IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT
                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                    (Docket No. 129201)

           THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RYAN
                     SHAVOR DON REDMOND, Appellee.


                             Opinion filed September 19, 2024.



        JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet, Cunningham, Rochford, and
     O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

        Justice Holder White took no part in the decision.

OPINION

¶1       In this case we must determine, after the recent changes to Illinois’s cannabis
     laws, whether a police officer’s detection of the odor of burnt cannabis, considered
     alone or in conjunction with other facts, provides probable cause to conduct a
     warrantless search of a vehicle. Illinois State Police officer Hayden Combs
     conducted a search of Ryan Redmond’s vehicle based on, inter alia, his detection
     of the strong odor of burnt cannabis emanating from the vehicle. The State
     primarily argues that Combs had probable cause to suspect that a search of the
     vehicle would uncover evidence that cannabis was improperly contained in the
     vehicle or, more likely, uncover evidence that Redmond had used cannabis on his
     trip from Des Moines to Chicago. See 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(a) (West 2020) (“No
     driver may use cannabis within the passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a
     highway in this State.”). Combs searched Redmond’s car and found one gram of
     cannabis inside the center console in a plastic bag.

¶2       The State charged Redmond with unlawful possession of cannabis in violation
     of section 4 of the Cannabis Control Act (Control Act) (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West
     2020)) and unlawful possession of cannabis by a driver in violation of section 11-
     502.15(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(b) (West 2020)).
     Redmond filed a motion to suppress the cannabis. The Henry County circuit court
     granted the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that recent changes to
     the law pertaining to cannabis made the odor of burnt cannabis, standing alone,
     insufficient to justify a warrantless search of an automobile. 

.

¶3       We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme
     Court Rule 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We also allowed the American Civil Liberties
     Union, ACLU of Illinois, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and
     the Illinois Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers to file an amici curiae brief
     on behalf of Redmond’s position. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). For
     the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.


¶4                                  I. BACKGROUND

¶5       On September 15, 2020, Officer Combs saw a car with an improperly secured
     license plate traveling at a speed of 73 miles per hour in a 70-mile-per-hour zone
     on Interstate 80 in Henry County. Combs initiated a traffic stop of Redmond’s
     vehicle. Combs approached on the passenger side, and when Redmond rolled down
     the passenger-side window, Combs smelled burnt cannabis. According to the
     complaint, Combs searched Redmond’s car and found one gram of cannabis in the




                                            -2-
       center console in a plastic bag.


¶6                                           A. Circuit Court

¶7        On June 29, 2021, Redmond filed a motion to suppress the evidence—the
       cannabis—the police found in his car. The court heard the motion on August 4,
       2021.

¶8         At the hearing on the motion, Combs testified that he stopped Redmond because
       his vehicle was travelling at 73 miles an hour in a 70-mile-per-hour zone (see 625
       ILCS 5/11-601(f)(1.5) (West 2020) (setting the “maximum speed limit” at “70
       miles per hour upon any interstate highway”)) and the vehicle had an improper
       display of registration (see 

 § 3-413(b) (West 2020) (“every registration plate or
       digital registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a horizontal
       position to the vehicle”)). 1 When Combs approached, he smelled the odor of burnt
       cannabis emitting from the vehicle. During the State’s examination, Combs
       testified that the odor was very strong. Combs also testified he asked Redmond
       about the odor and Redmond denied having smoked cannabis in the vehicle.

¶9         Combs’s examination of the vehicle did not reveal anything that was lit or
       currently emitting the odor of cannabis from the vehicle. Combs also agreed that
       he did not see any cannabis in plain view. Combs had Redmond step out of his
       vehicle and seated him in the squad car. With Redmond out of his vehicle, Combs
       could still smell the odor of burnt cannabis in the vehicle, but he could not recall
       smelling the odor of burnt cannabis on Redmond’s person. Combs admitted he saw
       no signs of impairment when he spoke to Redmond.

¶ 10       Redmond did not produce his license and registration. Using information
       obtained from Redmond, Combs retrieved a record showing that Redmond had a
       valid Illinois license with a Chicago address. Combs testified that Redmond failed
       to give a straight answer to questions about where he lived, but Combs admitted
       Redmond said he lived in Chicago and had stayed with a friend in Des Moines.



           1
            Redmond has not contested the validity of the stop in any court, and thus, we do not analyze
       the validity of the stop in this case.




                                                     -3-
¶ 11       Combs testified that he searched the car because there was an odor of burnt
       cannabis, Redmond gave evasive answers, Interstate 80 was “a known drug
       corridor,” and Redmond admitted he was driving from Des Moines to Chicago,
       where both cities are “hub[s] of criminal activity.” Combs’s search uncovered
       approximately one gram of cannabis in the center console in a plastic bag.

