally sufficient, but an affirmative matter exists that defeats the claim.” ’ ”

Reynolds v. Jimmy John’s Enterprises, LLC,

(quoting Winters

v. Wangler,

(2008)). Dismissal is permitted based on certain listed

“defects” (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1)-(8) (West 2018)) or some “other affirmative matter” (735

ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018)) outside the complaint. Reynolds,

.

¶ 29 On an appeal from a section 2-619 dismissal, our standard of review is de novo.

Hernandez v. Lifeline Ambulance, LLC,

; Solaia Technology,

. De novo review means that we perform the same analysis a trial court would perform.

Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP,

(2011). “Under the de novo standard

of review, this court owes no deference to the trial court.” People v. Williams,

(citing Townsend v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

(2007)).

¶ 30 In ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a court must interpret the pleadings and

supporting materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Van Meter v. Darien

7 No. 1-21-0279

Park District,

(2003). “[A] court must accept as true all well-pled facts

in the plaintiff’s complaint and any reasonable inferences that arise from those facts.”

Hernandez,

. Additionally, we may affirm on any basis appearing in the

record, whether or not the trial court relied on that basis and whether or not the trial court’s

reasoning was correct. Khan v. Fur Keeps Animal Rescue, Inc.,

; Mullins v. Evans,

.

¶ 31 II. Statutory Interpretation

¶ 32 Plaintiff’s claim requires us to interpret the Act’s statutory language and decide what

it requires. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. VC&M,

Ltd. v. Andrews,

. As noted above, de novo consideration means that we

perform the same analysis that a trial judge would perform. A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v.

MSMC Realty, L.L.C.,

.

¶ 33 A. Plain Language

¶ 34 With statutory interpretation, our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

intent of the statute’s drafters. VC&M, Ltd.,

. The most reliable indicator

of the drafters’ intent is the language used in the statute itself, which should be given its plain

and ordinary meaning. VC&M, Ltd.,

.

¶ 35 B. Dictionary Definition

¶ 36 “When a statute does not define its own terms, a reviewing court may use a dictionary

to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of those terms.” Maschek v. City of Chicago,

(citing People v. McChriston,

, and People v.

Bingham,

); see also People v. Chapman,

(“When

8 No. 1-21-0279

a statute contains a term that is not specifically defined, it is entirely appropriate to look to the

dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.”).

¶ 37 C. Objectives

¶ 38 “When interpreting a statute, we do not read a portion of it in isolation; instead, we read

it in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the drafters’ apparent objective

in enacting it.” People v. Miles,

; People v. Chatman,

. When considering the drafters’ objective, we examine the problems

that the legislature intended to remedy with the law and the consequences of construing it one

way or the other. People v. Almond,

(we “consider the reason for the law

and the problems intended to be remedied”); People v. Eppinger,

(legislative intent may be ascertained by considering “the statute in its entirety, its nature and

object, and the consequences of construing it one way or the other”).

¶ 39 D. Every Word

¶ 40 “In addition, whenever possible, every word, clause, and sentence is to be given

reasonable meaning and shall not be treated as superfluous or rendered void.” Mulry v. Berrios,

; People v. Harmon,

, ¶ 68 (“one of

the principles of statutory interpretation is that we should give effect to every word and section

of the statute”); Speedy Gonzalez Landscaping, Inc. v. O.C.A. Construction, Inc.,

(2008) (“ ‘If possible, courts must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence

and may not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant.’ ”

(quoting Newland v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.,

(2001))).

9 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 41 E. Legislative History

¶ 42 Where the language is plain and unambiguous, we apply the statute without resort to

further aids of statutory interpretation. In re Lance H.,

; Krohe v. City of

Bloomington,

(2003); Maschek,

(“If the

statutory language is clear, we must apply it, without resort to any aids of statutory

construction.”). “If, and only if, the statutory language is ambiguous, we may look to other

sources to ascertain the legislature’s intent.” Maschek,

(citing

Krohe,

). “These other sources include primarily the statute’s legislative

history and debates.” Maschek,

(citing Krohe,

).

