Opinion filed May 11, 2023 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2023

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit, ) Peoria County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-21-0292 v. ) Circuit No. 14-CF-989 ) DEON DAVELLE WELLS, ) The Honorable ) Katherine S. Gorman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HETTEL delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices McDade and Albrecht concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 In 2014, when defendant Deon D. Wells was 19 years old, he was charged with first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2014)). Defendant pled guilty, and in 2016, the trial court

sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison. In 2017, defendant filed a postconviction petition,

arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his sentence violated the Illinois

and United States Constitutions. The State filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted.

On appeal, defendant argues that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified

Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115 (West 2020)) violates the equal protection clauses of the Illinois

Constitution and the United States Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1) because it grants parole review only to young offenders sentenced after June 1, 2019,

not those sentenced prior thereto, like defendant. We hold that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified

Code does not violate equal protection principles and, therefore, affirm defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 A. Defendant’s Case

¶4 On December 26, 2014, defendant Deon D. Wells, a 19-year-old, was charged with first

degree murder in connection with the death of a 19-month-old child. On October 8, 2015,

defendant pled guilty in exchange for a 40-year cap on his prison sentence. On January 15, 2016,

the trial court sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.

¶5 On October 12, 2017, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel. The trial court appointed postconviction counsel to represent defendant.

Defendant’s counsel filed a supplemental postconviction petition, alleging that defendant’s

sentence violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate

penalties clauses of the Illinois and United States Constitutions. The State filed a motion to dismiss

defendant’s original and supplemental postconviction petitions. On July 2, 2021, the trial court

granted the State’s motion to dismiss defendant’s postconviction petitions.

¶6 On appeal, defendant raises a new argument. He contends that section 5-4.5-115 of the

Unified Code violates the equal protection clauses of the Illinois Constitution and the United States

Constitution.

¶7 B. Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code

¶8 In January 2017, House Bill 531 was introduced in the Illinois General Assembly and was

enacted two years later as Public Act 100-1182, adding section 5-4.5-115 to the Unified Code.

2 Pub. Act 100-1182 (eff. June 1, 2019) (adding 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115). Section 5-4.5-115 of the

Unified Code creates parole review for offenders under the age of 21 at the time of their offense.

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-115(b) (West 2020). Under the statute, a person convicted of first degree murder

is eligible for parole after serving 20 years if he was under 21 years old at the time of the offense

and was sentenced after June 1, 2019. Id. In determining if a defendant should be granted parole,

the Prisoner Review Board must “consider the diminished culpability of youthful offenders, the

hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and maturity of the youthful offender

during incarceration.” Id. § 5-4.5-115(j).

¶9 According to one of its sponsors, Senator Don Harmon, the legislation was introduced as

a “response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller against Alabama that laid out the

fundamental notion that juvenile offenders are simply wired differently and have a propensity,

much more so than older offenders, to be rehabilitated.” 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate

Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 31 (statement of Senator Harmon). It creates “a parole system that

would permit long sentences to be revisited at ten years or fifteen or twenty years depending ***

on the crime.” Id. Senator Harmon explained:

“The Supreme Court—the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on youthful

offenders is moving forward and is relying upon the—the brain science of

development. And the science of brain development suggests that young people

don’t reach the age of fully formed brains at eighteen or at twenty-one. It’s not till

the mid-twenties, so we’re still a few years away from the—the brain science here.

*** [T]here is no judge on the planet who can look at a nineteen-year-old and say,

I know for a fact that you’re the kind of young person who is going to mature and

rehabilitate in prison or you’re the kind who is never going to get out of prison.

3 That’s why we create this parole process, so that ten years or fifteen years down the

road, we can have a second look at the offender and say whether or not it is

appropriate for them to be released. *** To the concern over victims, a concern that

I shared, victims were at the table. This is prospective only. It will not disturb any

victims who are—whose offenders have already been imprisoned.” Id. at 36.

