Opinion filed February 18, 2022 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2022

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Henry County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-19-0281 v. ) Circuit No. 17-CF-348 ) SHAUN N. TAYLOR, ) ) Honorable Terence M. Patton, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Lytton dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant Shaun N. Taylor appeals from his conviction of attempted first degree murder

of a peace officer. The lower court sentenced defendant to 30 years in prison plus an additional 20

years for using a firearm during the commission of the offense. On appeal, he argues that (1) the

trial court erred in denying his request for a second expert to evaluate his mental state at the time

he committed the offense and (2) the 20-year firearm enhancement for attempted murder of a peace

officer does not apply. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 Defendant was charged with one count of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer

(720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), (c)(1)(A), 9-1 (West 2016)) and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm

(id. § 24-1.2(a)(3)) for shooting at Illinois State Police Trooper Andrew Scott after Scott initiated

a traffic stop of defendant’s vehicle. Prior to trial, the court appointed clinical psychologist Dr.

Kirk Witherspoon to examine defendant and determine whether he was fit to stand trial and

whether he could raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI). Witherspoon

conducted an evaluation and diagnosed defendant as suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder

stemming from his military service in Afghanistan. Applying multiple psychological factors,

Witherspoon concluded that defendant was fit for trial and failed to meet the threshold for asserting

the defense of NGRI. In an addendum to his report, Witherspoon noted that defendant reported

using “psychostimulants” to stay awake while driving at the time of his arrest. Witherspoon stated

that the ingestion of such stimulants would, in his opinion, preclude defendant’s ability to plead

not guilty by reason of insanity. Witherspoon concluded that, in the event defendant was found

guilty, a guilty-but-mentally-ill presumption would apply. Specifically, he recommended that

defendant “be considered as reasonably experiencing significant and debilitating posttraumatic

stress disorder, irrespective of psychostimulant use, relative to adjudicatory and dispositional

considerations.”

¶4 In addition to his report, Witherspoon provided defense counsel with a handwritten note,

opining:

“Mr. Taylor is a borderline case. I do not think he meets the

threshold of NGRI. However, if his parents can afford it, you may wish to

seek a second opinion. If so, I can give you the names of a couple of other

good psychologists who can do this work.”

2 ¶5 In response to Witherspoon’s note, defendant filed a motion requesting the appointment of

a psychologist, at the State’s expense, to conduct an evaluation and provide a second opinion as to

his mental state at the time he committed the offense. In support of his motion, defendant cited

Witherspoon’s report, the addendum, and the handwritten note.

¶6 Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied defendant’s request. The court

found that defendant had met the threshold requirement of establishing that he was indigent. It

then discussed whether there was a need for a second expert. The court noted that defendant had

already been evaluated by Witherspoon at the State’s expense with Witherspoon finding defendant

did not meet the requirements of an insanity defense. The court noted that Witherspoon’s report

did not include a recommendation that the court appoint another evaluator. The court emphasized

that, in prior cases, Witherspoon’s report included a recommendation for a second evaluation if

needed and found that the psychologist’s failure to do so in this case was significant.

¶7 At trial, evidence revealed that Scott stopped defendant on Interstate 80 around 9:30 p.m.

on October 15, 2017. Defendant was traveling from the state of Washington to Massachusetts.

Scott approached defendant’s vehicle, identified himself as an Illinois State Trooper, and informed

defendant that he was going to give him a warning. He asked defendant to return to the squad car

with him, but defendant declined the invitation. While Scott was preparing the warning, another

officer arrived with a canine unit. The officer walked around defendant’s vehicle, and the dog

alerted. Scott and the other officer then approached the vehicle and asked defendant to exit the car.

Instead, defendant sped off.

¶8 Defendant pulled off the interstate at a nearby exit and parked his car on a country road.

He grabbed his AR-15 semiautomatic rifle and a .40-caliber handgun and took a position with a

line of sight of his vehicle in a nearby cornfield. Moments later, Scott pulled up behind defendant’s

3 vehicle. He exited his squad car but did not approach defendant’s vehicle, instead, moving toward

the back of his squad car. That is when defendant fired 23 shots in Scott’s direction with the

semiautomatic rifle. Scott survived the incident unharmed. Law enforcement pursued defendant

on foot. Several hours later, defendant surrendered.

