IN THE
                                SUPREME COURT

                                            OF
                          THE STATE OF ILLINOIS




                                    (Docket No. 129244)

               THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
                        CHAR M. SHUNICK, Appellant.


                                Opinion filed May 23, 2024.



        JUSTICE OVERSTREET delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

        Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Holder White, Cunningham,
     Rochford, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1       Petitioner, Char M. Shunick, filed a petition for postconviction relief pursuant
     to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2020). The
     circuit court of Knox County summarily dismissed the petition at the first stage and
     denied petitioner’s motion to reconsider the dismissal. The appellate court found
     that petitioner’s motion to reconsider was untimely and, as a result, his notice of
     appeal was also untimely. 

. 1 Accordingly, the
     appellate court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the substantive
     merits of the appeal, thereby limiting its review and disposition to vacating the
     circuit court’s denial of the motion to reconsider and dismissing the motion to
     reconsider as untimely. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21, 26. For the following reasons, we affirm the
     judgment of the appellate court.


¶2                                         I. BACKGROUND

¶3                                A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing

¶4        On January 15, 2016, the State charged petitioner, by information, with
     unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS
     570/401(a)(2)(B) (West 2016)) and unlawful possession of a controlled substance
     (id. § 402(a)(2)(B)). After a bench trial, petitioner was convicted of both offenses.
     The circuit court merged the offenses and sentenced petitioner to a 16-year prison
     term. Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the sentence. At the hearing on the
     motion to reconsider, the circuit court indicated that, after sentencing, it discovered
     that petitioner had been shackled during the sentencing hearing. The circuit court
     noted that, if petitioner were to raise that issue on direct appeal, the appellate court
     may remand for a new sentencing hearing. As such, the circuit court offered to
     reduce the sentence to the nine-year minimum in exchange for petitioner waiving
     his right to a direct appeal while retaining his right to file a postconviction petition.
     Petitioner accepted the offer and was sentenced to a nine-year prison term.


¶5                                     B. Postconviction Petition

¶6        On September 20, 2021, petitioner filed a pro se petition for postconviction
     relief, arguing that (1) pretrial counsel who represented him before the trial had a
     per se conflict of interest, (2) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing
     to object to the prosecution’s concealing the identity of a confidential informant,
     (3) his request for counsel was denied prior to his arrest, (4) his arrest and strip

         1
           These findings were originally set forth in a Rule 23 order, which the appellate court withdrew.
     The findings were subsequently published in a modified opinion on denial of rehearing. See 

.




                                                     -2-
       search violated the fourth amendment, (5) the circuit court’s refusal to grant a
       continuance violated due process, and (6) the circuit court violated his right to a fair
       trial by keeping him shackled during the trial and sentencing.

¶7         On September 30, 2021, the circuit court entered an order summarily dismissing
       the postconviction petition. The circuit court found that petitioner’s conflict-of-
       interest claim was patently without merit because pretrial counsel withdrew several
       months before trial and petitioner was represented by different counsel at trial. The
       circuit court rejected the remaining claims as barred by petitioner’s knowing and
       voluntary waiver of his direct appeal. The circuit court’s docket entry of September
       30, 2021, reflects that a courtesy copy of the dismissal order was sent to petitioner.


¶8                                    C. Motion to Reconsider

¶9         Subsequently, petitioner filed a “Motion to Reconsider and Leave to Amend
       Petition for Post Conviction Relief Under 725 ILCS 5/122-1.” The last page of the
       motion to reconsider contained a “CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE,” which
       provided:

           “This is to certify [t]hat I have on this date served true and correct copies of the
           foregoing to:

           Clerk of the Circuit Court of Knox County and;

           Knox County States Attorney

           via U.S. Mail postage fully prepaid on this 26th Day of Oct 2021 by depositing
           the same in the institutional mailbox at Dixon C.C.”

       The motion to reconsider was file-stamped by the circuit clerk on November 3,
       2021.

¶ 10      On December 14, 2021, the circuit court entered an order denying petitioner’s
       motion to reconsider. 2 Petitioner filed a pro se notice of appeal on January 5, 2022.
       Counsel was appointed to represent petitioner on January 6, 2022. Appointed

           2
            The circuit court provided no reasoning or explanation and simply denied the motion to
       reconsider.




                                                  -3-
       counsel filed an amended notice of appeal on January 11, 2022.


¶ 11                                    D. Appellate Court

¶ 12       At the outset, the appellate court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to
       consider the substantive merits of the appeal because petitioner’s motion to
       reconsider and notice of appeal were both untimely. 

