South Park Commissioners v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Cases that cite this one
13 later published cases cite this decision.
- Detroit, Grand Haven & Milwaukee Railway Co. v. City of Grand Rapids (Mich. 1895)
- Little Carnegie Realty Corp. v. Delmonico Movienews Theatre, Inc. (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York 1947)
- Des Moines City Railway v. City of Des Moines (Iowa 1927)
- Lenoir v. . R. R. (N.C. 1927)
- Town of Lenoir v. Carolina & Northwestern Railway Co. (N.C. 1927)
- Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. City of Gainesville (Fla. 1922)
- Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Poland (Mont. 1918)
- Oklahoma Ry. Co. v. Severns Paving Co. (Okla. 1917)
- Texas Bitulithic Co. v. Abilene St. Ry. Co. (Tex. App. 1914)
- Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Richland County (N.D. 1914)
- Kneebs v. City of Sioux (Iowa 1912)
- Indianapolis & Vincennes Railway Co. v. Capitol Paving & Construction Co. (Ind. Ct. App. 1899)
- Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. People ex rel. Seip (Ill. 1887)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court:
It is apparent from the foregoing statement, the only question presented for determination is, whether “the right of way of occupancy, franchises, property and interests of” the appellee, in Michigan avenue, are, within the meaning of the acts above cited, “contiguous property abutting upon such avenue,” for no other description of property is authorized to be assessed. It does seem to us the very statement of this question furnishes its own solution. It is clear that nothing but some tangible object or thing can, with propriety, be said to abut on a street or avenue, and it is not pretended the subject of assessment in this case is anything of the-kind. If the interests or rights assessed can be said to have any corporeal or physical existence, so that they could, with any propriety of language, be said to be contiguous to or abutting upon anything, they must be represented by the avenue itself, and, as is well said by the Appellate Court, it would be a legal solecism to say the avenue was contiguous to and abutted on itself. Property, in its appropriate sense, is that dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects. But the term is often used to indicate the res or subject of property rather than the property itself, and so we understand it to be used in the second section of the act of 1879, above referred to, which authorizes the park commissioners “to levy, or cause to be levied and collected, a special tax or assessment on contiguous property abutting upon such street,” etc. And as a street can not, in the nature of things,' abut on itself, and as mere intangible rights or privileges, for the same reason, are incapable of abutting on anything, it is clear the assessment was unauthorized.
The authorities cited as sustaining a contrary view we do not regard as in point. There is no question but that the' legislature may lawfully provide for the taxation of property of this character, but that is not the question here.
The judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.