MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Sharon Jackson brings this action against defendant Richard Doria, Sheriff of DuPage County, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Doria has moved to dismiss Jack­son’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below, Doria’s motion is denied.

I. Background

On January 7, 1986, plaintiff Sharon Jack­son was arrested in Park Forest, Illinois. After fingerprinting Jackson, the arresting officer discovered an arrest warrant for “Sharon Jackson” bearing plaintiffs driver’s license number. However, plaintiff does not fit the description on the warrant, live at the address listed on the warrant, or have the same fingerprints as the person identified on the warrant. Notwithstanding these 1 facts, and despite plaintiffs protestations that she was not person listed on the warrant, the officer executed the warrant against plaintiff, and then released her on bond. She subse­quently established to Judge Bowman of the DuPage County Circuit Court that she was not the “Sharon Jackson” named in the war­rant. The charges were dropped, and the warrant was reissued in the name of “Sherry Jackson.” In addition, her public defender gave her a letter stating that the arrest warrant was in error and that the charges had been dropped.

Approximately six months later, a Harvey, Illinois police officer stopped plaintiff for a traffic violation. The officer discovered the warrant for “Sherry Jackson,” still bearing plaintiffs driver’s license number, in the Illi­nois State Police Law Enforcement Data System (“LEADS”), and took plaintiff to the Harvey police station. Although plaintiff in­formed the officers that she was not the person named in the warrant, and showed them the letter from her public defender, the officers refused to release her, nor did they cheek her fingerprints. She was taken to the DuPage County Sheriffs Office and spent the night in jail. She again appeared before Judge Bowman, who immediately dropped all charges against her. The court’s order in­structed arresting agencies to verify the identity of anyone arrested pursuant to the warrant in the future through a fingerprint check. 1

However, in August, 1987, when plaintiff was stopped for a traffic violation, she was again arrested based upon the warrant. She was detained at the Flossmoor, Illinois police station and released. She was again de­tained on January 5, 1988 in Matteson, Illi­nois, when police discovered the “Sherry Jackson” warrant. Finally, on November 25, 1991, after being stopped for a speeding vio­lation, she was arrested when a computer check on her driver’s license again revealed the warrant. She was detained at the police station in Chicago Heights, Illinois before being released. Despite plaintiffs five ar­rests on this warrant, the DuPage County Sheriff never corrected the warrant by re­moving her driver’s license number, or took any other effort to clear or modify the war­rant. Although the warrant was quashed in *290 May, 1992, Jackson has alleged that it re­mains active in the DuPage County Sheriffs computer warrant system and in LEADS. Jackson alleges that defendant Doria violated her constitutional rights by failing to imple­ment procedures that would prevent the re­peated arrest of one person under a warrant issued for another person. Doria has moved to dismiss, asserting that Jackson has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. Motion to Dismiss Standard

A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it “appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-­46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242, 244 (7th Cir. 1988); Ellsworth v. City of Ra­cine, 774 F.2d 182, 184 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047, 106 S.Ct. 1265, 89 L.Ed.2d 574 (1986). We take the ‘Veil-­pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and view them, as well as reasonable infer­ences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Balabanos v. North Am. Inv. Group, Ltd., 708 F.Supp. 1488, 1491 n. 1 (N.D.Ill. 1988) (citing Ellsworth).

III. Discussion

We will first consider whether the Eleventh Amendment shields Doria from lia­bility in the present action. It is well estab­lished that official capacity suits against state officials are deemed to be suits against the state, and are therefore barred by the Elev­enth Amendment. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312-13, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). 2 Un­der Illinois law, however, the Sheriff of Du-­Page County is a county, rather than state, official. See Ill. Const. art. VII, § 4(e). As such, he is generally not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. See Scott v. O’Gra­dy, 975 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2421, 124 L.Ed.2d 643 (1993). This generalization not­withstanding, a county official can be consid­ered a state official with Eleventh Amend­ment immunity if he or she “acts as an arm of the Illinois state judicial system in execut­ing Writs of Assistance and other state court orders.” Id. Doria maintains that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Scott because he acted as a state offi­cial in executing an arrest warrant issued by a state court.

This contention, however, has been repeatedly rejected by judges in this district. For example, in Hvorcik v. Sheahan, No. 92 C 7329, 1993 WL 192948 (N.D.Ill. June 3, 1993), in considering the same argument pre­sented here, the court concluded:

Quite unlike the action implicated in Scott, [Sheriff] Sheahan’s activities that are the gravamen of the [complaint]—those relat­ing to the establishment and maintenance of records as to outstanding warrants—do not represent the purely ministerial en­forcement of the orders of the state judi­ciary (they are not the fulfillment of a “statutory, non-discretionary duty” as Scott, id. at 371 described what was at issue there).

Accordingly Sheahan’s motion to dismiss is denied.

Id. at *2-3. See also Ruehman v. Village of Palos Park, No. 91 C 8355, 1993 WL 502355 at *3 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 3, 1993). We are com­pelled by the reasoning in Hvorcik and Ruehman, and see no need to reconsider the issue here. Accordingly, we reject Doria’s claim that the Eleventh Amendment shields him from suit. 3

*291 We now turn to Doria’s contention that Jackson has failed to sufficiently allege a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Again, however, we face a well-established body of law to the contrary. Indeed, a near­ly identical fact pattern existed in Johnson v. City of Chicago, No. 90 C 6406, 1992 WL 39025 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 24, 1992). There the plaintiff, Andre Johnson, was arrested on three separate occasions based upon a war­rant issued for “Andre Jackson.” The errant arrests were apparently due to the fact that plaintiffs social security number was errone­ously listed on the Andre Jackson warrant, and social security numbers, like driver’s li­cense numbers, can be searched on the police computer systems. In holding that Johnson had stated a claim under § 1983, the court concluded:

[G]iven the large volume of individuals ar­rested in [the county] yearly, defendant [Sheriff] Sheahan should expect to incur mistakes of the kind which are alleged here. Knowledge of the numerical certain­ty of these errors imposes two constitu­tional responsibilities on defendant Sheah-­an: to adopt alternate means of verifying the identity of persons held in custody on the basis of a social security number check; and to see that when errors are made using social security numbers, they are promptly corrected to prevent future wrongful detentions. Failure to fulfill ei­ther responsibility constitutes deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of those, such as plaintiff, wrongfully held in custody as a result.

Id. at *3. Cf. Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 366 (7th Cir. 1980) (“It seems clear that appellant sustained a violation of consti­tutional rights by being arrested and de­tained pursuant to an invalid warrant.... Someone is surely at fault for failing to es­tablish or execute appropriate procedures for preventing such serious malfunctions in the administration of justice.”), cert. dismissed, Finley v. Murray, 456 U.S. 604, 102 S.Ct. 2226, 72 L.Edüd 366 (1982). 4 Because we find Johnson both factually and legally indis­tinguishable, we deny Doria’s motion to dis­miss.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, defendant Richard Doria’s motion to dismiss is denied. It is so ordered.