. The appellate court acknowledged that, although the prison mailbox
       rule may overcome a file stamp, the rule also requires an acceptable proof of
       service. Id. ¶ 17. To that regard, the appellate court observed that Illinois Supreme
       Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017) requires a proof of service by an
       incarcerated, pro se litigant to be by certification under section 1-109 of the Code
       of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020)). 

. The appellate court concluded that the certificate of service at the
       foot of petitioner’s motion to reconsider was inadequate because of two
       deficiencies. Id. ¶ 18.

¶ 13       First, the certificate of service contained no language resembling the language
       prescribed by section 1-109. Id. The appellate court explained that, to be
       substantially in the form of section 1-109, the certificate must contain the “ ‘main
       features’ ” or “ ‘substance’ ” of the language of that section, but petitioner’s
       certificate contained only one word from the section—“certif[y]”—and it lacked a
       verification subject to the penalties provided in the section. Id. ¶ 19 (quoting People
       ex rel. Davis v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 

 (1971)).
       Accordingly, the appellate court found the certificate lacked a main feature of
       section 1-109 and, as such, was not substantially in the form prescribed by the
       section. 

¶ 14      Second, the certificate of service failed to provide the complete address to
       which the motion was to be delivered, as required by Rule 12(b)(6). Id. ¶ 20. The
       appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that this omission was minor, as the
       absence of any address is not a minor defect. Id. (citing People v. Liner, 

, ¶ 17).

¶ 15       Because of these two deficiencies, the appellate court concluded that the
       certificate of service in petitioner’s motion to reconsider failed to satisfy the




                                                -4-
       requirements of Rule 12(b)(6). Id. ¶ 21. Consequently, the date of the circuit clerk’s
       file stamp controlled, rendering the motion to reconsider untimely. Id. Because the
       untimely motion to reconsider failed to toll the 30-day period for filing a notice of
       appeal, petitioner’s notice of appeal was also untimely. Id. For these reasons, the
       appellate court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the substantive
       merits of the appeal. Id. ¶¶ 1, 21.

¶ 16       The appellate court declined petitioner’s invitation to follow People v. Cooper,
       

, and order a remand to allow him to file a compliant
       certificate of service, reasoning that Cooper could not be squared with existing
       precedent. 

. Following People v. Bailey, 

, the appellate court concluded that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
       to rule on petitioner’s untimely motion to reconsider. 

. Therefore, the appellate court vacated the circuit court’s order denying the
       motion to reconsider and dismissed the motion. Id. ¶ 26. This court allowed
       petitioner’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).


¶ 17                                     II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18       Petitioner raises the following issues, which we have restated as follows:
       (1) whether petitioner substantially complied with the proof-of-mailing
       requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) such that his motion to reconsider was timely filed
       under the Illinois mailbox rule, rendering his subsequent notice of appeal timely
       and establishing appellate court jurisdiction over the substantive merits of his
       appeal, and (2) if petitioner did not substantially comply with the proof-of-mailing
       requirements of Rule 12(b)(6), whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to order
       a remand to allow petitioner to cure the jurisdictional defect by supplying a
       compliant certificate of service. These jurisdictional issues and the underlying
       questions concerning the interpretation of this court’s rules are all questions of law
       that we review de novo. People v. English, 

.


¶ 19                                A. Substantial Compliance

¶ 20      We first consider whether petitioner substantially complied with the proof-of-
       mailing requirements of Rule 12(b)(6) such that his motion to reconsider was timely




                                               -5-
       filed under the Illinois mailbox rule, rendering his subsequent notice of appeal
       timely and establishing appellate court jurisdiction over the substantive merits of
       his appeal.


¶ 21                       1. Interpreting Illinois Supreme Court Rules

¶ 22       The process of interpreting this court’s rules is governed by principles of
       statutory interpretation. 

 This court’s rules “ ‘have the force of law’ and are ‘not
       aspirational.’ ” 

 (quoting Bright v. Dicke, 

 (1995)). As with
       statutes, the goal in interpreting this court’s rules “is to give effect to our intent,
       most often through the ‘plain and ordinary meaning’ of the rule.” 

 (quoting
       People v. Glisson, 

 (2002)). “When a rule is ‘plain and
       unambiguous, we may not depart from [its] terms by reading into it exceptions,
       limitations, or conditions [this court] did not express, nor may we add provisions
       not found in the [rule].’ ” 

 (quoting Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.,
       

). Moreover, when the language of the rule is clear and
       unambiguous, we apply it as written without resorting to aids of construction.
       People v. Gorss, 

.


