NOTICE

FILED This Order was filed under April 10, 2023 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender NO. 4-22-0315 not precedent except in the th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Peoria County BRYCE K. LOWDER, ) No. 07CF22 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John P. Vespa, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: (1) The circuit court did not err in dismissing defendant’s successive postconviction petition.

(2) Defendant’s equal protection challenge fails where section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections is not facially unconstitutional.

¶2 Defendant Bryce K. Lowder pleaded guilty to the offenses of first degree murder

and aggravated battery in exchange for a 40-year sentence. He sought leave to file a successive

postconviction petition, arguing that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties clause of the

Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) due to his youth at the time of the offense

pursuant to Miller v. Alabama,

(2012), and its progeny. The circuit court denied

defendant’s request. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) he satisfied the cause and prejudice

standard to file a successive postconviction petition where he received a de facto life sentence and (2) section 5-.45-115(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b)

(West 2020)), which bars those sentenced before June 1, 2019, from parole eligibility, violates the

equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In 2007, the State charged defendant with two counts of first degree murder (720

ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2006)), two counts of attempted first degree murder (id. § 8-4(a),

9-1(a)(1)), and one count of aggravated battery with a firearm (id. § 12-4.2(a)(1)). The charges

resulted from an illegal sale of a firearm gone awry. Shortly after the attempted sale, defendant

shot Deandre Allen and Tyrone Brown, killing Allen and injuring Brown. Defendant entered a

fully negotiated guilty plea for the offenses of first degree murder and aggravated battery,

accepting concurrent sentences of 40 and 5 years, respectively.

¶5 At the plea hearing, the circuit court admonished defendant:

“You do have rights to a trial by judge or jury, and if by jury, 12 people

would have to be convinced of your guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before

you could be convicted. You’d have a right to confront and cross-examine

the State’s witnesses against you. You would have the right to call witnesses

of your own. Testify yourself if you wish, and not testify if you didn’t. And

if you didn’t testify, it could not be held against you. Do you understand

your rights to a trial?”

Defendant responded that he understood.

¶6 The State presented a factual basis for the plea, explaining that on January 1, 2007,

defendant tried to sell Allen and Brown a firearm, but they attempted to take the gun without

paying. Defendant “snatched” the weapon back and Allen and Brown drove away. Defendant

-2- pursued them and found them parked in a vehicle, allegedly discussing how to take the gun from

him by force. Defendant walked up to the passenger side of the parked vehicle and unloaded three

shots into the vehicle. Allen was shot once in the head and died from the injury; the other two shots

were directed at Brown and resulted in through-and-through wounds to his chest and under his

jawbone.

¶7 Defendant filed his initial postconviction petition in 2008, alleging numerous

constitutional deprivations. Specifically, he alleged his confession was involuntary, counsel’s

assistance was ineffective, and evidence was improperly obtained. Defendant then filed a

supplemental postconviction petition in 2015, alleging, inter alia, that his guilty plea was

involuntary owing to ineffective assistance of counsel and the circuit court failed to properly

admonish him of his appeal rights pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1,

2001). The circuit court denied the petition, and its ruling was subsequently affirmed by the

appellate court. People v. Lowder,

. Defendant then moved to file a

successive postconviction petition in June 2019. The circuit court denied the motion for leave to

file and, on appeal, the appellate court granted the Finley motion (Pennsylvania v. Finley,

(1987)) filed by the Office of the State Appellate Defender to withdraw and affirmed the

circuit court. People v. Lowder, No. 3-19-0625 (2021) (unpublished summary order under

Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶8 In December 2021, defendant again sought leave to file a successive postconviction

petition, arguing his 40-year sentence was unconstitutional as applied under the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) where he was 18 years

old when he committed the offenses and the sentencing court did not consider his youth in light of

Miller and its progeny. Defendant alleged that, at the time of the offenses, he suffered from

-3- “transient immaturity.” In support of the motion, defendant attached an article from the Juvenile

Justice Initiative. Kanako Ishida, Young Adults in Conflict with the Law: Opportunities for

Diversion, Juvenile Justice Initiative, February 2015. The article discussed the impulsivity and a

lack of self-control of young-adult offenders, which are distinctive characteristics that young adults

have been shown to outgrow.

