Opinion filed April 19, 2024 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2024

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, ) Will County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-23-0113 v. ) Circuit No. 20-CF-348 ) DOMINIQUE D. TRAVIS, ) Honorable ) Daniel D. Rippy, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Dominique D. Travis, appeals his convictions for being an armed habitual

criminal (AHC) and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF), arguing (1) the State did not

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed an actual firearm, (2) the statutes criminalizing

the possession of weapons by felons are unconstitutional both facially and as applied to defendant,

and (3) defendant’s convictions violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine. We vacate defendant’s

two UUWF convictions and otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 Defendant was charged with AHC (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)(2) (West 2020)) and two counts

of UUWF (id. § 24-1.1(a)). The case proceeded to a bench trial on April 21, 2021. At trial,

Detective Jeffrey German testified that on October 22, 2019, defendant and defendant’s cousin,

Dameonta Terry-Travis, created three videos using Dameonta’s cell phone showing both of them

holding handguns while sitting in a car with a third person. German located the videos after

performing a parole check on Dameonta on January 31, 2020. A subsequent search of Dameonta’s

residence revealed two firearms: a Springfield semiautomatic handgun and a Taurus PT111 9-

millimeter semiautomatic handgun, along with ammunition. The State introduced the Taurus 9-

millimeter into evidence.

¶4 The parties stipulated to the authenticity and admissibility of the videos, and German

testified he believed the firearms depicted in the videos were real firearms similar to the firearms

recovered from Dameonta’s residence. German testified to his familiarity with firearms, having

worked on cases involving firearms “[20], 30 times or more every year for the last 18 [years].” He

testified to his familiarity with Taurus handguns and described the specific features and markings

that led him to believe defendant was holding a Taurus PT111 9-millimeter handgun. German was

unable to identify the serial number of the firearm held by defendant in the videos, but he testified

Dameonta was holding one of the firearms recovered from his residence. The parties also stipulated

defendant had been convicted of two prior qualifying felonies.

¶5 Defendant waived his right to testify, and the trial court found him guilty on all counts. In

ruling, the court noted it was familiar with firearms and in fact had previously owned the same

model of firearm brandished by defendant in the video. The court stated, “[I]f this is a replica, I

would be shocked because of the markings on it, the mechanical aspects of the firearm.” The court

further stated its ruling was not based on whether the firearms recovered from Dameonta’s

2 residence were the same firearms depicted in the video and that the video evidence was sufficient

to determine defendant’s guilt.

¶6 Defendant filed a posttrial motion, challenging the sufficiency of the State’s evidence,

which the court denied. At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the State introduced a presentence

investigation report (PSI), which revealed defendant had twice been convicted of unlawful

possession of a weapon by a felon and aggravated battery. The trial court sentenced defendant to

three concurrent eight-year prison terms, and this appeal followed.

¶7 II. ANALYSIS

¶8 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict where the State’s

evidence failed to establish defendant possessed an actual firearm, (2) the statutes under which

defendant was convicted are unconstitutional, and (3) defendant’s convictions violated the one-

act, one-crime doctrine. We address each argument in turn.

¶9 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 10 First, defendant contends the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

possessed an actual firearm and not a replica or a BB gun. When reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence, the relevant inquiry is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins,

(1985)

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

(1979)). It is not our function to retry defendant,

nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. McLaurin,

. “[I]n weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences

which flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations

consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.” People v. Jackson, 232

, 281 (2009). We will reverse only if “the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or

unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Newton,

, ¶ 24.

¶ 11 To convict defendant of AHC, the State had to prove defendant (1) possessed a firearm,

and (2) was convicted of two or more qualifying offenses. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020).

Defendant contends only that the State failed to prove he possessed an actual firearm.

¶ 12 Section 2-7.5 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (id. § 2-7.5) has adopted the definition of

“firearm” found in section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (Act) (430 ILCS

65/1.1 (West 2020)), which states, “ ‘Firearm’ means any device, by whatever name known, which

is designed to expel a projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, [or] expansion of gas

***.” This provision specifically excludes, among other items, pneumatic guns, spring guns, paint

ball guns, BB guns, signaling devices, and antique firearms. Id.

¶ 13 A trier of fact may make reasonable inferences from the established facts of the case

(People v. Patterson,

) and may also rely on common sense and

general knowledge in drawing inferences from the facts (People v. Toliver,

(1978)). The State need not introduce into evidence the physical firearm for the trier of fact to

find the defendant possessed one. People v. Jackson,

. “[C]ourts

have consistently held that eyewitness testimony that the offender possessed a firearm, combined

with circumstances under which the witness was able to view the weapon, is sufficient to allow a

reasonable inference that the weapon was actually a firearm.”

