IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT

                                             OF
                           THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                    (Docket No. 129183)

                 TRI-PLEX TECHNICAL SERVICES, LTD., Appellee, v.
                          JON-DON, LLC, et al., Appellants.


                                 Opinion filed May 23, 2024.



        JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford,
     and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1       The plaintiff, Tri-Plex Technical Services, Ltd., filed a complaint in the circuit
     court of St. Clair County against the defendants, Jon-Don, LLC; Legend Brands,
     Inc.; Chemical Technologies International, Inc.; Bridgepoint Systems; Groom
     Solutions; and Hydramaster, LLC, alleging violations of the Illinois Uniform
     Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Deceptive Trade Practices Act) (815 ILCS 510/1
     et seq. (West 2020)) and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
     Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2020)). The
     circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice on numerous
     grounds, including that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim
     and that the plaintiff lacked standing. The appellate court reversed the judgment of
     the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings. 

. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate
     court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff’s
     complaint.


¶2                                     BACKGROUND

¶3      The plaintiff is an Illinois corporation that develops, manufactures, distributes,
     and sells commercial-grade carpet cleaning products to carpet cleaning companies.
     The defendants are the plaintiff’s competitors and are companies that also either
     develop, manufacture, distribute, and/or sell commercial-grade carpet cleaning
     products in Illinois.

¶4        On March 25, 2020, the plaintiff filed its complaint pursuant to the Deceptive
     Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act. As ultimately amended, the
     plaintiff’s complaint alleged generally that each defendant “omit[s] from its
     labeling” and “fail[s] to disclose” that its cleaning products contain excessive
     amounts of phosphorous, in violation of the Regulation of Phosphorus in
     Detergents Act (Detergents Act) (415 ILCS 92/5 (West 2020)), as well as excessive
     amounts of volatile organic material (VOM), in violation of an environmental
     regulation promulgated by the Pollution Control Board (VOM regulation) (35 Ill.
     Adm. Code 223.205(a)(17)(B) (2012)). The complaint asserted that the amounts of
     phosphorus and VOM in the defendants’ products render the products “illegal in
     Illinois,” unbeknownst to the commercial carpet cleaning companies that purchase
     the defendants’ products. The complaint further alleged that this harms the plaintiff
     because the plaintiff’s “products comply with Illinois law” and the carpet cleaning
     companies “prefer and purchase [the defendants’] products because they contain
     [phosphorus] and clean better, albeit illegally.”

¶5      The plaintiff’s complaint contained separate counts directed against each
     defendant alleging identical violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the



                                              -2-
     Consumer Fraud Act. In the Deceptive Trade Practices Act counts, the complaint
     alleged that each defendant distributed and sold its products in Illinois while
     “omitting the material fact” that the products “violate Illinois law.” This created “a
     likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding” and, therefore, according to the
     complaint, constituted a deceptive trade practice within the meaning of the
     Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The complaint further alleged that each defendant
     willfully engaged in these deceptive practices and that the plaintiff “suffered and
     continues to suffer a loss of the ability to compete in the marketplace and a loss of
     sales” caused by the deceptive practices. The complaint asked the circuit court to
     find that the defendants willfully engaged in deceptive trade practices, to enjoin the
     defendants from distributing or selling their products in Illinois, to award the
     plaintiff attorney fees, and for other “just and proper” relief.

¶6        In the Consumer Fraud Act counts, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the
     defendants each employed “deception, fraud and false pretenses to conceal,
     suppress and omit the material facts” that their products “do not comply with
     Illinois law” and that the products “exposed reasonable consumers to unwanted,
     harmful, illegal levels of chemical exposure.” The complaint further alleged that
     the defendants intended for others to rely upon these material omissions and that,
     if the defendants had stated on their labeling or packaging that their products are
     “illegal under Illinois law and that they could neither be purchased nor sold legally
     in Illinois, then no reasonable person would purchase” those products. The
     complaint asserted that the plaintiff “is unable to fairly compete” with the
     defendants and, therefore, the defendants’ “conduct directly and proximately
     caused substantial injury” to the plaintiff. The complaint asked the circuit court to
     find that the defendants willfully violated the Consumer Fraud Act; to enjoin the
     defendants from distributing or selling their products in Illinois; to award the
     plaintiff actual damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs; to assess punitive
     damages against the defendants for their “willful violations of Illinois law”; and for
     other “just and proper” relief.

