FILED May 28, 2024 NO. 4-24-0321 Carla Bender 4 th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County RICHARD D. ROMINE, ) No. 23CF345 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Ryan M. Cadagin, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Steigmann and Lannerd concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Defendant Richard D. Romine appeals the trial court’s February 5, 2024, order

denying him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2022)), as amended by Public Act 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan.

1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff.

Jan. 1, 2023) (amending various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul,

(setting the Act’s effective date as September 18, 2023). Defendant argues that the court erred in

detaining him pending trial for killing his mother, Donna Romine, in April 2023 because the State

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was a danger to the community and that

no combination of release conditions could mitigate the danger. Because the court did not abuse

its discretion in finding the State had met its burden of proof, we affirm. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 The following allegations are taken from the common-law record and the transcript

of the February 5, 2024, detention hearing. Transcripts of the earlier proceedings are not included

in the record on appeal.

¶4 Defendant formerly owned a shooting range in Sangamon County, where he trained

more than 200 law enforcement officers on the use of firearms and the requirements of a

“concealed carry” permit. Before the events of this case, defendant had no criminal history other

than an arrest for a misdemeanor that was never charged. Defendant lived with Donna for almost

all his life; she reportedly suffered from bipolar disorder and had early signs of dementia.

¶5 According to defendant, Donna had a tendency to lash out, and on this occasion in

April 2023, Donna attempted to stab him. She grazed his arm, then attempted to stab him again, at

which point he drew a concealed firearm and shot her once in the head. Defendant’s friends later

said that he and Donna had been feuding because he believed she had stolen money from him.

After killing Donna, defendant left the scene.

¶6 On April 27, 2023, the police went to Donna’s house to check on her welfare after

receiving multiple calls from her friends saying that she had not been heard from recently and that

defendant might have been involved. It is unclear from the record how much time elapsed between

Donna’s death and the welfare check. No one answered the door at Donna’s house, so the police

called defendant, who told them that Donna was alive and well and that they should knock on a

particular window to get her attention. After the officers’ attempt was unsuccessful, they called

him again. He informed them that he could not drive to Donna’s house to let them in because he

was intoxicated, and he refused to accept assistance to get there. After he hung up, he tried to

destroy his phone.

-2- ¶7 The police looked in the window again and saw what appeared to be a human body

on the floor. They entered the house and discovered Donna with a pillow over her head and a single

gunshot wound. The police tracked defendant to an address in Springfield and pursued his vehicle

with their lights and sirens on, but defendant did not pull over until he reached the driveway of

another residence, running at least two red lights in the process. Defendant had a loaded AR-style

rifle within reach and was on the phone with an officer he had trained; the officer told him to

remove the magazine from the rifle and throw it out the car window, which defendant did. He then

tried to ingest a large number of pills, but the officers intervened. After defendant was arrested, he

told the police that his mother had likely been killed by someone named “John,” who defendant

suspected was trying to commit a burglary.

¶8 The State charged defendant with first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West

2022)), concealment of a homicidal death (id. § 9-3.4(a)), aggravated unlawful use of a weapon

(id. § 24-1.6(a)(1), (3)(A)), and aggravated fleeing and eluding a police officer (625 ILCS

5/11-204.1(a)(4) (West 2022)). The trial court set defendant’s bail at $2 million. Defendant could

not post the required $200,000 bail deposit, so he filed a motion to reduce his bail, which the court

denied. While defendant was detained, the Act took effect and abolished monetary bail in Illinois.

See Rowe,

.

¶9 In February 2024, defendant moved for reconsideration of his pretrial detention

under the Code; the State responded by filing a petition to deny him pretrial release on the grounds

of dangerousness and willful flight. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1.5), (8) (West 2022). The trial

court proceeded to a hearing on the petition, at which the State and defendant proffered evidence

of the above allegations, including photographs of the crime scene that are not contained in the

-3- record on appeal. The court denied defendant pretrial release and entered a written detention order

summarizing its findings.

¶ 10 This appeal followed.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 In ordering a defendant detained on dangerousness grounds, the trial court must

find that the State has met its burden of proving three elements by clear and convincing evidence:

(1) “the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed an offense,”

(2) “the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case,” and (3) “no condition or

combination of conditions *** can mitigate *** the real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community.”

