IN THE
                                 SUPREME COURT
                                              OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                     (Docket No. 128935)

       M.U., a Minor, By and Through Her Parents Kelly U. and Nick U., Appellee,
             v. TEAM ILLINOIS HOCKEY CLUB, INC., et al., Appellants.


                                 Opinion filed March 8, 2024.



        JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford,
     and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1       At issue in this appeal is whether a youth hockey organization that leases and
     operates a portion of a public ice arena is subject to section 5-102(A) of the Illinois
     Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/5-102(A) (West 2020)) for alleged
     discrimination against a person with a disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
     a public place of accommodation. The circuit court of Du Page County held that
     the defendants in this case were not bound by section 5-102(A) and dismissed the
     plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. The
     appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 

. For the reasons that follow, taking as true the well-pleaded factual
     allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint, we hold that the defendants are subject to
     section 5-102(A). Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment reversing
     the circuit court’s judgment, and we remand the cause to the circuit court for further
     proceedings consistent with this opinion.


¶2                                         BACKGROUND

¶3       On April 20, 2021, the minor plaintiff, M.U., through her parents, Kelly U. and
     Nick U., filed a timely verified complaint in the circuit court against the defendants,
     Team Illinois Hockey Club, Inc. (Team Illinois), and the Amateur Hockey
     Association of Illinois, Inc. (AHAI). 1 The complaint made the following
     allegations, which we accept as true for purposes of this appeal. See DeHart v.
     DeHart, 

 (in ruling on a motion to dismiss under section 2-
     615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)), a court must
     accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the complaint and all reasonable inferences
     that can be drawn therefrom).

¶4       According to the complaint, Team Illinois is an Illinois not-for-profit
     corporation that operates youth hockey teams as part of the AHAI and USA
     Hockey, Inc. (USA Hockey), system. Larry Pedrie is the hockey director and
     primary executive in charge of all Team Illinois operations. Pedrie is also the coach
     for the Team Illinois Girls 14U team. AHAI, the Illinois affiliate of USA Hockey,
     is an Illinois not-for-profit corporation that regulates and controls youth hockey
     leagues, teams, and activities throughout Illinois, including Team Illinois. Mike
     Mullaly is a member of the AHAI board of directors and the central district director
     for USA Hockey.

¶5       Team Illinois offers activities and services that are open to the public, including
     club hockey teams, hockey practices, clinics, workouts, sessions to review tapes,

         1
           Prior to filing the instant complaint, M.U. exhausted her administrative remedies through the
     Illinois Department of Human Rights.




                                                   -2-
     team lunches and dinners, travel opportunities, coaching, and the opportunity to
     play in hockey games and tournaments. For its activities and services, Team Illinois
     leases and operates the Seven Bridges Ice Arena (Seven Bridges) in Woodridge,
     Illinois. Seven Bridges includes ice rinks with space for spectators, locker rooms,
     training facilities, concessions, offices for Team Illinois, and other related facilities.
     Seven Bridges is open to the public.

¶6        In 2019, M.U. signed up to play hockey with the Girls 14U team run by Team
     Illinois. The 2019-20 season began in August 2019 and coincided with M.U.’s first
     year of high school. On November 13, 2019, M.U. and her mother informed Pedrie,
     the team’s coach, that M.U. was being treated for anxiety, depression, and suicidal
     thoughts. M.U.’s mother “shared [with Pedrie] that [M.U.] had the support of
     mental health professionals and expressed that hockey was an important and
     supportive aspect of [M.U.’s] life.” After this conversation, M.U. participated in a
     practice session with her teammates. On the following day, Pedrie spoke with
     Mulally by phone about M.U.’s mental health. According to the complaint, Pedrie
     and Mulally “agreed on that phone call to banish [M.U.] from Team Illinois until
     she was able to participate 100% in Team Illinois activities.”