In the absence of eyewitness

testimony, video evidence of a defendant with a handgun has been enough to prove the defendant

possessed a firearm. People v. Collins,

.

4 ¶ 14 Here, the unrebutted evidence established defendant’s possession of a firearm. The videos

introduced by the State were sufficiently clear to allow German to identify both defendant and the

specific model of the firearm possessed by defendant. German testified to his familiarity with

firearms in general and with the particular firearm possessed by defendant in the videos. This

evidence, taken with the fact that similar firearms were found in Dameonta’s residence, allowed

the circuit court to draw the reasonable inference that defendant possessed a real firearm as defined

by the Act. See McLaurin,

(a trained and experienced officer with an

unobstructed view provided sufficient evidence to establish defendant was armed with a firearm).

The circuit court’s own knowledge and experience further supported the reasonable inference that

defendant possessed an actual firearm and not a replica or BB gun. See Toliver,

.

¶ 15 B. Constitutionality of AHC and UUWF Statutes

¶ 16 Next, defendant raises, for the first time on appeal, a constitutional challenge to the AHC

and UUWF statutes. Defendant argues these statutes improperly burden the right to keep and bear

arms as guaranteed by the second amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,

amend. II) and article I, section 22, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22), both

facially and as applied to him.

¶ 17 At the outset, the State requests we deem defendant’s as-applied challenge forfeited

because defendant failed to raise the issue in the circuit court. In general, defendants must raise as-

applied constitutional challenges in the circuit court before they may be considered on appeal.

People v. Thompson,

. Defendant concedes he did not raise the issue

previously but argues the record is sufficiently developed for us to review his claim, and upon

review of the record, we agree. See People v. Holman,

, overruled on

5 other grounds by People v. Wilson,

(finding where all relevant facts and

circumstances are contained in the record, a claim may be raised and reviewed on appeal).

¶ 18 The record contains defendant’s criminal history, and the parties do not dispute its

accuracy. The State contends the record does not detail whether defendant possessed a firearm

while committing prior violent felonies nor for what purpose he possessed a firearm in the instant

case. It is unclear how this information would aid us in determining whether the felon

dispossession statutes have been constitutionally applied to defendant. The challenged statutes do

not contain exceptions for self-defense or for any other conduct. We may therefore consider

defendant’s as-applied challenge under the second amendment. See People v. Brooks,

.

¶ 19 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional. People v. Wells,

.

“The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting this

presumption and clearly establishing a constitutional violation.” People v. Funches,

(2004). Courts are obligated to construe statutes in a manner that upholds the statute’s

validity and constitutionality, if reasonably possible.

We review the constitutionality of a statute

de novo. Wells,

.

¶ 20 1. United States Constitution

¶ 21 Defendant contends the AHC and UUWF statutes are facially unconstitutional because

they amount to a “permanent, status-based revocation of the right to keep and bear arms.”

Defendant additionally contends that, even if the statutes are not facially unconstitutional, they are

unconstitutional as applied to him because the predicate offenses used to establish defendant’s

violations were nonviolent offenses and defendant was not acting violently or otherwise violating

the law at the time of the instant offenses.

6 ¶ 22 a. Facial Challenge

¶ 23 The second amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “A well regulated

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. In 2022, the United States Supreme Court

clarified the standard by which laws affecting the right to bear arms under the second amendment

are to be reviewed. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc., v. Bruen,

(2022).

Bruen analyzed a New York law requiring residents to demonstrate “proper cause” when seeking

a license to carry a loaded pistol and found the regulation failed to pass constitutional muster.

. In reaching its conclusion, the Court determined that means-end scrutiny was not the

appropriate lens through which to analyze such regulations (id. at 19) and announced a two-part

analysis focused exclusively on history and tradition:

“When the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the

Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify

its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical

tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual’s

conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s ‘unqualified command.’ ”

at 24

(quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,

, 50 n.10 (1961)).

