People v. Yankaway

; see Willis,

. We emphasized that a

prejudice finding would be wholly speculative, finding, “We cannot presume the State would not

have prosecuted defendant within the required time. We simply do not know what would have

happened had defense counsel filed a proper intrastate detainers motion.” Willis,

; see Jackson,

- 12 - ¶ 41 A notable factual difference exists between those cases and the one at issue. In

Jackson, we observed, “The State’s brief indicates defendant’s trial was not delayed because of

case backlog.” Jackson,

. We found the State chose not to try the

defendants within 160 days “because [the State] knew defense counsel erroneously cited section

103-5 of the Code, rather than [the Intrastate Detainers Statute], and did not fulfill the terms of

the latter section in requesting a speedy trial.” Jackson,

. We denounced

the State’s decision as “an inappropriate reliance on the procedural requirements of [the

Intrastate Detainers Statute], particularly when the information that would have been contained

in a proper demand was already known to the prosecutor.” Jackson,

Here, neither the record nor the briefs suggest the State inappropriately exploited defense

counsel’s mistaken belief regarding the applicable speedy trial time frame. Instead, the record

suggests the State, defense counsel, and the trial court all operated under similar

misunderstandings regarding the speedy trial time frame during the hearing on June 30, 2022.

¶ 42 Nevertheless, we reach the same conclusion here as we did in Jackson and Willis.

Defendant was incarcerated for the duration of the proceedings below. Defense counsel’s

performance fell below a reasonably competent standard because he should have known the

Intrastate Detainers Statute governed defendant’s speedy trial right. See Jackson,

235 Ill. App. 3d at 738

; Willis,

235 Ill. App. 3d at 1067

. However, the record does not support the conclusion

that if defense counsel filed a speedy trial demand under the proper statute, defendant would not

have been brought to trial within 160 days. See Jackson,

; Willis,

. We simply do not know what would have happened if defense counsel filed a

proper intrastate detainers motion earlier in the process. Jackson,

; Willis,

. Therefore, defendant cannot satisfy Strickland’s second prong by

- 13 - showing a reasonable probability exists the proceeding’s result would have been different but for

counsel’s error in preparing defendant’s speedy trial demand. Jackson,

;

Willis,

327 Ill. App. 3d 685, 693

. Accordingly, defendant’s ineffective assistance argument fails.

See Simpson,

2015 IL 116512, ¶ 35

¶ 43 B. Defendant’s Convictions for Attempted First Degree Murder and Aggravated x

Battery Violated the One-Act, One-Crime Rule

¶ 44 Next, defendant argues we must vacate his aggravated battery conviction for

violating the one-act, one crime rule. While defendant forfeited this issue by not raising it during

the proceedings below or including it in a posttrial motion, he contends it constitutes

second-prong plain error.

¶ 45 The plain error doctrine permits us to review unpreserved error in two instances:

“(1) where a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely

balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the

defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error and (2) where a clear or

obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of

the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless

of the closeness of the evidence.” People v. Belknap,

2014 IL 117094, ¶ 48

23 N.E.3d 325

“Under the second prong of plain-error review, prejudice to the defendant is presumed because

of the importance of the right involved, regardless of the strength of the evidence.” (Emphasis in

original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Thompson,

238 Ill. 2d 598, 613

939 N.E.2d 403, 413

(2010). “[O]ne-act, one crime violations fall within the second prong of the

- 14 - plain error doctrine as an obvious error so serious that it challenges the integrity of the judicial

process.” People v. Coats,

2018 IL 121926, ¶ 10

104 N.E.3d 1102

¶ 46 “[A] criminal defendant may not be convicted of multiple offenses when those

offenses are all based on precisely the same physical act.” Coats,

2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11

. When

conducting a one-act, one-crime analysis, we first “ascertain[ ] whether the defendant’s conduct

consists of a single physical act or separate acts.” Coats,

2018 IL 121926

, ¶ 12. An act is “any

overt or outward manifestation which will support a different offense.” People v. King,