¶ 10 One of the bill’s House sponsors, Representative Barbara Flynn Currie, explained the

proposed legislation as follows:

“All this measure does is just say that people who committed crimes, while they

were under the age of 21, will after 10 years, in some cases 20 years, in some cases

never, have the opportunity to go to the Prisoner Review Board, to say I am a

different person, and I do think that it would be appropriate for me to be released.

In no way is this a get out of jail free card. I have no reason to think that the Prisoner

Review Board would apply any but the most stringent standards, to a decision

whether to release somebody after 10 years or after 20. But I do think that our

correctional system should be premised on the idea of rehabilitation, not just

retribution. Rehabilitation so that when somebody has shown that they really are

different they’re really a changed person, we ought to take that seriously. We ought

to take it into account. We ought to give them a second chance. *** Think about

what we know *** about brain research that says that young people, and the subject

of this Bill is young people, do not always have good judgment. They haven’t

always understood the consequences of their actions. *** This is a critical change

in our criminal justice system. To recognize that young people should be given, if

4 they deserve it, a second chance.” 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings , Nov.

28, 2018, at 47-48 (statement of Representative Currie).

According to one of the bill’s cosponsors: “This Bill provides an opportunity for youthful

offenders to rehabilitate, remediate, and reenter society.” Id. at 50 (statement of Representative

Parkhurst).

¶ 11 During the House debates, the following exchange took place between Representative

C.D. Davidsmeyer and Representative Currie:

“DAVIDSMEYER: Is this only going forward? So if somebody who has

committed a crime prior to this becoming law *** is not affected by this?

CURRIE: Absolutely, I’m glad you mentioned that. I meant to say so in my

opening remarks. This Bill will not affect anybody who is currently serving time in

the Illinois Correctional system. It is prospective only.”

DAVIDSMEYER: So, you know *** one of the concerns of my local

State’s Attorneys was you know, making a promise to the victim’s family that this

person will never come back. Now they’ll know going in *** that they may have

an opportunity for parole in 10 years, or 20 years or whatever that date may be,

correct?

CURRIE: And that was the reason we made the change because of the

concern for victim families.” Id. at 52-53 (statements of Representatives

Davidsmeyer and Currie).

¶ 12 Representative Rita Mayfield stated:

“I do want to just reiterate that this Bill is prospective, meaning those individuals

who are not currently incarcerated. This gives the State’s Attorneys opportunities,

5 when they are doing their sentencing, to take in consideration, you know the length

of the sentence when they are giving them. Knowing that after 10 or 20 years that

individual may be getting out.” Id. at 55 (statement of Representative Mayfield).

In addressing the scope of the bill, Representative Currie stated: “[T]he Sentencing Policy

Advisory Committee did give us help in figuring out how many people might be coming before

the Prisoner Review Board were this Bill to become Law, affecting as it does, only future

criminals, and the number is probably under 100 a year.” Id. at 61-62 (statement of Representative

Currie).

¶ 13 In Miller v. Alabama,

(2012), the United States Supreme Court ruled

that a defendant under 18 years of age cannot be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility

of parole unless the sentencing court considers youth and various factors attendant to it because of

“children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change.” “[T]he evolving science

on juvenile maturity and brain development” suggests that the principles of Miller may also apply

to young adults. People v. House,

; see also People v. Hilliard,

(“young adults (those between 18 and 21 years old) may rely on the

evolving neuroscience regarding brain development in juveniles and its correlation to maturity

underpinning the Miller decision” to support a constitutional challenge to a life sentence); People

v. Daniels,

(young adults 20 years old and younger may “rely on

the evolving neuroscience and societal standards underlying the rule in Miller” to support

constitutional challenges to life sentences).