¶ 24 Stated another way, to find the statute constitutional, the two-part process requires us to

determine (1) whether defendant’s conduct falls within the plain text of the second amendment

and, if so, (2) whether there is a justification for the regulation rooted in history and tradition. To

meet the second prong, we must look to “ ‘historical precedent’ from before, during, and even after

the founding [that] evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.”

at 27 (quoting District of

Columbia v. Heller,

(2008)). When the second amendment’s historically fixed

7 meaning is applied to new circumstances, courts must conduct a historical inquiry that involves

reasoning by analogy. Id. at 28. Determining whether historical regulations are properly analogous

to a modern firearm regulation requires courts to decide whether the two regulations are “relevantly

similar.” Id. at 29. Relevant similarities include, among other things, “how and why the regulations

burden a law-abiding citizen’s right to armed self-defense.” Id. The Court emphasized that

“ ‘individual self-defense is “the central component” of the Second Amendment right.’ ”

(Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago,

(2010),

quoting Heller,

).

¶ 25 Applying Bruen’s framework, we must first determine whether the second amendment’s

plain text covers defendant’s conduct. Id. at 24. The second amendment states “the right of the

people to keep and bear Arms[ ] shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const., amend. II. The State urges

us to find defendant is not a member of “the people” to whom the second amendment applies

because of his status as a felon. However, the Supreme Court in Heller defined “the people” as

“all Americans,” and we see no reason to depart from that definition. Heller,

. The

“plain text” of the second amendment contains no caveats exempting felons, and we decline to

read additional language into this straightforward first step. See United States v. Collette,

, 844 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (“***Bruen’s first step asks a strictly textual question with

only one answer: the Second Amendment’s plain text covers possession of a firearm.”).

¶ 26 In reaching this conclusion, we note different panels of this court have disagreed about

whether felons fall within the amendment’s scope. For instance, in People v. Baker,

, one panel of the First District concluded non-law-abiding citizens are not part

of “the people” to whom the second amendment applies. But in Brooks,

, a different panel found as we have that the second amendment’s plain language does not

8 exclude felons. While we acknowledge both courts ultimately concluded Bruen does not prohibit

the disarmament of felons, we adopt the reasoning set forth in Brooks.

¶ 27 Accordingly, we turn to Bruen’s second step. Here, we must consider whether the AHC

and UUWF statutes are rooted in this nation’s history and tradition of firearms regulation. We

begin by noting that the right to bear arms has never been unlimited. As the Supreme Court pointed

out in Heller:

“From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts

routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon

whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. [Citations.] For

example, the majority of the19th-century courts to consider the question held that

prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second

Amendment or state analogues.” Heller,

.

Indeed, “[t]hroughout modern Anglo-American history, the right to keep and bear arms in public

has traditionally been subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could

carry arms, the manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry

arms.” Bruen,

.

¶ 28 The Supreme Court has observed that the prohibition on felons possessing firearms is both

“longstanding” and consistent with historical tradition. Heller,

. Yet, as

defendant points out, felon dispossession statutes are a product of the twentieth century—felons

were not broadly prohibited from possessing firearms federally until 1961. Collette, 630 F. Supp.

3d at 845. In Illinois, the first criminal statute temporarily prohibiting felons from possessing

firearms was passed in 1967. Brooks,

.

9 ¶ 29 However, such laws evolved from preexisting prohibitions restricting access to firearms.

The most directly relevant federal precursor to modern statutes disarming felons was the Federal

Firearms Act of 1938, which was designed to address an unprecedented societal concern: an

“ ‘increase in organized crime and gangster violence.’ ” United States v. Banuelos,

, 723 (W.D. Tex. 2022) (quoting Conrad Kahn, Challenging the Federal Prohibition on

Gun Possession by Nonviolent Felons,

, 115-16 (2013)). More broadly,

“[h]istory shows that the right to keep and bear arms was subject to restrictions that included

prohibitions on possession by certain groups of people.” United States v. Jackson,

(8th Cir. 2023).

¶ 30 The government has historically promoted public safety by protecting society from persons

it deems to be dangerous. Gun safety regulations were “commonplace in the colonies, and around

the time of the founding, a variety of gun safety regulations were on the books” including “laws

disarming certain groups and restricting sales to certain groups.” National Rifle Ass’n of America,

Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,

(5th Cir. 2012),

abrogated on other grounds by Bruen,

. So-called “going armed” laws prohibited

persons from “bearing arms in a way that spreads ‘fear’ or ‘terror’ among the people.” Bruen,

. Other ratification-era laws disarmed people feared to be disloyal to the government.