¶ 43 “When interpreting an ambiguous phrase in a statute, our supreme court looks

especially to the remarks of a bill’s sponsor.” Maschek,

(citing

Krohe,

); see also In re Pension Reform Litigation,

(giving more weight to the remarks of “the chief sponsor of the legislation”); Julie Q. v.

Department of Children & Family Services,

(quoting the sponsor’s

remarks when interpreting a statute). “The remarks made immediately prior to passage are

particularly important.” Maschek,

(citing Poris v. Lake

Holiday Property Owners Ass’n,

(quoting the sponsors’ remarks in

order to interpret a statute and noting that, following these remarks, the bill passed)).

¶ 44 III. The Act

¶ 45 Plaintiff argues that the accrual date, for purposes of a statute of limitations, occurred

with the last scan that lacked notice or consent, and defendants argue that it occurred with the

first. The Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois Appellate Court, and the United States Seventh

10 No. 1-21-0279

Circuit Court of Appeals have yet to address this issue. 2 In the published, federal district court

case of Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc.,

(N.D. Ill. 2020), 3 the court

rejected an argument similar to the one defendants make here. In Cothron, the defendant

employer argued that the plaintiff employee’s suit under the Act was barred by the statute of

limitations because her claim accrued on the first day that it obtained her fingerprint for

purposes of allowing her to access a work computer. Cothron, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 727. The

district court denied the defendant employer’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff

employee had “alleged multiple timely violations” of the Act and that “[t]he number of those

timely violations will be resolved at a future point.” Cothron, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 734. For the

reasons explained below, we similarly find that plaintiff’s suit is not barred by the statute of

limitations and that damage issues will be resolved at a later date.

¶ 46 The Act itself does not contain an express statute of limitation or set forth an accrual

date. However, as we discuss below, the plain language of the statute establishes that it applies

to each and every capture and use of plaintiff’s fingerprint or hand scan. Almost every

substantive section of the Act supports this finding.

2 Both parties cite unpublished circuit court orders that we decline to consider. 3 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard oral argument in the appeal (No. 20-3202) of this case on September 14, 2021. See Kristin L. Bryan, Cothron v. White Castle: A Closer Look at One of the Most Important Data Privacy Litigations of 2021, 11 Nat’l L. Rev. 256 (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cothron-v-white-castle-closer-look-one-most-important-data- privacy-litigations-2021 [https://perma.cc/EW2N-PAVM]. During oral argument, the Seventh Circuit considered certifying the accrual date question to the Illinois Supreme Court. See Michael W. O’Donnell et al., Seventh Circuit Weighs Asking Illinois Supreme Court to Resolve Construction of the Biometric Information Privacy Act, Norton Rose Fulbright (Sept. 2021), https:// www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en-us/knowledge/publications/44932d79/seventh-circuit-weighs- asking-supreme-court-to-resolve-the-biometric-information-privacy-act [https://perma.cc/E6J4- RNZG]; Ill. S. Ct. R. 20(a) (eff. Aug. 1, 1992) (permitting the Seventh Circuit to certify questions to the Illinois Supreme Court). 11 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 47 A. Plain Language

¶ 48 In its “Definitions” section, the Act defines a “ ‘[b]iometric identifier’ ” to include a

“fingerprint” or “scan of hand,” such as what was used here. 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). The

same section defines “ ‘[b]iometric information’ ” to “mean[ ] any information, regardless of

how it is captured,” so long as it is “based on an individual’s” fingerprint or hand scan and

“used to identify an individual.” 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018). In the case at bar, defendants

used “information” based on plaintiff’s handscan or fingerprints to check him into work each

day and check him out. Since the Act applies to “any information, regardless of how it is

captured,” it applies, by its plain terms, to the twice-daily “capture[ ]” of plaintiff’s hand “to

identify” him. 740 ILCS 14/10 (West 2018).

¶ 49 The legislative purpose is easy to discern because the Act’s drafters provided a statutory

section entitled “[l]egislative findings” and “intent.” 740 ILCS 14/5 (West 2018); Sekura v.