¶9 The jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder of a peace officer and aggravated

discharge of a firearm. The trial court merged the aggravated discharge conviction into the

attempted murder conviction.

¶ 10 Prior to sentencing, the court entertained argument on the propriety of applying a 20-year

enhancement to defendant’s sentence for personally discharging a firearm. The State focused on

the term “shall” in the firearm enhancement language and argued it was mandatory. Defendant

argued that application of the firearm enhancement would constitute a double enhancement under

the statute given that he was already subject to the enhanced sentencing range of 20 to 80 years.

¶ 11 Relying on People v. Jackson,

, and People v. Tolentino,

(2011), the court found the 20-year enhancement would not constitute a double

enhancement. Specifically, the court stated,

“When the victim is a peace officer, the sentencing range is enhanced in

recognition of the heightened risk officers take in performing their duties,

seeking to deter the intentional killings of police officers. The 20-year

firearm enhancement, the purpose of that is to deter the use of firearms in

the commission of felonies due to the greater risk posed by their use. So the

Court found that those are designed to address different situations;

therefore, it’s not a double enhancement to impose both[.]”

4 ¶ 12 The court imposed an aggregate term of 50 years in prison. The court’s sentence consisted

of a 30-year term under section 8-4(c)(1)(A) of the attempt statute based on Scott’s status as a

peace officer plus a 20-year firearm enhancement under section 8-4(c)(1)(C) for defendant’s

personal discharge of a firearm. 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(A), (C) (West 2016).

¶ 13 Defendant appeals.

¶ 14 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 15 A. Request for Second Expert Opinion

¶ 16 Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request for the appointment of a

second expert to determine whether he was insane at the time of the offense.

¶ 17 A defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense and compel necessary

witnesses on his or her behalf regardless of a defendant’s ability to pay. People v. Lawson,

(1994). An indigent defendant, however, is not entitled to an expert merely because

the expert would be useful, helpful, valuable, or important to the defense. People v. Shelton,

(2010). The defendant must show that the requested expert assistance is

necessary in proving a crucial issue in the case and that the lack of funds for the expert will

therefore prejudice him. Lawson,

. We review a trial court’s denial of a motion

for an expert witness for an abuse of discretion. In re Commitment of Lingle,

, ¶ 39. A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or

unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. People

v. Donoho,

(2003).

¶ 18 In Ake v. Oklahoma,

(1985), the United State Supreme Court established

that, “when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is

to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a

5 competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation,

preparation, and presentation of the defense.” In Illinois, a defendant’s right of access to a

psychiatric examination is protected by statute as well. Under section 115-6 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-6 (West 2020)), if a defendant indicates that he or

she may rely on the defense of insanity or plead guilty but mentally ill, “the Court shall *** order

the defendant to submit to examination by at least one clinical psychologist or psychiatrist.”

Section 115-6 also provides that the trial court “may order additional examinations if the Court

finds that additional examinations by additional experts will be of substantial value in the

determination of issues of insanity or drugged conditions.”

¶ 19 In this case, the requirements of Ake have been met. Defendant demonstrated that he was

indigent and that his sanity was to be a significant issue at trial. Thus, the State was required to

provide defendant with access to a psychiatric evaluation. See Ake,

. The trial court

appointed Witherspoon at the State’s expense to determine whether defendant was sane at the time

he committed the offense, fulfilling the mandate of Ake. Witherspoon, a clinical psychologist,

conducted a thorough evaluation of defendant’s mental condition and reported that defendant was

not insane when he fired upon Scott.

¶ 20 In his report, Witherspoon stated that he interviewed defendant on two occasions.

Defendant was well oriented for person, place, and time, showing no signs of hallucinations or

delusions. Based on several mental assessment procedures, including a mental status exam and the

Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-III, Witherspoon opined that defendant suffered from

bipolar I disorder, in partial remission, and severe posttraumatic stress disorder. In relation to

defendant’s sanity at the time of the offense, Witherspoon reviewed the case file and police

interviews and reported that defendant’s actions were based on paranoia and fear. He stated that,

6 although defendant had paranoid thoughts, his self-defense motive did not comport with the nature

of his calm and compliant surrender to police. Defendant was able to reflect on his actions and

describe the events of that day; he described paranoid but rational behavior. Based on his

evaluation, Witherspoon concluded that defendant’s actions did not reflect psychosis or a degree

of irrationality that would have prevented him from understanding the criminality of his behavior.