¶7       The plaintiff’s complaint also contained a single count alleging a civil
     conspiracy by two of the defendants, Jon-Don, LLC, and Legend Brands, Inc. The
     complaint alleged that the two defendants entered into an agreement to develop and
     sell carpet cleaning products that violate Illinois environmental laws. That




                                             -3-
       agreement is alleged to have caused the plaintiff “to suffer a significant loss of
       sales.”

¶8         The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for
       failure to state a cause of action under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
       (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2020)), as well as motions to dismiss the
       complaint for lack of standing under section 2-619 of the Code (id. § 2-619). The
       defendants adopted each other’s arguments.

¶9          Following a hearing on the defendants’ motions, the circuit court dismissed the
       plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. Relevant here, the circuit court determined that
       “the State maintains exclusive enforcement authority” over the environmental laws
       at issue in this case and, therefore, the violations of those laws cannot be “within
       the scope of conduct” covered by the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the
       Consumer Fraud Act. The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff could not use
       the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act as a “back door
       method” to bring an otherwise impermissible private cause of action against the
       defendants for violation of the State’s environmental laws. Accordingly, the circuit
       court dismissed the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act
       counts of the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

¶ 10       The circuit court also found that the plaintiff had failed to establish standing
       with respect to its claims under the Consumer Fraud Act. The circuit court further
       determined that, to establish standing for these claims, the plaintiff was required to
       satisfy the so-called “consumer nexus test,” since the plaintiff was not a purchaser
       or consumer of the defendants’ products. The circuit court concluded that the
       plaintiff did not satisfy this test because the defendants’ alleged conduct, which
       formed the basis of the plaintiff’s complaint, was directed at other businesses.
       Specifically, the defendants’ conduct was directed at businesses such as
       commercial carpet cleaning companies and was not marketed to consumers directly
       or generally. The trial court then dismissed the remaining civil conspiracy claim
       since it was “based on the same alleged conduct” as the other failed claims.

¶ 11       The plaintiff appealed, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the
       circuit court. 

. The appellate court held that the circuit
       court erred in finding that violations of the Detergents Act and the VOM regulation
       could not form the basis for claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and



                                               -4-
       the Consumer Fraud Act. 

. The appellate court reasoned that, while
       environmental laws are enforced by the State, the plaintiff’s claims were not
       brought under those laws. 

. “Rather, the plaintiff invoked those laws and
       regulations as evidence to support its claims of unfair competition and unfair
       practices.” 

 The appellate court found that the plaintiff’s complaint simply used
       the environmental laws as “a quantum of proof regarding the deceptive actions.”
       

. The appellate court therefore held that the circuit court improperly
       dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that violations of the Detergents
       Act and the VOM regulation could not support its claims under the Consumer Fraud
       Act and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 

¶ 12        The appellate court then turned to the circuit court’s determination that the
       plaintiff did not establish standing for its Consumer Fraud Act claims. 

. The
       appellate court noted that the Consumer Fraud Act’s protections are not limited to
       consumers, as the full title of the Consumer Fraud Act is “ ‘An Act to protect
       consumers and borrowers and businessmen against fraud, unfair methods of
       competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
       commerce ***.’ ” 

 ¶ 42 (quoting Sullivan’s Wholesale Drug Co. v. Faryl’s
       Pharmacy, Inc., 

 (1991)). Because the plaintiff
       conceded it is not a consumer of the defendants’ products, the appellate court stated
       it needed to determine “whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish
       standing under the ‘consumer nexus’ test.” Id. ¶ 43. The appellate court found that
       the plaintiff satisfied the consumer nexus test because it alleged that the defendants
       directed deceptive practices toward consumers and created an anticompetitive
       effect on the market. Id. ¶ 45. Thus, the appellate court held that the plaintiff had
       established standing through the consumer nexus test for its Consumer Fraud Act
       claims and so the circuit court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for
       lack of standing. Id. Finally, the appellate court held that, since the plaintiff
       adequately asserted claims under the Consumer Fraud Act and the Deceptive Trade
       Practices Act, its civil conspiracy claim also survived. Id. ¶ 62.

¶ 13      This court granted the defendants’ petition to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
       Oct. 1, 2021). We allowed the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to file an
       amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345(a) (eff. Sept. 20,
       2010).