¶ 14 Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code was enacted in response to “emerging case law” to

address “youthful offenders under the age of 21.” People v. Green,

. It seems to be “a remedial response to the constitutional issues recognized in Miller for both

6 juveniles and young adults.” People v. Elliott,

. The legislation is

one of the “significant steps” taken by the legislature “in implementing Miller protections.” People

v. Montanez,

.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 A. Timeliness of Defendant’s Constitutional Attack

¶ 17 Ordinarily, a defendant forfeits an issue he does not raise in his postconviction petition.

See People v. Davis,

(citing People v. Ortiz,

(2009)).

However, a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute may be raised at any time, including for

the first time on appeal. People v. Roberts,

(2002) (citing People v. Wright,

(2000), and People v. Wooters,

, 510 (1999)). A defendant may

attack a statute’s constitutionality on appeal even if he did not raise the issue in the trial court in

his postconviction petition. People v. Villareal,

(citing People v.

Thompson,

, and Davis,

). Thus, even though defendant

did not raise the constitutionality of section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code in his postconviction

petition, we will consider defendant’s challenge on appeal.

¶ 18 B. Constitutional Equal Protection Principles

¶ 19 “All statutes are presumed to be constitutional.” People v. Funches,

(2004). “The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation.”

A court must construe a statute

to uphold its constitutionality if reasonably possible.

We review the constitutionality of a

statute de novo.

.

¶ 20 The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution provides: “No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection

7 of the laws.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Likewise, the equal protection clause of the United States

Constitution provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1.

¶ 21 In conducting an equal protection analysis, we apply the same standards under the United

States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution. In re Jonathon C.B.,

. The

constitutional right to equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated

in a similar manner, unless the government can demonstrate an appropriate reason to treat them

differently.

The equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper

distinctions in legislation among different categories of people, but it prohibits the government

from doing so on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the legislation’s purpose.

When a

legislative classification does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class,

we apply a rational basis scrutiny and consider whether the challenged classification bears a

rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. People v. Masterson,

.

¶ 22 “Under the rational-basis test, judicial review of legislative classifications is limited and

generally deferential ***.” In re A.A.,

, 38 (1998). “[A] challenged classification may

be invalidated only if it is arbitrary or bears no reasonable relationship to the pursuit of a legitimate

State goal.” People v. P.H.,

(1991) (citing Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp.,

(1986)). The classification must be upheld if any set of facts can reasonably

be conceived to justify it. A.A., 181 Ill. 2d at 38. In an equal protection challenge, “ ‘[t]he burden

is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might

8 support it.’ ” Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,

(1987)

(quoting Madden v. Kentucky,

(1939)).

¶ 23 The rational basis test does not require that the legislature ever state the purpose or rationale

supporting its classification. Cutinello v. Whitley,

(1994). “It requires only that

there be a reasonable relationship between the challenged legislation and a conceivable, and

perhaps unarticulated, governmental interest.” Id.; see Nordlinger v. Hahn,

(1992)

(“Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature

or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its

classification”). “[I]t is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason

for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature.” Federal Communications

Comm’n v. Beach Communications, Inc.,

(1993); Miller v. Department of Public

Aid,

(1981). “Where any plausible reasons for the legislature’s actions can

be discerned, this court’s inquiry ends.” Miller,

.

¶ 24 When reviewing a statute challenged as violating equal protection, we must give “high

deference” to the legislature (People v. Gale,

(2007)) and exercise

“judicial restraint” (Beach Communications,

). We may not second-guess the

wisdom of the legislature in creating the classification. See United States v. Carolene Products

Co.,

(1938); see also Beach Communications,

(“[E]qual

protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.”).

Nor may we question if the classification is the best means to achieve the goals of the legislature.

See Gale,

; Vermouth v. Corrothers,

(9th Cir. 1987); see

also Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc.,

(1973) (rational-basis

review does not allow courts “to speculate as to whether the statute is unwise or whether the evils

9 sought to be remedied could have been regulated in some other manner”). “If the classification has

some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because *** [‘]in practice it

results in some inequality.’ ” Dandridge v. Williams,

(1970) (quoting Lindsley

v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,

(1911)).