¶7       Pedrie called M.U.’s parents and informed them that M.U. was banned from all
     Team Illinois activities due to her suicidal thoughts from depression and anxiety
     and was not allowed to return until she was recovered and able to participate in
     100% of Team Illinois activities. Beginning on November 14, 2019, M.U. was
     banned from attending all Team Illinois events, practices, games, and tournaments,
     and she was cut off from team communications and prohibited from any contact
     with Team Illinois players. Pedrie subsequently sent an e-mail to the other players’
     families instructing them to have no contact with M.U. in person or by phone, text,
     or social media. The e-mail stated that M.U. had been removed “ ‘from any
     involvement and or communication with our team and her teammates’ ” until she
     was back to “ ‘the positive, happy, smiling kid that we all know she is.’ ” On
     December 11, 2019, M.U. was allowed to return to Team Illinois activities after her
     parents retained legal counsel and threatened litigation against the defendants.

¶8      The complaint alleged that M.U. is a person with a disability as defined in the
     Act. See 775 ILCS 5/1-103(I) (West 2020). It alleged that Seven Bridges and other
     unspecified facilities used and controlled by Team Illinois are “places of public




                                               -3-
       accommodation” as defined in section 5-101(A) of the Act. See 

 § 5-101(A). It
       alleged that both Team Illinois and AHAI are subject to the Act because they are
       “persons” as defined in the Act. See id. § 5-102(A) (“It is a civil rights violation for
       any person on the basis of unlawful discrimination to *** [d]eny or refuse to
       another the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of any
       public place of accommodation[.]”); see also id. § 1-103(L) (“ ‘Person’ includes
       one or more individuals, partnerships, associations or organizations, *** or ***
       corporations ***.”).

¶9         The first two counts of the complaint alleged that Team Illinois discriminated
       against M.U. due to her disability (count I) or, alternatively, because Team Illinois
       perceived her to have a disability (count II). Specifically, counts I and II alleged
       that Team Illinois “segregated, isolated, and excluded [M.U.] from participating in
       [and being present at] Team Illinois programs, events, and activities at Seven
       Bridges Ice Arena and other places of public accommodation,” which “denied her
       the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities and services of places of public
       accommodation offered through Team Illinois,” in violation of section 5-102(A) of
       the Act (id. § 5-102(A)). Count III alleged that AHAI, through its board member
       and agent, aided, abetted, and/or conspired with Team Illinois to commit a violation
       of the Act by discriminating against M.U. See id. § 6-101(B) (“It is a civil rights
       violation for a person, or for two or more persons to conspire, to *** [a]id, abet,
       compel or coerce a person to commit any violation of this Act[.]”). The complaint
       sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, fees, and costs.

¶ 10       On July 7, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant
       to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
       2020)). In their motion, the defendants argued, inter alia, that the complaint failed
       to state a cause of action because it failed to allege facts showing that M.U. was
       denied the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of a public
       place of accommodation. 2 The defendants contended that the complaint alleged
       that Team Illinois denied M.U. the full and equal enjoyment of a team and its
       activities, not a place. The defendants contended that this allegation was

            2
              The defendants did not challenge the plaintiff’s allegation that she was a person with a
       disability. That issue was not before the trial court, nor is it before this court. Our decision in this
       case is limited to the issues that were properly preserved in the lower courts and presented by the
       parties in this court.




                                                        -4-
       insufficient to state a claim because Team Illinois itself is not a “public place of
       accommodation” as defined in the Act (see 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A) (West 2020)).
       Alternatively, the defendants argued that the complaint failed to state a claim that
       M.U. was denied the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services
       of Seven Bridges because it did not allege that she was banned from the entire
       facility. Although M.U. was excluded from the portions of the facility that were
       reserved for members of Team Illinois, the defendants argued that M.U. retained
       the right to access the portions of the facility that were open to members of the
       public.

¶ 11       Following a hearing on September 13, 2021, the circuit court entered an order
       granting the defendants’ motion and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. On
       appeal, the appellate court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the cause
       to the circuit court for further proceedings. 