¶ 23                                        2. Timeliness

¶ 24       Under this court’s rules, “filing a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step
       in perfecting an appeal.” People v. Walls, 

 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R.
       606(a) (eff. Dec. 1, 1999)). The jurisdiction of the appellate court hinges on whether
       the litigant complied with the deadlines set forth in this court’s rules. People v.
       Salem, 

, ¶ 11. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 (eff.
       July 1, 2017), appeals are perfected by filing a notice of appeal “with the clerk of
       the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from
       or if a motion directed against the judgment is timely filed, within 30 days after the
       entry of the order disposing of the motion.” (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, a
       postconviction petitioner may file a motion to reconsider a first-stage, summary
       dismissal within 30 days of the entry of the judgment without first filing a notice of
       appeal. See id.; People v. Rivera, 

 (2001) (“ ‘first-stage
       dismissals are final and appealable judgments’ ” (quoting People v. Noel, 

 (1997))); 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2020) (30-day deadline to



                                                -6-
       file a motion to reconsider judgment in a nonjury civil action); People v. Bailey,
       

 (general rules of civil procedure apply to postconviction
       proceedings so long as they do not conflict with the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).

¶ 25       Here, the circuit court entered a final judgment summarily dismissing
       petitioner’s postconviction petition on September 30, 2021. Petitioner had 30 days
       to file either a notice of appeal or a motion to reconsider that judgment—with a
       deadline of November 1, 2021. 3 See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. July 1, 2017); Rivera,
       

; see also 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2020); Bailey, 

. It is undisputed that petitioner did not file his notice of appeal within
       30 days after the circuit court entered its final judgment. At issue is whether
       petitioner timely filed his motion to reconsider, thus tolling the 30-day deadline to
       file his notice of appeal. The circuit clerk file-stamped petitioner’s motion to
       reconsider on November 3, 2021—two days after the filing deadline. Accordingly,
       unless the mailbox rule applies, the date of the file stamp controls, rendering the
       motion to reconsider—and the subsequent notice of appeal—untimely.


¶ 26                             3. Filing Procedure and Mailbox Rule

¶ 27        Illinois Supreme Court Rule 373 (eff. July 1, 2017) governs deadlines for filing
       in reviewing courts and provides that “the time of filing” is when the subject
       document is “actually received by the clerk of the reviewing court.” See Ill. S. Ct.
       R. 612(b)(18) (eff. July 1, 2017) (making Rule 373 applicable to criminal appeals).
       This court’s version of the mailbox rule is set forth in Rule 373 and provides that,
       if the filing in the reviewing court is “received after the due date, the time of mailing
       by an incarcerated, self-represented litigant shall be deemed the time of filing.” Ill.
       S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017). Rule 373 adds that “[p]roof of mailing shall be as
       provided in Rule 12.” Id.; see English, 

 (“litigants cannot
       supply proof of mailing in ways other than those expressly listed in Rules 373 and
       12”); Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 

       (2009) (mailbox rule applies only if the litigant “files proper proof of mailing as

           3
            The State aptly notes that, because the last day of the 30-day interval was Saturday, October
       30, 2021, the filing deadline was the following Monday, November 1, 2021. See 5 ILCS 70/1.11
       (West 2020) (providing method of calculating filing due dates); City of Chicago v. Greene, 

 (1970) (applying that method to calculate notice of appeal due date).




                                                     -7-
       required by Rule [12]”). To summarize, “the sole means of establishing ‘time of
       mailing’ under Rule 373 in the case of a pro se incarcerated litigant is by
       certification as described in Rule 12(b)(6) [citation].” English, 

.
       Applied here, the mailbox rule applies to petitioner’s motion to reconsider so long
       as he satisfied the requirements of Rule 12(b)(6).


¶ 28                         a. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6)

¶ 29       Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017) sets forth, in relevant
       part, the following manner of service:

          “[I]n case of service by mail by a self-represented litigant residing in a
          correctional facility, by certification under section 1-109 of the Code of Civil
          Procedure of the person who deposited the document in the institutional mail,
          stating the time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the
          document was to be delivered.”

¶ 30        Petitioner notes that this court has not yet addressed the issue of substantial
       compliance with Rule 12(b)(6), but he cites People v. Dominguez, 

, in which this court examined substantial compliance with Rule 605(c)
       (Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(c) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001)). In Dominguez, 

, this
       court held that the word “substantially” in Rule 605(c) “does not require a strict
       verbatim reading of the rule *** to ‘substantially advise’ defendants of its
       contents.” This court held, rather, that “the court must impart *** largely that which
       is specified in the rule, or the rule’s ‘essence,’ as opposed to ‘wholly’ what is
       specified in the rule.” 