¶ 12       In an order dated November 10, 2021, the circuit court granted the motion to
       suppress, finding Combs lacked probable cause for the warrantless search. The
       court first noted what was not present during the stop; namely, Combs did not
       observe any signs of impairment or signs indicative of recent cannabis use. Combs
       also did not observe any paraphernalia, loose or unpackaged cannabis, or the odor
       of raw cannabis coming from the vehicle. The circuit court found that “nothing”
       about Redmond’s “living arrangement, travel plans, or travel route add[ed] to the
       likelihood that [he] was engaged in criminal conduct.” As to the odor of burnt
       cannabis, the circuit court found that, because the smell of burnt cannabis could
       persist even if possessed and used wholly within the bounds of Illinois law, the
       smell of burnt cannabis standing alone could not constitute probable cause for a
       warrantless vehicle search.

¶ 13        On November 10, 2021, the State filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to
       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) with a certificate stating
       that the order substantially impaired its prosecution of the case. See People v. Truitt,
       

 (1997).


¶ 14                                    B. Appellate Court

¶ 15       The appellate court held that “ ‘the smell of the burnt cannabis, without any
       corroborating factors, is not enough to establish probable cause to search the
       vehicle.’ ” 

 (quoting People v. Stribling, 

). The appellate court, like the trial court, pointed out the
       absence of evidence supporting the search. Id. ¶ 22 (“Redmond did not delay
       pulling over or make any furtive movements, he rolled down the window when
       Combs came to the passenger side of the vehicle, and Combs did not observe any
       cannabis or related drug paraphernalia in the vehicle, smoke in the vehicle, or signs
       of impairment in Redmond.”).




                                                -4-
¶ 16       The court also found a lack of evidence supporting Combs’s testimony that
       Interstate 80 was a known drug corridor and that Des Moines and Chicago were
       hubs of criminal activity. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Both facts were unrelated to and
       unsupportive of Combs’s suspicion that Redmond had smoked cannabis in the
       vehicle. Id. The appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment suppressing
       the cannabis seized in the warrantless search of Redmond’s car. Id. ¶ 26.

¶ 17       This court granted the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a)
       (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).


¶ 18                                      II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19       The sole issue before this court is whether Officer Combs had probable cause
       to search Redmond’s vehicle after Combs smelled the odor of burnt cannabis
       coming from the vehicle. The State argued in its brief that “where the officer
       detected the strong odor of burnt cannabis—a reasonable officer was justified in
       suspecting either a violation of the odor-proof transportation requirement or,
       perhaps more likely, the prohibition on the use of cannabis within a vehicle.”
       Redmond responds that, after the legislature legalized the use and possession of
       cannabis, the odor of burnt cannabis emanating from a vehicle alone “lacks a clear
       and direct enough connection to illegal activity to make it ‘probable’ that a crime
       has recently been committed or is being committed.”


¶ 20                                  A. Standard of Review

¶ 21       We review the trial court’s ruling on the motion to suppress under the two-part
       standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United
       States, 

 (1996). People v. Hill, 

, ¶ 14. “Factual
       findings by the trial court will be reversed only if they are against the manifest
       weight of the evidence, but the ultimate legal determination as to whether
       suppression is warranted is reviewed de novo.” People v. Salamon, 

.




                                               -5-
¶ 22                          B. Constitutional Prohibitions Against
                                    Unreasonable Searches

¶ 23       The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right
       of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
       unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
       issue, but upon probable cause ***.” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Illinois
       Constitution similarly provides: “The people shall have the right to be secure in
       their persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches
       ***. No warrant shall issue without probable cause ***.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,
       § 6. “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
       judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
       subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz
       v. United States, 

 (1967).

¶ 24       One well-established exception is for searches of automobiles. See Carroll v.
       United States, 

 (1925); People v. Webb, 

       (“There are recognized exceptions to the general rule, however, including an
       exception for searches of vehicles.”). The automobile exception is justified because
       of an automobile’s “transient nature,” which “often renders it impracticable to
       secure a warrant before the automobile escapes the jurisdiction in which the warrant
       must be sought.” Hill, 

, ¶ 21. “Under the automobile exception, law
       enforcement officers may undertake a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is
       probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of criminal activity
       that the officers are entitled to seize.” People v. James, 

 (1994).


¶ 25                               C. Probable Cause to Search

¶ 26       Probable cause exists where the evidence known to the officer raises a “fair
       probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
       place.” Illinois v. Gates, 

 (1983); see 

 at 243 n.13 (“[P]robable
       cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an
       actual showing of such activity.”). “Whether the necessary probability exists is
       governed by commonsense considerations that are factual and practical, rather than
       by technical rules.” People v. Manzo, 

. “[P]robable cause does
       not require an officer to rule out any innocent explanations for suspicious facts.”



                                                -6-
       Hill, 

. “Instead, it requires only that the facts available to the
       officer—including the plausibility of an innocent explanation—would warrant a
       reasonable man to believe there is a reasonable probability” that a search of the
       automobile will uncover contraband or evidence of criminal activity. 

 “A court
       must examine the events leading up to the search or seizure, and then decide
       whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
       reasonable law enforcement officer, amount to probable cause.” People v. Jones,
       

 (2005).


