FIFTH DIVISION June 11, 2021

No. 1-20-1050

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook ) County Respondent-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 15 CR 10914 ) GERMEL DOSSIE, ) ) Honorable William H. Hooks, Petitioner-Appellee. ) Judge, presiding. )

PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Rochford concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s order quashing defendant’s arrest and suppressing evidence. The police had probable cause to arrest defendant and the use of an investigative alert did not invalidate the arrest.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Defendant Germel Dossie was arrested pursuant to an investigative alert related to the

shooting of Clifton Frye. Frye later died of his injuries and defendant was charged with six

counts of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2014)). Defendant moved to quash his

arrest and suppress an incriminating statement that he made while under arrest. He argued that 1-20-1050

the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and that the use of an investigative alert,

rather than an arrest warrant, was unconstitutional. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the

motion, during which several police officers testified.

¶4 Officer Nicolas Sanchez testified that on June 1, 2015, he and his partner were engaged

in narcotics surveillance in the Rogers Park neighborhood of Chicago. Around 1:00 p.m.,

Sanchez observed Clifton Frye in a red Pontiac, conducting what Sanchez suspected to be a

hand-to-hand narcotics transaction. Sanchez and his partner then lost sight of Frye’s car. Shortly

thereafter, a report of “shots fired” came across the police radio. Sanchez and his partner drove to

the scene and found Frye on the ground injured.

¶5 After other officers and detectives arrived on the scene, Sanchez went into a building

near the corner of Ashland Avenue and Jonquil Terrace to view its surveillance video. According

to Sanchez, the video showed two Black males in their teens or early twenties, dressed in dark

clothing with hooded jackets. The men were shown running eastbound on the south sidewalk of

Jonquil Terrace, one with a revolver in his hand and the other with his left hand in his jacket

pocket.

¶6 Detective Brian Tedeschi testified that he was assigned to investigate the shooting of

Clifton Frye. He testified, based on information he received from other officers, that security

camera footage from a building near the corner of Ashland Avenue and Jonquil Terrace showed

a red Hyundai Santa Fe driving westbound on Jonquil through the intersection with Ashland. A

short time later, the same car drove eastbound through the intersection and out of frame. The

video then showed two individuals running from the direction of the car to the intersection. At

the intersection, one of the individuals turned onto Ashland Avenue and out of frame. He came

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back into frame shortly thereafter, and the two individuals sprinted back in the direction of the

car. The Hyundai’s license plate was clearly visible in the footage.

¶7 Tedeschi later learned that another police officer had located the car from the video. In

the car were Tyrone Crosby and his grandmother. Tedeschi testified that Crosby was taken in for

questioning. Crosby told Tedeschi that he was driving the car at the time of the shooting. He told

Tedeschi that he had picked up individuals known to him as Lil’ Shawn and Spazz. Crosby said

that after they reached the intersection of Ashland and Jonquil, they circled back, and he stopped

to let Lil’ Shawn and Spazz out of the car. Shortly thereafter, Crosby heard gunshots and Lil’

Shawn and Spazz came running back to the car. Spazz had a “large-barrel handgun” in his hand,

and Lil’ Shawn was holding his side.

¶8 Tedeschi testified that, based on Crosby’s statements, he searched a police database for

the nicknames “Lil’ Shawn” and “Spazz”. The results of that search led Tedeschi to identify Lil’

Shawn as Shawn Randall and Spazz as defendant. Tedeschi then issued investigative alerts for

both Randall and defendant.

¶9 Tedeschi testified that the next morning, June 2, Crosby gave a recorded statement to an

assistant Cook County State’s Attorney. During the statement, Crosby identified a photo of

defendant as Spazz. Crosby also reaffirmed his statement that defendant was the individual with

the “large-barrel handgun”. Tedeschi testified that later that day, Crosby also testified before a

grand jury. During that testimony, Crosby again identified defendant.

¶ 10 Officer Chris Dingle testified that on June 9, 2015, he was working on “fugitive

apprehension” detail. While he and his partners were conducting undercover surveillance, he

observed defendant leaving an apartment building and get into a car. Once defendant drove off,

Dingle followed him and radioed for a marked police car to initiate a stop.