In other words, his behavior did not demonstrate insanity. Witherspoon’s addendum also states

that defendant’s condition did not meet the clinical threshold to present the defense of NGRI.

Witherspoon’s evaluation indicates that he carefully studied the mental examination data,

considered the investigative reports, and analyzed the evaluation of defendant in light of these

records. It is for those reasons we cannot conclude that the denial to appoint an additional

psychiatric expert was an abuse of discretion.

¶ 21 Defendant maintains that Witherspoon’s reference to defendant’s case as “borderline” in

his handwritten note to defense counsel required the trial court to order a second evaluation, at the

State’s expense. However, given the information submitted by Witherspoon after examining

defendant, there was no substantial value in ordering another evaluation. Although an additional

expert witness may have been helpful to defendant, the State was not required to finance the

assistance to assure defendant’s access to a complete defense. See Lingle,

(finding that second expert was not required where first expert provided thorough

evaluation and diagnosis). Accordingly, the trial court’s failure to approve additional funds for

further psychiatric evaluation did not amount to an abuse of discretion.

¶

-Year Firearm Enhancement

¶ 23 Next, defendant challenges his sentence. He claims that the trial court erred in applying

both the status-based sentencing range under section 8-4(c)(1)(A) and the 20-year firearm

7 enhancement under section 8-4(c)(1)(C) of the attempt statute when formulating his sentence for

attempted first degree murder of a peace officer. 720 ILCS 5/804(c)(1)(A), (C) (West 2020). He

argues that, once a sentencing court applies the status-based 20- to 80-year sentencing range in

subsection (A), the other subsections of the attempted first degree murder statute cannot apply

without running afoul of the prohibition against double enhancements.

¶ 24 Defendant notes a split of authority on this issue, citing People v. Phagan,

, leave to appeal denied, No. 125249 (Ill. Nov. 26, 2019); People v. Holley,

, leave to appeal denied, No. 125078 (Ill. Sept. 25, 2019); and People v. Douglas,

(2007) (holding that, once a court applies the status-based sentencing range in

section 8-4(c)(1)(A), it cannot apply a firearm enhancement) as compared to Jackson,

, leave to appeal denied, No. 123784 (Ill. Sept. 26, 2018); People v. Smith,

, appeal denied, No. 115292 (Ill. Jan. 30, 2013); and Tolentino,

, appeal denied, No. 112553 (Ill. Sept. 28, 2011) (adopting a conjunctive reading of the

attempt statute, allowing application of the sentencing range in section 8-4(c)(1)(A) as well as a

firearm enhancement). Defendant urges us to follow the Phagan line of cases and vacate the 20-

year firearm enhancement from his sentence.

¶ 25 The Illinois attempt statute sets forth the elements of attempt and provides sentencing

guidelines for attempted offenses, including first degree murder. Section 8-4(c)(1) states:

“[T]he sentence for attempt to commit first degree murder is the sentence

for a Class X felony, except that

(A) an attempt to commit first degree murder when at least one of

the aggravating factors specified in paragraphs (1), (2), and (12) of

subsection (b) of Section 9-1 is present is a Class X felony for which the

8 sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of not less than 20 years and

not more than 80 years;

(B) an attempt to commit first degree murder while armed with a

firearm is a Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term

of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(C) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the

person personally discharged a firearm is a Class X felony for which 20

years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(D) an attempt to commit first degree murder during which the

person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great

bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to

another person is a Class X felony for which 25 years or up to a term of

natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the

court; and

(E) if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence at

sentencing that, at the time of the attempted murder, he or she was acting

under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation

by the individual whom the defendant endeavored to kill, or another,

and, had the individual the defendant endeavored to kill died, the

defendant would have negligently or accidentally caused that death,

then the sentence for the attempted murder is the sentence for a Class 1

felony[.]” 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(A)-(E) (West 2020).

