City of Bloomington v. Perdue
City of Bloomington v. Perdue
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
Questions ■ of fact do not in this case come before us for review. We think there was no error in refusing instruction No. 4, for the reason that the law therein stated had already been distinctly stated in other instructions given. Instruction Ho. 6, given at request of defendant, fully expresses the idea found in the refused instruction. Hor do we find anything faulty in the instructions Hos. 8, 9 and 10, given at request of plaintiff. These instructions do not refer as a standard of caution to “ what ordinary young ladies would do,” but to the conduct of “ an ordinarily prudent person,” and ofí¡ a woman of common or ordinary prudence.”
Hor do we think the circuit court erred in permitting an experienced practicing physician to testify to what was usual knowledge among persons of the same class as that of the plaintiff, as to questions of physiology and internal ailments.
In the trial of a case like this, we are of opinion that the city can not raise the question as to whether it is already indebted to an amount in excess of the constitutional limitation. It was not error to exclude proof on that subject.
Finding no material error, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- The City of Bloomington v. Amanda Perdue
- Cited By
- 21 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Instruction — repeating. ' There is no error in refusing an instruction, where another one given fully expresses the law expressed in the one refused. 2. Negligence — standard of care on part of plaintiff. In an action by a young lady against a city, to recover damages for an injury based upon the negligence of the defendant in not keeping a sidewalk in repair, involving the question of the plaintiff’s freedom from negligence, instructions which do not refer as a standard of caution to “ what ordinary young ladies would do,” but to the conduct of “an ordinarily prudent person,” and of “a woman of common or ordinary prudence,” are not faulty in respect to the standard referred to. 3. Same — evidence as tending to disprove want of due care and caution. In a suit by a young lady against a city to recover damages for an injury to the uterus, caused by a fall from a defective sidewalk, the defendant proved that she did not take proper care of herself after the injury, by remaining quiet, as showing negligence on her part increasing the injury. On cross-examination of the physicians called by the defence, the plaintiff proved, over defendant’s objection, tha{, an unmarried woman, not acquainted with the anatomy of the injured part, could not be expected to act as promptly and intelligently as one understanding it, or as a medical man would, and that it was a common thing for women to suffer from a displacement or injury of the organ spoken of, without themselves knowing the trouble: Held., that there was no error in allowing the evidence. 4. Municipal inbebtebness — in excess of constitutional limitation — not applicable to liability for torts. In an action on the case against a city to recover for a personal injury growing out of negligence on the part of the city, it can not raise the question that it is already indebted to an amount in excess of the constitutional limitation.