Krishna Schaumburg Tan, Inc.,

(the Act’s “legislative purpose

is easy to discern,” where its drafters provided a statement of intent). This section states that

the Act serves the public “by regulating the collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage,

retention, and destruction of biometric identifiers and information.” 740 ILCS 14/5(g) (West

2018). The stated purpose, then, is to regulate not simply the “collection” but also everything

that follows, including the subsequent “use” and “storage” of the collected information. 740

ILCS 14/5(g) (West 2018). According to this section, the goal of this regulation is to reassure

a skeptical public and to protect “the individual” who otherwise would have “no recourse.”

740 ILCS 14/5(c), (d) (West 2018). This section further supports our finding that the Act

applies to defendants’ subsequent “use” of plaintiff’s hand scan or fingerprints and not just its

initial collection. 740 ILCS 14/5(g) (West 2018).

12 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 50 Section 15 of the Act sets forth the obligations for an entity that chooses to utilize

biometric information.

¶ 51 First, “[a] private entity in possession of biometric identifiers or biometric information

must develop a written policy, made available to the public, establishing a retention schedule

and guidelines for permanently destroying biometric identifiers and biometric information

when the initial purpose for collecting or obtaining such identifiers or information has been

satisfied or within 3 years of the individual’s last interaction with the private entity, whichever

occurs first.” 740 ILCS 14/15(a) (West 2018). In the case at bar, “the initial purpose for

collecting” plaintiff’s “identifiers,” according to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, was

to clock him in and out of work. 740 ILCS 14/15(a) (West 2018). That purpose ended or was

“satisfied” when he stopped working for defendants. 740 ILCS 14/15(a) (West 2018). With

respect to Lincoln Park, that date was February 21, 2019. Thus, on February 21, 2019, if not

earlier, Lincoln Park owed plaintiff a written destruction policy.

¶ 52 Section 15 further provides, in relevant part:

“(b) No private entity may collect, capture, purchase, receive through trade, or

otherwise obtain a person’s or a customer’s biometric identifier or biometric

information, unless it first:

(1) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in

writing that a biometric identifier or biometric information is being collected or

stored;

(2) informs the subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative in

writing of the specific purpose and length of term for which a biometric identifier

or biometric information is being collected, stored, and used; and

13 No. 1-21-0279

(3) receives a written release executed by the subject of the biometric identifier

or biometric information or the subject’s legally authorized representative.” 740

ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018).

¶ 53 Defendants argues that the Act’s use of the word “first” above means that the

prohibitions and, hence, the accrual date apply to an entity’s “first” capture or collection. See

740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018). Unfortunately for defendants, the word “first” does not

modify or change “collect” or “capture.” See 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018). Instead, the

word modifies the words “informs” and “receives.” See 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018). It

modifies the entity’s obligations, not the triggering actions. Thus, before collection or capture,

the entity must “first” inform a subject and receive a release. Defendants seek to rewrite the

statute so that it reads “before an entity first collects or captures,” but the statute is not written

that way. There is no modifier limiting “collect” or “capture”; thus, the requirements apply to

each and every collection and capture. By contrast, there is a temporal limitation on an entity’s

authority to act; an entity may not collect or capture without “first” informing a subject and

receiving a release.

¶ 54 This interpretation comports with both the dictionary definitions of these words and the

legislative history, as we explain below.

¶ 55 B. Dictionary Definitions

¶ 56 When seeking dictionary definitions to interpret the Act, our supreme court has turned

first to Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary, so we will do the same. See Rosenbach v. Six Flags

Entertainment Corp.,

. When interpreting the Act, this court also relied

on definitions from Dictionary.com, so below we provide definitions from both dictionaries.

See Sekura,

, ¶ 53.

14 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 57 The word “first” can be used as an adjective, adverb, or noun. See Merriam-Webster

Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/first (last visited Dec. 1,

2021) [https://perma.cc/8VM3-M8MT]; Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/

browse/first (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Y4YY-RF4J]. In the Act, it is used

immediately before a verb. As an adverb, the word “first” is defined as “before another”

(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/first

(last visited Dec. 1, 2021)) or “before all others” or “before some other thing, event”

(Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/first (last visited Dec. 1, 2021)).

Applying this definition to the language at hand means that an entity must inform a subject

and receive a release “before” it collects or captures. As noted above, there is no temporal

limitation on “collects” or “captures,” thereby applying to the first, as well as the last,

collection or capture.