Kanter v. Barr,

(7th Cir. 2019) (Barrett, J., dissenting), abrogated on other

grounds by Bruen,

. Such individuals included British loyalists whom authorities

believed could not be trusted to remain loyal to the newly founded American government. See

United States v. Washington, No. 23-cr-00274,

, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2023).

¶ 31 The concept of disarming criminals dates at least to Pennsylvania’s ratifying convention,

at which it was proposed that the right to bear arms be guaranteed “ ‘unless for crimes committed,

10 or real danger of public injury from individuals.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Kanter,

(Barrett, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History

675 (1971)). Other colonies adopted the concept of attainder, a status applied to the “disaffected”

and “delinquents,” which resulted in the forfeiture of property and loss of civil rights, including

disarmament. United States v. Coombes,

, 1157 (N.D. Okla. 2022). “In

colonial America, legislatures continued to disarm individuals whose status indicated that they

could not be trusted to obey the law.” Brooks,

.

¶ 32 Reasoning by analogy, as Bruen instructs, we find these regulations provide a “historical

analogue” to the AHC and UUWF statutes. (Emphasis omitted.) Bruen,

. At this

second step of Bruen’s analysis, it is also highly relevant that the proposed legislation has almost

no effect on a “ ‘law-abiding, responsible’ ” citizen’s right to armed self-defense, which the second

amendment “ ‘elevates above all other interests.’ ”

at 26 (quoting Heller,

);

Banuelos, 640 F. Supp. 3d at 722-23 (observing the question of how a defendant’s “prior felony

might impact his Second Amendment right to possess a firearm is more properly addressed under

step two’s historical tradition analysis”).

¶ 33 In sum, we conclude there is a history and tradition dating back to the founding era of

identifying dangerous individuals and disarming them. See Jackson,

. Our holding

is consistent with Bruen’s discussion of state-administered firearms licensing regimes, which

“often require applicants to undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety course, [and]

are designed to ensure only that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding,

responsible citizens.’ ” Bruen,

n.9 (quoting Heller,

). The AHC and

UUWF statutes are consistent with this nation’s history of preventing potentially dangerous

individuals from exercising the right to bear arms, and their effects on law-abiding citizens’ right

11 to self-defense are minimal. Id. at 29; see People v. Mobley,

(observing individuals convicted of multiple felonies, including violent felonies, are

incontrovertibly not “law-abiding citizens”). Therefore, the statutes at issue, here, are facially

constitutional.

¶ 34 b. As-Applied Challenge

¶ 35 The distinction between an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge “goes to the breadth

of the remedy employed by the Court.” Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n,

(2010). An as-applied challenge requires a showing that the statute violates the

constitution as it applies to defendant’s particular facts and circumstances, whereas a facial

challenge requires a showing that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts. Thompson,

. Defendant argues (1) his actions in possessing a firearm were presumptively

lawful because he was not acting violently at the time of his offense and (2) the qualifying offenses

used to convict defendant of AHC were also “non-violent, possessory offenses.”

¶ 36 Defendant presents no coherent argument as to why his nonviolence at the time of the

offense should affect whether the State can disarm him for being a felon, nor can we find any.

According to the AHC statute and the UUWF statute, the relevant unlawful conduct consists of

(1) having prior felony convictions and (2) possessing a firearm. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a), 24-

1.7(a) (West 2020). Neither statute distinguishes between violent and nonviolent conduct at the

time of the offense. Moreover, the State is free under the UUWF statute to use any of defendant’s

prior felonies to sustain defendant’s convictions, and defendant’s PSI reveals he has been

convicted of at least two violent felonies, namely two separate aggravated batteries. Defendant is,

therefore, precisely the type of person the government has historically and traditionally sought to

disarm. See Kanter,

(Barrett, J., dissenting).

12 ¶ 37 Even if defendant had been convicted of only nonviolent felonies, we would reject

defendant’s invitation to second-guess the legislature’s determination of which crimes merit felony

status and, consequently, disarmament. See Atkinson v. Garland,

(7th Cir.

2023) (Wood, J., dissenting). Under the AHC and UUWF statutes, both of which are facially

constitutional, defendant is prohibited from possessing a firearm due to his status as a felon,

irrespective of the violent or nonviolent nature of his convictions. We decline to invade the

province of the legislature to determine which convictions warrant a loss of rights. As Justice

Wood observed,

“The Judiciary cannot be in the position of looking at prior offenses identified by

Congress and second-guessing Congress’s decisions both with respect to

criminalization and to sentencing exposure. *** Such a system would impose

impossible burdens on courts and prosecutors and would lead to an arbitrary

patchwork of decisions—as far from the rule of law as one could imagine.”