¶ 31        Here, petitioner urges this court to follow Dominguez and likewise construe
       Rule 12(b)(6) such that a proof of mailing that does not contain the contents of the
       rule verbatim is nonetheless substantially compliant if it imparts “largely that which
       is specified” by supplying the “essence” of the rule’s requirements. See 

 We
       agree that the Dominguez principles also apply in the context of construing Rule
       12(b)(6). As such, substantial compliance with Rule 12(b)(6) does not require a
       strict verbatim repetition, so long as the essence of the requirements is included
       such that the document contains largely what is specified in the rule. See 

                                               -8-
¶ 32       At this point, we note—and reject—petitioner’s claim that the appellate court
       “impose[d] strict compliance where only substantial compliance is required.” The
       appellate court found that petitioner failed to satisfy Rule 12(b)(6) because his proof
       of service included only one word from section 1-109 (“certif[y]”), lacked a
       certification subject to the penalties set forth in that section, and failed to include
       the complete address to which the motion was to be delivered. 

. Moreover, the appellate court identified the enforcement of the
       truthfulness of a statement as a “main feature” of section 1-109 (id. ¶ 19), which is
       congruent with a substantial compliance analysis. See Dominguez, 

. There is nothing to suggest that the appellate court imposed strict compliance
       or analyzed petitioner’s certificate under a strict compliance standard, and we reject
       petitioner’s suggestions to the contrary.

¶ 33       Applying the principles of Dominguez here, petitioner maintains that he
       substantially complied with Rule 12(b)(6) because his proof of mailing contained
       the essence of what the rule requires, including the date of mailing, his signature,
       “and other factual representations designed to establish the remaining requirements
       of Rule 12(b)(6).” We disagree.

¶ 34       The plain language of Rule 12(b)(6) requires the manner of service by
       petitioner—a pro se litigant residing in a correctional facility—(1) to provide
       service by certification under section 1-109 of the Code, (2) to state the complete
       address to which the document was to be delivered, and (3) to state the time and
       place of deposit. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). Petitioner failed to
       satisfy the first two requirements, thus failing to substantially comply with Rule
       12(b)(6). We examine those requirements in detail. The third requirement is not at
       issue in this appeal.


¶ 35                    i. Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Section 1-109

¶ 36       Rule 12(b)(6) prescribes service by certification under section 1-109 of the
       Code, which requires “[t]he person *** having knowledge of the matters stated in
       a pleading, affidavit or other document” to

          “subscribe to a certification in substantially the following form: Under penalties
          as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure,




                                                -9-
           the undersigned certifies that the statements set forth in this instrument are true
           and correct, except as to matters therein stated to be on information and belief
           and as to such matters the undersigned certifies as aforesaid that he verily
           believes the same to be true.” 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020).

¶ 37       Petitioner’s proof of mailing provides:

               “This is to certify [t]hat I have on this date served true and correct copies of
           the foregoing to:

               Clerk of the Circuit Court of Knox County and;

               Knox County States Attorney

              via U.S. Mail postage fully prepaid on this 26th Day of Oct 2021 by
           depositing the same in the institutional mailbox at Dixon C.C.”

¶ 38       Petitioner argues that his proof of mailing “contains the substance or main
       features” of, or “the essence of the form” of, section 1-109, resulting in substantial
       compliance with the certification requirement. See 

;
       Dominguez, 

. Petitioner clarifies that “[t]he remaining
       verbiage appearing in section 1-109 that is absent from [his] certification, relating
       to matters stated ‘on information and belief,’ does not alter this conclusion because
       [he] had personal knowledge of his mailing of the motion.” We disagree.

¶ 39       Petitioner’s certificate was not substantially in the form required by section 1-
       109 because it did not include (1) a verification under penalty of perjury (2) that the
       statements set forth in the document were true and correct. See 735 ILCS 5/1-109
       (West 2020). We examine each of these components in detail.


¶ 40                              a. Verification Under Penalties

¶ 41       First, the certificate did not include a verification “[u]nder penalties as provided
       by law pursuant to Section 1-109.” 

 The appellate court suitably identified the
       enforcement of the truthfulness of a statement as a “main feature” of section 1-109.
       See 

. At its outset, section 1-109 indicates that,
       when a document filed in court “is required *** to be verified, or made, sworn to
       or verified under oath,” that requirement is “defined to include a certification” of



                                                - 10 -
       the “document under penalty of perjury as provided in this Section.” 735 ILCS 5/1-
       109 (West 2020). In its concluding paragraph, section 1-109 describes criminal
       liability resulting from deliberate false statements in the document. See 

 The
       body of section 1-109 requires a certification, subjecting the filer of the document
       to such criminal liability if the document contains a deliberate false statement. See
       

¶ 42       References to false statements and the penalties therefor are specified largely
       throughout section 1-109—at the beginning, end, and points in between—thus
       clearly constituting the essence of the section. See id.; Dominguez, 

. As such, if a certification lacks language subjecting the filer to the penalties
       set forth in section 1-109, the certificate is not substantially in the form required by
       the section. See 

