No. 2-22-0086 Opinion filed May 24, 2023 ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

STACY GOODMAN, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 18-L-355 ) DRU GOODMAN, ) Honorable ) Mitchell L. Hoffman and David P. Brodsky, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 During the parties’ divorce proceedings, the plaintiff, Stacy Goodman, discovered that the

defendant, Dru Goodman, had hired investigators to conduct surveillance of her for over three

years. After the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, Stacy filed a complaint against Dru,

alleging, in relevant part, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and three claims

related to various forms of abuse under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Act) (750

ILCS 60/101 et seq. (West 2018)). The trial court dismissed the abuse claims based on the Act,

finding that the Act did not provide a private right of action. It later granted summary judgment in

favor of Dru on Stacy’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, finding it barred by

the absolute litigation privilege. Stacy appeals from these orders. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 We took the following facts from the filed record and an unpublished order related to

Stacy’s request for an extension of an order of protection entered against Dru. See In re Marriage

of Goodman,

(Goodman II). The parties were married in 1996, and

three children were born of the marriage. The record indicates that, in August 2013, Stacy told Dru

she wanted a divorce and started sleeping in his home office rather than in their bedroom. In

November 2013, Stacy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On July 26, 2017, the trial court

entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage.

¶4 In 2013, during the pendency of the divorce proceedings, Stacy filed an emergency motion

for an order of protection. The trial court subsequently entered an agreed order, which required

Dru to transfer funds for Stacy’s purchase of a new residence and provided that Stacy’s emergency

petition for an order of protection had been withdrawn. A separate order restrained each party from

harassing, intimidating, or interfering with the other’s liberty.

¶5 On March 22, 2017, Stacy filed a verified petition for an order of protection against Dru

pursuant to the Act. That petition was docketed in the trial court as case No. 17-OP-486 and was

consolidated with the dissolution action. In an affidavit attached to the petition, Stacy asserted that

when she resided in the marital home, Dru “maintained constant, 24-hour surveillance” of her,

using cameras placed throughout the interior and exterior of the residence. Stacy further stated that

she suspected Dru had hired a private investigator to follow her soon after she filed for divorce.

Stacy stated that her suspicion was confirmed on December 31, 2015, when her boyfriend,

Matthew Kornick, looked out the window of her home and observed a camera flash come from a

car parked nearby. Stacy obtained the license plate number and filed a police report. She later

learned that the car’s owner was Bing R. Apitz, a private investigator.

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¶6 After the incident with Apitz, Stacy’s attorneys issued discovery to Dru. In response, Stacy

learned that, between September 2013 and April 2016, Dru had someone follow, videotape, and

photograph her for approximately 12 hours per day at home, on vacation, and in public places.

Stacy also discovered that Dru had spent more than $1.295 million to surveil her. Stacy stated that

Dru’s constant surveillance had caused her emotional distress and anxiety. Stacy also stated that

she continued to fear that someone was following and recording her because, on February 27,

2017, Dru disclosed that another private investigator, Robert Scigalski, had provided services to

him.

¶7 At a hearing on the petition for an order of protection, Scigalski testified that he was a

private investigator, and Dru’s attorney hired him to investigate whether Stacy was cohabitating

with her boyfriend, Matthew Kornick. Scigalski’s investigation lasted from mid-February to the

end of March 2017. He conducted all surveillance within the bounds of the law, and, at times, it

lasted 18 hours per day.

¶8 Grady Vogt testified that he was employed by DDG, the same corporation that employed

Dru. Dru was his boss. In 2013, Dru told him that he was having family problems, was receiving

threatening phone calls, and was concerned for the well-being of his children. In August 2013, due

to the parties’ marital problems, Vogt hired private investigator Bob Arden without Dru’s

knowledge and instructed Arden to investigate Stacy and to look out for the safety of Dru and his

children. Vogt testified that, within a couple of weeks, Arden discovered that Stacy was

consistently with Kornick. At that point, the purpose of the surveillance changed from ensuring

safety to investigating adultery and possible cohabitation. Dru did not know about Arden until

about two or three months after Vogt hired him. Vogt hired an attorney, John Purdy, to oversee

Arden.