¶9 On March 18, 2022, the circuit court denied leave to file the successive petition,

finding defendant was not advancing an actual innocence claim and that Miller had not been

extended to young adults.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 A. Successive Postconviction Petition

¶ 13 In seeking leave to file a successive postconviction petition, defendant claims that

“as an emerging adult at the time of the offenses, the sentencing considerations created in Miller

for juveniles should apply to him based on his circumstances.” More to the point, defendant raises

an as-applied challenge to his 40-year sentence pursuant to the Illinois proportionate penalties

clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11).

¶ 14 The Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.) (West 2020)) allows defendants to assert there

was a substantial deprivation of their rights under the constitution of the United States or of the

State of Illinois, or both, in proceedings resulting in the defendant’s conviction. People v. Lusby,

, ¶ 27 (quoting 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2014)). The Act only contemplates

a defendant filing a single petition. Id. As a result, courts disfavor successive postconviction

petitions, as they plague the finality of criminal litigation. People v. Davis,

.

When seeking leave to file a successive petition, a defendant faces immense hurdles relating to

-4- procedural default; any subsequent allegation of a constitutional deprivation not previously raised

is considered forfeited.

A court of review will relax the principles of procedural forfeiture where

the defendant can show “cause” and “prejudice” for failing to raise the claim earlier. 725 ILCS

5/122-1(f) (West 2020). “Leave of court to file a successive petition should be denied when it is

clear from a review of the successive petition and supporting documents that the claims raised fail

as a matter of law or are insufficient to justify further proceedings.” People v. Dorsey,

. We review the circuit court’s denial of leave to file a successive postconviction

petition de novo.

¶ 15 1. Miller and Its Progeny

¶ 16 Defendant argues he has shown the requisite cause and prejudice by asserting that

Miller was decided after both his sentencing and initial postconviction petition and that his

sentence was imposed without adequate consideration of his youth at the time of the offense.

¶ 17 In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory life sentence

without the possibility of parole prevented the consideration of a juvenile defendant’s youth and

attendant circumstances. Miller,

. The Court mandated that when sentencing

juvenile defendants to life without parole, there must be “the opportunity to consider mitigating

circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles.”

. In People

v. Reyes,

, our supreme court expanded Miller’s protections to de facto life

sentences.

¶ 18 Our supreme court once again clarified its Miller jurisprudence in People v. Buffer,

, finding:

“to prevail on a claim based on Miller and its progeny, a defendant

sentenced for an offense committed while a juvenile must show that (1) the

-5- defendant was subject to a life sentence, mandatory or discretionary, natural

or de facto, and (2) the sentencing court failed to consider youth and its

attendant characteristics in imposing the sentence.”

Buffer established a bright-line rule that a sentence that exceeds 40 years is a de facto life sentence.

Id. ¶ 41.

¶ 19 Our supreme court curtailed the application of Miller in Dorsey, and then again in

People v. Jones,

, cert. denied sub nom., Jones v. Illinois,

(2022).

In Dorsey,

, the court held that a sentence imposed on a juvenile defendant

under a statutory scheme allowing for release after serving 40 years or less of the term of

imprisonment imposed is not a de facto life sentence. The court also noted:

“Moreover, we find that Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule

under the eighth amendment does not provide cause for a defendant to raise

a claim under the proportionate penalties clause. See Patterson,

(“A ruling on a specific flavor of constitutional claim may not

justify a similar ruling brought pursuant to another constitutional

provision.”). As defendant acknowledges, Illinois courts have long

recognized the differences between persons of mature age and those who

are minors for purposes of sentencing. Thus, Miller’s unavailability prior to

2012 at best deprived defendant of ‘some helpful support’ for his state

constitutional law claim, which is insufficient to establish ‘cause.’ See

People v. LaPointe,

.” Id. ¶ 74.