¶ 27                                  D. Evolution of Cannabis Law

¶ 28      Because cannabis law has changed drastically over the last decade, we briefly
       address the evolution of statutes dealing with cannabis and the caselaw analyzing
       whether probable cause exists based on an officer’s detection of the odor of
       cannabis coming from a vehicle. And because probable cause deals with the
       probability that a search will produce contraband or evidence of criminal activity,
       we address the state of cannabis laws at the time of the stop in September 2020.


¶ 29                            1. Pre-2013: All Cannabis Is Contraband

¶ 30       Prior to 1971, marijuana was classified as a narcotic and punished accordingly.
       See People v. McCabe, 

 (1971) (per curiam) (observing that the
       legislature had recently removed marijuana from the purview of the Narcotic Drug
       Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 38, ¶ 22-1 et seq.)). In 1971, the legislature enacted
       the Control Act. See Pub. Act 77-758, § 1 (adding Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 56½,
       § 701 et seq.). 2 The Control Act provided: “It is unlawful for any person knowingly
       to possess cannabis.” Id. § 704. The Control Act set penalties between a Class C
       misdemeanor for the possession of not more than 2.5 grams of any substance


           2
             Among the legislative findings were that cannabis was “widely used and pervasive among the
       citizens of Illinois” and that previous laws on cannabis had “unnecessarily and unrealistically drawn
       a large segment of our population within the criminal justice system.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 56½,
       § 701. The General Assembly declared its intent to “establish a reasonable penalty system which is
       responsive to the current state of knowledge concerning cannabis and which directs the greatest
       efforts of law enforcement agencies toward the commercial traffickers and large-scale purveyors of
       cannabis.” Id.




                                                      -7-
       containing cannabis and a Class 3 felony for the possession of more than 500 grams
       of any substance containing cannabis. Id. § 704(a)-(e).

¶ 31       In People v. Stout, 

 (1985), this court held that “additional
       corroboration” was not required to establish probable cause for a warrantless search
       “where a trained and experienced police officer detects the odor of cannabis
       emanating from a defendant’s vehicle.” The defendant had been pulled over for
       making an illegal turn. 

. As the officer approached the vehicle, he smelled
       the odor of “burning cannabis from inside the defendant’s car.” 

. We
       explained that a “police officer’s detection of controlled substances by their smell
       has been held to be a permissible method of establishing probable cause.” 

 This
       court added that the officer, “when confronted with circumstances which tended to
       indicate that criminal activity was taking place,” had a duty “to investigate in order
       to determine whether such criminal activity in fact existed.” 

¶ 32                              2. Legalization (Medical) and
                                     Decriminalization Phase

¶ 33       In 2013, the General Assembly promulgated the Compassionate Use of Medical
       Cannabis Pilot Program Act (Medical Act). See Pub. Act 98-122, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1,
       2014) (adding 410 ILCS 130/1 et seq.). The Medical Act made it lawful for certain
       individuals with debilitating medical conditions to possess and use cannabis. 410
       ILCS 130/10(t), 25(a) (West 2014). Nevertheless, the Vehicle Code prohibited the
       use of cannabis in a motor vehicle (625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(a) (West 2014)), and if it
       was possessed in a motor vehicle, the cannabis was required to be stored in a
       “sealed, tamper-evident medical cannabis container” (id. § 11-502.1(b), (c)).

¶ 34      In 2016, the Control Act was amended, and the possession of not more than 10
       grams of any substance containing cannabis was made a civil law violation with a
       minimum fine of $100 and a maximum fine of $200. 720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West
       2018); see Pub. Act 99-697, § 40 (eff. July 29, 2016). Possession of more than 10
       grams of a substance containing cannabis remained criminal, with penalties ranging
       from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. See 720 ILCS 550/4(b)-(g) (West
       2018).




                                               -8-
¶ 35       During the evolution of Illinois’s cannabis laws—the legalization of medical
       cannabis and the decriminalization of the possession of small amounts of
       cannabis—this court decided Hill, 

. In Hill, this court decided the
       propriety of a search that occurred on May 29, 2017. Id. ¶ 5. The defendant was
       pulled over based on the officer’s belief that the passenger was a fugitive. Id. The
       defendant drove a few blocks before pulling over, which the officer testified was
       indicative of someone in the car concealing or destroying contraband or producing
       a weapon. Id. The officer approached the passenger side and immediately smelled
       the strong odor of raw cannabis. Id. The passenger admitted that he was a cannabis
       user and that he had smoked cannabis earlier that day. Id. ¶ 10. The officer also
       observed in plain view a “bud” in the back seat of the car. Id.

¶ 36       This court first declined to address the “narrow legal issue” of whether Stout
       remained good law because, unlike the officer in Stout, the officer relied on more
       than the odor of raw cannabis. Id. ¶¶ 16, 18. In a footnote we stated: “Although we
       do not reach whether the odor of cannabis, alone, is sufficient to establish probable
       cause, the smell and presence of cannabis undoubtedly remains a factor in a
       probable cause determination.” Id. ¶ 18 n.2.