¶ 43       Petitioner argues that requiring such language mandates strict compliance, as
       the desired veracity of the filing may be accomplished by other means. Petitioner
       explains that, “should a court determine that [a] representation was deliberately
       untruthful,” his signature on the proof of mailing subjects him to several other
       penalties by operation of law. He notes in particular Illinois Supreme Court Rule
       137 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), section 22-105 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/22-105 (West
       2020)), and procedures such as contempt proceedings, all of which provide
       penalties for untruthfulness. We acknowledge the existence of other penalties, yet
       we cannot agree that being subject to those penalties establishes substantial
       compliance with Rule 12(b)(6) or excuses the filer from the requirements thereof.

¶ 44        As this court indicated in English, 

, “litigants cannot
       supply proof of mailing in ways other than those expressly listed in Rules 373 and
       12.” See Secura, 

 (“a party can only take advantage of Rule 373 if
       it files proper proof of mailing as required by Rule [12]”). Again, our rules “ ‘have
       the force of law’ and are ‘not aspirational.’ ” English, 

       (quoting Bright, 

). Moreover, we may not graft exceptions or
       provisions onto a rule that do not exist. Id. ¶¶ 30-31. Nor may we interpret a rule in
       such a way to render any part of it superfluous. Dominguez, 

.

¶ 45       Applied to this case, the plain language of the mailbox rule provides that
       “[p]roof of mailing shall be as provided in Rule 12.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1,
       2017). The plain language of Rule 12(b)(6) requires certification under section 1-



                                                - 11 -
       109 of the Code (Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017)), which in turn requires a
       verification under penalties provided in that section (735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West
       2020)). Overlooking noncompliance with these rules simply because other means
       of penalties exist would disregard the plain language of the rules and render it
       superfluous, which is unacceptable. See Dominguez, 

; English,
       

. Accordingly, notwithstanding the existence of other sources
       providing penalties for untruthfulness, petitioner was still required to substantially
       comply with Rules 373 and 12(b)(6).

¶ 46       We are mindful that this court could have chosen other methods of proof but
       did not do so. Because section 1-109 certifications are considered reliable enough
       to substitute for sworn statements, this court chose this method of proof to ensure
       the truthfulness of filings by means of verification under penalty of perjury. See Ill.
       S. Ct. Rs. 373, 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017); 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020). Here,
       petitioner’s certificate lacked a verification subjecting him to the penalties provided
       in section 1-109. Accordingly, the certificate was not substantially in the form
       required by section 1-109 and, as such, failed to substantially comply with Rule
       12(b)(6). See 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1,
       2017).


¶ 47                              b. True and Correct Statements

¶ 48       Besides lacking a verification under penalties provided in section 1-109,
       petitioner’s certificate did not verify “that the statements set forth in this instrument
       are true and correct.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020). Petitioner
       certified, rather, that he “served true and correct copies of the foregoing.”
       (Emphasis added.)

¶ 49       Petitioner points out that the appellate court incorrectly found that “certif[y]”
       was the only word from section 1-109 contained in the certificate. See 

. Petitioner stresses that, in addition to “certify,” he also used the
       words “true and correct” and, as such, the certificate “substantially tracks the model
       language in section 1-109.” We disagree and find that, notwithstanding petitioner’s
       noted inaccuracy, the appellate court’s conclusion that the certificate did not
       substantially comply with the form of section 1-109 is nonetheless correct.




                                                - 12 -
¶ 50       The State properly asserts that, just as “an affidavit must be sworn to, and
       statements in a writing not sworn to before an authorized person cannot be
       considered [an affidavit]” (Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 

 (2002)), it follows that a certificate lacking language that the statements set
       forth in the document are “true and correct” and “under penalty of perjury” or
       “[u]nder penalties as provided by law pursuant to Section 1-109” cannot be
       considered a “[v]erification by certification.” See 735 ILCS 5/1-109 (West 2020).

¶ 51       The purpose of section 1-109 is to provide a certification that “may be used in
       the same manner and with the same force and effect as though subscribed and sworn
       to under oath,” as a substitute for a sworn affidavit. Id.; see People v. Allen, 

 (sworn affidavit “ensure[s] that [the] person understands that he
       subjects himself to penalties of perjury”); People v. Badoud, 

       (1988) (“perjury sanctions [provide] an assurance of veracity”). Serving “true and
       correct copies” simply cannot accomplish that purpose. (Emphasis added.) Nor
       does the mere use of the words “true and correct” “substantially track[ ] the model
       language in section 1-109.”