¶ 20 In Jones, the defendant received a 50-year sentence for a single count of first degree

murder as part of a fully negotiated guilty plea agreement. Jones,

. Our

-6- supreme court found that by entering the plea agreement, the defendant waived all

nonjurisdictional errors or irregularities, including constitutional ones, foreclosing any claim of

error.

¶ 20 (quoting People v. Sophanavong,

, quoting People v. Townsell,

(2004)). Further, the sentencing court exercised discretion in accepting the

fully negotiated plea and was not required to impose a mandatory sentence, placing the sentence

outside of Miller’s additional protections. Id. ¶ 28. Therefore, the defendant’s “knowing and

voluntary guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent changes in the

applicable law.” Id. ¶ 26.

¶ 21 Recently, and after the parties filed their briefs, our supreme court relied on its

finding in Dorsey that Miller’s announcement of a new substantive rule under the eighth

amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. VIII) does not provide cause

for a defendant to raise a claim under the proportionate penalties clause in a successive

postconviction petition. See People v. Clark,

.

¶ 22 In Clark, the defendant was 24 years old and suffered from mental impairments

when he pleaded guilty but mentally ill to one count of first degree murder and one count of

robbery. Id. ¶ 1. Relying on Miller, among other cases, the defendant argued he was justified in

filing a successive postconviction petition asserting “a new proportionate penalties clause

challenge to his 90-year sentence because this court has interpreted the proportionate penalties

clause as providing a limitation on penalties beyond those afforded by the eighth amendment.”

Id. ¶ 58. The court found that even though “Dorsey involved a juvenile offender,” the same

reasoning that “Miller does not present new proportionate penalties clause principles with respect

to discretionary sentencing of young adult offenders” applied to the defendant, who was 24 years

old when he committed the offenses. Id. ¶ 93. Further, the defendant “ ‘had the essential legal tools

-7- to raise his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause’ when he filed his

previous postconviction petitions.” Id. (quoting People v. Haines,

).

¶ 23 Having reviewed Miller and its progeny, we now determine whether defendant can

meet the requirements of cause and prejudice under the Act.

¶ 24 2. Cause and Prejudice

¶ 25 As used in the Act, a defendant demonstrates “cause” by “identifying an objective

factor that impeded his or her ability to raise a specific claim during his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2020). The Act also clarifies that

“prejudice” is established “by demonstrating that the claim not raised during his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated

due process.”

¶ 26 As should be apparent from our review of Miller and its progeny, defendant’s claim

suffers from glaring deficiencies. First, he was not sentenced as a juvenile, and his 40-year term

of imprisonment does not qualify as a de facto life sentence under Miller. Buffer,

. Second, Dorsey clarified, albeit in dicta, that reliance on Miller is insufficient to

satisfy cause for a proportionate penalties clause challenge in a successive postconviction petition.

Dorsey,

. Third, Clark reiterates the finding in Dorsey that Miller is

insufficient to provide cause in a successive postconviction petition alleging a violation of the

proportionate penalties clause regardless of whether the defendant is a minor or a young adult.

Clark,

. Finally, Jones precludes our consideration of defendant’s petition

where his fully negotiated guilty plea waived any constitutional challenge based on subsequent

-8- changes in the applicable law and his sentence was discretionary, placing him outside of the

protections of Miller. Jones,

.

¶ 27 Defendant cites People v. House,

, People v. Harris,

, People v. Thompson,

, and People v. Ruiz,

, for

the proposition that the protections of Miller are not foreclosed to him merely because of his age

and the length of his sentence. The court in Clark addressed this exact argument, finding:

“Defendant is correct that this court has not foreclosed ‘emerging adult’

defendants between 18 and 19 years old from raising as-applied

proportionate penalties clause challenges to life sentences based on the

evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development. See People

v. Thompson,

(19-year-old defendant sentenced

to a term of natural life in prison); People v. Harris,

(defendant, aged 18 years and 3 months, sentenced to 76 years in

prison).” Clark,

.

However:

“those cases addressed the possibility of a defendant raising a Miller-based

challenge with respect to mandatory life sentences in initial postconviction

petitions. [Citations.] Here, defendant seeks to raise a constitutional

challenge to a discretionary de facto life sentence in a successive

postconviction petition and must be able to satisfy the cause-and-prejudice

test to do so.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 88.