¶ 37       This court then analyzed the changes in Illinois’s cannabis law. Id. ¶¶ 27-31.
       We rejected the defendant’s argument that decriminalization of the possession of
       small amounts of cannabis affected the probable cause analysis because the
       possession of cannabis remained unlawful. See id. ¶ 31 (“the decriminalization of
       possessing small amounts of cannabis did not alter the status of cannabis as
       contraband”). Regarding the Medical Act, we noted that, “[w]hile the mere
       presence of cannabis for medical users may no longer be immediately attributable
       to criminal activity or possession of contraband, such users must possess and use
       cannabis in accordance with the [Medical] Act.” Id. ¶ 34 (citing the Vehicle Code’s
       requirement that a medical user must possess cannabis within a motor vehicle in a
       “sealed, tamper-evident medical cannabis container” (625 ILCS 5/11-502.1(b), (c)
       (West 2016))).

¶ 38       With the legal framework established, this court found that the officers had
       probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle based on the totality of the
       circumstances, including (1) the defendant’s delay in pulling over and the officer’s
       testimony that a delay often means the car’s occupants are hiding contraband or




                                               -9-
       retrieving a weapon, (2) the passenger stating that he smokes cannabis and had done
       so that day, (3) the officer’s observation of a loose “bud” in the back seat, and
       (4) the strong odor of raw cannabis, which, “together,” indicated that cannabis was
       in the car and likely not properly contained. Id. ¶ 35. We then analyzed the case
       under standards we have used related to an officer’s smell of alcohol because, like
       cannabis, “possession of alcohol is lawful under some circumstances but remains
       unlawful under other circumstances.” Id. ¶ 36. We concluded that there was
       probable cause because, as the alcohol precedent instructed, there was some indicia
       of criminality in addition to the smell of cannabis. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.


¶ 39                   3. Public Act 101-27: Cannabis Act Amended and
                                    Regulation Act Enacted

¶ 40       On June 25, 2019, the General Assembly promulgated Public Act 101-27 (eff.
       June 25, 2019), which, along with Public Act 101-593, § 35 (eff. Dec. 4, 2019),
       amended the Control Act to provide: “Except as otherwise provided in the Cannabis
       Regulation and Tax Act and the Industrial Hemp Act, it is unlawful for any person
       knowingly to possess cannabis.” Id. (amending 720 ILCS 550/4). The Control Act
       maintained the same penalty structure regarding the possession of cannabis: the
       possession of not more than 10 grams of a substance containing cannabis remained
       a civil law violation, and the possession of more than 10 grams was penalized
       ranging from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 1 felony. See 720 ILCS 550/4(a)-
       (g) (West 2020).

¶ 41       In Public Act 101-27 (eff. June 25, 2019), the General Assembly also enacted
       the Cannabis Regulation and Tax Act (Regulation Act) (410 ILCS 705/1-1 et seq.
       (West 2020)), the most comprehensive and detailed legislation regarding the use
       and possession of cannabis in the State of Illinois. In what could be described as
       the legalization clause, section 10-5 of the Regulation Act provides:

          “Beginning January 1, 2020, notwithstanding any other provision of law, and
          except as otherwise provided in this Act, the following acts are not a violation
          of this Act and shall not be a criminal or civil offense under State law or the
          ordinances of any unit of local government of this State or be a basis for seizure
          or forfeiture of assets under State law for persons other than natural individuals
          under 21 years of age:



                                              - 10 -
                 (1) possession, consumption, use, purchase, obtaining, or transporting
              cannabis paraphernalia or an amount of cannabis for personal use that does
              not exceed the possession limit under Section 10-10 or otherwise in
              accordance with the requirements of this Act[.]” Id. § 10-5(a)(1).

       Section 10-10 of the Regulation Act defines the possession limit “for a person who
       is 21 years of age or older and a resident of this State” as “(1) 30 grams of cannabis
       flower; (2) no more than 500 milligrams of THC contained in cannabis-infused
       product; [and] (3) 5 grams of cannabis concentrate.” Id. § 10-10(a)(1)-(3). 3
       Pursuant to the Regulation Act, it is generally legal for an Illinois resident who is
       over the age of 21 to use cannabis and to possess up to 30 grams of cannabis. Thus,
       the Regulation Act provides an exception to the Control Act’s prohibition against
       the possession of cannabis. Compare 720 ILCS 550/4 (West 2020), with 410 ILCS
       705/10-5(a)(1), 10-10(a)(1)-(3) (West 2020).

¶ 42      Section 10-35 of the Regulation Act, titled “Limitations and penalties,”
       provides that the Regulation Act

          “does not permit any person to engage in, and does not prevent the imposition
          of any civil, criminal, or other penalties for ***

                   ***

                   (2) possessing cannabis ***

                                                    ***

                       (D) in a vehicle not open to the public unless the cannabis is in a
                   reasonably secured, sealed container and reasonably inaccessible while
                   the vehicle is moving[.]” 410 ILCS 705/10-35(a)(2)(D) (West 2020).