¶ 25 “Prospective application of a new doctrine or rule of law does not violate the equal

protection of laws under either the Federal or Illinois constitution.” Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,

Inc.,

(1983); People v. Hunter,

, ¶ 61. “[N]either the

fourteenth amendment nor the Illinois Constitution prevents statutes and statutory changes from

having a beginning, nor does either prohibit reasonable distinctions between rights as of an earlier

time and rights as they may be determined at a later time.” People v. Richardson,

; see also Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Rhodes,

(1911) (“[T]he Fourteenth

Amendment does not forbid statutes and statutory changes to have a beginning and thus to

discriminate between the rights of an earlier and later time.”). Even though the legislature might

have granted benefits retroactively, it is not required to do so when it appears to have a legitimate

reason for applying them prospectively. See Frazier v. Manson,

(2d Cir. 1983).

¶ 26 1. Equal Protection and Prospective Sentencing Laws

¶ 27 Courts “generally defer to the legislature in the sentencing arena because the legislature is

institutionally better equipped to gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences

accordingly.” People v. Sharpe,

(2005). “The legislature’s discretion in setting

criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally decline to overrule legislative determinations in

this area unless the challenged penalty is clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations

on this authority.”

10 ¶ 28 “[T]here is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense receive

identical sentences.” Williams v. Illinois,

(1970). “It is perfectly proper for the

[l]egislature to create a new sentencing procedure which operates prospectively only.” People v.

Gilchrist,

(Ct. App. 1982). “A legislature may prospectively reduce the

maximum penalty for a crime even though prisoners sentenced to the maximum penalty before the

effective date of the act would serve a longer term of imprisonment than one sentenced to the

maximum term thereafter.” Frazier,

. Discrepancies in sentencing among defendants

who committed the same or similar crimes at different times are not unconstitutional under equal

protection principles because such discrepancies are inescapable whenever the legislature raises

or lowers the penalties for an offense. See United States v. Goncalves,

(1st Cir.

2011). “There is no denial of equal protection in having persons sentenced under one system for

crimes committed before [a specific date] and another class of prisoners sentenced under a different

system.” Foster v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles,

(9th

Cir. 1989).

¶ 29 Our supreme court has determined that amending a sentencing statute prospectively does

not violate equal protection. See People v. Grant,

(1978). On February 1, 1978, the

legislature amended a sentencing provision and made it applicable only to defendants who had not

yet been sentenced as of its effective date.

. The Grant defendant, who was sentenced

nearly three years earlier, argued that his equal protection rights were violated because there was

no rational basis for distinguishing between individuals sentenced after the statute’s effective date

and those, like him, who were sentenced prior to that date.

Our supreme court rejected the

defendant’s equal protection challenge, stating:

11 “Without a doubt, the power of the legislature to determine punishment is subject

to constitutional limitations. Nevertheless, the ability to elect to be sentenced under

a law enacted after the date of the commission of a crime is not a constitutional

right but a benefit conferred solely by statute. It is not unconstitutional for the

legislature to confer such benefit only prospectively, neither is it unconstitutional

for the legislature to specify ‘a classification between groups differently situated,

so long as a reasonable basis for the distinction exists.’ [Citation.] In this instance,

the legislature distinguished between those defendants, on the one hand, who had

not yet been accorded any sentencing hearings prior to the cut-off date, and those,

on the other hand, whose sentences, already imposed, would require remandments

for additional sentencing hearings. We find this to be a reasonable basis for

distinction and, therefore, no constitutional denial of equal protection.”

at 561-

62.