                                                -5-
¶ 14                                      ANALYSIS

¶ 15                         Deceptive Trade Practices Act Claims

¶ 16      The Deceptive Trade Practices Act states, in relevant part, that

          “[a] person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his or
          her business, vocation or occupation, the person:

                  ***

                 (2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the
              source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods ***;

                                              ***

                 (5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,
              characteristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not
              have ***; [or]

                                              ***

                  (12) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood
              of confusion or misunderstanding.” 815 ILCS 510/2(a)(2), (5), (12) (West
              2020).

¶ 17        The purpose of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is to prohibit unfair
       competition. Phillips v. Cox, 

 (1994). As such, the statute
       “ ‘is primarily directed towards acts which unreasonably interfere with another’s
       conduct of his business.’ ” 

 (quoting Popp v. Cash Station, Inc., 

 (1992)). The Deceptive Trade Practices Act does not provide a private cause
       of action for damages. Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co., 

       (1985). Instead, the statute authorizes private lawsuits for injunctive relief. 815
       ILCS 510/3 (West 2020) (“A person likely to be damaged by a deceptive trade
       practice of another may be granted injunctive relief upon terms that the court
       considers reasonable.”); see Glazewski, 

 (noting that plaintiffs
       under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act will “often be more interested in stopping
       the unlawful conduct than collecting damages, which may not be readily
       measurable”).




                                               -6-
¶ 18       In this case, the defendants contend that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not
       pled a deceptive act or practice within the meaning of the Deceptive Trade Practices
       Act. The defendants rest their argument on the premise that both the Detergents Act
       and Illinois’s Environmental Protection Act (Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West
       2020)) and its associated regulations “can only be enforced by the State.” The
       defendants argue that the Deceptive Trade Practices Act cannot be used by the
       plaintiff “to assert claims that rest entirely on allegations that [the defendants] have
       violated environmental laws that are not otherwise privately enforceable.” To allow
       the plaintiff’s claims to go forward under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the
       defendants reason, would impermissibly create a private cause of action for
       violations of environmental laws when such an action is not permitted under Illinois
       law. For this reason, the defendants contend, the circuit court properly dismissed
       the Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims.

¶ 19       We agree with the defendants that the circuit court properly dismissed the
       plaintiff’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims. However, we reach this result for
       reasons other than those asserted by the defendants.

¶ 20        Contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the State does not maintain the exclusive
       authority to enforce environmental laws in Illinois. Section 45(b) of the Act
       provides that “[a]ny person adversely affected in fact by a violation of this Act” or
       of regulations adopted thereunder “may sue for injunctive relief against such
       violation.” 

 § 45(b). Significantly though, this statement comes with an
       important qualification. The next sentence of section 45(b) states that “no action
       shall be brought under this Section until 30 days after the plaintiff has been denied
       relief by the Board in a proceeding brought under subsection (d)(1) of Section 31
       of this Act.” Id. Section 31(d)(1) of the Act provides, in turn, that “[a]ny person
       may file with the [Pollution Control] Board a complaint *** against any person
       allegedly violating this Act, any rule or regulation adopted under this Act, any
       permit or term or condition of a permit, or any Board order.” Id. § 31(b).

¶ 21       Notably, the Act expressly authorizes the State, through the attorney general or
       a state’s attorney, to file original actions for injunctive relief in the circuit court for
       violations of environmental laws and regulations. See id. § 43(a). However, no such
       authorization exists for the filing of injunctive claims by private parties. Instead,
       for private parties, the plain language of section 45(b) dictates that a plaintiff




                                                  -7-
       seeking injunctive relief based on environmental violations must first pursue an
       administrative remedy before the Pollution Control Board, the adjudicative body
       charged with hearing environmental disputes.

¶ 22       For private parties, section 45(b) bars a complaint for injunctive relief in circuit
       court based on violations of environmental laws until a ruling from the Pollution
       Control Board is first obtained. That did not happen here. The alleged violations of
       both laws underlying the plaintiff’s complaint could have been brought under
       section 31(d)(1): the Detergents Act is enforced by the Pollution Control Board
       (415 ILCS 92/5(e) (West 2020)), and the VOM regulation was promulgated by the
       Pollution Control Board under the authority of the Act (415 ILCS 5/27(a) (West
       2020)). Yet, despite this available procedural avenue, counsel for the plaintiff
       indicated during oral argument before this court that the plaintiff has not sought nor
       pursued administrative relief.