          3
           The legislative findings for the Regulation Act include the following:
          “In the interest of allowing law enforcement to focus on violent and property crimes, generating
          revenue for education, substance abuse prevention and treatment, freeing public resources to
          invest in communities and other public purposes, and individual freedom, the General
          Assembly finds and declares that the use of cannabis should be legal for persons 21 years of
          age or older and should be taxed in a manner similar to alcohol.” 410 ILCS 705/1-5(a) (West
          2020).




                                                    - 11 -
       Section 10-35 also provides that the Regulation Act “does not permit any person to
       engage in, and does not prevent the imposition of any civil, criminal, or other
       penalties for *** (3) using cannabis *** (D) in any motor vehicle *** [or] (F) in
       any public place.” Id. § 10-35(a)(3)(D), (F). Thus, if an individual engages in the
       conduct described in section 10-35, the section 10-5 immunity provision is rendered
       inapplicable. 4

¶ 43       The Vehicle Code, amended at the same time and in the same public act that
       created the Regulation Act, prohibits the use of cannabis in a vehicle upon a
       highway and restrains how an individual may possess cannabis within a vehicle.
       Pub. Act 101-27 (eff. June 25, 2019) (adding 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15). The Vehicle
       Code provides: “No driver may use cannabis within the passenger area of any motor
       vehicle upon a highway in this State.” 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15(a) (West 2020). The
       Code also provides that “[n]o driver may possess cannabis within any area of any
       motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in a sealed, odor-proof, child-
       resistant cannabis container.” Id. § 11-502.15(b). 5


¶ 44                             E. The Odor of Burnt Cannabis Alone
                                 No Longer Establishes Probable Cause

¶ 45       After January 1, 2020, when the use and possession of cannabis was legalized
       in many instances, our appellate court has reached conflicting results in cases
       concerning the effect of legalization on probable cause for automobile searches.
       The Second District has held that the odor of burnt cannabis, standing alone, still
       justifies a warrantless search of an automobile. See People v. Harris, 

 (holding that an officer that smells the strong odor of burnt
       cannabis coming from a vehicle has “probable cause to believe that cannabis is

           4
               The use and possession of up to “30 grams of cannabis flower; *** no more than 500
       milligrams of THC contained in cannabis-infused product; [and] *** 5 grams of cannabis
       concentrate” is not a criminal or civil offense under state law (410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)(1), 10-10(a)(1)-
       (3) (West 2020)), but section 10-35 of the Regulation Act removes its protection for the use of
       cannabis in a motor vehicle and the possession of cannabis in a motor vehicle “unless the cannabis
       is in a reasonably secured, sealed container and reasonably inaccessible while the vehicle is moving”
       (id. § 10-35(a)(2)(D), (3)(D)).
             5
               Redmond does not contest the validity of the odor-proof container requirement. In People v.
       Molina, 

, a case dealing with a police officer’s detection of the odor of raw cannabis
       coming from a vehicle, we address the validity of the odor-proof container requirement.




                                                      - 12 -
       being transported, possessed, or used in a manner contrary to law”). The Third
       District has held that “the smell of the burnt cannabis, without any corroborating
       factors, is not enough to establish probable cause to search [a] vehicle.” Stribling,
       

. We now resolve the conflict between the districts
       and consider whether the legalization of cannabis affects the legality of warrantless
       searches based on the odor of burnt cannabis.

¶ 46       At oral argument, the State conceded 6 that the smell of burnt cannabis, standing
       alone, is insufficient to give an officer probable cause to search a vehicle. 7 While
       we are not bound by the State’s concession (In re Brandon P., 

,
       ¶ 44), we agree with the concession in this case. The laws on cannabis have changed
       in such a drastic way as to render the smell of burnt cannabis, standing alone,
       insufficient to provide probable cause for a police officer to search a vehicle without
       a warrant. See 720 ILCS 550/4 (West 2020); 410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)(1), 10-10(a)
       (West 2020); 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15 (West 2020).

¶ 47        Unlike the legal landscape considered in Hill, Illinois cannabis law has evolved,
       and use and possession have not only been decriminalized in numerous situations,
       but they have been legalized in numerous situations. See 410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)(1),
       10-10(a) (West 2020). There are now a myriad of situations where cannabis can be
       used and possessed (id.), and the smell resulting from that legal use and possession
       is not indicative of the commission of a criminal offense. See 720 ILCS 5/2-12
       (West 2020) (“ ‘Offense’ means a violation of any penal statute of this State.”).
       Therefore, given the fact that under Illinois law the use and possession of cannabis
       is legal in some situations and illegal in others, the odor of burnt cannabis in a motor

           6
            The following two colloquies occurred during oral argument:
                CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS: “So you are conceding that the case *** where there is burnt
           marijuana, you are conceding that that is the case in which the analysis should be totality of the
           circumstances?”
                STATE: “Yes. *** The smoked cannabis, yes. *** It is not directly before this court
           because there were additional circumstances beyond the smell of cannabis alone.”
                ***
                JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE: “Okay, so burnt cannabis, you’re stopped and the officer
           smells burnt cannabis. *** Your argument is that that alone is insufficient to search the
           vehicle?”
                STATE: “I think that’s correct though it’s not necessarily before this court *** because
           there were additional circumstances in this case which I believe led to the probable cause.”
           7
             The State argued in its brief that “the odor of cannabis—whether in raw or burnt form—
       continues to provide police with probable cause to search the vehicle.”