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¶9 Purdy testified that Vogt engaged him on behalf of DDG to review Arden’s reports “to

make sure that there were no problems for [DDG] and its officers.” Once Purdy received and

reviewed the reports, he would send them to Vogt. The record contains an e-mail written by Purdy

on September 13, 2013, to Latressa Stahlberg. In that e-mail, Purdy wrote as follows:

“[Vogt] called me early this afternoon and told me that the owner of DDG, who lives in

northern Cook or Lake County[,] is in the middle of a divorce and wishes to have a private

investigator investigate his estranged wife. The name of the investigator is Robert Arden

and the name of the firm is Arkus Investigators, Inc. he [sic] wishes us the [sic] high [sic]

the investigator to protect his findings from discovery.”

¶ 10 Dru testified that he did not know about Arden until December 2013 or January 2014. He

believed Vogt initially hired Arden for the safety of Dru and his children. Thereafter, the

investigation continued to prove adultery. In June 2016, the surveillance focused on proving

conjugal cohabitation. Dru testified that Arden’s investigation lasted until August 2016, but Dru’s

divorce counsel hired another investigator and that investigation lasted until around March 2017.

The record indicates that, starting in January 2014, Arden’s reports were being forwarded to Dru’s

divorce attorneys.

¶ 11 Stacy testified consistently with the allegations in her petition. She stated that the

surveillance made her paranoid, and it was often difficult to sleep at night. She acknowledged on

cross-examination that she began seeing a therapist long before the divorce proceedings

commenced.

¶ 12 At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court (Judge Joseph V. Salvi) entered a two-

year plenary order of protection against Dru. The trial court found that the surveillance was

obsessive and was commenced initially to show that Stacy was having an affair. Ultimately,

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however, the surveillance was transformed into a means for determining whether or not Stacy was

cohabitating. The trial court noted that anyone who would spend $1.5 million for private

investigators was obsessed and would cause any reasonable subject of such investigation to be

anxious, afraid, angry, and upset. The trial court found that the extent of the investigation was “not

necessary to accomplish any purpose” and “was completely and utterly inappropriate and warrants

a plenary order of protection.”

¶ 13 In the direct appeal from the dissolution proceeding, Dru argued that the plenary order of

protection entered by the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirmed

the trial court’s decision and held that a finding opposite to the trial court’s was not clearly

apparent. See In re Marriage of Goodman,

, ¶ 167 (Goodman I). We

stated, “even if the surveillance was partially directed at gathering evidence of cohabitation, the

trial court could have concluded that the duration and scope of the surveillance exceeded what was

reasonably necessary to gather evidence of cohabitation.”

We explained that our conclusion

did not bar a party to a divorce action from engaging a private investigator to gather relevant

evidence. Id. ¶ 169. “Rather, we simply [held] that the trial court’s determination that the

surveillance at issue did not serve a purpose that [was] reasonable under the circumstances in light

of its duration and scope was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. Finally, we

determined that the trial court’s finding that the surveillance caused Stacy emotional distress was

also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 171. Thus, we affirmed the trial court’s

decision to enter the plenary order of protection against Dru. Id.

¶ 14 When the plenary order of protection was set to expire, Stacy filed a motion to extend the

order of protection. At a hearing on the motion to extend, before trial court Judge Janelle K.

Christensen, Dru testified that he did not know if he would hire a private investigator if the order

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of protection was lifted. He stated that he would make that decision based on advice from legal

counsel on whether to investigate cohabitation. Any investigation would be “more limited” and

restricted to the issue of cohabitation. Stacy testified that she wanted the extension because she did

not want to live in fear that someone was constantly following her. The thought of having the order

of protection lifted had caused her anxiety and made it difficult to sleep. Following argument, the

trial court granted the motion to extend. The trial court stated that it believed that Dru would

immediately begin surveilling Stacy if the order of protection was lifted and that the surveillance

would cause Stacy emotional distress.