¶ 30 Nearly 40 years later, our supreme court relied on Grant to uphold a legislative

classification that applied prospectively only. See Richardson,

. In

Richardson, the defendant was charged with criminal offenses in June 2013, when he was 17 years

old. Id. ¶ 3. At that time, the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 only applied to minors under 17 years of

age. Id.; see 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 2012). In July 2013, the legislature amended the Juvenile

Court Act so that it applied to minors under 18 years of age beginning on the statute’s effective

date of January 1, 2014. Richardson,

, ¶ 3. The amendment included a saving

clause providing that its changes only “ ‘apply to violations or attempted violations committed on

or after the effective date of this amendatory Act.’ ” Id. (quoting 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West Supp.

2013)). The defendant argued that the saving clause violated his equal protection rights because

12 he was 17 when he committed his crimes. Id. ¶ 1. Our supreme court disagreed, finding the

challenged legislative classification distinguishing between those who committed violations

before and after the statute’s effective date “is rationally related to the legislature’s goal of

including 17-year-olds within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act.” Id. ¶ 10. The court

explained:

“The saving clause reasonably achieves the amendment’s purpose of including 17-

year-olds within the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court Act because it does so in a

manner that avoids confusion and delay and also preserves judicial resources. By

limiting the amendment’s application to violations or attempted violations

committed on or after the effective date, an accused, as well as the courts, are on

notice as to whether the Juvenile Court Act will apply in certain proceedings. ***

We acknowledge that statutory amendments which apply to some but not to others

may appear unfair to a certain extent. This is particularly true with ameliorative

amendments such as the amendment here. Nevertheless, statutory changes must

have a beginning. The simple fact that the saving clause precludes the amendment

from applying to some 17-year-olds such as defendant does not defeat its

constitutionality. Here, the legislature’s chosen effective date bears a rational

relationship to the legislature’s goal of extending the exclusive jurisdiction

provision of the Juvenile Court Act.” Id.

¶ 31 Thereafter, in Hunter,

, ¶¶ 60-61, the First District held that

section 5-4.5-105 of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016)), which requires trial

courts to consider mitigating factors when sentencing a juvenile, does not violate the equal

protection clause even though it applies only to individuals sentenced after the statute’s effective

13 date. The court cited Richardson in support of its decision. Hunter,

,

¶ 61. Like section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code, the legislature enacted section 5-4.5-105 of the

Unified Code in response to Miller. See Montanez,

.

¶ 32 Our sister states have also determined that equal protection principles allow ameliorative

sentencing provisions to be applied prospectively only. See, e.g., State v. Ross,

(Wash. 2004) (rejecting claim that prospective application of sentencing amendments violated

equal protection by “favoring offenders who committed crimes after the amendments’ effective

date”); Ex parte Zimmerman,

(Ala. 2002) (finding the defendant’s equal

protection rights were not violated by prospective sentencing statute because defendant was

“treated similarly to all other offenders sentenced under the law in effect at the time he was

sentenced”); Carter v. State,

(Ind. 1987) (holding the defendant was not

denied equal protection where he was sentenced “according to the statute in effect at that

time”); Bowen v. Recorder’s Court Judge,

(Mich. 1970) (holding

prospective application of sentencing amendment did not violate the defendant’s equal protection

rights); Clayton v. Iowa District Court,

, 828-30 (Iowa Ct. App. 2017) (finding

no equal protection violation where ameliorative sentencing provision applied only prospectively

and did not apply to the defendant); People v. Smith,

(Ct. App. 2015)

(“Prospective application of the ameliorative benefits of second strike sentencing under

Proposition 36 does not violate equal protection guarantees.”); Burch v. Tennessee Department of

Correction,

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that

his equal protection rights were violated by imposing “a different penalty upon him than upon an

individual guilty of an identical crime, just because of his date of sentencing”). No denial of equal

protection occurs when the legislature enacts a statute lowering the punishment for a crime with

14 prospective relief only, thereby making it inapplicable to those already sentenced. See State v.

Clayton,

(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952).

¶ 33 Additionally, federal courts have consistently upheld the nonretroactivity of the Fair

Sentencing Act (FSA), which reduced penalties for defendants sentenced after a certain date. See

Dorsey v. United States,

(2012); United States v. Black,

(4th

Cir. 2013); United States v. Swangin,

(D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Reeves,

(8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Lucero,

(10th Cir.