9 ¶ 26 We apply the de novo standard of review when construing a statute. Jackson,

. The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect

to the legislature’s intent. People v. Casler,

. All other rules of statutory

construction are subordinate to this principle.

“In determining the intent of the legislature, the

court may properly consider not only the language of the statute, but also the reason and necessity

for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved.” People v. Frieberg,

(1992). While penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to

be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature. People v. Kirkrand,

(1947). We construe statutes presuming the legislature did not intend absurd,

unjust, or inconvenient results. People v. Lewis,

(2009).

¶ 27 When presented with a similar issue regarding the attempt statute, Justice Wolfson writing

for a unanimous court in Douglas,

, found that section 8-4(c)(1)(A) was not an

enhancement but, rather, the enhancements were contained in the following subsections of (B),

(C), and (D).

. At this point in his analysis, Justice Wolfson was one for one. Nonetheless,

the Douglas court went on to preclude the application of the firearm enhancements by engaging in

presumptions of what the legislature may have intended. See

(“[T]he legislature well might

have believed it was authorizing trial judges to impose severe sentences.”). By engaging in

speculation regarding the legislature’s intent, Justice Wolfson ended up only batting 0.500 on his

analysis, which is not bad considering not even Babe Ruth achieved that average. 1

¶ 28 Next came Tolentino,

. The court in Tolentino agreed that the analysis

in Douglas was only partially correct, finding that speculation as to what the legislature “might

1 Babe Ruth only achieved a career batting average of 0.342. Major League Baseball, https://www.mlb.com/search?q =babe%20ruth&playerId=121578 (last visited Feb. 14, 2022) [https://perma.cc/DR6X-TU6U]. 10 have believed” was dicta and declined to follow it.

. Analyzing the statute, the court

found no express prohibition on the application of the firearm enhancements when sentencing

under section 8-4(c)(1)(A).

The court also delineated that the public policy concerns underlying

section 8-4(c)(1)(A) differ from those underlying the firearm enhancement provisions.

¶ 29 The attempt statute was amended in 2010, adding section 8-4(c)(1)(E) along with the now

infamous “and.” Pub. Act 96-710, § 25 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010) (amending 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)). The

Jackson court had the first crack at interpreting the amended statute. Jackson,

. The court conceded the use of semicolons between the subsections signaled a disjunctive

reading was appropriate, only allowing one subsection to apply to a given case. Id. ¶ 51.

Nonetheless, the use of “and” before section 8-4(c)(1)(E) signaled that the General Assembly

intended for section (c)(1)’s exceptions to apply conjunctively, not disjunctively. Id. The court

held that the most natural reading was that section 8-4(c)(1)(A) was the baseline sentence with one

of the firearm enhancements applying based on the facts of the case. Id. ¶ 52.

¶ 30 In 2019, the appellate court came to the opposite result, first in Phagan and then in Holley.

In those cases, the appellate court indulged in a disjunctive reading of the statute precluding the

application of a firearm enhancement to a sentence under section 8-4(c)(1)(A).

¶ 31 Turning to Phagan, the decision in that case is full of tortured reasoning that overlooks the

plain language of the statute. One example of this obfuscation is the detour into the discussion of

Apprendi v. New Jersey,

(2000). Phagan,

, ¶ 88. Apprendi

is irrelevant to the issues in either Phagan or this case. Apprendi is not dispositive as to whether

section 8-4(c)(1)(A) is a sentencing enhancement, as Apprendi stands for the proposition that a

sentencing enhancement still must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Pointing to the State’s

compliance with Apprendi in finding section 8-4(c)(1)(A) a nonelement sentencing enhancement

11 is illogical when the State needed to advance proof beyond a reasonable doubt regardless of the

statutory section’s classification. Id.

¶ 32 When addressing the merits, Phagan disparaged the analysis in Jackson because of the

failure to address the content of section 8-4(c)(1)(E). Id. ¶ 100. Once engaged in statutory

construction, Phagan found that reading subsection (E) with the other subsections conjunctively,

as the court did in Jackson, brought about “absurd results.” Id. ¶ 101. The court then turned its

attention to subsections (B) through (D), finding a conjunctive reading equally absurd owing to

the fact a sentencing court could apply all three of the firearm enhancements if the State proved

the facts necessary to apply the most serious of the three. Id. Both of these alleged problems were

solved at once by a disjunctive reading of subsections (A) through (E). Id. ¶ 103.