-9- Clark’s factual categorization of Thompson and Harris also applies to the defendant in House,

where the proportionate penalties clause challenge was directed at a mandatory life sentence in an

initial postconviction petition. House,

.

¶ 28 Here, defendant is facing neither a mandatory sentence that resembles what has

been recognized as a de facto life sentence, nor is he advancing the as-applied proportionate

penalties clause argument in his initial postconviction petition. We have repeatedly found Illinois

courts have been aware that “less than mature age can extend into young adulthood—and they

have insisted that sentences take into account that reality of human development.” Clark,

(quoting Haines,

, citing People v. Maldonado,

(1992), People v. Center,

(1990), People v.

Adams,

, 13-14 (1972)); see also People ex rel. Bradley v. Illinois State

Reformatory,

(1894). Simply put, Miller’s announcement of a new substantive

rule under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution does not provide cause for

defendant to pursue a proportionate penalties clause claim. Dorsey,

.

¶ 29 While the unavailability of the authority cited by defendant arguably deprived him

of “some helpful support” for his constitutional claim, he “ ‘had the essential legal tools to raise

his present proposed claim under the proportionate-penalties clause’ when he filed his previous

postconviction petitions.” Clark,

(quoting LaPointe,

, Haines,

); see also People v. Guerrero,

(“[T]he lack of precedent for a position differs from ‘cause’ for failing to raise an

issue, and a defendant must raise the issue, even when the law is against him, in order to preserve

it for review.”).

- 10 - ¶ 30 Even if we ignored the inadequacies of defendant’s allegation of cause for not

previously raising his claims in prior petitions, Jones still precludes our review where defendant’s

plea agreement waived all nonjurisdictional errors and irregularities, including constitutional ones,

foreclosing any claim of error. Jones,

. Defendant attempts to escape this

conclusion by alleging that, unlike the defendant in Jones, his plea was not knowing and voluntary

where the circuit court failed to properly admonish him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule

402(a) (eff. July 1, 1997). However, postconviction proceedings allow inquiry only into

constitutional issues that were not, and could not have been, adjudicated on direct appeal; issues

that could have been raised, but were not, are considered waived. People v. Pitsonbarger,

(2002). Defendant has waived this claim by not raising it previously. Furthermore,

even if we were to ignore defendant’s repeated procedural forfeiture of this issue, it is apparent

from the record that the circuit court substantially complied with Rule 402(a). See People v.

Whitfield,

(2005), as modified on denial of reh’g (Dec. 20, 2005) (finding

substantial compliance with Rule 402 sufficient to establish due process, and that an imperfect

admonishment is not reversible error unless real justice has been denied or the defendant has been

prejudiced by the inadequate admonishment).

¶ 31 Accordingly, defendant did not establish a prima facie case of cause for failing to

previously raise the as-applied proportionate penalties clause argument. Having found defendant

cannot establish cause, we need not consider prejudice. See People v. Smith,

, ¶ 37.

The circuit court did not err in denying defendant leave to file a successive postconviction petition.

¶ 32 B. Equal Protection Challenge

¶ 33 Next, defendant presents an equal protection challenge to the constitutional validity

of Public Act 100-1182 (Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110).

- 11 - The legislature has since moved the language of section 5-4.5-110 within the Code (730 ILCS 5/5

et seq. (West 2020)) by Public Act 101-288 (Pub. Act 101-288 (eff. Jan. 1, 2020) (adding 730

ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). For purposes of this appeal, we refer to the challenged statutory language as

currently enumerated in the Code.

¶ 34 As noted, defendant was sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment for first degree

murder, which he committed when he was 18 years old. Unlike other individuals aged 21 or

younger who were sentenced for the same offense on or after June 1, 2019, he is ineligible for

parole. This distinction was created by Public Act 100-1182, and the specific dividing line is its

effective date. Defendant argues there is no rational basis for distinguishing between those

sentenced before and those sentenced on or after June 1, 2019, and the provision barring offenders

from parole based only on their sentencing date violates the constitutional guarantee of equal

protection under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill.

Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Effectively, defendant is arguing that the restriction on retroactivity is void

ab initio and should be severed from the rest of the statute. Although this issue was not previously

raised in the circuit court, a facial constitutional challenge to a statute may be raised at any time.

Thompson,

.

¶ 35 The principles governing the review of a facial challenge to a statute are well

established. All statutes are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging a statute’s

constitutionality has the burden of rebutting that presumption and establishing a clear

constitutional violation. People v. Bochenek,

. “A party raising a facial

challenge to a statute faces a particularly heavy burden.”

We will find a statute facially

unconstitutional only where there is no scenario under which the statute would be valid.

“A

reviewing court is bound to construe the challenged statute so as to uphold its constitutionality

- 12 - whenever reasonably possible.” People v. Sroga,

. In stark contrast to

defendant’s as-applied proportionate penalties clause argument above, the specific facts as related

to the defendant are irrelevant in a facial challenge. Thompson,

. The

constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Austin,

.

¶ 36 In conducting an equal protection analysis, we apply the same standards under the

fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) and article I,

section 2 of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). People v. Richardson,

. “The constitutional right to equal protection guarantees that similarly situated

individuals will be treated in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an

appropriate reason to treat them differently.”

“The equal protection clause does not forbid the

legislature from drawing proper distinctions in legislation among different categories of people,

but the equal protection clause does prohibit the legislature from doing so based on criteria wholly

unrelated to the legislation’s purpose.” In re M.A.,

. When the legislative

classification does not impact a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class, rational

basis is the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in determining whether the classification reveals

a rational relationship between a legitimate governmental purpose and the classification.

Richardson,

.

¶ 37 Here, neither party disputes the application of rational basis scrutiny, as prisoners

are not a suspect class (People v. Alcozer,

(2011)), and there is no fundamental

right to parole (Vitek v. Jones,

(1980)). Rational basis review is limited and

deferential, and the legislation will not be held to violate the equal protection clause if any set of

- 13 - facts can rationally be conceived to justify the legislative classification. In re Destiny P.,

.

¶ 38 In analyzing the statute, we “will not second-guess the wisdom of legislative

enactments or dictate alternative means to achieve the desired result” as the legislature’s judgment

in drafting the statute “ ‘ “may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or

empirical data.” ’ ” People v. Pepitone,

(quoting People v. Boeckmann,

(2010), quoting Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder,

, (2003)). Rational basis

review in the context of an equal protection challenge “tolerates overinclusive classifications,

underinclusive ones, and other imperfect means-ends fits.” St. Joan Antida High School Inc. v.

Milwaukee Public School District,

(7th Cir. 2019) (citing Heller v. Doe,

(1993), Gregory v. Ashcroft,

(1991), Vance v. Bradley,

(1979)). The burden rests with the challenger to show that the classification is not

reasonably related to a stated legislative purpose, as the standard affords a strong presumption of

validity to the contested classification. Id.; Szczurek v. City of Park Ridge,

(1981).

¶ 39 The statutory enactment challenged provides, in pertinent part:

“A person under 21 years of age at the time of the commission of first degree

murder who is sentenced on or after June 1, 2019 (the effective date of

Public Act 100-1182) shall be eligible for parole review by the Prisoner

Review Board [(PRB)] after serving 20 years or more of his or her sentence

or sentences, except for those subject to a term of natural life imprisonment

under Section 5-8-1 of this Code or any person subject to sentencing under

- 14 - subsection (c) of Section 5-4.5-105 of this Code.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115

(West 2020).

¶ 40 The purpose of the scheme is clear from the plain language: to provide an

opportunity for young adult and juvenile offenders to receive parole after serving a determined

amount of the sentence imposed for certain offenses. The logic behind the enactment is clarified

further by the comments of Senator Don Harmon:

“This bill continues our general response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s

decision in [Miller v. Alabama] that laid out the fundamental notion that

juvenile offenders are simply wired differently and have a propensity, much

more so than older offenders, to be rehabilitated. We are creating *** a

parole system that would permit long sentences to be revisited at ten years

or fifteen or twenty years depending on *** the crime.” 100th Ill. Gen.

Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 31 (statements of Senator

Harmon).

¶ 41 Regarding the absence of retroactive application, comments from several

lawmakers make clear that the primary reasons for making the law prospective were concern for

victims and their families and upholding the promises made by prosecutors surrounding the finality

of a defendant’s sentence. See 100th Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2018, at 52-53

(statements of Representative Currie); id. at 53 (statements of Representative Davidsmeyer).

¶ 42 Defendant argues neither a “victim’s fear of an offender’s release” nor “avoiding

humiliation” by breaking the promises of prosecutors made to victims is a sufficient rational basis

for the legislative classification. We disagree with defendant’s characterization of the reasons for

prospective application. The stated reasoning for the statutory enactment was to further compliance

- 15 - with Miller in sentencing, and what can be gleaned from the legislators’ comments is they sought

to avoid undermining confidence in the justice system by diminishing the finality of sentences on

matters already adjudicated. Of course, this goes directly to the legitimate government interest of

safeguarding public confidence in the justice system. Further, courts have repeatedly recognized

that “neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Illinois Constitution prevents statutes and statutory

changes from having a beginning, nor does either prohibit reasonable distinctions between rights

as of an earlier time and rights as they may be determined at a later time.” Richardson,

(citing Braeburn Securities Corp. v. Smith,

(1958); Sperry &

Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes,

(1911) (noting the fourteenth amendment does not

forbid statutes and statutory changes from having a beginning and distinguishing between the

rights of an earlier and later time)). Moreover, “[p]rospective application of a new doctrine or rule

of law does not violate the equal protection of laws under either the Federal or Illinois

constitution.” Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,

(1983).

¶ 43 Nonetheless, even if, as defendant contends, the reason for prospective application

discussed above does not constitute a legitimate government interest, we are not bound to accept

the reasoning of the legislature, as a classification will not be set aside if any facts, even those not

presented, rationally justify the legislation. Union Cemetery Ass’n of City of Lincoln v. Cooper,

(1953). The State argues that when putting aside the explicit reasons for prospective

application, we should look no further than our supreme court’s decision in Richardson in

disposing of defendant’s equal protection challenge.

¶ 44 In Richardson,

, ¶¶ 3-4, the defendant asserted an equal protection

challenge to the savings clause of amended section 5-120 (705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp.

2013)) because the legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705

- 16 - ILCS 405/1 et seq. (West Supp. 2013)) to 17-year-olds but did so only prospectively based on

when the alleged offenses occurred in relation to the amendment’s effective date. Defendant

argued that the savings clause was not rationally related to the amendment’s purpose, as it treated

similarly situated individuals unequally. Id. ¶ 4. In finding that the savings clause was rationally

related to the legislature’s goal of expanding the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987,

the supreme court reasoned that the challenged language reasonably achieved the amendment’s

purpose by avoiding confusion and delay, and also by preserving judicial resources. Id. ¶ 10.

¶ 45 The court in Richardson also cited People v. Grant,

(1978), as further

support for its decision. In Grant, the defendant advanced an equal protection challenge to an

amended sentencing statute that only applied to those sentenced after the effective date of the

amendment.

. The defendant argued there was no rational basis for the legislative

classification. The supreme court found:

“the ability to elect to be sentenced under a law enacted after the date of the

commission of a crime is not a constitutional right but a benefit conferred

solely by statute. It is not unconstitutional for the legislature to confer such

benefit only prospectively, neither is it unconstitutional for the legislature

to specify ‘a classification between groups differently situated, so long as a

reasonable basis for the distinction exists.’ (People v. Spears,

(1971)). In this instance, the legislature distinguished between those

defendants, on the one hand, who had not yet been accorded any sentencing

hearings prior to the cut-off date, and those, on the other hand, whose

sentences, already imposed, would require remandments for additional

- 17 - sentencing hearings. We find this to be a reasonable basis for distinction

and, therefore, no constitutional denial of equal protection.” Id. at 561-62.