                                                      - 13 -
       vehicle, standing alone, is not a sufficiently inculpatory fact that reliably points to
       who used the cannabis, when the cannabis was used, or where the cannabis was
       used.

¶ 48       A comparison to the odor of alcohol caselaw supports the conclusion that
       probable cause does not exist based on the smell of burnt cannabis alone. See 410
       ILCS 705/1-5(b) (West 2020) (finding that “cannabis should be regulated in a
       manner similar to alcohol”). “Similar to cannabis, possession of alcohol is lawful
       under some circumstances but remains unlawful under other circumstances.” Hill,
       

; see, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/11-502(a) (West 2020) (providing that
       “no driver may transport, carry, possess or have any alcoholic liquor within the
       passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in the
       original container and with the seal unbroken”); 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2020)
       (“A person shall not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle within this
       State while: (1) the alcohol concentration in the person’s blood, other bodily
       substance, or breath is 0.08 or more ***.”). Our cases, and those of other
       jurisdictions, support the proposition that more is needed to establish probable
       cause than the odor of alcohol.

¶ 49       For example, in People v. Smith, 

 (1983), the officer stopped
       the driver of a truck based on an expired sticker. The officer smelled alcohol on the
       defendant’s breath and observed an open bottle in a brown paper bag. 

.
       “The bottle’s neck was exposed and the officer could observe that it contained
       liquid.” 

 “Judging from the shape of the bottle and color of the label on the neck,
       the officer was nearly certain that it was a bottle of Miller’s beer.” 

 We held that
       on this information “alone it was reasonable for the officer to enter the passenger
       compartment of the defendant’s vehicle in order to inspect the bottle and search for
       alcohol.” 

. Similarly, the appellate court held that probable caused existed
       in People v. Corrigan, 

 (1977), where the officers (1) observed
       a passenger’s hurried and suspicious movements, (2) observed liquid dripping from
       the glove compartment, and (3) smelled the odor of alcohol. The court held that the
       “odor of alcohol associated with the dripping glove compartment would warrant
       the belief of a reasonable man that further investigation was appropriate.” 

.




                                               - 14 -
¶ 50       Courts from other states agree. In State v. Stevenson, 

 (Kan.
       2014), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that probable cause to search a vehicle
       did not exist based on the strong odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. There,
       officers stopped the defendant for a turn signal violation. 

. When the
       officers approached, they smelled the very strong odor of alcohol. 

 The defendant
       exited the vehicle, passed field sobriety tests, and then was allowed to reenter the
       vehicle. 

 The officers then searched the vehicle. 

.

¶ 51       The court conducted a detailed analysis of the facts known to the officers in
       relation to the crime suspected, transporting an open container of alcohol, to
       determine if there was a “fair probability” that a search would uncover evidence of
       the crime. 

. The court noted several exculpatory facts that the officers
       discovered during their investigation, including that the defendant passed a field
       sobriety test and that an initial observation into the vehicle uncovered no open
       containers. 

. The court stated:

          “the totality of the circumstances in this case only establishes that the officers’
          observation of a very strong odor of alcohol emanating from within the vehicle,
          which they suspected to be the result of spilled alcohol, provided them with
          reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic infraction detention to further
          investigate whether [the defendant] was transporting an open container of
          alcohol.” 

       The court concluded that the “officers’ failure to acquire additional inculpatory
       facts relating to the crime being investigated before commencing their search of the
       vehicle rendered the search unreasonable and unlawful.” Id.; see State v. Burbach,
       

 (Minn. 2005) (odor of alcohol did not justify search during a
       traffic stop).

¶ 52       In State v. Torgerson, 

 (Minn. 2023), the Minnesota Supreme
       Court extended the reasoning of Burbach to a case involving the odor of cannabis
       in a vehicle. The Torgerson court said:

          “[W]e hold that the odor of marijuana may be considered as part of the probable
          cause calculus. Specifically, the odor of marijuana is one of the circumstances
          in the totality of circumstances analysis that should be considered in




                                              - 15 -
          determining if there is a ‘fair probability’ that contraband or evidence of a crime
          will be found in the location searched. [Citations.]