§ 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). We review the trial court’s decisions

regarding pretrial release for an abuse of discretion. People v. Morgan,

, pet. for leave to appeal pending, No. 130626 (filed Apr. 19, 2024). “An abuse of discretion

occurs when the [trial] court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable or where no

reasonable person would agree with the position adopted by the [trial] court.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

¶ 13 Defendant briefly addresses the first element in his notice of appeal, stating:

“Defendant is asserting the affirmative defense of self-defense. A deadly weapon (knife) was

recovered which supports Defendant’s affirmative defense. The State cannot prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that Defendant committed

the offense of first-degree murder.” Under Illinois law, the use of deadly force in one’s defense is

governed by the following standard:

-4- “A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that

he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another

against such other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the

use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if

he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or

great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.”

720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2022).

See

§ 7-14 (“A defense of justifiable use of force *** is an affirmative defense.”). When this

affirmative defense is raised by the evidence at trial, the State must prove a lack of justification

beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction. See id. § 3-2.

¶ 14 This court has not yet addressed when, if ever, a defendant’s assertion of an

affirmative defense before trial can affect the State’s burden of proof on the first element at a

detention hearing. However, defendant makes no effort to address the statutory standard in his

notice of appeal or supporting memorandum, and that standard requires more than just evidence

that another person threatened to use unlawful force. See People v. Washington,

(“[T]o obtain a jury instruction on self-defense, a defendant must establish some evidence of

six factors ***.”). Rather, defendant focuses on his claim of self-defense as it pertains to the

elements of dangerousness and conditions of release, so we will do the same. See People v. Inman,

(declining to reach an undeveloped argument raised in a notice of

appeal).

¶ 15 Defendant argues that the State failed to establish his dangerousness because,

although he shot his mother, “[t]here is no evidence or even a theory that he poses a threat to any

other person or the community at large.” Defendant then cites People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st)

-5- 231753, ¶ 18, for the proposition that “bare allegations that [the] defendant has committed a violent

offense are not sufficient to establish th[e] element” “that no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate the threat posed by [the] defendant” (id. ¶ 17 (citing 725 ILCS

5/110-10(b) (West 2022)). In Stock, the State relied only upon “a conclusory statement” with “no

evidence to support that conclusion” and “at no point referenced or discussed *** conditions or

section 110-10(b) of the Code.”

The appellate court concluded that “[i]f the base allegations

that make up the sine qua non of a violent offense were sufficient on their own to establish this

element, then the legislature would have simply deemed those accused of violent offenses

ineligible for release.” Id. ¶ 18. We agree with Stock to the extent that it held a bare consideration

of the defendant’s dangerousness, with absolutely no consideration of possible conditions of

release, cannot justify pretrial detention under the Act’s three-element framework. People v.

Atterberry,

, ¶ 18 (“[T]he fact that a person is charged with a detainable

offense is not enough to order detention, nor is it enough that the defendant poses a threat to public

safety.”).

¶ 16 However, defendant appears to believe that a single violent offense can never

justify pretrial detention when “it was not the result of a pattern of abuse or criminal behavior.” In

making this argument, defendant is subtly attempting to extend the express holding of Stock, in

which the appellate court found no error in the trial court’s consideration of the dangerousness

element but reversed based on the trial court’s consideration of the third element: conditions of

release. See Stock,

(“Defendant’s behavior as alleged, at a

bare minimum, was dangerous, and such behavior poses a threat to those around him even if he

did not intend any harm.”). Of course, dangerousness and conditions of release are two sides of

the same coin; the nature and severity of the threat necessarily determine the nature and severity

-6- of the conditions that could—or could not—mitigate the threat. Compare 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)

(West 2022) (listing considerations for determining dangerousness) with

§ 110-5(a) (listing

similar considerations for determining conditions of release).

¶ 17 In this sense, defendant’s argument has at least some basis in Stock,

(“This is not to say that alleged facts stating the basic elements of an offense

are not relevant or are not part of the proof that no conditions could mitigate the threat posed by a

defendant. But more is required.”). Here again, we agree with the proposition that “more is

required” only to an extent; an untried indictment or other charging instrument triggers the State’s

right to file a verified petition to deny pretrial release but has a different purpose altogether; it

needs only to present the most bare and conclusory facts necessary to state an offense. The full

picture of the underlying events, however, may be relevant to the trial court’s detention decision.

¶ 18 For instance, count I of the complaint in the present case charges that “defendant,

without lawful justification, and with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to Donn[a] Romine,

personally discharged a firearm, and shot Donna Romine in the head, causing the death of Donna

Romine.” See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022). This allegation may provide the information

necessary to charge the offense in question, but it does not speak to defendant’s future

dangerousness or the possibility of conditions of release, nor is it intended to. See 725 ILCS

5/111-3(a) (West 2022) (specifying the formal requirements of a criminal charge). As such, Stock’s

holding that “more is required” than the allegations in the charging instrument is axiomatic and

should not be read to say more than it does. Stock,

.