¶ 23       The plaintiff notes that its primary reason for seeking an injunction to stop the
       defendants from selling their products was to prevent the loss of the plaintiff’s
       customers and not to protect the public from environmental harm caused by the
       defendants. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the relief sought by the plaintiff
       under its Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims—an injunction based on violations
       of the relevant environmental laws—is indistinguishable from what is initially
       required to be considered by the Pollution Control Board. Fundamentally, the
       plaintiff’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims in this case are not “substantially
       different than the normal dispute over alleged environmental damage which the
       legislature has determined should be brought in the first instance before the
       Pollution Control Board when not brought by a public official.” Decatur Auto
       Auction, Inc. v. Macon County Farm Bureau, Inc., 

 (1993).
       Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act seeking
       injunctive relief for violations of the Detergents Act and the VOM regulation must
       be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 

¶ 24                               Consumer Fraud Act Claims

¶ 25       Unlike the plaintiff’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims, its claims under the
       Consumer Fraud Act are not limited solely to seeking injunctive relief. For this
       reason, our analysis regarding the Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims cannot



                                                -8-
       completely resolve the Consumer Fraud Act claims. Nevertheless, for the following
       reasons, we conclude that the circuit court properly dismissed those counts of the
       plaintiff’s complaint alleging a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.

¶ 26       A plaintiff who asserts a private cause of action under section 10a(a) of the
       Consumer Fraud Act must allege the following elements: “(1) a deceptive act or
       practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the
       deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception in the course of conduct involving
       trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff (5) proximately caused
       by the deception.” Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 

 (2002); see
       De Bouse v. Bayer, 

 (2009); Barbara’s Sales, Inc. v. Intel Corp.,
       

 (2007); Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
       

 (2005). Section 10a(a) of the Act expressly requires proof that
       the plaintiff suffered “actual damage,” as well as proof that the damage occurred
       “as a result of” a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. 815 ILCS 505/10a(a) (West
       2020); Oliveira, 

. This statutory language “imposes a proximate
       causation requirement” for private causes of action under the Consumer Fraud Act.
       Oliveira, 

. In order to establish the element of proximate causation,
       a plaintiff must prove that it was actually deceived by the misrepresentation. Avery,
       

. If the plaintiff has neither seen nor heard a deceptive statement,
       it cannot have relied on the statement and, consequently, cannot prove that the
       statement was the proximate cause of its injury. De Bouse, 

.

¶ 27       This court elaborated on the proximate causation requirement in Shannon v.
       Boise Cascade Corp., 

 (2004). There, a group of homeowners filed
       a private cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act against the manufacturer
       of the composite siding on their homes. 

. The homeowners alleged that
       the manufacturer had deceptively advertised the composite siding, making false
       representations as to its quality and failing to disclose that the siding had a “ ‘high
       rate of failure’ ” and required “ ‘highly particularized maintenance.’ ” 

.
       The homeowners conceded that they had not received any representations regarding
       the siding from the manufacturer. 

¶ 28       Relying on Oliveira, this court held that, because the deceptive advertising was
       not received by the homeowners, it could not be the proximate cause of their
       injuries. 

. We explained:




                                                -9-
          “[The homeowners’] complaint in this case does not allege that any deceptive
          advertising by [the manufacturer] was received by any [homeowner], or that it
          was received by any builder, architect, engineer, or other like person somehow
          connected with a [homeowner]. *** The advertising in Oliveira and in this case
          did not in any way deceive the plaintiffs, and thus could not have proximately
          caused the claimed damages, whatever their nature.” 

       While the deceptive statements need not be conveyed directly to the plaintiffs,
       proximate cause requires that the plaintiffs must be the intended target of the
       alleged deception. 

 Accordingly, because the homeowners’ pleadings relied only
       on an alleged deception of unspecified persons having no demonstrated connection
       to the homeowners, their Consumer Fraud Act claim failed. 

.

