Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Co.
Illinois Supreme Court
Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Co., 2024 IL 129895 (Ill. 2024)
Kuhn v. Owners Insurance Co.
Opinion
2024 IL 129895
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 129895)
MARK KUHN et al., Appellants, v. OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.
Opinion filed May 23, 2024.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Theis and Justices Neville, Overstreet, Holder White,
Cunningham, and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The question presented in this declaratory judgment action is whether the $1
million liability limits for each of seven covered vehicles in a single multivehicle
insurance policy may be aggregated or “stacked” for a total of $7 million of liability
coverage for one accident, despite an “antistacking” policy provision. The McLean
County circuit court answered this question in the affirmative, and the appellate
court reversed. Based on the specific insurance policy at issue, we affirm the
appellate court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Shortly before 9 p.m. on December 5, 2018, appellant Mark Kuhn was driving
a school bus carrying the Normal West High School junior varsity girls basketball
team, their coach Steven Price, and adult volunteer Charlie Crabtree. The bus was
traveling west on Interstate 74 in McLean County. Traveling in the opposite
direction, Ryan Hute was driving a 2010 Kenworth semitruck with an attached
trailer in the course of his employment with Farrell Trucking. The semitruck
crossed the center grass median of the highway, continued driving east in the
westbound lanes, and struck the school bus in a head-on collision. Hute and
Crabtree died as a result of the accident, and other occupants of the school bus were
injured.
¶4 Appellee Owners Insurance Company (Owners) insured the semitruck that
Hute was driving under a commercial vehicle insurance policy issued to Farrell
Trucking. 1 The policy also listed Hute as a covered driver. Farrell Trucking is
located in Iowa, but the parties have stipulated that the policy should be interpreted
under Illinois law.
¶5 Mark Kuhn and Karen Kuhn brought an action against Hute’s estate and entities
related to Farrell Trucking. 2 They then filed this suit seeking a declaration that the
$1 million liability limits in the insurance policy covering the semitruck and six
other vehicles (three semitrucks and four trailers in total) could be stacked, for a
combined $7 million in liability coverage. In their amended complaint, the Kuhns
added as defendants the other bus passengers who were potential claimants in the
underlying action (potential claimants), in order to bind them to the terms of the
judgment in this suit.
1
The trailer attached to the semitruck was not a listed vehicle in the policy.
2
The underlying complaint alleged that Hute was employed by Jason Farrell, Farrell Trucking,
and/or 3 Guys and a Bus, Inc. For purposes of this appeal, it is undisputed that the semitruck was
insured under Owners’ policy.
-2-
¶6 The Kuhns and Owners filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 3 The trial
court granted the Kuhns’ motion for summary judgment. In a 73-page order, it ruled
that the insurance policy was ambiguous and therefore should be construed against
Owners, such that stacking of the liability limits was appropriate. The appellate
court reversed the trial court’s decision. 2023 IL App (4th) 220827, ¶ 71. It held
that the policy’s antistacking clause was unambiguous on its face and, when read
together with the declarations and other policy provisions, that the antistacking
clause should be enforced as written. Id. ¶ 70.
¶7 This court allowed the petition for leave to appeal filed by the Kuhns and other
potential claimants. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2021).
¶8 II. INSURANCE POLICY PROVISIONS
¶9 Section II(A) of the policy provides in relevant part: “We will pay all sums an
insured legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage
to which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto as an auto.”
¶ 10 Section II(C) of the policy states:
“C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE
We will pay damages for bodily injury, property damage and covered
pollution cost or expense up to the Limit of Insurance shown in the Declarations
for this coverage. Such damages shall be paid as follows:
1. When combined liability limits are shown in the Declarations, the
limit shown for each accident is the total amount of coverage and the most
we will pay for damages because of or arising out of bodily injury, property
damages and covered pollution cost or expense in any one accident.
2. When separate bodily injury and property damage limits are shown
in the Declarations:
3
Some potential claimants joined in the Kuhns’ motion for summary judgment.
-3-
***
3. The Limit of Insurance applicable to a trailer, non-motorized farm
machinery or farm wagon which is connected to an auto covered by this
policy shall be the limit of insurance applicable to such auto. The auto and
connected trailer, non-motorized farm machinery or farm wagon are
considered one auto and do not increase the Limit of Insurance.
***
5. The Limit of Insurance for this coverage may not be added to the
limits for the same or similar coverage applying to other autos insured by
this policy to determine the amount of coverage available for any one
accident or covered pollution cost or expense, regardless of the number of:
a. Covered autos;
b. Insureds;
c. Premiums paid;
d. Claims made or suits brought;
e. Persons injured; or
f. Vehicles involved in the accident.”