¶ 52       Petitioner’s statement regarding the absence of “[t]he remaining verbiage
       appearing in section 1-109” has no bearing on our conclusion. It is axiomatic that
       the certificate must contain a verification that the statements in the filing are true
       and correct. That language was absent from the certificate, and petitioner fails to
       explain its absence in his “remaining verbiage” argument. Because petitioner’s
       certificate did not verify that the statements in the document were true and correct,
       the certificate was not substantially in the form required by section 1-109 and, as
       such, failed to substantially comply with Rule 12(b)(6). See 735 ILCS 5/1-109
       (West 2020); Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017).


¶ 53                                   ii. Complete Address

¶ 54       Besides certification under section 1-109 of the Code, Rule 12(b)(6) also
       requires the certificate to state “the complete address to which the document was
       to be delivered.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017). In this
       case, petitioner’s certificate failed to state the complete address but merely reflected
       that it was mailed to the “Clerk of the Circuit Court of Knox County and; Knox
       County States Attorney.”



                                                - 13 -
¶ 55       Petitioner concedes that the proof of mailing lacks a street address. Yet he
       argues that limiting the inquiry to the four corners of the proof of mailing “is akin
       to strict compliance,” produces an “unjust result,” and punishes him “for the clerk’s
       opting not to retain the envelope for inclusion in the record.” Petitioner explains
       that substantial compliance with Rule 12(b)(6) may be inferred from “competent
       circumstantial evidence that the document was mailed to the correct address.” In
       support, he cites People v. Hansen, 

, and People v.
       Humphrey, 

, which relied on postmark evidence to
       establish substantial compliance with the mailbox rule.

¶ 56       This court considered those decisions in English, 

,
       and rejected them as inconsistent with our “clear and unambiguous rules.” Though
       English involved the timeliness of the filing of a notice of appeal containing a
       postage meter stamp, the principles of that decision regarding compliance with this
       court’s rules are applicable to this case. We concluded in English that, because the
       petitioner failed to file the appropriate certification under section 1-109 “stating the
       time and place of deposit and the complete address to which the document was to
       be delivered,” the mailbox rule did not apply, the notice of appeal was considered
       filed when the clerk of the circuit court received it beyond the due date, and the
       appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. Id. ¶ 36. This
       conclusion likewise applies in this case.

¶ 57       Petitioner alternatively suggests that the absence of a street address “should be
       remedied by *** [taking] judicial notice” of the address provided on the Knox
       County website and “of the fact that the clerk had, at the time of mailing, been
       located at [that address] for approximately 135 years.” We decline petitioner’s
       invitation to take judicial notice of the address, as doing so would disregard the
       requirements of our rules. Instead, we apply the plain language of our rules as
       written. See id. ¶ 31; Gorss, 

.

¶ 58       The plain language of the mailbox rule provides that “[p]roof of mailing shall
       be as provided in Rule 12.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 373 (eff. July 1, 2017). The plain language
       of Rule 12(b)(6) requires the manner of service by petitioner to state the complete
       address to which the document was to be delivered. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff.
       July 1, 2017). Petitioner’s argument reads the “complete address” requirement out
       of Rule 12(b)(6) and renders its language superfluous, which is unacceptable. See




                                                - 14 -
       Dominguez, 

. We agree with the appellate court that the
       “ ‘failure to include any address’ ” (emphasis in original) (

 (quoting Liner, 

, ¶ 17)) is not a minor defect
       and rendered the certificate insufficient to prove that it was timely mailed (id. ¶ 21).

¶ 59        Finally, we note that petitioner’s argument disregards that the address
       requirement of Rule 12(b)(6) exemplifies “a certain form of proof reliant only on
       the litigant” that “provide[s] incarcerated pro se litigants with a guaranteed method
       to prove that their [document] was timely placed in the institutional mail.” English,
       

. As such, Rule 12(b)(6) avoids “uncertain form[s] of proof
       reliant on a third party” and seeks to ensure that the circuit court timely receives
       the documents necessary to establish jurisdiction. 

 Though providing an adequate
       certificate of service was entirely in petitioner’s hands, he failed to do so.

¶ 60       To summarize, the plain language of Rule 12(b)(6) requires the certificate to
       state the complete address to which the document is to be delivered, and we refuse
       to read into the rule the exceptions and/or additions petitioner suggests. See id.
       ¶¶ 30-31. Petitioner’s certificate did not include a complete address and, as such,
       failed to substantially comply with Rule 12(b)(6). See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12(b)(6) (eff.
       July 1, 2017).


¶ 61                                  4. Pro Se Court Filings

¶ 62       Petitioner next contends that finding substantial compliance “would be
       consistent with longstanding treatment of pro se court filings by Illinois courts.”
       Petitioner acknowledges that his pro se status does not excuse the complete failure
       to produce documents required by this court’s rules. See People v. Arriaga, 

; Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 

 (2001);
       Domenella v. Domenella, 

 (1987). He maintains, however, that
       he did not completely fail to produce the proof of mailing under Rule 12(b)(6) but,
       “at worst, *** left a bit to be desired.”