¶ 46 We find the reasoning of Richardson and Grant applicable here. The purpose of

this amendment was to bring the sentencing scheme of this state concerning juvenile and young-

adult offenders into further compliance with the mandates of Miller. Pursuant to Dorsey, this

amendment alleviates concerns that come with sentencing these individuals to terms of

imprisonment greater than 40 years. Similar to the amendment in Grant, the legislature

distinguished between defendants who had already been sentenced and those who had not. We

find the legislative classification reasonable as it avoids confusion and delay. Similar to

Richardson, the prospective application preserves governmental resources.

¶ 47 Defendant disputes the classification will preserve resources and argues that any

speculation that retroactive application will result in an “avalanche” of parole petitions is

unfounded, as uniform treatment would result in fewer than 4000 additional petitions. Further, he

argues the PRB should be able to manage any influx in petitions; owing to the time constraints in

the challenged parole legislation, PRB “currently has no new petitioners before it.” This is a

short-sighted view of the requirements of the statute and the duties of the PRB.

¶ 48 A review of the PRB’s 44th annual report gives perspective to the massive

undertaking the agency performs annually. 2020 Illinois Prisoner Review Board Annual Report at

44; see also Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Board,

, ¶ 12 n.3 (noting courts may take

judicial notice of documents from readily verifiable sources of indisputable accuracy). In relation

to adult cases only, the PRB considered and reviewed over 40,000 matters. 2020 Illinois Prisoner

Review Board Annual Report at 7. This is in addition to the thousands of other issues brought

before the PRB, from executive clemency petitions (1189), Morales/King hearings (3936), and

- 18 - attorney screenings (1926). Id. at 10-11, 14. While the PRB may have no new petitioners before it

as a result of the new parole legislation, it already manages a significant caseload, and the addition

of approximately 4000 new cases represents a significant increase.

¶ 49 The statute defendant challenges also requires additional action on behalf of the

PRB, including the appointment of counsel if requested by an indigent defendant, a personalized

review of the defendant’s case, and recommendations for services that the Illinois Department of

Corrections would have to determine whether to make available. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(d), (e)

(West 2020). The PRB would also have to disseminate materials to the defendant and counsel

before the hearing. Id. § 5-4.5-115(f). We disagree with defendant’s oversimplification of the

requirements of the statute, as it is clear that preparing for the parole hearing is resource intensive.

Defendant argues that the legislative history is silent regarding an “avalanche” of petitions or a

strain on resources. Certainly, he is correct, but this is not because this concern did not exist; it is

because from the very beginning the legislation was prospective only, meaning that there was

never a reason to consider or discuss those concerns.

¶ 50 Defendant also points to section 5-4.5-115(i), stating the PRB has the authority to

change the scheduled parole hearing date upon a showing of good cause. Section 5-4.5-115(i)

states merely that “[o]nly upon motion for good cause shall the date be changed.” (Emphasis

added.) Id. § 5-4.5-115(i). This language does not evidence the PRB’s inherent authority to

reschedule hearings in the case of an overwhelming amount of petitions. It is also apparent that

when rescheduling, the PRB incurs additional resource-sapping responsibilities to notify the

impacted parties. Id.

¶ 51 Finally, defendant relies on People v. Nicks,

(1976), and People

ex rel. Carroll v. Frye,

(1966), for support. Those cases are factually inapposite here.

- 19 - Nicks concerned a limitation on consecutive sentences, and the factual circumstances surrounding

the court’s application of the statute were unique. See Nicks,

. Frye involved

an arbitrary cut-off date regarding credit for time actually served prior to sentencing based on the

date the defendant was sentenced and the cut-off date did not relate to a legitimate government

interest. See Frye,

.

¶ 52 We echo the sentiment of the Richardson court that “statutory amendments which

apply to some but not to others may appear unfair to a certain extent. This is particularly true with

ameliorative amendments such as the amendment here.” Richardson,

.

However, a classification is not arbitrary or unreasonable “because it is not made with

mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Heller,

. We find the prospective application of the statute neither

arbitrary nor an invidious discrimination. Defendant has failed to meet his burden in establishing

an equal protection violation.

¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 55 Affirmed.

- 20 -