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¶ 11 After a marked car pulled defendant over, another officer handcuffed him and put him in

the car. Dingle testified that defendant was taken to the police station. Dingle testified that he did

not have an arrest or search warrant for defendant at the time of the arrest. He also testified that

he did not witness defendant commit any crimes and that defendant complied with all police

requests.

¶ 12 Dingle testified that the investigative alert stated that defendant was involved in an

aggravated battery with a handgun. However, the investigative alert did not specify the nature of

that involvement. He also testified that he later learned that the Illinois Department of

Corrections had issued a juvenile warrant for defendant, but that he was unaware of that warrant

at the time of the arrest.

¶ 13 The circuit court heard closing argument and reviewed additional briefing. In its ruling,

the court found that defendant’s arrest, pursuant to an investigative alert, was unconstitutional.

The court analyzed a then-existing split of authority between panels of this district of the

Appellate Court on the issue and concluded that the use of investigative alerts is a “questionable,

constitutionally-offensive Chicago-only policy” that impermissibly circumvents the warrant

requirements of the United States and Illinois constitutions. Of particular concern to the court

was the lack of exigent circumstances; the police had Crosby testify before a grand jury within a

day of the shooting but did not arrest defendant until a week later. However, the record showed

no indication that the police ever sought an arrest warrant.

¶ 14 The circuit court also held that even if the use of an investigative alert did not invalidate

the arrest, the police lacked probable cause to arrest defendant. In its ruling, the court specifically

found that the witnesses had all offered credible testimony during the hearing. However, the

court questioned the reliability of the information provided by Crosby. The court explained that

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had the police sought a warrant in the first instance, it would have requested information about

Crosby’s criminal history, the conditions under which he gave information to the police, and

other considerations that would bear on his credibility. Crosby’s background, the court observed,

“is a mystery to the universe,” unprobed by the mechanisms designed to ensure that arrest

warrants issue only upon probable cause.

¶ 15 Moreover, the court noted that Crosby did not identify defendant by name, but only as

“Spazz.” The State provided no evidence about the reliability of the database used to link that

nickname to defendant, including how that database was compiled and maintained, or how many

individuals were linked to the nickname “Spazz.” Because of these unanswered questions about

the reliability of Crosby and the police database, the court ruled that the police lacked probable

cause to arrest defendant.

¶ 16 On two separate grounds, therefore, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion, quashed

his arrest, and suppressed all evidence stemming from the arrest. The State filed a certificate of

substantial impairment, and this appeal followed.

¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 The State makes three arguments for reversing the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s

motion: (1) that the court erred in finding that arrests based on investigative alerts are per se

unconstitutional, (2) that the court erred in finding that police lacked probable cause to arrest

defendant, and (3) even if the arrest was unconstitutional, the exclusionary rule should be relaxed

because the police acted in good faith.

¶ 19 Our review of a ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence presents

questions of both fact and law. See People v. Luedemann,

(2006). We

give great deference to factual findings and will not disturb them unless they are against the

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manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Burns,

. The circuit court’s

ultimate ruling on the motion, however, is a question of law which we review de novo. Id. ¶ 16.

¶ 20 In ruling that defendant’s arrest was unconstitutional because it was based on an

investigative alert, the circuit court relied upon People v. Bass,

, ¶ 71,

aff'd in part, vacated in part,

(holding that “an arrest [is] unconstitutional

when effectuated on the basis of an investigative alert issued by the Chicago Police

Department.”). Although other panels of this court subsequently disagreed with Bass—beginning

with People v. Braswell, 2019 IL App (1st) 172810—Bass remained good law at the time of the

circuit court’s ruling in this case and the circuit court was entitled to follow it. See People v.

Harris,

(1988) (“It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of an

appellate court are binding precedent on all circuit courts regardless of locale”), citing People v.

Thorpe,

(1977).

¶ 21 Defendant argues that the Braswell court and subsequent courts misread Bass. He

contends that Bass did not stand for the proposition that the use of investigative alerts is per se

unconstitutional, notwithstanding the court’s statement that “[w]e hold an arrest unconstitutional

when effectuated on the basis of an investigative alert issued by the Chicago Police Department.”