. The
       court first agreed with the defendants’ argument that Team Illinois itself is not a
       “public place of accommodation” under the Act because it is not a physical place.
       Id. ¶¶ 23-34. The appellate court rejected the defendants’ second argument,
       however. It held that the complaint stated a cause of action for a section 5-102(A)
       violation because it alleged facts to establish that (1) Seven Bridges is a “place of
       public accommodation,” (2) Team Illinois is a “ ‘person,’ ” and (3) Team Illinois
       denied to M.U. the full and equal enjoyment of the portions of the Seven Bridges
       facility (4) that were leased and operated by Team Illinois. Id. ¶¶ 35-43. The parties
       did not identify, nor did the appellate court’s research reveal, any Illinois case on
       point. Id. ¶ 36. The court, therefore, looked to federal precedent interpreting Title
       III of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), which contains similar
       language to article 5 of the Act (775 ILCS 5/art. 5 (West 2020)). 

 (citing 

(7), 12182(a) (2018)).

¶ 12       The appellate court held that PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 

 (2001)
       (Martin II), “translates directly to the instant matter.” 

. In Martin II, a professional golfer with a physical disability that prevented
       him from walking a golf course challenged a Professional Golf Association (PGA)
       Tour rule that prohibited the use of golf carts in PGA Tour events. Martin II, 

. The threshold issue in the case was whether the PGA’s tours and
       qualifying rounds were subject to Title III of the ADA, which governs public
       accommodations. 

. The United States Supreme Court held that they




                                               -5-
       were, reasoning that the events occur at public golf courses, which are specifically
       enumerated as “public accommodation[s]” under the ADA. 

. Because the
       PGA Tour leased and operated the golf courses for its qualifying rounds and tours,
       the Court held that, “[a]s a lessor and operator of golf courses, then, [it] must not
       discriminate against any ‘individual’ in the ‘full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
       services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations’ of those courses.”
       

 (quoting 

(a) (2000)). Importantly, the Court also held that
       Title III of the ADA extended not only to the areas of the golf courses that were
       open to spectators during PGA tour events but also to the areas that were reserved
       for qualified competitors in the events. 

.

¶ 13      The appellate court below compared the circumstances in the case at bar
       favorably to Martin II, holding:

              “Like the PGA Tour in Martin, Team Illinois is a membership organization
              that holds competitive sporting events at a place of public accommodation.
              Like the PGA Tour, which conceded that ‘its tournaments are conducted at
              places of public accommodation’ [citation], Team Illinois does not dispute
              that Seven Bridges is a place of public accommodation under the Act.
              Neither ‘ice rink’ nor ‘ice arena’ is listed in the Act as an example of a place
              of public accommodation. Nevertheless, by application of the interpretive
              canon ejusdem generis, these places are ‘others such like’ a golf course (also
              at issue in Martin), which is specifically listed as a place of public
              accommodation under the Act. See 775 ILCS 5/5-101(A)(13) (West 2020)
              (concerning ‘a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other
              place of exercise or recreation’). Similar to the PGA Tour in Martin,
              although Team Illinois itself is not a place of public accommodation, it
              nevertheless is subject to the Act because, as alleged in the complaint, it
              barred plaintiff on the basis of her disability from participating in Team
              Illinois events, like hockey games and tournaments, that were held at a place
              of public accommodation that it leased and operated. Team Illinois, by
              virtue of its lease and operation of a place of public accommodation, offered
              the general public at least three distinct services: (1) watching Team Illinois
              competitions; (2) open tryouts to earn membership on the team; and (3) the
              opportunity to actually play in competitive hockey games as a member of
              the team, if selected. Like in Martin, even though earning a spot to play in




                                               -6-
                competitive athletics for Team Illinois is distinctly more difficult and
                expensive than simply watching the team play, it nevertheless is a privilege
                that Team Illinois makes available to the public at Seven Bridges. [Citation.]

                    ***

                    Martin instructs that, once a place constitutes a ‘place of public
                accommodation,’ the service allegedly denied to the plaintiff need not have
                been available to the general public. The fact that Team Illinois is selective
                in choosing its members is unimportant because, under Martin, a facility
                does not lose its status as a place of public accommodation merely because
                entry to the field of play during athletic competitions is limited. [Citation.]
                Accordingly, because plaintiff earned a coveted place on Team Illinois’s
                roster, it could not then deny her on the basis of her disability the privilege
                of participation at athletic events held at places of public accommodation,
                such as Seven Bridges.” 