¶ 15 In Goodman II, we reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the trial court’s

decision to grant the extension on the plenary order of protection was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. We noted that Stacy was required to establish “ ‘good cause’ ” by a preponderance

of the evidence to extend the order of protection. Goodman II,

(quoting 750 ILCS 60/220(e) (West 2018)). We held that there was no evidence to support a

finding of good cause, such as continued hostility or harassment.

Although Dru testified he

may surveil Stacy again to investigate cohabitation, we held that this did not establish good cause.

. We noted that Illinois courts regularly review evidence from private investigators in

cohabitation cases and held that there was no reason to bar a party from conducting surveillance

to gather evidence of cohabitation so long as it was within the bounds of reason.

Further, there

was no evidence to substantiate the trial court’s finding that any future surveillance of Stacy by

Dru would cross the line to harassment, as Dru testified that he would only conduct surveillance

based on the advice of counsel and he had demonstrated that he would comply with court

directives, as evidenced by his compliance with the original order of protection.

.

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¶ 16 On March 21, 2019, Stacy filed an amended five-count complaint related to Dru’s past

surveillance of her. Count I stated a claim for intrusion upon seclusion, alleging that Dru surveilled

Stacy within the marital home and outside the marital home. Count II asserted a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the surveillance had caused Stacy anguish,

humiliation, depression, and sleep loss, for which she had to seek counseling. Counts III, IV, and

V asserted private causes of action under the Act for negligent abuse, willful and wanton negligent

abuse, and willful and wanton intentional abuse. Stacy alleged that the many years of surveillance

constituted abuse and harassment under the Act and that the Act created an implied private right

of action.

¶ 17 Dru filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of

Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)), for failure to state a cause of action. The

trial court (Judge Mitchell Hoffman) largely denied the motion. As to the claim for intrusion upon

seclusion, the trial court denied the motion regarding the allegations concerning surveillance

within the marital home but granted dismissal of the allegations related to surveillance outside the

marital home. The trial court also addressed Dru’s argument that the absolute litigation privilege

was a basis to dismiss the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court

found that the allegations of the complaint did not support using the litigation privilege as an

affirmative defense, as there were questions of fact that could not be resolved within a section 2-

615 dismissal proceeding. Finally, in relation to counts III, IV, and V of the amended complaint,

the trial court found that a private right of action under the Act was consistent with the underlying

purpose of the statute and provided Stacy a remedy for Dru’s repeated harassment of her.

¶ 18 Dru filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to dismiss with respect to the

claims under the Act, counts III through V. Dru argued that there was no private right of action

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because the Act itself provided sufficient remedies for Dru’s alleged violations of the Act. The

trial court denied the motion to reconsider, finding that a private cause of action was necessary to

allow a full, complete, and adequate remedy for Dru’s violations of the Act.

¶ 19 Dru filed a second motion to reconsider, which the trial court granted. The trial court found

that, upon reconsideration, a private right of action under the Act was unnecessary because the Act

provided appropriate remedies for violations of its provisions. Further, noneconomic damages

were available to Stacy in her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court

thus granted the dismissal of counts III, IV, and V with prejudice.

¶ 20 Thereafter, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on count II of the

amended complaint, the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and as to the

affirmative defense of the absolute litigation privilege. Dru also requested summary judgment on

count I, for intrusion upon seclusion related to surveillance within the marital home, on the basis

that a two-year statute of limitations barred it. The trial court (Judge David Brodsky) denied the

cross-motions for summary judgment on Stacy’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, finding that there was a question of fact for the jury as to whether Dru intended his actions

to cause emotional distress. The trial court also denied summary judgment on the absolute

litigation privilege. The trial court found that even if the surveillance was excessive, unnecessary,

and harassing, that did not mean it did not pertain to the divorce litigation. The trial court noted

that the surveillance was overseen by Dru’s attorneys, who certainly knew about the law regarding

cohabitation, and it was subject to discovery. The trial court also found that there was evidence

that at least some of the surveillance pertained to cohabitation and that whether the privilege

applied was a question for the trier of fact. Finally, the trial court granted summary judgment in

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favor of Dru on count I, Stacy’s claim for intrusion upon seclusion, finding that the statute of

limitations barred it.