¶ 29       Like the homeowners in Shannon, the plaintiff in this case fails to allege in its
       complaint that the defendants intended for the plaintiff to rely upon the alleged
       misrepresentations on their product labels. Rather, the plaintiff alleges that the
       defendants intended for the carpet cleaning companies that purchased the
       defendant’s products to rely upon the alleged misrepresentations. Furthermore, the
       plaintiff concedes it is not a purchaser or consumer of the defendants’ products.
       The allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint thus are insufficient to establish the
       proximate cause element for a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. See
       Oliveira, 

 (to adequately plead a private cause of action for a
       violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, a plaintiff must allege a deceptive act or
       practice by the defendant and the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the
       deception). As such, the plaintiff has failed to plead all the elements of a Consumer
       Fraud Act claim.

¶ 30       Nevertheless, the appellate court below held that the plaintiff sufficiently
       alleged a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act because it satisfied the so-
       called “consumer nexus test.” 

. Although
       the appellate court couched its holding in a discussion about “standing,” the
       practical effect of the appellate court’s ruling was to excuse the plaintiff from
       pleading the proximate cause element of its cause of action. We disagree with this
       analysis.

¶ 31       The term “consumer nexus” does not appear in the Consumer Fraud Act, and
       this court has never addressed the “consumer nexus test.” The first mention of the



                                              - 10 -
       term in the appellate court appeared in a 1998 decision, Brody v. Finch University
       of Health Sciences/The Chicago Medical School, 

 (1998). In
       Brody, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for breach of implied contract, common-law
       fraud, and a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act against the defendant medical
       school. 

. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant falsely represented that
       students who enrolled in the defendant’s “Applied Physiology Program” and
       received a grade point average of 3.0 or higher would be admitted to the defendant’s
       medical school; then it reneged on that promise on the first day of orientation. 

       Following a trial, the circuit court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to introduce
       sufficient evidence in support of their cause of action under the Consumer Fraud
       Act, and it entered a judgment for the defendant on that claim. 

. The
       appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment as to the Consumer Fraud Act
       claim. 

.

¶ 32       The Brody court first held that the evidence at trial established all the required
       elements for a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. 

. Nevertheless, the
       court held that the plaintiffs’ claim failed because they did not satisfy their
       obligation to “plead an implication of consumer protection concerns” in their
       complaint. 

. The court held that the Consumer Fraud Act is not
       intended to apply to every commercial transaction or every dispute arising from a
       breach of contract. 

. In short, “[a] breach of contract, without more, is
       insufficient to sustain a cause of action cognizable under the Consumer Fraud Act.”
       

. For this reason, the court held, claims brought under the Consumer Fraud
       Act must satisfy the “ ‘consumer nexus test.’ ” 

 The court explained that this test
       involves the following inquiry:

          “ ‘[W]here a plaintiff attempts to allege a violation of the [Consumer Fraud]
          Act in a case which appears on its face to involve only a breach of contract, the
          relevant inquiry is “whether the alleged conduct [involves trade practices
          addressed to the market generally or otherwise] implicates consumer protection
          concerns.” ’ ” 

 at 159 (quoting Lake County Grading Co. of Libertyville, Inc.
          v. Advance Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 

 (1995),
          quoting Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. v. Wigglesworth Imports, Inc., 

 (1989)).




                                               - 11 -
¶ 33        To the extent that the appellate court below applied the consumer nexus test as
       set forth in Brody, we find that Brody and its progeny have no bearing on this case.
       This case does not involve a breach of contract or any other commercial transaction
       between the parties. The plaintiff has not alleged any contractual or transactional
       relationship between itself and the defendants. Accordingly, we make no ruling on
       the validity of the consumer nexus test if it takes place in the context of a complaint
       arising out of an alleged breach of contract.

¶ 34       We recognize, however, that there is another line of state and federal cases that
       have applied the “consumer nexus test” in a slightly different fashion. For instance,
       in Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc., a car dealership filed suit against another car
       dealership, alleging three claims: a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, tortious
       interference with business, and libel, all based on the defendant’s brochure that
       allegedly reported false information about the plaintiff’s services. Downers Grove
       Volkswagen, Inc., 

. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s
       Consumer Fraud Act count for failure to state a cause of action because the plaintiff
       was not a “consumer” under the Act. 

. The appellate court reversed the
       judgment of dismissal. 

.

¶ 35       The appellate court in Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. stated that the
       Consumer Fraud Act should be liberally construed and is not limited exclusively to
       the protection of consumers. 