.

       Based on this analysis, the appellate court concluded that the allegations in M.U.’s
       complaint were sufficient to subject the defendants to section 5-102(A) of the Act.
       It held, therefore, that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint under section
       2-615 for failure to state a cause of action. Id. ¶ 43.

¶ 14       This court allowed the defendants’ petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct.
       R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021). We allowed leave to three organizations to file briefs
       as amici curiae in support of the defendants’ position. 3 Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept.
       20, 2010). We also allowed leave to the Illinois Attorney General and a separate
       joint group of organizations 4 to file briefs as amici curiae in support of M.U.’s
       position. Id.




           3
             These organizations include the Thomas More Society; USA Hockey, Inc.; and Three Fires
       Council, Inc., Boy Scouts of America.
           4
             These organizations include Equip for Equality, Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago, the
       Center for Disability & Elder Law, the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, the Epilepsy
       Foundation of Greater Chicago, Legal Council for Health Justice (IL), Equality Illinois, the Shriver
       Center on Poverty Law, and Legal Aid Chicago.




                                                      -7-
                                            ANALYSIS

¶ 15       On appeal to this court, the defendants argue that the trial court properly
       dismissed the complaint because it failed to state a cause of action for a violation
       of the Act. A motion filed under section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615
       (West 2020)) challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects
       apparent on the face of the complaint. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 

 (2006). A complaint should not be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615
       unless the plaintiff is not entitled to recovery under any possible set of facts.
       Henderson Square Condominium Ass’n v. LAB Townhomes, LLC, 

,
       ¶ 61. On appeal of a dismissal order, a reviewing court must determine whether the
       allegations in the complaint, taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to
       the nonmovant, state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Khan v.
       Deutsche Bank AG, 

. We apply a de novo standard of review
       to orders entered pursuant to section 2-615. Marshall, 

. Resolution
       of this appeal entails statutory interpretation, an issue of law that is likewise subject
       to de novo review. Andrews v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater
       Chicago, 

, ¶ 21.

¶ 16        In construing the statute, we are guided by the principle that our primary goal
       is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Alvarez v. Pappas, 

 (2008). The best indicator of legislative intent is the language in the
       statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Home Star Bank & Financial Services
       v. Emergency Care & Health Organization, Ltd., 

, ¶ 24. Where the
       language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to its plain
       meaning without resorting to supplementary aids of statutory construction.
       Petersen v. Wallach, 

 (2002). We must consider the language
       of the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the
       legislature’s apparent objective in enacting it. Van Dyke v. White, 

,
       ¶ 46.

¶ 17      The legislature’s objectives in enacting the Act are explicitly stated in section
       1-102 (775 ILCS 5/1-102 (West 2020)). One of the public policies set forth in
       subsection 1-102(A) is




                                                 -8-
              “[t]o secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from
              discrimination against any individual because of his or her race, color,
              religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, order of protection status,
              marital status, physical or mental disability, military status, sexual
              orientation, pregnancy, or unfavorable discharge from military service in
              connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial
              credit, and the availability of public accommodations.” Id. § 1-102(A).

       As remedial legislation, the Act must be liberally construed to achieve its purpose—
       here, the prevention of unlawful discrimination in public accommodations for all
       individuals. Id.; see Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human
       Rights Comm’n, 

 (2009); Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois
       University v. Department of Human Rights, 

 (1994) (Nickels,
       J., dissenting, joined by Freeman, J.).

¶ 18       Article 5 of the Act governs discrimination in the availability of public
       accommodations. 775 ILCS 5/art. 5 (West 2020). Section 5-102(A) of the Act
       states: “It is a civil rights violation for any person on the basis of unlawful
       discrimination to *** [d]eny or refuse to another the full and equal enjoyment of
       the facilities, goods, and services of any public place of accommodation.” 

 § 5-
       102(A). “Unlawful discrimination” is defined as “discrimination against a person
       because of his or her actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin,
       ancestry, age, sex, marital status, order of protection status, disability, military
       status, sexual orientation, pregnancy, or unfavorable discharge from military
       service as those terms are defined in this Section.” Id. § 1-103(Q).