2013); United States v. Hippolyte,

(11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Speed,

(7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Reevey,

(3d Cir. 2010).

“Disparate treatment” among inmates based on their date of sentencing is “plainly rational”

because “ ‘discrepancies among persons who committed similar crimes are inescapable whenever

Congress raises or lowers the penalties for an offense.’ ” Speed,

(quoting

Goncalves,

). “Someone, in the end, will always be left behind to live with the

earlier, harsher penalty, whenever Congress chooses to amend a sentencing statute.”

“Whatever

arbitrariness there may be is therefore unavoidable.”

¶ 34 2. Equal Protection and Parole Eligibility

¶ 35 “[P]arole laws do not fix punishment but direct the manner of imposing sentence by the

court.” People v. Moses,

(1919) (citing Featherstone v. People,

(1901)). Parole does not end or change the length of a sentence but “authoriz[es] service of the

sentence outside the penitentiary.” People ex rel. Abner v. Kinney,

(1964).

¶ 36 Just as the legislature is in the best position to make changes to sentencing statutes (see

Sharpe,

), the determination of when a prisoner shall become eligible for parole

is “purely a legislative function.” People v. Rucker,

(1936). “[A] prisoner has no

15 right, except as the legislature gives it, to be paroled.” People ex rel. Kubala v. Kinney,

(1962). “[I]t is clear that parole in Illinois is in the nature of a gift and as such, its

conditions can be changed at the discretion of the legislature.” Harris v. Irving,

(1980). “[T]he legislature has the power to make changes in the terms and conditions for parole”

and make those changes effective at any time. Kubala,

. It is improper for courts

to judge “the wisdom of the legislative plan for parole of prisoners committed to the Department

of Corrections.” People v. Williams,

(1977).

¶ 37 Both state and federal courts have found that prospective parole eligibility laws do not

violate equal protection principles. See Whatley v. State,

(Miss. Ct. App.

2017); Bergee v. South Dakota Board of Pardons & Paroles,

,

;

Mayabb v. Johnson,

(5th Cir. 1999)). “ ‘A state’s decision to expand parole

eligibility only on a prospective basis is rational’ and does not violate the constitutional rights of

offenders convicted previously.” Whatley,

(quoting Fluker v. State,

(Miss. Ct. App. 2016)); see also Bergee,

,

(finding

“inmates’ equal protection rights were not violated by *** application of the old parole laws to

those sentenced for crimes committed before the effective date” of the new parole laws).

¶ 38 3. Equal Protection and Section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code

¶ 39 Defendant contends that section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code violates principles of equal

protection because it does not apply to defendants who, like him, were under 21 years of age when

they committed their crimes but were sentenced prior to June 1, 2019. Defendant concedes that

section 5-4.5-115 does not affect a fundamental right or discriminate against a suspect class, so

rational basis scrutiny applies. See Masterson,

. Defendant contends that

16 granting parole eligibility only to defendants sentenced after June 1, 2019, has no rational basis.

We disagree.

¶ 40 First, “[i]mprovement in sentencing is [a] rational government purpose.” Foster,

(citing Mistretta v. United States,

(1989)). In 2015, our appellate court urged

the legislature to improve sentencing laws in this state for minors and young adults. See People v.

Decatur,

(asking the legislature “to revisit the sentencing schemes

that result in *** lengthy imprisonment terms without allowing for adequate consideration of

mitigating factors such as age”); People v. Gipson,

(“urging the

legislature to expeditiously address the inability of our present statutory scheme to provide

allowances for the special considerations that youth warrants”). In 2019, our legislature created

section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code, which allows those who committed crimes when they were

younger than 21 years of age “a meaningful opportunity for release” from prison. People v. Beck,

. As Senator Harmon explained, the impetus for the

legislation was Miller,

, in which the United States Supreme Court determined that

juvenile offenders are much more likely than adults to be rehabilitated. See 100th Ill. Gen. Assem.,

Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 31 (comments of Senator Harmon). Based on “the science

of brain development” suggesting that brains of young adults are still not fully formed, the

legislature created the “parole process” set forth in section 5-4.5-115. See

Thus, section 5-4.5-

115 of the Unified Code is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of improving

sentencing laws for young adults. Therefore, it does not violate equal protection principles.