¶ 21 Dru filed a motion to reconsider the denial of summary judgment on Stacy’s claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following argument on February 16, 2022, the trial

court granted the motion to reconsider and entered summary judgment in favor of Dru on count II.

The trial court stated that it had erred in its previous ruling when it found that the application of

the absolute litigation privilege was a question of fact for the jury. The trial court found that the

application of the privilege must be decided by the trial court as a matter of law. The trial court

concluded that the privilege barred Stacy’s claim because the overwhelming weight of the

evidence demonstrated that the surveillance and its disclosure were related to future anticipated or

pending issues in the parties’ divorce proceedings. This timely appeal followed.

¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 23 On appeal, Stacy argues that the trial court erred in finding that the absolute litigation

privilege barred her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Alternatively, Stacy

argues that, if this court holds that the privilege applies, then the trial court erred in finding no

implied private right of action under the Act and in dismissing counts III, IV, and V of her amended

complaint.

¶ 24 When parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that there are only

questions of law to decide, and they invite the court to decide the issue based on the record. Pielet

v. Pielet,

. Summary judgment should be granted where the pleadings,

depositions, and admissions on file—together with any affidavits—show that there are no genuine

issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735

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ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on cross-motions for

summary judgment. Schroeder v. Sullivan,

.

¶ 25 The absolute litigation privilege is an affirmative defense. Bedin v. Northwestern Memorial

Hospital,

. “The absolute-litigation privilege immunizes certain

statements and conduct by attorneys in the course of litigation.” Doe v. Williams McCarthy, LLP,

, ¶ 19. The purpose of the privilege is to allow attorneys “ ‘the utmost

freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.’ ” Kurczaba v. Pollock,

(2000) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 cmt. a, at 247 (1977)). The

privilege is based on section 586 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that an

attorney is “absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in

communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during

the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some

relation to the proceeding.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 586 (1977). Under section 587 of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, a private party to the litigation “enjoys the same privilege.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bedin,

(citing Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 587 (1977)).

¶ 26 For the litigation privilege to apply, “ ‘the communication must pertain to proposed or

pending litigation.’ ” Id. ¶ 40 (quoting Scarpelli v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP,

). However, the pertinency requirement is not strictly construed, and the

privilege can be applied to statements or actions related to the subject controversy and those not

confined to specific issues related to the litigation.

Any doubts related to pertinency must be

resolved “in favor of finding the communication pertinent to the litigation.” Doe,

. When the privilege applies, “no liability will attach even at the expense of

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uncompensated harm to the plaintiff.” O’Callaghan v. Satherlie,

.

The privilege applies to communications made before, during, and after litigation, regardless of

the defendant’s motive or the unreasonableness of his conduct. Bedin,

. The determination of whether the absolute litigation privilege applies is reviewed de novo.

¶ 27 Based on the above principles, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding count II

barred by the absolute litigation privilege. Count II stated a claim for intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The scope of conduct shielded by the privilege extends beyond defamatory

communications, and the privilege applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

See O’Callaghan,

. Regarding whether the surveillance was

pertinent to pending or proposed litigation, it is undisputed that the surveillance commenced after

Stacy informed Dru in August 2013 that she wanted a divorce. Vogt testified that, in August 2013,

he hired a private investigator to investigate Stacy and look out for the safety of Dru and his

children. After about a week or two of surveillance, Vogt discovered that Stacy was constantly

with another man. Vogt testified that, at that point, the purpose of the surveillance became related

to adultery and cohabitation. Purdy’s September 2013 e-mail also indicated that the surveillance

was related to divorce proceedings. It is well settled that Illinois courts regularly review evidence

from private investigators in cohabitation cases (Goodman II,

(citing cases)), and adultery may be proven when there is conjugal cohabitation before a

dissolution of marriage. Accordingly, the surveillance was clearly in the course of, and in

furtherance of, anticipated and pending divorce proceedings. As the surveillance was pertinent to

the divorce litigation, the privilege applies.