¶ 33 Phagan was wrongly decided. 2 A review of section 8-4(c)(1)(A)-(E) of the Criminal Code

of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(A)-(E) (West 2020)) makes clear that section 8-4(c)(1)(A) is not

an enhancement but, rather, the base sentencing range for a status-based offense such as the one at

issue. The plain unambiguous language of the statute states that in the presence of certain

aggravating factors, while still a Class X felony, “the sentence shall be a term of imprisonment of

not less than 20 years and not more than 80 years.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(A); Smith,

. Common sense dictates that the 20 to 80-year baseline

2 The Phagan court’s finding that it could merely vacate the firearm enhancement absent a remand for resentencing is also incorrect. Courts craft terms of imprisonment mindful of firearm enhancements, thereby reaching a just sentence for the accused offense. There is no need to cite authority for this contention as experience and logic are adequate support. Phagan provides a defendant the unjust windfall of vacating the mandatory enhancement absent remand for resentencing. Phagan improperly relied on one act, one crime principles in arriving at the conclusion the court could vacate the less severe of the enhancements and forego resentencing. What does one act, one crime principles have to do with this issue? That’s right: nothing! It is apparent that the lower court in this case did not view a 30-year sentence, only 4 years above the minimum for the same offense not committed against a peace officer a just result. It is more than likely that had the trial judge known the 20-year firearm enhancement was inapplicable, he would have sentenced defendant differently under section 8-4(c)(1)(A). When a firearm enhancement is vacated, the cause should be remanded for resentencing. 12 sentence is not an enhancement. This interpretation is enforced by the remainder of the statute with

subsections (B), (C), and (D) of section 8-4(c)(1) setting forth sentence enhancements that “shall

be added” to whichever sentence range is applicable for the Class X felony. 720 ILCS 5/8-

4(c)(1)(B)-(D) (West 2020); Smith,

. Absent from the statute

is language prohibiting the imposition of the firearm enhancements. Smith,

.

¶ 34 Further, supporting this interpretation are the separate evils sought to be prevented by the

status-based offense and the firearm enhancements. The legislature has been explicit in its intent

to punish attempt first degree murder of a peace officer more severely than the same attempt on an

ordinary citizen. Moreover, the legislature has clearly expressed its intent to punish offenses

perpetrated with firearms with sentencing enhancements. See

(noting public policy concern of

section 8-4(c)(1)(A) is to deter the intentional killing of peace officers who take heightened risks

in performing their duties, as opposed to the policy concerns underlying the following subsections

of (B), (C), and (D) that are meant to deter the use of firearms in the commission of felonies due

to the greater risk their use poses to society at large); see also Tolentino,

;

People v. Felton,

. There is more than one way to attempt to take

the life of a peace officer. An attempt first degree murder of a peace officer using an AR-15 should

be punished more harshly than the same attempt using a butter knife. Any speculation that the

legislature has already contemplated the use of firearms in an attempt to commit first degree

murder of a peace offer and has addressed those concerns via the 20 to 80-year sentencing range

is unwarranted. See Smith,

.

¶ 35 As the State points out, if defendant in this case would have fired upon a civilian rather

than the trooper, Class X sentencing would apply with a baseline sentence in the 6 to 30-year range

13 along with a mandatory 20-year firearm enhancement. The minimum possible sentence in that

scenario is 26 years, 6 years more than the minimum allowed under section 8-4(c)(1)(A). The end

result of the interpretation advocated by defendant would allow for an individual attempting to

murder a peace officer while discharging a firearm to receive a sentence below the mandatory

minimum sentence of an attempt first degree murder of an ordinary citizen under the same facts.

This runs afoul of the legislative intent to punish these status-based crimes and crimes committed

with a firearm more severely. Despite the legislature’s express intent, defendant’s interpretation of

the statute leads to absurd results. To engage in this suggested reading would do nothing more than

place form over substance.