¶ 58 The word “capture” can mean “to record in a permanent file (as in a computer)”

(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/capture

(last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5Z2T-EHF9]), as well as “to take by force or

stratagem; take prisoner; seize” (Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/

capture (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/M2QC-96FT]). In the case at bar,

defendants took or seized their employees’ fingerprints or hand scans each time they clocked

in or out to record their hours.

¶ 59 The word “collect” can mean “to gather or exact from a number of persons or

sources” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/collect (last visited Dec. 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/J2G5-M4DN]), as well as “to

gather together; assemble,” as in “[t]he professor collected the students’ exams”

15 No. 1-21-0279

(Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/collect (last visited Dec. 1, 2021)

[https://perma.cc/JD9M-2KZV]). In the case at bar, defendants “gather[ed] or exact[ed]”

fingerprints or hand scans “from a number of” their employees at the end of the day in order

to clock them out, similar to a professor gathering his or her students’ exams at the end of

class. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/collect (last visited Dec. 1, 2021).

¶ 60 Thus, the dictionary definitions confirm our reading of the plain language of the statute

that its obligations applied to each and every hand scan.

¶ 61 C. Legislative History

¶ 62 If the words of a statute are ambiguous, and only if they are ambiguous, may we turn

to other aides, such as legislative history. Sekura,

; Maschek,

. While we do not find the words ambiguous, we do find that

the legislative history further supports our finding.

¶ 63 When considering legislative history, a reviewing court pays particular attention to the

remarks of a bill’s sponsor and to the remarks immediately prior to passage. Sekura,

; Maschek,

. Before the House’s passage

of the Act, Representative Kathleen Ryg, the House sponsor, explained the impetus for this

act, as follows:

“This Bill is especially important because one of the companies that has been piloted

in Illinois, Pay By Touch, is the largest fingerprint scan system in Illinois and they have

recently filed for bankruptcy and wholly stopped providing verification services in

March of 2008. This pullout leaves thousands of customers from Albertson’s, Cub

Foods, Farm Fresh, Jewel Osco, Shell, and Sunflower Market wondering what will

16 No. 1-21-0279

become of their biometric and financial data. The California Bankruptcy Court recently

approved the sale of their Pay By Touch database. So, we are in very serious need of

protections for the citizens of Illinois when it comes to biometric information. I know

of no opposition to the legislation and I’ll attempt to answer any questions.” 95th Ill.

Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 30, 2008, at 249 (statements of Representative

Ryg).

There were no questions and no discussion. The bill proceeded immediately to a vote and

passed the House. It was subsequently passed by the Senate on July 10, 2008, and signed into

law by the governor on October 3, 2008.

¶ 64 Representative Ryg’s remarks establish that the primary impetus behind the bill was to

allay the fears of and provide protections for “thousands of” people who had provided their

biometric data for use as identifiers and who were now left “wondering what will become of”

this data. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 30, 2008, at 249 (statements of

Representative Ryg); Sekura,

(“Representative Ryg’s remarks

establish that the primary impetus behind the bill was to alleviate the fears” of those whose

biometric data had been seized). This is the position that plaintiff found himself in after leaving

defendants’ employ without ever having been provided with a statement of defendants’

destruction policy and schedule.

¶ 65 In short, we find that the plain language of the statute, its legislative history and

purpose, and the dictionary definitions of its key terms compel us to reject defendants’

argument that the accrual date occurred with the first collection of plaintiff’s finger or

handprint.

17 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 66 Defendants argue that, if we find the accrual date is not the first collection, then

damages will be ruinous for them. However, we do not need to decide at this time whether

each scan was a new and separate violation or a continuing violation. 4 All we have to determine

now is whether plaintiff’s suit against these defendants survives their motion to dismiss. See

Cothron, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 734 (where “it is clear that at least some of [the plaintiff’s] claims

survive,” a motion to dismiss her complaint must be denied). Questions relating to damages

are not before us. For this reason, we deny the motion of LeadingAge Illinois to file an

amicus curiae brief since the predominant focus of its motion and proposed brief is on

damages. For similar reasons, we deny the motion of Restaurant Law Center and Retail

Litigation Center, Inc., to file an amicus curiae brief since it also focuses on damages.