¶ 63       Citing Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 

 (1979),
       petitioner urges that, because perfection is not required “even from represented
       parties” when “drafting a jurisdictionally necessary notice of appeal,” it certainly
       follows that perfection should not be required of him—a pro se, incarcerated




                                                - 15 -
       litigant—when drafting his own proof of mailing. Petitioner asserts that he made a
       good-faith effort to comply with Rule 12(b)(6) and “[i]t would be the height of
       unfairness” to deny him “the benefit of a full post[ ]conviction review *** because,
       due to his incarceration and lack of legal experience, he was unable to correctly
       identify the most critical components of Rule 12(b)(6).” We disagree.

¶ 64       Proceeding pro se does not excuse petitioner’s failure to comply with this
       court’s rules, as he presumably had “full knowledge of applicable court rules and
       procedures, including procedural deadlines with respect to filing motions.”
       Steinbrecher, 

. Petitioner was required to comply with this court’s
       procedural rules, and his pro se status does not entitle him to more leniency. See
       English, 

. Moreover, Rule 606(c) ameliorates “any perceived
       harshness in our rules” by invoking a remedy when a notice of appeal is untimely.
       

¶ 65       As the State points out, “filing a compliant certificate of service is not
       particularly difficult,” as demonstrated by petitioner’s postconviction petition in the
       record, which includes the circuit court’s address as well as language substantially
       in the form of section 1-109. Moreover, in English, we rejected the argument that a
       straightforward application of Rules 373 and 12(b)(6) leads to harsh or unfair
       results. English, 

.

¶ 66       Because petitioner’s certificate failed to substantially comply with Rule
       12(b)(6), the mailbox rule does not apply, and his motion to reconsider was
       untimely, rendering his notice of appeal untimely. Accordingly, the appellate court
       correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of petitioner’s
       appeal. See 

.


¶ 67                                B. Jurisdiction to Remand

¶ 68       Having found that petitioner failed to substantially comply with the proof-of-
       mailing requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6), we next consider
       whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to order a remand to allow petitioner to
       cure the jurisdictional defect by supplying a compliant certificate of service. The
       appellate districts are divided regarding the propriety of such a remand. Compare
       

, Arriaga, 

, ¶¶ 16-




                                               - 16 -
       20, and Liner, 

, ¶¶ 22-26 (refused to remand for
       compliance with notice requirements under Rule 12(b)(6)), with Cooper, 

 (remand allowed for defendant to cure jurisdictional
       defect by supplementing record with compliant Rule 12(b)(6) certificate).

¶ 69       Petitioner relies on Cooper, in which “[t]he first apparent remand of this kind
       occurred.” After pleading guilty and being sentenced, the Cooper defendant filed a
       pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was file-stamped one day past the
       deadline. Cooper, 

. The defendant did not include
       proof of mailing with the motion. Id. ¶ 18. The circuit court conducted a hearing at
       which it inquired about the date the motion was filed—as opposed to the date it was
       mailed—and ultimately denied the defendant’s motion as untimely. Id. ¶ 5.

¶ 70       The appellate court found that the mailbox rule did not apply to render the
       defendant’s motion timely, because the mailbox rule only applies where proof of
       mailing is provided “in the manner specified by Rule 12” and that did not occur. Id.
       ¶ 18. However, though the defendant failed to provide proof of mailing, that was
       not the end of the inquiry. See id. ¶¶ 19-22. The appellate court indicated that, once
       the circuit court determined that the motion was file-stamped one day late, “the
       appropriate next step was to determine if [the defendant] could supplement his
       motion with the certification required by Rule 12(b)(6) and section 1-109 of the
       Code.” Id. ¶ 20. The appellate court found that the circuit court left the proceedings
       “incomplete” by omitting this “appropriate next step.” Id. The appellate court found
       nothing in Rule 12(b)(6) to “prohibit[ ] a litigant from supplementing his filing with
       a certification proving the date and manner of mailing.” Id. ¶ 21.