¶ 19       The Act defines a “disability,” in part, as “a determinable physical or mental
       characteristic of a person, *** the history of such characteristic, or the perception
       of such characteristic by the person complained against, *** and which
       characteristic *** is unrelated to a person’s ability to utilize and benefit from a
       place of public accommodation.” Id. § 1-103(I)(4).

¶ 20      A “place of public accommodation” is defined, in its entirety, as follows:

              “ ‘Place of public accommodation’ includes, but is not limited to:




                                               -9-
    (1) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an
establishment located within a building that contains not more than 5 units
for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such
establishment as the residence of such proprietor;

   (2) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;

    (3) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place
of exhibition or entertainment;

   (4) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of
public gathering;

   (5) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping
center, or other sales or rental establishment;

    (6) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment;

   (7) public conveyances on air, water, or land;

    (8) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public
transportation;

    (9) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection;

   (10) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;

   (11) a non-sectarian nursery, day care center, elementary, secondary,
undergraduate, or postgraduate school, or other place of education;

   (12) a senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, non-sectarian
adoption agency, or other social service center establishment; and

    (13) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf course, or other place
of exercise or recreation.” Id. § 5-101(A).




                                - 10 -
¶ 21        The plain language in section 5-102(A) is clear and unambiguous. The statute
       prohibits a “person” from unlawfully discriminating against another by denying or
       refusing “the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of any
       public place of accommodation.” Id. § 5-102(A). Comparing the statutory language
       to the allegations in M.U.’s complaint, we first find that Team Illinois is a “person”
       as defined in the Act. The Act defines a “person” as “one or more individuals,
       partnerships, associations or organizations, labor organizations, labor unions, joint
       apprenticeship committees, or union labor associations, corporations, the State of
       Illinois and its instrumentalities, political subdivisions, units of local government,
       legal representatives, trustees in bankruptcy or receivers.” Id. § 1-103(L). As
       alleged in the complaint, Team Illinois fits squarely within this definition as both a
       “corporation” and an “organization.” Next, we find that Seven Bridges is a “place
       of public accommodation” within the meaning of the Act. The definition of a “place
       of public accommodation” set forth above comprises a nonexclusive list of various
       places and facilities. Id. § 5-101(A). Although the list does not include an “ice
       arena” or “ice rink,” it does include “a gymnasium, health spa, bowling alley, golf
       course, or other place of exercise or recreation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. 5-
       101(A)(13). An ice arena is obviously a “place of exercise or recreation.”
       Moreover, applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis, an ice arena is “such like” a
       gymnasium, bowling alley, or golf course as to be given the same interpretation in
       this context. See Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University, 

 (“ejusdem generis provides that when a statute lists several classes of persons
       or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated
       persons or things will be interpreted as those ‘others such like’ the named persons
       or things”).

¶ 22       The application of section 5-102(A) to the instant complaint is straightforward.
       In her complaint, M.U. alleges that Team Illinois discriminated against her because
       of her disability, i.e., depression and anxiety, or because Team Illinois perceived
       her to have a disability. The complaint alleges that Team Illinois (a “person”) leases
       and operates portions of Seven Bridges, a “place of public accommodation.” It
       alleges that Team Illinois “segregated, isolated, and excluded [M.U.] from
       participating in Team Illinois programs, events, and activities at Seven Bridges”
       because of her disability and, by doing so, “denied her the full and equal enjoyment
       of the facilities and services” of a place of public accommodation. Accepting as
       true these well-pleaded facts, as well as the reasonable inferences arising therefrom,



                                               - 11 -
       we hold that the complaint, on its face, pleads a cause of action for unlawful
       discrimination in the availability of public accommodations under section 5-
       102(A).