¶ 67 As a final note, we observe that both sides made arguments in their briefs and at oral

argument based on the almost 20-year-old case of Feltmeier v. Feltmeier,

(2003), which was decided years before the Act was first passed. In Feltmeier, our supreme

court found that the plaintiff’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress accrued on

the date of the defendant’s last outrageous act because it was impossible to discern when

defendant’s conduct became sufficiently outrageous to permit suit. Feltmeier,

. “Because it is impossible to pinpoint the specific moment when enough conduct ***

occurred to become actionable, the termination of the conduct provides the most sensible place

to begin the running of the prescriptive period.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Feltmeier,

.

4 Although we do not address the issue of damages for the reasons already explained above, we observe that damages are discretionary not mandatory. The Act introduces a list of possible damages with the statement that this list constitutes what a “prevailing party may recover.” (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 14/20 (West 2018). 18 No. 1-21-0279

¶ 68 Defendants argue that Feltmeier requires us to find that accrual occurred with the first

collection, and they quote in support the following statement from Feltmeier: “Generally, a

limitations period begins to run when facts exist that authorize one party to maintain an action

against another.” Feltmeier,

. Defendants argue that, since defendants failed

to provide notice or obtain consent prior to their initial collection of plaintiff’s biometric

information, plaintiff could have sued them for that violation at that time and, therefore, the

“facts exist[ed]” at that time to “authorize” suit. Feltmeier,

.

¶ 69 This argument has a number of flaws. First, as we discussed above, this argument

overlooks all the ensuing times defendants violated the statute by their use and capture of

plaintiff’s biometric information. See 740 ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018). Second, the quoted

statement begins with the word “[g]enerally,” indicating that it is not an absolute statement.

See Feltmeier,

. Third, the Feltmeier court explained the animating principle

behind its statement as “The purpose behind a statute of limitations is to prevent stale claims,

not to preclude claims before they are ripe for adjudication [citation], and certainly not to shield

a wrongdoer.” Feltmeier,

. In the case at bar, it would be hard to argue that

plaintiff’s claim was stale when, only a couple of months prior to filing suit, his employment

ended with him left “wondering” what would then become of his biometric information. See

95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 30, 2008, at 249 (statements of Representative

Ryg). It was this type of concern, as we discussed above, that caused lawmakers to draft this

statute in the first place. Fourth, the Feltmeier court stressed the importance of looking to the

applicable statute for guidance. See Feltmeier,

. In the case at bar, the Act

places the burden of notification of a possible injury squarely on the entity choosing to utilize

the information rather than on the person from whom the information is obtained. See 740

19 No. 1-21-0279

ILCS 14/15(b) (West 2018) (entity must “inform[ ] the subject” that biometric information is

being collected or stored, as well as the specific purpose, length of retention, and destruction

policy). Lastly, our finding comports with the recent pronouncement of our supreme court in

this area. With respect to the Act, our supreme court found that, “when a private entity fails to

comply with one of section 15’s requirements, that violation constitutes an invasion,

impairment, or denial of the statutory rights of any person.” (Emphasis added.) Rosenbach,

. “The violation, in itself, is sufficient to support the individual’s ***

statutory cause of action.” (Emphasis added.) Rosenbach,

, ¶ 33. For these

reasons, we do not find defendants’ arguments persuasive and must reverse the trial court’s

dismissal order.

¶ 70 Defendants also cite in support Blair v. Nevada Landing Partnership, RBG, LP,

(2006). First, Blair was an interpretation of a completely different statute,

namely, the Right of Publicity Act (Publicity Act) (765 ILCS 1075/1 et seq. (West 2018)), with

a completely different purpose, as its name—“Publicity”—suggests. The Publicity Act

provides that “[t]he rights under this Act are property rights that are freely transferable.” 765

ILCS 1075/15 (West 2018). By contrast, the whole point of the Act at issue here is that

biometric rights are inherently not transferable. In the section of the Act that sets forth the act’s

purpose, our legislature observed that biometric information is “unlike” all other “identifiers”

in that it is “unique” and that, “once compromised, the individual has no recourse.” 740 ILCS

14/5(c) (West 2018) (titled “Legislative findings; intent”). Second, our supreme court recently

questioned the logic and reasoning underlying Blair’s findings. See Ciolino v. Simon,

. Third, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois

recently rejected arguments based on Blair in a case under the Act. See Stauffer v. Innovative

20 No. 1-21-0279

Heights Fairview Heights, LLC,

, 904-05 (S.D. Ill. 2020). For these

reasons, we do not find Blair persuasive.