¶ 11 The declarations pages contain an “ITEM ONE,” with the named insured’s
information. “ITEM TWO” begins on the same page and is titled “SCHEDULE OF
COVERED AUTOS AND COVERAGES.” It consists of a chart listing the
different types of coverages, “COVERED AUTOS SYMBOLS,” the “LIMIT OF
INSURANCE FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS,” and the premium costs
for each type of coverage. The coverage for “Combined Liability” lists “$1 Million
each accident.” The page described appears as follows: 4
4
The numbers under “COVERED AUTOS SYMBOLS” refer to a separate table, in which
number “7” stands for “Scheduled Autos Only,” number “8” stands for “Hired Autos Only,” number
“9” stands for “Non-owned Autos Only,” and number “19” stands for “Mobile Equipment Subject
To Compulsory Or Financial Responsibility Or Other Motor Vehicle Insurance Law Only.”
-4-
Owners Page 1
Issued
58979 (10-16)
12-06-2018
INSURANCE COMPANY COMMERCIAL AUTO POLICY DECLARATIONS
6101 A NACAPRI BLVD.. LANSING. Ml 48917-3999 PREFERRED PROGRAM
•<<>c PRINS INSURANCE INC Endorsement Effective 11•27•2018
07-0677-00 MKT TERR 038 (712) 729-3252 POLICY NUMBER 51-829-065-00
ITEM ONE Company use 39-04-IA-1806
NAMEOINSIJAED JASON FARRELL
JASON FARRELL TRUCKING Company POLICY TERM
B111 12 01 a.m. 12:01 a.m .
At)0qf.SS 3717 210TH ST
06-22- 2018 to 06-22-2019
CLINTON IA 52732-8920
Entity: Individual
IN RETURN FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM. AND SUBJECT TO ALL THE TERMS OF THIS POLICY. WE AGREE WITH
YOU TO PROVIDE THE INSURANCE AS STATED IN THIS POLICY.
ITEM lWO • SCHEDULE OF COVERED AUTOS AND COVERAGES
This poHcy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column bek>w. Each of these coverages wil apply
only to those autos shown as covered ilutos. Autos are shown as covered autos for a par1.io.Jlar coverage by 1he entry of one or more
of the symbols from the COVERED AUTOS section of the Commercial Auto Pol,cy next to lhe name of the coverage.
COVERAGES COVERED AUTOS LIMIT OF INSURANCE PREMIUM
SYMBOLS FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR LOSS
Combined Liability 7.8. 9. 19 S1Million each accident S6.311.69
Uninsured Motorist •
7 S27.72
Uninsured/tJnclerinsured 5100,000 each person/ S100.000 each accident
Molorist Coverage
Underinsured Motorist •
7 $53.31
S100.000 each person/ s100.000 each accodenI
Medical Payments 7 SS,000 each person $39.27
.."' Comprehensive 7
S250 deductible applies for each covered auto unless a
deductible appears in IT EM T HREE.
52,120.34
0
i comsion 7
SS00 deductible applies for each covered auto unless a
deduclible appears in ITEM THREE.
S5.S79.75
e·;;; Road Trouble Service No Coverage
"'
.,:
0..
Additional Expense No Coverage
Premium for Endorsements and Terro rism Coverage 5201 .50
ESTIMATED TOTAL PREMIUM" $1 4,333.58
• Th.is poky may be subject to final audit.
¶ 12 Another portion of the declarations is titled “ITEM THREE—SCHEDULE OF
COVERED AUTOS, ADDITIONAL COVERAGES AND ENDORSEMENTS.”
Immediately above this title is the sentence: “This policy is amended in
consideration of the additional or return premium shown below. This Declarations
[sic] voids and replaces all previously issued Declarations bearing the same policy
number and premium term.” This section contains separate listings for each of the
seven vehicles, including the premium for each vehicle, and every listing states
“Combined Liability” under the heading “COVERAGES” and “$1 Million each
accident” under the heading “LIMITS.” The page of “ITEM THREE” containing
-5-
the semitruck involved in the accident appears as follows:
Page 6 58979 (10.16)
OWNERS INS. CO. issued 12-06-2018
A,>ENCY PRINS INSURANCE INC Company POLICY NUMBER 51-829-065-00
07-0677-00 MKT TERR 038 Bill Company Use 39-04-IA-1806
NAMEOINSUl<ED JASON FARRELL Term 06-22-2018 lo 06-22-2019
TERRITORY CLASS
5. 2010 KW T660 048
VIN: 1XKAD49X1AJ270127 Clinlon County, IA
COVERAGES LIMITS P REMIUM CHANGE
Combined Liability $1 Million each accident $2,265 28
Uninsured Motorist $ 100.000 each person/S 100.000 each accident 9 24
Underinsurcd Motorist $ 100.000 each person/S 100.000 each accident 17.77
Medical Payments $ 5.000 each person 13.09
Comprehensive ACV - 52.500 deductible 1.117.83
Collision ACV - $2.500 deductible 2.848.38
Terrorism Coverage 31.36
TOTAL 56.302.95
No Charge
Interested Panics:
Lienholdcr MAQUO<ETA STATE 81\NK. 203 N M/\IN ST. M/\QUOKETA. IA 52060-2204
Ad<l,tio°"I Endorsements ForThis Item: 58329 !10-16) 58330 no-16) 58402 105-16)
ITEM DETAILS. Extra hea..y 1ruck-traaor operated within a 300 m•c radius.