¶ 36 Defendant points to the reasoning in Phagan, arguing that a conjunctive reading of the

statute is impossible. First, he argues that a conjunctive reading of the statute would require the

lower court to apply the 15, 20, and 25-year firearm enhancements in certain situations. Second,

he notes the incompatibility of section 8-4(c)(1)(A) and section 8-4(c)(1)(E) under a conjunctive

reading.

¶ 37 To the first point, having found from the plain language that section 8-4(c)(1)(A) is a base

sentencing range, under a conjunctive reading, only one of the firearm enhancements can apply.

This is because double enhancements to a sentence are prohibited unless the legislature clearly

intended such a penalty and “that intention is clearly expressed” in the statute. People v. Guevara,

(2005); see also Jackson,

(noting we will

not interpret a statute as permitting double enhancements). The Jackson court was correct in

finding “unfounded” the notion that a court would apply all three of the firearm enhancements

when the State was able to prove the most serious of the three.

The Phagan court conceded that

there was no such case in which all three firearm enhancements were applied. Phagan, 2019 IL

14 App (1st) 153031, ¶ 102. We similarly find defendant’s contention that a lower court would apply

more than one firearm enhancement “unfounded.” Jackson,

.

¶ 38 As to the second contention, the court in Jackson was on the right track when interpreting

this statute, but as pointed out in Phagan, Jackson failed to address the content of section 8-

4(c)(1)(E). The Jackson court conceded that the use of semicolons between the subsections

generally indicate a disjunctive reading. Id. ¶ 51. This concession is perplexing as the use of a

semicolon often replaces a coordinating conjunction, most often the word “and.” Nonetheless, the

Jackson court found that the use of “and” at the end of the series of subsections, before subsection

(E), signaled the intent of the General Assembly for the subsections to be read conjunctively.

¶ 39 What the Jackson court left out is that the legislature at times has difficulty properly

codifying its intent. See Goldblatt v. City of Chicago,

(1961) (“The use

of ‘or’ and ‘and’ is so frequently inaccurate in statutory enactments that the courts readily change

‘or’ to ‘and’ and vice versa, whenever such conversion is required by the context.”). Section 8-

4(c)(1)(E) is not an enhancement, rather, it describes mitigating circumstances that lessens the

provided for Class X sentencing to that of a Class 1 felony. Similar to section 8-4(c)(1)(A), section

8-4(c)(1)(E) is a baseline sentence. In the presence of serious provocation, the sentencing court is

instructed to treat the offense as a Class 1 felony, thereby rendering the firearm enhancements

inapplicable. Although the legislature intended section 8-4(c)(1)(A) and the appropriate firearm

enhancement that follows to apply in the cumulative as evidenced by the “and” before section 8-

4(c)(1)(E), it is proper to read the “and” as an “or” in light of the content of section 8-4(c)(1)(E),

allowing that section alone to apply disjunctively. See County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor

Relations Board,

(2008) (“In construing statutes, the strict meaning of words

like ‘and’ ‘is more readily departed from than that of other words.’ ” (quoting John P. Moriarty,

Inc. v. Murphy,

(1944))); Martin v. Office of the State’s Attorney, 2011 IL App

15 (1st) 102718, ¶ 11 (“[I]f reading ‘and’ in a statute literally would create an inconsistency in the

statute or render the sense of the statute dubious, then the term ‘and’ will be read as ‘or.’ ” (citing

County of Du Page,

)). Ergo, subsection (A) is the baseline sentence in cases

dealing with status-based offenses such as the one here, with either subsection (B), (C), or (D) also

applying when a firearm is used in the commission of the offense.

¶ 40 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in sentencing defendant.

¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 42 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Henry County.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

¶ 44 JUSTICE LYTTON, dissenting:

¶ 45 I concur with the finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

defendant’s motion for a second expert regarding the determination of insanity at the time of the

offense. However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court appropriately

applied both the status-based enhancement under section 8-4(c)(1)(A) and the 20-year firearm

enhancement under section 8-4(c)(1)(C) to defendant’s sentence for attempted first degree murder

of a peace officer.

¶ 46 IT IS ALL ABOUT THE SEMICOLONS

¶ 47 When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to give effect to the legislature’s

intent, which we do by looking to the language in the statute and determining its plain and ordinary

meaning. Jackson,

. In construing legislative intent, we must

consider the entire statute in light of the subject it addresses, presuming the legislature did not

intend absurd, unjust, or inconvenient results. Lewis,

. Double enhancements to a

sentence are prohibited unless the legislature clearly intended such a penalty and “that intention is

clearly expressed” in the statute. People v. Guevara,

(2005).