¶ 23        The defendants challenge this straightforward application of the plain statutory
       language. They contend that Team Illinois is not subject to section 5-102(a) for its
       conduct as pleaded in the complaint because (1) Team Illinois does not own Seven
       Bridges and therefore has no authority to bar M.U. from the entire Seven Bridges
       facility, (2) M.U. was not barred from the entire facility, and (3) the portions of
       Seven Bridges used by Team Illinois, a private entity, were not open to the public
       at large. 5

¶ 24       In their briefs, the defendants argue that

                “[s]ection 5 [of the Act] cannot be stretched to reach all manner of
                organizations, clubs, programs, and businesses based solely on the locations
                where those organizations may meet or hold events. This is particularly true
                where—as here—the organization in question has a pre-screening process
                and is not truly open to the public at large.”

       The defendants expand on this argument with the following hypothetical:

                “When an organization rents, uses, or reserves space for a private event that
                space is no longer open to the public. When, for example, the Du Page
                County Bar Association reserves a room at the Wheaton Library for a
                committee meeting, that room ceases to be open to the public. It is closed
                for a private event. Members of the public—regardless of who they are—
                are not permitted to crash that event.

                   It is no different for Team Illinois. When Team Illinois’ U-14 girls’ team
                uses the locker rooms at Seven Bridges before a game, members of the
                public are no longer free to simply drop in and use the locker room.


           5
             As the appellate court below noted, the defendants did not argue in their motion to dismiss that
       M.U. failed to plead that she was a person with a disability or that her civil rights were violated.
       

, 45 n.5. Thus, these points have been conceded and are not at issue
       in this appeal.




                                                      - 12 -
              Therefore, the portions of Seven Bridges being rented by Team Illinois were
              not open to the public.”

       The defendants further argue that M.U. never alleged that she was “barred from
       using the Seven Bridges facility. On the contrary, she could enter Seven Bridges,
       watch games, take skating lessons, eat at the restaurant, and skate during free skate.
       Based on her allegations, M.U. had the same access to Seven Bridges as any other
       member of the public.”

¶ 25        The defendants’ arguments essentially boil down to two points: (1) a private
       organization that occupies a portion of a place of public accommodation is not
       bound by section 5-102(A) and (2) the only persons with a cause of action under
       section 5-102(A) are those individuals who have been denied the full and equal
       enjoyment of the portion of a place of public accommodation that is fully open to
       the public. We disagree with both points. Neither of these arguments shields Team
       Illinois from the reach of the statute.

¶ 26       The language in section 5-102(A) does not delineate between the “portions” of
       a place of public accommodation that are subject to the Act and the “portions” that
       are not. It does not state that only a member of the “public at large” can file an
       antidiscrimination claim, nor does it restrict a claim to those portions of the facility
       that are open to the public at large. The defendants’ interpretation reads additional
       language into the statute to reach the desired result. This court may not depart from
       the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
       conditions that the legislature did not express. Lawler v. University of Chicago
       Medical Center, 

. Furthermore, the limitations the defendants
       seek to read into the Act are contrary to the liberal construction that must be given
       to the Act. See Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 

. Reading
       the statute liberally, it applies to a member of an organization who, because of her
       disability, has been denied the “full and equal enjoyment” of a place of public
       accommodation. (Emphasis added.) 775 ILCS 5/5-102(A) (West 2020). In this
       case, M.U., a member of Team Illinois, alleges that she was denied the full and
       equal enjoyment of the parts of the facility that remained open to similarly situated
       individuals—members of Team Illinois. These allegations are sufficient to state a
       cause of action under section 5-102(A).




                                                - 13 -
¶ 27      Our interpretation of section 5-102(A) is supported by persuasive federal case
       law construing Title III of the ADA, which contains similar language to section 5-
       102(A). See Zaderaka v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 

       (1989) (in the absence of relevant state authority, it is appropriate to rely on federal
       law interpreting similar legislation for guidance); see also Lau v. Abbott
       Laboratories, 

. The general antidiscrimination
       provision in Title III of the ADA states:

                  “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability
              in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
              advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
              any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
              accommodation.” 

(a).

¶ 28       In Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 

 (9th Cir. 2000) (Martin I), a
       disabled professional golfer filed a discrimination claim against the PGA seeking
       an exception from the PGA’s “walking rule” to allow him to ride a golf cart during
       PGA competitions. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon held
       that the PGA was subject to Title III of the ADA because it owns, operates, and
       leases golf courses, which the ADA identifies as places of public accommodation.
       