See Bass,

, ¶ 71. Rather, he argues, Bass stood for the proposition that

an investigative alert is not an adequate substitute for a warrant in a case where a warrant is

required. See id. ¶ 62 (“in the ordinary case, a warrant [must] issue before an arrest can be made.

Arrests based on investigative alerts violate that rule.”). But defendant’s reliance on Bass is

misplaced because our supreme court has now vacated those portions of Bass analyzing the

constitutionality of investigative alerts. People v. Bass,

. Without a

definitive resolution of this issue from our supreme court, we will continue to follow Braswell

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and the line of cases disagreeing with Bass. See, e.g., People v. Simmons,

; People v. Bahena,

; People v. Thornton,

. Consequently, we find the circuit court erred in ruling that the

arrest was unconstitutional simply because it was based on an investigative alert.

¶ 22 We note that the timing of the Bass decisions put the circuit court and the parties in a

difficult position. The evidentiary hearing in this case took place on non-consecutive days, and

this court issued its opinions in Bass and Braswell between those days. Coincidentally, the

Illinois Supreme Court issued its opinion in Bass after this appeal was partially briefed. The state

of the law has been in flux and our supreme court has specifically vacated the appellate court’s

holding in Bass on which the circuit court relied. We choose to follow the most recent case law

on point, which requires us to reverse the circuit court on this issue.

¶ 23 Turning to the second issue, we find that the circuit court erred in ruling that there was

not probable cause for the police to arrest defendant. “[P]robable cause exists when the facts

known to the [arresting] officer at the time are sufficient to lead a reasonably cautious person to

believe that the arrestee has committed a crime, based on the totality of the circumstances. The

standard is the probability of criminal activity, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that

it be more likely than not.” People v. Gocmen,

, ¶ 19. “When officers are

working in concert, probable cause can be established from all the information collectively

received by the officers even if that information is not specifically known to the officer who

makes the arrest.” People v. Buss,

(1999) (quoting People v. Bascom,

(1997)). When relying on third-party information, the State must establish

that such information bears “some indicia of reliability and must be sufficient to establish the

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requisite quantum of suspicion.” People v. Maxey,

(quoting

People v. Jackson,

(2014)).

¶ 24 There are no contested issues of fact because the circuit court specifically found that all

the witnesses at the hearing were credible. Therefore, we simply review, de novo, the court’s

ultimate ruling. See Burns,

. The evidence at the hearing established

that police officers quickly responded to a report of “shots fired” and found Clifton Frye on the

ground injured. The evidence showed that the police then viewed surveillance video from a

nearby building, which showed two Black males getting out of a red Hyundai Santa Fe, running

to the street corner, then running back to the car. The police located that car, and questioned one

of its occupants, Tyrone Crosby. Crosby’s account of the afternoon included picking up an

individual later identified as defendant, driving to the scene of the crime, seeing defendant with a

handgun in his hand, and driving away after hearing gunshots.

¶ 25 In his brief, defendant—as did the circuit court its ruling—speculates about reasons that

Crosby may not have been reliable. However, the State need not establish that third-party

information be unimpeachable, only that it has “some indicia of reliability”. Maxey,

. Crosby’s account was corroborated by the security video, which showed a red

Hyundai Santa Fe—the same car in which Crosby was first located by the police—at the scene of

the crime. The video and Crosby also both depicted two Black males getting out of that car,

going to the street corner, then sprinting back to the car. And although Crosby only identified

defendant by a nickname, he did identify a photo of defendant as “Spazz” and described picking

up Spazz in his car and seeing Spazz holding a “large-barrel handgun” at the scene of the crime.

¶ 26 Taken together, the information collectively known to the police would have led a

reasonably cautious person to believe that defendant had committed a felony. Consequently, the

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police had reasonable cause to make the arrest. See Gocmen,

. Having

concluded that the circuit court erred in granting defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and

suppress evidence, we do not reach the State’s argument that the exclusionary rule should be

relaxed because the police acted in good faith.

¶ 27 CONCLUSION

¶ 28 We reverse the circuit court’s order granting defendant’s motion to quash his arrest and

supress evidence, and we remand the case for further proceedings.

¶ 29 Reversed and remanded.

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