Stobie v. Dills
Stobie v. Dills
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
There can be no doubt that the defendants in this case are personally liable for the rent. It is true, they are described in the lease as “trustees of Quincy Lodge No. 139, I. O. of G. Templars,” but this is merely “ desoriptio personarwm.n They execute the lease as private individuals, and in the body of the instrument covenant personally to pay the rent. The point is too plain for argument, and the circuit court decided properly in refusing to receive evidence dehors the lease, as to the intent of the parties.
The only material error in this record is in sustaining the demurrer to the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth pleas. The fifth set up a new lease of the premises by the appellee to Van Doom, a taking of possession and payment of rent by him, and his acceptance by the appellee as his tenant in lieu and discharge of the appellants, and with their consent. This was pleaded as a defense to the recovery of rent that had accrued after January 1, 1869, when it is alleged this arrangement was made, and to that extent was a complete defense. The objections urged to the plea on the ground of its uncertainty, are not well taken. The sixth, seventh, and eighth pleas were the same in substance, merely alleging the new lease as running to a different person, in each plea. For the error in sustaining the demurrer to these pleas, the judgment must be reversed.
Objection is taken to a statement made by the court, in one of its instructions, to the effect that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had accepted a surrender of the lease. It is not customary in this State for the court to tell the jury that any fact has or has not been proven, where any evidence has been admitted bearing upon the point, except where a question of law is involved, as in the proof of title. The proof, however, was wholly insufficient to show an acceptance of a surrender; and as this statement worked the appellants no prejudice, it would not be a ground of reversal. We reverse solely for the error in sustaining the demurrer.
Judgment reversed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Alexander Stobie v. Harrison Dills
- Cited By
- 17 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Contract—construction as to party hound. The lessees in the caption of a lease were described as “trustees of Quincy Lodge No. 139,1. 0. of Gr. Templars,” and they executed the same in their individual names, and in the body of the instrument covenanted to pay the rent, without using any words to show an intention to bind the lodge: Held, that they were personally liable; and that the words “trustees,” etc., were merely desariptio personae, and did not change the legal effect of their undertaking. 2. Pabol evidence—to explain contract. Where parties covenant personally to pay rent, and execute the obligation in their individual names, evidence dehors the written undertaking is inadmissible to show that they intended to bind an incorporated lodge, although in the body of the obligation they are described as trustees of such lodge. 3. Landlord and tenant—relation how terminated. Where, before the expiration of the term, the landlord, with the consent of the lessee, makes a new lease to another person, who enters into possession and pays rent to the landlord, this will terminate the first lease, and from that time will bar a recovery of rent from the first lessee. 4. Same—pled. In a suit upon a written lease for the recovery of rent, the defendants, who were the lessees, pleaded in bar as to the rent from a certain da.y, that on such day the plaintiff, with the assent of defendant, leased the premises to another person named, at a specified rent, and accepted such person as his tenant in the place of the defendant; that such person took possession of the premises, and has since paid the plaintiff all the rent due under his lease, and the acceptance of rent from such new lessee by the lessor, whereby the said indenture (sued upon) was canceled and annulled: Held, that the plea showed a complete defense to the recovery of rent accruing after such new arrangement. 5. Same—surrender—abandonment. The lessee can not surrender premises leased to him, before the expiration of the term, so as to absolve himself from the payment of rent thereafter, without the consent of the lessor; and the abandonment of the premises, with notice thereof to the lessor, will not exonerate the lessee thereafter from his obligation to pay rent, unless the lessor assents thereto. 6. Instruction—as to evidence. According to the practice in this State the court is not justified in instructing the jury that any fact has or has not been proved, where any evidence has been admitted bearing upon the point, except where a question of law is involved, as in the proof of title. 7. Erbob—not cause for reversal. Where the court instructed the jury that there was no evidence of a material fact involved, and there was evidence admitted on the point, which this court deemed wholly insufficient to establish the fact: Held, that, as the error worked no prejudice, it was no ground for reversal.