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¶ 28 Stacy makes several arguments as to why application of the absolute litigation privilege is

improper. Stacy argues that the surveillance was not pertinent to the divorce litigation because the

surveillance commenced two months before she filed her petition for dissolution. This argument

is unavailing as the privilege applies to conduct before, during, and after litigation. Bedin,

.

¶ 29 At oral argument, Stacy asserted that the privilege was not applicable because Dru

originally hired the investigator, controlled the surveillance, and testified that until June 2016 the

purpose of the surveillance was not about proving cohabitation. This argument is unpersuasive.

The record shows that Vogt initiated the surveillance and that Dru did not find out about it until

December 2013 or January 2014. Further, it is improper to cherry-pick favorable evidence while

ignoring other relevant evidence. While Dru testified that the surveillance was not about

cohabitation until 2016, Vogt, who initiated the surveillance, testified that, within a couple of

weeks, the purpose of the surveillance was to prove adultery and cohabitation. Purdy’s September

2013 e-mail supported Vogt’s testimony, and the record shows that as of January 2014, the

surveillance reports were being sent to Dru’s divorce attorneys. Merely because Dru first became

aware of the legal term “cohabitation” in June 2016 does not overcome the other evidence that

clearly establishes that the surveillance was pertinent to the divorce litigation. Moreover, even if

Dru did not originally intend to use the surveillance evidence to prove cohabitation, this would not

establish that it did not pertain to the anticipated divorce proceedings. The privilege applies “ ‘even

where the [conduct] is not confined to specific issues related to the litigation.’ ”

(quoting

Malevitis v. Friedman,

(2001)).

¶ 30 Next, Stacy argues that the surveillance between September 2013 and June 2016 did not

pertain to the divorce litigation because none of that surveillance was ever presented in the divorce

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proceedings to prove cohabitation. Further, Stacy notes that, in Goodman I, the trial court found

that the surveillance between 2013 and 2016 was “ ‘an obsessive pattern of surveillance of his wife

that was precipitated, not by the trying [sic] to draw a legal conclusion as to whether she was

cohabitating, but initially to show that she was having an affair’ ” and that the surveillance was

“ ‘not necessary to accomplish a purpose.’ ” Goodman I,

, ¶ 160. We

affirmed, holding that the trial court’s determination that the surveillance did not serve a reasonable

purpose under the circumstances was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 169.

¶ 31 This argument is also unpersuasive because it is well settled that the absolute litigation

privilege applies regardless of Dru’s motives and whether his conduct was reasonable. Bedin,

. Further, the surveillance evidence did not have to be used at trial to be

pertinent to the litigation. Rather, the surveillance at issue only needed to bear some relation to the

litigation.

While the surveillance evidence was not ultimately used in the divorce proceedings

to show cohabitation, it could have been so used or it could have been used for impeachment

purposes had Stacy testified inconsistently with the surveillance. Dru and his attorneys could not

have known whether the surveillance would result in useful evidence until after surveillance was

conducted and the divorce proceedings were further advanced. For example, while cohabitation

would be relevant to periodic maintenance, it would not have been relevant had Stacy requested

maintenance in gross. Accordingly, we hold that the surveillance did bear some relation to the

divorce proceedings and that the absolute litigation privilege barred Stacy’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

¶ 32 Stacy’s next contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding that there was no

implied private right of action under the Act and in granting Dru’s section 2-615 motion to dismiss

counts III, IV, and V of her amended complaint. “The standard that must be met for a court to

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imply a private right of action in a statute is quite high.” Channon v. Westward Management, Inc.,

. The implication of a private right of action is appropriate only if (1) the

plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted, (2) providing a private

right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act, (3) the plaintiff’s injury is one

the Act was designed to prevent, and (4) providing a private right of action is necessary to provide

an adequate remedy for violations of the Act. Sawyer Realty Group, Inc. v. Jarvis Corp.,

(1982). As counts III, IV, and V were dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code,

our review is de novo. Luise, Inc. v. Village of Skokie,

(2002). Moreover,

whether a statute creates an implied private right of action is an issue of statutory interpretation

and, thus, presents a question of law that we review de novo. Metzger v. DaRosa,

(2004). In construing a statute, our principal objective is to ascertain and effectuate the

underlying legislative intent. The best way to accomplish that goal is to apply the plain language

of the statute.