¶ 71       The appellate court observed that, when “ ‘further trial court hearings are called
       for in a criminal case,’ ” the preferred procedure “ ‘is to remand for those hearings
       while retaining jurisdiction.’ ” Id. ¶ 22 (quoting People v. Hill, 

). The appellate court added that its “authority to do so lies in Rule
       615(b)(2),” which allows reviewing courts to “ ‘set aside, affirm, or modify any or
       all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from
       which the appeal is taken.’ ” 

 ¶ 15 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1,
       1967). Finally, the appellate court indicated that, under Rule 615(b)(2), it “may
       ‘revest the trial court with jurisdiction to complete [those] proceedings [we] found
       deficient before resuming consideration of the appeal.’ ” 

 (quoting Hill, 2021 IL




                                               - 17 -
       App (1st) 131973-B, ¶ 18). As such, the appellate court remanded “to the circuit
       court for the limited purpose of inquiring of [the defendant] when his motion was
       mailed.” 

.

¶ 72       Here, given our finding of insubstantial compliance with Rule 12(b)(6),
       petitioner urges this court to follow Cooper and remand to the circuit court to allow
       him to supplement his proof of mailing. We decline to follow Cooper, as the
       appellate court correctly indicated that it did not square with existing precedent that
       (1) when a postjudgment motion does contain sufficient service at the time of filing,
       the date of the file-stamp controls, (2) a circuit court lacks jurisdiction to rule on an
       untimely postjudgment motion, and (3) if the circuit court does rule on an untimely
       postjudgment motion, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to vacating
       the circuit court’s judgment and dismissing the motion. 

.

¶ 73        The appellate court followed Bailey, 

, in which this court
       explained that, where an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
       substantive merits of an appeal, it is not completely without jurisdiction but has
       “the authority conferred on it by law to review, recognize, and correct any action
       that exceeded the trial court’s jurisdiction.” In other words, a circuit court’s lack of
       jurisdiction is not a complete bar to appellate jurisdiction, but in such
       circumstances, “the appellate court is limited to considering the issue of jurisdiction
       below.” 

 If the appellate court concludes that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction,
       the appellate court should vacate the circuit court’s judgment and dismiss the
       subject motion (id.), which is exactly what the appellate court did in this case.

¶ 74       Notably, the Cooper court based its decision on the erroneous premise that it
       had jurisdiction to order the remand. The Rule 604(d) postjudgment motion in
       Cooper was untimely because it did not include the proper proof of mailing
       prescribed by Rule 12. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 12 (eff. July 1, 2017). As such, the motion
       failed to toll the deadline to file a notice of appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(a), (b) (eff.
       July 1, 2017). Because the notice of appeal was untimely, the appellate court in
       Cooper lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal, was limited to
       vacating the circuit court’s order and dismissing the motion, and exceeded the
       bounds of its jurisdiction in ordering the remand. See Bailey, 

.




                                                  - 18 -
¶ 75        The appellate court in Cooper also criticized the circuit court for not
       determining whether the defendant could supplement the motion with a compliant
       certificate of service, although the hearing was conducted well past the due date for
       filing the notice of appeal. See Cooper, 

. This was
       also erroneous because the circuit court was divested of jurisdiction to do so, as its
       only remaining power was to enforce the judgment or correct clerical errors “or
       matters of form so that the record conformed to the judgment actually rendered.”
       People v. Flowers, 

 (2003).

¶ 76        Petitioner argues—as did the Cooper court—that nothing in Rule 373 or
       12(b)(6) “imposes a temporal limitation that would stand in the way of the appellate
       court exercising its authority under Rule 615(b)(2) to order a remand for further
       factual development.” See Cooper, 

. We find that
       inconsequential, as the flip side is that nothing in Rule 373 or 12(b)(6) affords a
       litigant a post hoc attempt at compliance with those rules. Indeed, the lack of
       language prohibiting a remand is not the equivalent of permitting a remand.

¶ 77       We further reject petitioner’s argument that the appellate court was authorized
       to remand under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), as the
       appellate court must first have jurisdiction to do so. See People v. Young, 

 (authority under Rule 615(b) “presumes that the issue underlying the
       requested relief is properly before the reviewing court”); People v. Bingham, 

 (under Rule 615(b), appellate court may not exceed “the scope
       of appellate review”); Salem, 

 (“The appellate court’s power
       ‘attaches only upon compliance with the rules governing appeals.’ ” (quoting
       People v. Lyles, 

 (2005))).

¶ 78       To summarize, in this case, the appellate court correctly followed Bailey and
       concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to remand the cause to allow petitioner to cure
       the jurisdictional defect by supplementing the record with a compliant certificate
       of service. 

. Cooper contradicts this court’s
       precedent and is hereby overruled.


¶ 79                                   III. CONCLUSION




                                               - 19 -
¶ 80       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court’s judgment, concluding
       that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rule on petitioner’s untimely motion to
       reconsider, vacating the circuit court’s order denying the motion to reconsider, and
       dismissing the motion. We reject petitioner’s request for this court to exercise its
       supervisory authority.


¶ 81      Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 82      Circuit court judgment vacated.




                                              - 20 -