 The court further held that, where a Consumer
       Fraud Act claim involves a dispute between two businesses who are not consumers
       of each other’s products, a court should apply the following test to determine
       whether the claim is actionable:

          “ ‘[D]eceptive conduct is not actionable under the Consumer Fraud Act unless
          the conduct involves trade practices addressed to the market generally or
          otherwise implicates consumer protection concerns. [Citation.] However,
          businesses have standing to sue under the Consumer Fraud Act to redress
          competitive injury they suffer when other businesses deceive customers.
          [Citation.]’ ” 

 at 532 (quoting Pain Prevention Lab, Inc. v. Electronic
          Waveform Labs, Inc., 

 (N.D. Ill. 1987)).

¶ 36       Applying this test, the appellate court held, “[h]ere, where plaintiff has alleged
       defendant published false information about its prices for services, plaintiff has
       alleged conduct which implicates consumer-protection concerns. Thus, plaintiff has



                                               - 12 -
       standing to sue under the [Consumer Fraud] Act.” Id. at 534. Having found that the
       plaintiff alleged it had standing pursuant to the test set forth above, the appellate
       court reversed the circuit court’s judgment dismissing the complaint for the failure
       to plead a sufficient cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act. Id.

¶ 37        Subsequent cases in our appellate court and the federal courts have referred to
       the test set forth in Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc., 

, as
       the “consumer nexus test” and applied it to a variety of disputes involving
       Consumer Fraud Act claims brought by businesses who are not consumers of the
       defendant’s products. However, the problem with this body of case law is that it is
       irreconcilable with the language in the Consumer Fraud Act that imposes a
       proximate cause requirement. As we explained in Oliveira, the statutory language
       expressly requires a plaintiff to plead and prove that the deceptive act or practice
       proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, which means that the plaintiff must be the
       intended target of the alleged deception. Oliveira, 

; Shannon, 

. Moreover, Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc., and many cases that
       adopted the analysis in that opinion predated this court’s decision in Oliveira, where
       we held that a plaintiff who brings a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud Act
       must allege “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s
       intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the occurrence of the deception in
       the course of conduct involving trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the
       plaintiff (5) proximately caused by the deception.” Oliveira, 

.

¶ 38       Accordingly, to the extent that Downers Grove Volkswagen, Inc. and other
       appellate court decisions hold that a business bringing a claim under the Consumer
       Fraud Act need not allege or establish all the elements set forth in Oliveira, those
       decisions are overruled. A business plaintiff must meet the same requirements and
       allege the same elements as any other plaintiff when bringing a claim under the
       Consumer Fraud Act. There is no “consumer nexus” exemption that relieves a
       business plaintiff from alleging facts in support of the element of proximate cause.
       Because the plaintiff in this case did not plead that it was the intended recipient of
       the defendants’ alleged deceptions, it failed to plead all the elements of a Consumer
       Fraud Act claim. Accordingly, the circuit court correctly dismissed those counts of
       the plaintiff’s complaint alleging a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.




                                               - 13 -
¶ 39                                    Civil Conspiracy

¶ 40       “Civil conspiracy is defined as a combination of two or more persons for the
       purpose of accomplishing, by some concerted action, either an unlawful purpose or
       a lawful purpose by unlawful means.” Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n, 

. To state a civil conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege an agreement
       and a tortious act committed in furtherance of that agreement. Id. ¶ 20.

¶ 41       The essence of a conspiracy claim is not the agreement but rather the tortious
       acts performed in furtherance of the agreement. Adcock v. Brakegate, Ltd., 

 (1994). It necessarily follows, therefore, that a conspiracy is not an
       independent tort and, where a plaintiff fails to state an independent cause of action
       underlying the conspiracy allegations, the claim for conspiracy also fails. See Süd
       Family Ltd. Partnership v. Otto Baum Co., 

.

¶ 42       Here, the parties do not dispute that the plaintiff’s conspiracy claim rests upon
       the validity of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act
       claims. For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiff has failed to state an
       independent cause of action under either of those statutes. Consequently, the circuit
       court correctly dismissed the civil conspiracy count of the plaintiff’s complaint.


¶ 43                                    CONCLUSION

¶ 44      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed. The
       judgment of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint is affirmed.


¶ 45      Appellate court judgment reversed.

¶ 46      Circuit court judgment affirmed.




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