¶ 19 However, the trial court does not simply review the charging instrument when

determining whether to detain the defendant on dangerousness grounds; indeed, the trial court must

go beyond these bare allegations to address “the specific articulable facts of the case.” 725 ILCS

-7- 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022). In doing so, the court may consider “evidence or testimony concerning

*** [t]he nature and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a

crime of violence” (id. § 110-6.1(g)(1)), although the trial court’s decision cannot be based

exclusively on this or any other single factor. See id. § 110-6.1(f)(7); People v. Bond,

(reversing a detention order when, “beyond the nature of the offenses

themselves, the State presented nothing to show that no set of conditions would mitigate the threat

to the victim defendant’s release would present”). Nevertheless, the evidence the court uses to

determine the nature and circumstances of the offense may also shed light on the other statutory

factors governing dangerousness and conditions of release, including those the trial court relied on

here: defendant’s personal history, statements attributed to him, the age and physical condition of

his mother, and his access to firearms. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(1)-(2), (4), (6)-(7); see also

§ 110-5(a) (providing that a determination regarding conditions of release shall be made “on the

basis of available information”). This same evidence would not be less probative on the question

of pretrial detention even if it provided the sole basis for the allegations in the charging instrument.

¶ 20 Ultimately, the evidence of a defendant’s charged conduct, even if it took place on

a single occasion, may reflect such a departure from the basic expectations of civil society that it

becomes difficult to predict the defendant’s compliance with court orders—or even societal norms

regarding the safety of others—if the defendant is placed on pretrial release. The presumption in

favor of pretrial release under the Act does not obligate a trial court to release such a defendant in

the hopes that his otherwise spotless record will negate the real and present threat he poses to the

safety of the community as shown by the State’s evidence.

¶ 21 In the present case, defendant does not dispute that he shot his mother, but he claims

that he acted in self-defense because she was approaching him with a knife and had already cut his

-8- arm once. While we agree that his proffered evidence on this point was potentially relevant to his

alleged dangerousness, as well as the question of whether that alleged danger could be mitigated

by conditions of release, his focus on this evidence is myopic. The evidence of his subsequent

conduct, which the trial court properly considered in reaching its decision, paints a different picture

and undermines this characterization of defendant’s conduct. See id. § 110-6.1(g)(1) (providing

that the trial court may consider the “nature and circumstances of any offense charged” (emphasis

added)). The court was not required to accept defendant’s contention that he acted in self-defense

when the record permitted other conclusions concerning his culpability and, by extension, his

potential dangerousness.

¶ 22 It is unclear from the record whether prompt medical intervention might have saved

his mother’s life, but it is evident that defendant abandoned her body rather than calling the

authorities to explain the situation, preserve evidence to support his claim of self-defense, and have

his mother properly laid to rest. Even if defendant was uncertain about the right thing to do, he

could have called one of his many police contacts to ask, as he later did when he wanted to

determine what to do with his loaded rifle. Instead, when the police called him after he left the

house, he lied and said that his mother was alive and well, and then he attempted to destroy his

phone. Had the officers not investigated further, her death would have gone undiscovered even

longer. When police cars pursued defendant with their lights and sirens on, he refused to pull over

and ran red lights, and after the police arrested him, he lied again and said that a burglar named

“John” had likely killed his mother.

¶ 23 Defendant’s actions are not consistent with an innocent mistake or genuine remorse

but a concerted refusal to accept responsibility for conduct he knew was wrong. Defendants on

pretrial release are expected not just to comply with the terms of their release but to be forthright

-9- about their efforts to comply and to accept responsibility for violations, even if they believe those

violations were innocent mistakes. In light of defendant’s repeated efforts to escape responsibility

for what he only now claims was an act of self-defense, the trial court’s conclusion that no

conditions of release could avoid the real and present threat defendant posed to the safety of the

community was within the bounds of reason.

¶ 24 Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant detained

on dangerousness grounds, we decline to reach defendant’s arguments regarding willful flight.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 27 Affirmed.

- 10 - People v. Romine,

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 23- CF-345; the Hon. Ryan M. Cadagin, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys James E. Chadd, Carolyn R. Klarquist, and Peter Sgro, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:

Attorneys Patrick Delfino and David J. Robinson, of State’s Attorneys for Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Springfield, for the People. Appellee:

- 11 -