              ***

              It is undisputed that the only indication that evidence of a crime or
          contraband may be found in Torgerson’s vehicle was the odor of marijuana
          emanating from the vehicle. *** There was nothing in Torgerson’s actions to
          give suspicion that he was under the influence while driving, no drug
          paraphernalia or other evidence to indicate that the marijuana was being used
          in a manner, or was of such a quantity, so as to be criminally illegal, and no
          evidence showing that any use was not for legal medicinal purposes. In the
          absence of any other evidence as part of the totality of the circumstances
          analysis, the evidence of the medium-strength odor of marijuana, on its own, is
          insufficient to establish a fair probability that the search would yield evidence
          of criminally illegal drug-related contraband or conduct.” 

.

¶ 53       The Minnesota Supreme Court’s ruling comports with several recent decisions
       from other states that have reduced or eliminated criminal penalties for cannabis
       possession and use. See Commonwealth v. Barr, 

, 44 (Pa. 2021) (“the
       odor of marijuana alone does not amount to probable cause to conduct a warrantless
       search of a vehicle but, rather, may be considered as a factor in examining the
       totality of the circumstances”); Commonwealth v. Craan, 

       (Mass. 2014) (“Since the enactment of the 2008 initiative decriminalizing the
       possession of one ounce or less of marijuana, we have held that the odor of burnt
       marijuana alone cannot support probable cause to search a vehicle without a
       warrant.”).

¶ 54       Therefore, based on our precedent and the state of cannabis laws at the time of
       the search, we hold that the odor of burnt cannabis is a fact that should be
       considered when determining whether police have probable cause to search a
       vehicle, but the odor of burnt cannabis, standing alone without other inculpatory
       facts, does not provide probable cause to search a vehicle. In light of our holding,
       Stout’s core holding—that an officer’s detection of the odor of burnt cannabis
       emanating from a vehicle, standing alone, establishes probable cause to conduct a
       warrantless search of the vehicle—is no longer valid for searches that occurred on




                                              - 16 -
       or after January 1, 2020.


¶ 55                            F. The Totality of the Circumstances Did
                                 Not Provide Probable Cause to Search

¶ 56       We have summarized the state of the law regarding cannabis in September
       2020. Now we will discuss in more detail the legal landscape in relation to the
       search in this case. We pause here to discuss, in slightly more detail, what crimes
       Combs was investigating.

¶ 57        First, the State argues that Redmond was likely violating the Vehicle Code by
       using cannabis in a motor vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/11-502.15 (West 2020). Section 11-
       502.15 of the Vehicle Code provides: “No driver may use cannabis within the
       passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State.” 

 § 502.15(a).
       Second, Redmond may have violated the Vehicle Code by possessing cannabis in
       a motor vehicle in violation of the Vehicle Code. See id. § 11-502.15(b) (“No driver
       may possess cannabis within any area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this
       State except in a sealed, odor-proof, child-resistant cannabis container.”). What is
       notable about the Vehicle Code provisions is that they do not prohibit the
       possession or use of cannabis within a motor vehicle. See id. § 502.15. The
       gravamen of the offenses is that the conduct occurs “upon a highway in this State.” 8
       Thus, it would not have been a violation of the Vehicle Code for Redmond to have
       used cannabis in a motor vehicle before he left Des Moines or in any location within
       Illinois not considered a “highway.” 9

¶ 58      Finally, the State points to the Regulation Act’s (1) prohibition against the use
       of cannabis in a motor vehicle and (2) prohibition against the possession of
       cannabis in a motor vehicle “unless the cannabis is in a reasonably secured, sealed
       container and reasonably inaccessible while the vehicle is moving.” 410 ILCS
       705/10-35(a)(2)(D) (West 2020); id. § 10-35(a)(3)(D). Notably, these are not


           8
            We note the narrowness of these prohibitions in comparison to the prohibition against driving
       while under the influence, which applies if a person “drive[s]” or is in “actual physical control of
       any vehicle within this State.” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a) (West 2020).
           9
            The Vehicle Code defines “highway” as the “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of
       every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes
       of vehicular travel or located on public school property.” 625 ILCS 5/1-126 (West 2020).




                                                     - 17 -
       offenses themselves. Instead, the Control Act establishes the penalty structure for
       the possession of cannabis. See 720 ILCS 550/4(a)-(g) (West 2020). Section 10-5
       of the Regulation Act then generally grants immunity from prosecution for the use
       and possession of cannabis. Section 10-35 then describes conduct for which section
       10-5 does not apply. In other words, if the State can establish that an individual is
       engaged in conduct described in section 10-35 (i.e., the individual used cannabis in
       the vehicle or possessed cannabis in an unauthorized container), the individual’s
       possession of cannabis is not immune from the Control Act’s general prohibition
       against the possession of cannabis.