¶ 71 On this appeal, plaintiff also asks us to find that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to reconsider based on “newly discovered” evidence. Since we are reversing, we do

not consider the issue of newly discovered evidence.

¶ 72 IV. No Cross Appeal

¶ 73 In their responding brief, defendants raise an issue not raised in plaintiff’s opening

appellate brief. Defendants ask this court to reverse the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s

claims were not preempted by LMRA (

(a)). In his reply brief, plaintiff argues

that, since defendants failed to file a cross-appeal, this issue is not properly before us on this

interlocutory appeal. We agree that this issue is not properly before us for the following

reasons.

¶ 74 “Where a trial court’s judgment is entirely in favor of a party, specific findings of the

trial court that may have been adverse to the party do not give rise to an appeal.” Argonaut-

Midwest Insurance Co. v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co.,

(2003).

In the case at bar, the trial court’s judgment was “entirely in favor of a party” since it dismissed

plaintiff’s suit with prejudice with respect to the two defendants involved in this appeal. See

Argonaut-Midwest,

. If we were to consider this issue, we would be

doing so without the input of the third defendant, whose rights would also be affected by any

ruling that we would make.

¶ 75 “Where a general decision for the appellee contains findings unfavorable to the

appellee and no cross-appeal is filed, the adverse findings are not properly before the reviewing

court.” Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Chapman,

; Stevens v.

21 No. 1-21-0279

Village of Oak Brook,

(“It is well settled that, in the absence

of a cross-appeal, a reviewing court is confined to those issues raised by the appellant and will

not consider those urged by the appellee.”). Defendants chose not to file a cross-appeal as

permitted by Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(3) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 76 This appeal was filed pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8,

2016), which permits an interlocutory appeal with only a limited number of parties, although

“multiple parties *** are involved in an action.” The rule permits an interlocutory appeal on

the conditions that (1) there is “a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the

parties” and (2) “the trial court has made an express written finding.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff.

Mar. 8, 2016). In its written order, dated February 23, 2021, the trial court made such an

express written finding with respect to only Legacy and Lincoln Park, the two defendants in

this appeal. The third defendant, South Loop, is not before us and, thus, neither are issues

involving it.

¶ 77 As plaintiff observes, this court has already accepted a certified question regarding this

same issue, namely, whether LMRA preempts claims under the Act, and this question has been

fully briefed in another appeal. See Walton v. Roosevelt University, No. 1-21-0011 (Feb. 1,

2021) (Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308 leave to appeal granted); Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Oct.

1, 2019) (permitting an interlocutory appeal on a question certified by the trial court). Thus, a

decision on this question will issue shortly.

¶ 78 For all the foregoing reasons, we decline to consider the preemption issue raised by

22 No. 1-21-0279

defendants on this interlocutory appeal.

¶ 79 CONCLUSION

¶ 80 In sum, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing Legacy and Lincoln Park from this

action, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 81 Reversed and remanded.

23 No. 1-21-0279

No. 1-21-0279

Cite as: Watson v. Legacy Healthcare Financial Services, LLC,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2019-CH- 03425; the Hon. Pamela McLean Meyerson, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Alejandro Caffarelli and Alexis D. Martin, of Caffarelli & for Associates Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Anne E. Larson, Harry J. Secaras, and Michael V. Furlong, of for Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., of Chicago, for Appellee: appellees.

Amicus Curiae: Debra R. Bernard, of Perkins Coie LLP, of Chicago, for amicus curiae LeadingAge Illinois.

Anneliese Wermuth and Jenny Goltz, of Cozen O’Connor, of Chicago, Meredith C. Slawe and Michael W. McTigue Jr., of Cozen O’Connor, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Angelo I. Amador, of Restaurant Law Center, and Deborah R. White, of Retail Litigation Center, Inc., both of Washington, D.C., amici curiae.

24