16 ¶ 48 In interpreting criminal statutes, we are mindful to apply the statutory language strictly in

favor of the accused; nothing should be taken by implication beyond the plain and obvious

meaning of the statute. People v. Lavallier,

(1999). Thus, if a criminal statute

is ambiguous, it will generally be construed in a defendant’s favor. People v. Johnson,

.

¶ 49 In this case, defendant argues that the 20-year enhancement for personally discharging a

firearm does not apply to his conviction for attempted first degree murder of a peace officer

because the plain language of the attempt statute only allows the court to impose one enhancement

or the other, not both. See Phagan,

; Holley,

; and Douglas,

.

¶ 50 As a baseline, the plain language of the attempt statute requires attempted first degree

murder to be sentenced as a Class X offense, carrying a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years. 720

ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 2020); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2020). The semicolons between the

subsections that follow indicate that each exception must be read disjunctively. See Jackson,

(conceding that the use of semicolons between subsections ordinarily

means that the subsections are related but separate concepts that should be read disjunctively). If

the victim is a peace officer, the statute increases the sentencing range to 20 to 80 years. 720 ILCS

5/8-4(c)(1)(A), 9-1(b)(1) (West 2020). If a firearm is used during the commission of the offense,

the statute requires the imposition of an additional 15 years to the Class X sentence.

§ 8-

4(c)(1)(B). If the defendant personally discharges a firearm during the commission of the offense,

the statute requires the imposition of an additional 20 years. Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(C). If the defendant’s

actions caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death, the

statute mandates the imposition of an additional 25 years. Id. § 8-4(c)(1)(D). However, if certain

17 mitigating factors are present, the sentence is reduced to the sentence for a Class 1 felony. Id. § 8-

4(c)(1)(E). I believe each subsection applies separately, not collectively.

¶ 51 The placing of a semicolon at the end of each subsection and use of the word “and” between

subsections (D) and (E) may seem confusing to some, but the grammatical structure of section 8-

4(c)(1) as a whole is clear. The rules of punctuation in the English language are well defined. The

semicolon is used to separate “two or more clauses which are of more or less equal importance”

as a means of indicating discontinuity. The New Fowler’s Modern English Usage 699 (R.W.

Burchfield ed., 3d ed. 1996); Karen Elizabeth Gordon, The New Well-Tempered Sentence: A

Punctuation Handbook for the Innocent, the Eager, and the Doomed 61 (1993). Its function is “to

separate contact clauses—that is, clauses that are not linked by a conjunction.” Theodore M.

Bernstein, The Careful Writer; A Modern Guide to English Usage 373 (1965).

¶ 52 Jackson agrees with these rules but relies on the word “and” between subsection (D) and

(E) to support a conjunctive interpretation. See Jackson,

. The

majority follows Jackson, ignoring the purpose of the semicolon. Both, however, miss the point.

¶ 53 The use of a semicolon between each subsection is significant. A semicolon signals a stop;

it forces the reader to contemplate each sentencing exception independently. A semicolon is not a

comma. A comma indicates a pause, not a stop, and is used to combine elements in a series.

Gordon, supra at 46 (“three or more elements in a series are separated by commas”); see also

Bernstein, supra at 359 (discussing correlative conjunctions and the use of commas to combine

related material in a series). Unlike commas, nothing in the rules of punctuation suggests that the

use of a semicolon allows for a conjunctive reading of equally weighted provisions. See The New

Fowler’s Modern English Usage 699 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 3d ed. 1996). Likewise, the semicolons

between subsections (A) through (E) in the attempt statute mean something: they provide an

interruption of grammatical construction, they signal discontinuity between the subsections, and,

18 most importantly, they indicate there are five distinct factors that modify the Class X sentence for

attempted murder.

¶ 54 The “and” between subsections (D) and (E) connects subsections (A) through (D) with

subsection (E) to cohere them into a complete sentence, nothing more. It links them into a whole;

it does not add them together.