 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the PGA
       argued that, although the golf course was a place of public accommodation with
       regard to the spectator areas, the competitors’ area “ ‘behind the ropes’ ” was not a
       place of public accommodation because the public had no right to enter it. 

. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, holding it “too narrowly construe[d]
       the nature of a public accommodation.” 

 The court explained:

              “It is true that the general public cannot enter the area ‘inside the ropes,’ but
              competitors, caddies, and certain other personnel can. *** The statute does
              not restrict this definition [of a ‘public accommodation’] to those portions
              of the place of exhibition that are open to the general public. The fact that
              entry to a part of a public accommodation may be limited does not deprive
              the facility of its character as a public accommodation. [Citation.] Indeed,
              the underlying premise of the cases dealing with disabled student athletes is
              that Title III applies to the playing field, not just the stands.” 

 at 997-98
              (citing Bowers v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 

,




                                                - 14 -
              483-90 (D. N.J. 1998), Tatum v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 

 (E.D. Mo. 1998), Ganden v. National Collegiate Athletic
              Ass’n, No. 96 C 6953, 

, at *8-11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996),
              and Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 

 (D.
              Ariz. 1992)).

       See also Matthews v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 

 (E.D. Wash. 2001).

¶ 29       The Ninth Circuit also rejected the PGA’s argument that “the fact that its
       tournaments are restricted to the nation’s best golfers means that the courses on
       which they play during tournaments cannot be places of public accommodation.”
       (Emphasis in original.) Martin I, 

. The court reasoned that a
       winnowing process that begins with a competition being open to members of the
       public and results in the selection of a group of elite athletes does not change the
       nature of the facility itself. 

. It stated, “We see no justification in reason
       or in the statute to draw a line beyond which the performance of athletes becomes
       so excellent that a competition restricted to their level deprives its situs of the
       character of a public accommodation.” 

¶ 30       The PGA appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, and the
       Court affirmed the judgment. Martin II, 

. In the Supreme Court, the
       PGA abandoned its argument that “the competitors’ area ‘behind the ropes’ is not
       a public accommodation, notwithstanding the status of the rest of the golf course.”
       

. Instead, the PGA reframed the issue by arguing that the competing
       golfers were not members of the class protected by Title III of the ADA. 

.
       The Court disagreed, stating:

              “In our view, petitioner’s tournaments (whether situated at a ‘golf course’
              or at a ‘place of exhibition or entertainment’) simultaneously offer at least
              two ‘privileges’ to the public—that of watching the golf competition and
              that of competing in it. Although the latter is more difficult and more
              expensive to obtain than the former, it is nonetheless a privilege that
              petitioner makes available to members of the general public. In
              consideration of the entry fee, any golfer with the requisite letters of
              recommendation acquires the opportunity to qualify for and compete in
              petitioner’s tours. Additionally, any golfer who succeeds in the open



                                                - 15 -
              qualifying rounds for a tournament may play in the event. That petitioner
              identifies one set of clients or customers that it serves (spectators at
              tournaments) does not preclude it from having another set (players in
              tournaments) against whom it may not discriminate. It would be
              inconsistent with the literal text of the statute as well as its expansive
              purpose to read Title III’s coverage, even given petitioner’s suggested
              limitation, any less broadly.” 

.

¶ 31        The reasoning set forth in Martin I and Martin II is directly applicable to this
       case. M.U. tried out for, and was accepted as a member of, Team Illinois. She
       alleges that Team Illinois discriminated against her by restricting her from the
       portions of a place of public accommodation that were reserved for Team Illinois
       members. Team Illinois cannot escape liability under section 5-102(A) by claiming
       that M.U. was not barred from the parts of the facility that were open to the public
       at large. Like the competitive areas “behind the ropes” on golf courses, the areas of
       Seven Bridges that are restricted to members of Team Illinois are no less a place of
       public accommodation than the areas that are open to the general public. See Martin
       I, 

.