¶ 41 Furthermore, the legislature’s decision to grant parole eligibility only prospectively to

defendants sentenced after June 1, 2019, is rationally related to the legislature’s goal of

implementing sentencing reform “one step at a time.” People v. Anderson,

, 31

17 (1992); Michael v. Ghee,

(6th Cir. 2007). “The legislature need not deal with

all conceivable evils at once; it may proceed one step at a time.” Anderson,

.

“Prospective application allows the [l]egislature to control the risk of new legislation by limiting

its application.” People v. Lynch,

(Ct. App. 2012). If the legislature

subsequently determines the benefits of the legislation outweigh its costs, then it may extend the

legislation’s benefits retroactively. Id.; see also Anderson,

(“Should the legislature

see fit to broaden the scope of the statute to include other possible groups, it is free to do so.”).

“Requiring the [l]egislature to apply retroactively any change in the law benefitting criminal

defendants imposes unnecessary additional burdens to the already difficult task of fashioning a

criminal justice system that protects the public and rehabilitates criminals.” Lynch,

. Because the prospective application of parole eligibility under section 5-4.5-115 is

reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of implementing change “one step at a

time,” the statute does not violate equal protection principles.

¶ 42 In Illinois, “prospective application of a statute is preferred.” Cooper v. Chicago Transit

Authority,

(1991). This preference is codified in section 4 of the

Statute on Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2020)), which provides: “No new law shall be construed

*** in any way whatever to affect any *** offense or act *** committed or done, or any penalty,

forfeiture or punishment *** incurred *** before the new law takes effect ***.” “[S]ection 4

represents a clear legislative indication that the retroactive application of substantive statutory

changes is forbidden.” Caveney v. Bower,

(2003). Thus, section 5-4.5-115 of the

Unified Code, which applies a new parole process prospectively to those sentenced after its

effective date, is rationally related to our State’s interest in applying new laws prospectively, not

retroactively.

18 ¶ 43 Moreover, “the State has a weighty interest in the finality of *** sentences.” In re N.G.,

. Prospective-only application of sentencing laws based on sentencing date

“maintains the integrity of sentences that were valid when imposed and ensures the discretion

exercised in the charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing decisions of the People and the trial

courts is not destabilized or nullified.” People v. Cruz,

(Ct. App. 2012).

Thus, section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code, which applies a new parole process prospectively to

individuals sentenced after its effective date, is rationally related to the government’s interest in

ensuring the finality of sentences.

¶ 44 In discussing the proposed legislation that became section 5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code,

it was important to legislators that the new parole process be applied only prospectively to

criminals not yet sentenced. See 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 31, 2017, at 31,

36; 100th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Nov. 28, 2018, at 47-48, 52-53, 55, 62. It was not

necessary for the legislature to articulate any purpose for enacting the statute or applying it

prospectively. See Cutinello,

. A statute passes constitutional muster as long as

“any plausible reasons for the legislature’s action can be discerned.” Miller,

.

As set forth above, there were many rational bases supporting the legislature’s enactment of section

5-4.5-115 of the Unified Code and its prospective application. Thus, the statute passes

constitutional muster, and we reject defendant’s constitutional challenge.

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 46 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.

¶ 47 Affirmed.

19 People v. Wells,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 14-CF- 989; the Hon. Katherine S. Gorman, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Karalis, and Bryon Kohut, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Jodi Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Thomas for D. Arado, Gary F. Gnidovec, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Appellee: Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

20