66 Ill. 2d 551, 566

363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45

(1977). If the defendant committed multiple acts, we must

then “determine[ ] whether any of the offenses are lesser-included offenses. [Citation.] If none of

the offenses are lesser-included offenses, then multiple convictions are proper.” Coats,

2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12

. We review de novo whether a one-act, one-crime violation occurred. Coats,

2018 IL 121926, ¶ 12

¶ 47 1. The State Did Not Apportion the Offenses Among the Different Gunshots

¶ 48 Defendant argues his attempted first degree murder and aggravated battery

convictions were based on the same act, and he claims the State did not apportion the offenses

into separate conduct. Relying on People v. Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d 335

788 N.E.2d 1117

(2001),

defendant contends we should not distinguish between the various gunshots because the State did

not make that distinction in the charging documents or at trial.

¶ 49 In Crespo, the defendant stabbed the victim three times, but the State did not

differentiate between the different stab wounds when charging the defendant with armed

violence and two counts of aggravated battery. Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 342-43

. Rather than

apportioning the offenses among the three stab wounds, the indictment treated the stabbings as a

single infliction of bodily harm and “charge[d] [the] defendant with the same conduct under

- 15 - different theories of criminal culpability.” Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 342

. After reviewing the

indictment and the State’s closing argument to the jury, our supreme court determined “the

State’s theory at trial *** amply supports the conclusion that the intent of the prosecution was to

portray [the] defendant’s conduct as a single attack.” Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 343-44

. The court

found the defendant’s convictions for armed violence and aggravated battery with a deadly

weapon violated the one-act, one-crime doctrine, and it vacated his conviction for aggravated

battery with a deadly weapon. Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 344-46

¶ 50 In People v. Beltran,

765 N.E.2d 1071, 1078

(2002),

the Second District applied Crespo to an incident involving multiple shooters, after which the

defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm.

The Second District summarized Crespo’s finding thusly: “[A]lthough the multiple stabbings

could have supported the separate convictions, the State did not apportion the crimes among the

various wounds, either in the indictment or at trial. Because the State portrayed the defendant’s

conduct as a single attack, multiple convictions were untenable.” Beltran,

. The Second District found Crespo controlled because, while the defendant and his

accomplice fired multiple shots at multiple victims, the State “did not specify which shot

supported which charge” in the indictment or at trial. Beltran,

. The

Second District concluded, “Thus, against each victim, defendant committed a single act that

supported only a single conviction,” and it vacated the defendant’s aggravated discharge of a

firearm convictions. Beltran,

¶ 51 We find Crespo controls. While defendant and his accomplice fired multiple

gunshots, which would have supported the different charges if distinguished in the charging

documents or at trial (see Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 342, 345

; Beltran,

), the

- 16 - State failed to apportion the offenses to the various gunshots fired, “and it is improper for this

court to do so now on appeal.” Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 345

. On appeal, the State argues the

shooting consisted of multiple acts because the jury was instructed on defendant’s accountability

for his accomplice’s actions. However, the State fails to distinguish Crespo and Beltran, which

require us to look to the proceedings below to identify how the State treated the conduct at issue.

See Crespo,

203 Ill. 2d at 345

(“[T]he indictment must indicate that the State intended to treat

the conduct of defendant as multiple acts in order for multiple convictions to be sustained.”);

Beltran,

327 Ill. App. 3d at 692-93

(“Because the State portrayed the defendant’s conduct as a single

attack, multiple convictions were untenable.”). Beltran also dealt with a shooting involving a

defendant and an accomplice, finding the defendant’s accountability for his accomplice’s actions

did not prevent his convictions from violating the one-act, one-crime rule. See Beltran,

. We agree with Beltran and reach the same conclusion.

¶ 52 During the proceedings below, the State treated the shooting as a single act of

bodily harm, as it did not apportion the charged offenses to the gunshots fired or the multiple

injuries inflicted. See Beltran,

. Accordingly, defendant’s conduct

constituted a single act, which cannot sustain multiple convictions. See Coats,

2018 IL 121926, ¶ 11

. We vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for aggravated battery, as attempted first

degree murder is the more serious offense. See Beltran,