¶ 32        The defendants attempt to distinguish Martin by arguing that Team Illinois
       lacks a “close connection to a specific facility,” unlike the PGA Tour and its golf
       courses. See Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America, 

 (7th Cir.
       1993) (holding that the Boy Scouts of America was not subject to Title II of the
       Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)-(b) (1988)) because it was a
       membership organization that was not closely connected to a specific physical
       facility). The defendants argue that “there is a significant difference between an
       entity that occupies a facility so comprehensively that it becomes synonymous with
       the facility, and an entity such as Team Illinois that is just one of many
       organizations that rents a space during a specified time and then vacates that space
       to make room for the next renter.” We disagree. According to the complaint, Team
       Illinois leases parts of Seven Bridges, has its office at Seven Bridges, and uses the
       facility as the primary location for its activities. Thus, the defendants fail to
       distinguish Martin on the basis that Team Illinois lacks a sufficient nexus with a
       place of public accommodation.




                                              - 16 -
¶ 33       The defendants make several other arguments in opposition to our interpretation
       of section 5-102(A), but none of these arguments are persuasive. They contend that
       applying the statute to the facts in this case will have the effect of “reaching into
       the affairs” of religious, academic, political, charitable, and other private
       organizations, including their decisions on funding, membership, personnel, and
       internal disciplinary matters. We disagree. By its terms, section 5-102(A) does not
       subject all activities of an organization to the Act. It is strictly limited to actions
       that deny a person the full and equal enjoyment of a place of public accommodation.

¶ 34        The defendants next contend that Team Illinois itself is not a place of public
       accommodation under the Act because places of public accommodation are limited
       to physical places and do not include member organizations. We need not decide
       this question because we have already held that the complaint states a cause of
       action sufficient to survive dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code. While we
       note that the complaint refers to Team Illinois as a “place of public
       accommodation” in two places, the gist of the complaint is that Team Illinois denied
       M.U. the full and equal enjoyment of the facilities, goods, and services of Seven
       Bridges. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois High School Ass’n, No. 12 C
       3758, 

, at *4-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2012) (holding that it was
       unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the Illinois High School Association
       (IHSA) was a place of public accommodation because the complaint sufficiently
       alleged that the IHSA operated track and swimming facilities to which the plaintiff
       was denied access). “A motion to dismiss [under section 2-615] does not lie as long
       as a good cause of action is stated ***.” Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 

 (1994). The only question before this court is whether the complaint
       states a cause of action upon which relief may be granted. Beahringer v. Page, 

 (2003). It does. We therefore do not need to determine whether the
       complaint states a separate cause of action based on an alternate reading of the
       factual allegations.

¶ 35       The defendants’ final contention is that this court should “articulate the legal
       standards that govern application” of the “private club” exemption in section 5-
       103(A) of the Act. 775 ILCS 5/5-103(A) (West 2020). Section 5-103(A) states:

              “Nothing in this Article shall apply to:




                                               - 17 -
                  *** A private club, or other establishment not in fact open to the public,
              except to the extent that the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
              advantages, or accommodations of the establishment are made available to
              the customers or patrons of another establishment that is a place of public
              accommodation.” 

       The private club exemption is a defense to the allegation that a defendant is a place
       of public accommodation. See Hardie v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No.
       13-CV-0346 (RBB), 

, at *6 (S.D. Calif. May 30, 2013).

¶ 36       We decline the defendants’ request to provide guidance regarding the
       parameters of the private club exemption. In its motion to dismiss, the defendants
       alleged that Team Illinois is a private club that is exempt from the Act under section
       5-103(A). However, even if this were true, M.U.’s theory of liability is not
       dependent on finding that Team Illinois is a place of public accommodation. The
       defendants do not contend that Seven Bridges is a private club. Consequently, any
       guidance this court might provide on this exception would amount to an advisory
       opinion. See People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 

 (1990) (“Our
       jurisdiction is restricted to cases which present an actual controversy, and we
       decline to issue advisory opinions on moot or abstract questions of law.”).


¶ 37                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 38       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment that
       reversed the circuit court’s order dismissing the complaint with prejudice. We
       remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this
       opinion.


¶ 39      Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 40      Circuit court judgment reversed.

¶ 41      Cause remanded.




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