Thus, we find that the statutes are also constitutional as applied to defendant.

¶ 38 2. Illinois Constitution

¶ 39 Defendant next claims the AHC and UUWF statutes violate article I, section 22, of the

Illinois Constitution facially and as applied to him. Defendant argues the Illinois Constitution

provides greater protection than the second amendment.

¶ 40 Article I, section 22, provides: “Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual

citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22. There are two

important differences between this portion of the Illinois Constitution and the federal constitution.

First, it replaces the prefatory language concerning the necessity of a well-regulated militia with

the words “ ‘[s]ubject only to the police power.’ ” Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove,

2d 483, 491 (1984) (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22). Second, it replaces “the people” with

“ ‘the individual citizen.’ ” Id. (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. § 22). In Kalodimos, our supreme

court held the inclusion of the phrase “the individual citizen” was intended to “broaden the scope

of the right to arms from a collective one applicable only to weapons traditionally used by a

regulated militia [citation] to an individual right covering a wider variety of arms.” Id.

¶ 41 In contrast, the inclusion of the words “ ‘[s]ubject only to the police power’ ” was intended

“as a limitation on the liberty the provision affords.” Id. The police power was intended to provide

an “ ‘extraordinary degree of control’ ” over the possession and use of arms due to the

“ ‘extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of society’ ” posed by such weapons. Id. at

491-92 (quoting 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 88 (report of

the committee on the bill of rights)). The court found “that the police power comprehends laws

‘restraining or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the people.’ ” Id. at 496 (quoting

People v. Warren,

(1957)).

¶ 42 As discussed above, we reject the State’s request to hold that defendant is not a member of

“the people” for the purpose of applying the second amendment. Supra ¶ 26. We similarly reject

the State’s contention that article I, section 22, does not apply to defendant. However, having found

felons are not excluded from either constitutional clause, we cannot ignore our supreme court’s

observation that the inclusion of the prefatory clause “[s]ubject only to the police power” was

intended to grant the government an “extraordinary degree of control” over the use of firearms.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kalodimos, 103 Ill. 2d at 491-92. While it is well established

that a state may impose greater protections under its state constitution and may not reduce its

protections below the minimum required by the federal constitution (see, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420

, 719 (1975)), defendant presents no compelling argument that Illinois has elected to

impose greater protections, nor does our independent review find this to be the case.

¶ 43 In support of his as-applied challenge, defendant contends the framers of the Illinois

Constitution were more concerned with violence than with felon status. Even if we accept

defendant’s argument, it fails because, as noted above, he has been convicted of violent acts. Supra

¶ 36. We find the AHC and UUWF statutes are a proper exercise of the state’s police power, which

allows the state to exert, through legislation, control over the dangers posed by firearms and the

people who might use them to do harm. See People v. Boyce,

.

Accordingly, defendant has failed to demonstrate the challenged statutes violate the Illinois

Constitution either facially or as applied to him.

¶ 44 C. One-Act, One-Crime Violation

¶ 45 Finally, defendant asserts his UUWF convictions violate the one-act, one-crime doctrine.

The State notes defendant forfeited the error but nevertheless concedes plain error. See People v.

Coats,

(one-act, one-crime violations are reviewable under the second-prong

of the plain-error doctrine). We accept the State’s concession.

¶ 46 The one-act, one-crime doctrine prohibits multiple convictions based on a single physical

act or acts. People v. West,

. When two or more convictions are

based on a single act, the sentence imposed for the less serious offense should be vacated.

To

determine which offense is more serious, courts generally compare the relative punishments

prescribed by the legislature. People v. Artis,

(2009).

¶ 47 Here, defendant’s act of possessing a firearm resulted in three convictions—AHC and two

counts of UUWF. As the State concedes, the three convictions stem from a single physical act,

defendant’s possessing a firearm. AHC is a Class X felony (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2020)),

15 while the two convictions for UUWF are Class 2 felonies (id. § 24-1.1(e)). Defendant’s conviction

for AHC is therefore the most serious offense. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s two UUWF

convictions.

¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we vacate defendant’s two UUWF convictions and otherwise affirm

the judgment of the circuit court of Will County.

¶ 50 Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

16 People v. Travis,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Will County, No. 20-CF-348; the Hon. Daniel D. Rippy, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Santiago A. Durango, and Mark D. Fisher, of for State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Patrick Delfino, for Thomas D. Arado, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

17