¶ 55 Moreover, the plain text of the statute does not contain a statement clearly indicating

legislative approval of a double enhancement. See Guevara,

(applying more

than one enhancement is prohibited unless the statute clearly expresses that intention). Thus, under

the rules of statutory construction, as well as English grammar, a conjunctive reading cannot be

adopted.

¶ 56 My view is supported by the court’s analysis in Phagan and Holley. Phagan held that the

20-year firearm enhancement imposed by the trial court did not apply to the charged offense of

attempted murder of a peace officer. Phagan,

. The court

construed the attempted first degree murder statute and concluded that the statute contains five

distinct sentencing exceptions that are mutually exclusive. Id. ¶ 103. Phagan rejected Jackson,

Smith, and Tolentino. It found that a conjunctive reading of subsections (A) through (D) failed to

consider the addition of subsection (E) to the attempt statute, which allows the sentencing court to

lessen the class of attempted murder under certain mitigating circumstances. Id. ¶¶ 92-100. The

Phagan court explained:

“Jackson relied on the word ‘and’ to support its conjunctive

interpretation of the subsections without taking account of what came after

the ‘and.’ One simply cannot read subsection (A) and subsection (E)

conjunctively. Applying the conjunctive reading proposed in Jackson to the

remainder of the subsections would require us to acquiesce in an impossible

19 reading of the statutory scheme as a whole, an absurd result we are obligated

to avoid. [Citation.]” Id. ¶ 100.

The court noted that reading the statute conjunctively led to an impossible sentence because the

mitigating circumstances that allow for the application of subsection (E) did not apply to the

aggravated versions of attempted murder described in subsections (A) through (D). Id. ¶ 99.

Indeed, logically, how could it?

¶ 57 The Phagan court also reasoned that reading subsections (A) through (D) conjunctively

would produce an absurd result when a defendant, charged with attempted first degree murder of

a peace officer, personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm,

permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death. In that situation, the sentencing court

would be required to impose the 15-year, 20-year, and 25-year enhancements in addition to

subsection (A) for attempted murder of a police officer. Id. ¶ 101. To avoid both of these illogical

results and unintended multiple enhancements, the court read subsections (A) through (E)

disjunctively and concluded that only one subsection could apply at a time. Id. ¶ 103.

¶ 58 In Holley, the court applied a similar analysis and concluded that the legislature intended

for subsections (A) through (E) to be alternative sentencing options, not cumulative. Holley,

. It noted that the State’s argument advocated for a “selectively

cumulative reading” of section 8-4(c)(1). Id. ¶ 31. The State in Holley acknowledged that

subsections (A) and (E) cannot be applied cumulatively without running afoul of double

enhancement concerns but encouraged the court to apply the status-based enhancement in

subsection (A) and the firearm enhancements in (B), (C), and (D) together. Id. The court declined

by stating:

20 “What the State is actually asking us to do is treat subsection (A) as the

baseline in [the defendant’s] case with a permissible sentencing

enhancement to be drawn from subsections (B), (C), or (D). However, this

reading would only make sense if the ‘and’ that the State relies on were

placed immediately after subsection (A).” Id.

The court determined that the general structure of the statute indicated that subsections (A) through

(E) were separate paragraphs with separate applications and found that the trial court erred in

applying the 25-year firearm enhancement to the defendant’s convictions of attempted murder of

a peace officer. Id. ¶¶ 32-33.

¶ 59 The majority disregards Phagan, but I find Phagan and Holley to be well reasoned.

Following Jackson, as the majority suggests, leads to an illogical and unintended result that

directly contradicts the prohibition against double enhancements.

¶ 60 Applying the rule of statutory construction, as we must, the first degree murder provision

of the attempt statute does not allow for the imposition of a 20-to-80-year sentence under

subsection (A) combined with the firearm enhancements in subsections (B), (C), and (D). I would

therefore vacate the 20-year firearm enhancement and remand the cause for resentencing.

21 No. 3-19-0281

Cite as: People v. Taylor,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Henry County, No. 17-CF-348; the Hon. Terence M. Patton, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Santiago A. Durango, for of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Catherine Runty, State’s Attorney, of Cambridge (Patrick for Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Justin A. Nicolosi, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

22