.

¶ 33 In the present case, there is no dispute that Stacy was a member of the class for whose

benefit the statute was enacted and that her injury was of the type that the Act was designed to

prevent. Further, a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act. As

stated in the Act, two of the underlying purposes are as follows:

“(3) Recognize that the legal system has ineffectively dealt with family violence in

the past, allowing abusers to escape effective prosecution or financial liability, and has not

adequately acknowledged the criminal nature of domestic violence; ***

***

(6) Expand the civil and criminal remedies for victims of domestic violence; ***.”

750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2018).

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¶ 34 Nonetheless, consideration of the fourth factor does not support the implication of a private

cause of action in this case. “[O]ur supreme court has found an implied private right of action

under a statute only in cases where the statute would be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless

such an action were implied.” Davis v. Kewanee Hospital,

(citing

Fisher v. Lexington Health Care, Inc.,

(1999)); see also Metzger,

(adequacy of a statute’s enforcement scheme does not turn on the claimed right to

compensation for injuries but instead focuses on whether “adequate remedies are provided to make

compliance with the [statute] likely”). Here, the Act provides many remedies in section 214 of the

Act. Section 214(b) of the Act provides that the “remedies listed in this subsection shall be in

addition to other civil or criminal remedies available to petitioner.” 750 ILCS 60/214(b) (West

2018). Possible remedies include prohibition of abuse, stay-away orders, orders to appear in court,

orders to pay for losses, and injunctive relief.

An order for payment of losses includes, “but [is

not] limited to, medical expenses, lost earnings or other support, repair or replacement of property

damaged or taken, reasonable attorney’s fees, courts costs and moving or other travel expenses.”

§ 214(b)(13). Further, violation of an order of protection can be punished as a criminal offense

or enforced through contempt procedures, and penalties may include incarceration, payment of

restitution, a fine, payment of attorney fees and costs, or community service. Id. § 223. Because

the Act provides for issuing orders of protection and the remedies for violations of an order of

protection, it is effective on its own. Therefore, an implied private right of action is not necessary

to achieve the Act’s purposes. See Kagan v. Waldheim Cemetery Co.,

(no implied private right of action where statute was “replete with sanctions and remedies for

violations of its provisions”).

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¶ 35 Moreover, the Act’s plain language indicates that the legislature did not intend to imply a

private right of action. Section 214 states that the remedies provided were in addition to other civil

or criminal remedies available to Stacy. This plain language indicates the legislature’s awareness

that remedies were available through other causes of action not associated with the Act. Here,

Stacy had civil remedies available under common law, such as her claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress. See Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos,

(1999) (no implied

private right of action under the Lead Poisoning Prevention Act (410 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West

1996)) since, in addition to several remedies provided by the Act, the common law provided an

adequate remedy in the form of a negligence action). Stacy argues that implying a private right of

action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy because the absolute litigation privilege bars

her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Merely because Dru has a successful

affirmative defense to Stacy’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is not a

sufficient basis to find that the legislature intended to imply a private right of action. 1541 North

Bosworth Condominium Ass’n v. Hanna Architects, Inc.,

(“the

most recent decisions of our supreme court [related to an implied private right of action] have

made it clear that the focus should be on whether an implied right of action is necessary to enforce

the provisions of the statute, not on whether a particular plaintiff could recover from a particular

defendant” (emphasis omitted)).

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 38 Affirmed.

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Goodman v. Goodman,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 18-L-355; the Hon. Mitchell L. Hoffman and the Hon. David P. Brodsky, Judges, presiding.

Attorneys Daniel F. Konicek, Amanda J. Hamilton, and Peter L. LeGrand, for of Konicek & Dillon, P.C., of Geneva, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Neil M. Rosenbaum and Damon E. Dunn, of Funkhouser for Vegosen Liebman & Dunn Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee. Appellee:

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