¶ 59       The State contends that the totality of the circumstances, including Combs’s
       detection of the strong odor of burnt cannabis, made it reasonable to suspect that
       Redmond had smoked cannabis in the car on his way from Des Moines to Chicago.
       The State relies on the following facts in addition to the strong smell of burnt
       cannabis coming from the vehicle: (1) the stop occurred on Interstate 80, halfway
       between Des Moines and Chicago, (2) Combs continued to smell the odor of burnt
       cannabis in the vehicle after he removed Redmond, (3) Redmond did not produce
       his license and registration, and (4) Redmond did not provide direct answers to
       Combs’s questions about where he lived or why he was traveling from Des Moines
       to Chicago. The State concludes that these facts established probable cause to
       believe that Redmond violated the Vehicle Code and Regulation Act.

¶ 60       The first two facts are not inculpatory facts that provide probable cause for a
       search. Notably, the State has abandoned its argument related to, and the trial court
       discounted as “unpersuasive,” Combs’s testimony that Interstate 80 is a “drug
       corridor.” That Redmond had likely been in the car for a lengthy period and that
       the smell of cannabis remained in the car when Redmond was removed support a
       reasonable suspicion that he had smoked cannabis in the car at some point.
       However, Combs, aside from the smell, observed no signs of impairment and no
       drug paraphernalia or evidence of cannabis use in the car. See Stevenson, 

 (“Country common sense would likewise lead one to believe that an
       intoxicated person would be more likely to have an open container in the vehicle
       from which he or she had been drinking than a sober person who had passed the
       field sobriety tests.”). Combs also did not smell the odor of burnt cannabis on
       Redmond, which undercuts the reasonable belief that Redmond had recently
       smoked cannabis inside the vehicle while on an Illinois highway.




                                              - 18 -
¶ 61       We are unpersuaded that the two latter facts provided any support to the
       probable cause analysis. First, while it is a violation of the Vehicle Code for a driver
       not to have his driver’s license in his immediate possession when operating a motor
       vehicle (625 ILCS 5/6-112 (West 2020)), that violation does not add to the probable
       cause analysis because it did not make it any more likely that evidence of the
       suspected crime would be present. Also, Combs’s search through the Secretary of
       State’s database established that Redmond had a valid Illinois license at the time of
       the stop. Second, the trial court found, and we agree, that there was a semantic
       difference between Combs and Redmond regarding Redmond’s living
       arrangements. Redmond explained that he lived in Chicago but was temporarily
       staying in Des Moines because of the pandemic. Combs continued to construe that
       explanation as Redmond stating that his permanent address had changed to
       Des Moines. We also agree with the trial court’s finding that Redmond’s alleged
       failure to give “direct answers” on his living arrangements did not make it any more
       likely, alone or along with the other evidence, that Redmond’s car contained
       contraband or evidence of a crime.

¶ 62       Police are also, in considering the totality of the circumstances, required to
       consider facts that tend to defeat or dispel probable cause. See United States v.
       Cortez, 

 (1981) (“But the essence of all that has been written is
       that the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into
       account.”); Terry v. Ohio, 

 (1968) (recognizing that facts may be
       uncovered that “dispel” an officer’s initial reasonable suspicion). As the appellate
       court noted,

          “Redmond did not delay pulling over or make any furtive movements, he rolled
          down the window when Combs came to the passenger side of the vehicle, and
          Combs did not observe any cannabis or related drug paraphernalia in the
          vehicle, smoke in the vehicle, or signs of impairment in Redmond.” 

.

¶ 63       In short, Officer Combs’s detection of the strong odor of burnt cannabis coming
       from the vehicle certainly established reasonable suspicion to investigate further.
       Combs reasonably investigated whether Redmond had violated the Vehicle Code
       and whether Redmond was driving impaired. When his further investigation did
       not yield any inculpatory facts, the quantity of evidence never advanced on the




                                                - 19 -
       continuum from reasonable suspicion to probable cause to search. Therefore, the
       search was unreasonable and unlawful, and the circuit court properly granted
       Redmond’s motion to suppress the evidence in this case.

¶ 64       Finally, the State argues that this court should reverse the circuit court because
       Combs acted in good faith when he searched Redmond’s car. The State did not raise
       any issue regarding the good faith exception in the circuit court. The State forfeited
       the issue a second time by failing to raise it in the appellate court. See People v.
       Sophanavong, 

. Therefore, we decline to address the State’s
       twice-forfeited good faith argument.


¶ 65                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 66       In sum, since January 1, 2020, the use and possession of cannabis is
       presumptively lawful, subject to certain restrictions. See 410 ILCS 705/10-5(a)
       (West 2020) (“Beginning January 1, 2020 ***.”). We hold that the odor of burnt
       cannabis, alone, is insufficient to provide probable cause for police officers to
       perform a warrantless search of a vehicle. We also hold that the totality of the facts
       and circumstances known to Officer Combs did not provide probable cause to
       search Redmond’s vehicle. Therefore, the circuit court correctly granted the motion
       suppressing the evidence confiscated from Redmond. Accordingly, we affirm the
       appellate court’s decision affirming the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence
       seized in the warrantless search of Redmond’s car.


¶ 67      Judgments affirmed.


¶ 68       JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of
       this case.




                                               - 20 -