use CLASS (00753): Tn,d<crs - Miscclaneous.
Commercial Auto P~s Coverage Package apphcs.
Vchldc Count Faaor /\pplcs.
AS~ seat bett credit has been appffd 10 Bl and/or Med Pay premium.
Diminished Value Cova~ge applies.
160 0143665A 1184
6. 2000 NON OWNED TRAILER 048
VIN: NON OWNED Clinton County, IA
Secured Interested Part Chan ed
COVERAGES LIMITS PR EMIU M CHANGE
Combined Liabd1ty $1Million each acodent 578.66
Comprehensive ACV - $2,500 deductible 133.85
Collision ACV - 52.500 deductible 327.49
Terrorism Coverage 2.70
TOTAL $542.70
No Charge
Interested Parties:
Licnholdcr. XTRA LEASE LLC. 850 66TH AVE SW. CEDAR RAPIDS. IA 52404-4709
ITEM DETAILS: Uvcstoek trailer Operated w,lhln a 300 mt1e radius.
USE CLASS (00753): Trud<crs - fAiS<:elaneous.
Vehide Count Faaor App~es.
Diminished va~e Coverage appNes.
160 0080000 1184
¶ 13 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 14 When, as in this case, the parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they
implicitly agree that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the dispute
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involves only questions of law, such that the court may decide the issues based on
the record. Acuity v. M/I Homes of Chicago, LLC, 2023 IL 129087, ¶ 20. We review
de novo the court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Id. Likewise, the
construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that we review de novo.
Hess v. Estate of Klamm, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 14.
¶ 15 An insurance policy is a contract, so the rules governing contract interpretation
also govern the interpretation of an insurance policy. Galarza v. Direct Auto
Insurance Co., 2023 IL 129031, ¶ 38. Our primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the parties’ intent, as expressed in the policy language. Id. Clear and
unambiguous policy language will be enforced as written unless it conflicts with
public policy. Id.
¶ 16 As a general rule, antistacking clauses in insurance policies do not violate public
policy. Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 16. A reviewing court will therefore give effect to
unambiguous antistacking clauses. Id. However, if insurance policy language is
ambiguous, the court will construe it liberally in favor of coverage and against the
insurer who drafted the policy. Id.; West American Insurance Co. v. Yorkville
National Bank, 238 Ill. 2d 177, 184-85 (2010). “Policy language is ambiguous if it
is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Hess, 2020 IL 124649,
¶ 16. “Reasonableness is the key” in determining whether a provision is subject to
more than one reasonable interpretation, as opposed to “whether creative
possibilities can be suggested.” Bruder v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 156 Ill.
2d 179, 193 (1993).
¶ 17 Appellants argue that, pursuant to Bruder and subsequent supreme court cases,
insurance policies are ambiguous where the declaration pages separately list
liability limits for each of the multiple vehicles insured, with the result that the
policy must be construed in favor of the insured and allow the stacking of coverage.
¶ 18 The pertinent part of Bruder examined whether the uninsured-motorist
coverage in a business auto policy should be stacked in return for separate
premiums for two pickup trucks. Id. at 189-90. The antistacking clause stated:
“ ‘The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one
person caused by any one accident is the limit of Bodily Injury shown in the
declarations for “Each Person.” ’ ” Id. at 189. The provision applied “ ‘regardless
of the number of covered autos.’ ” Id. at 194. The declarations page had separate
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entries for the premium paid for each pickup truck, but it listed the limit of liability
of $100,000 for bodily injury for “each person” just once on the page, separate from
the columns listing the vehicle information. Id. at 193. We stated:
“The only reasonable interpretation is that the policy provides only $100,000 of
liability for bodily injury occasioned to each person insured no matter how
many vehicles are listed in the column arrangement and no matter how many
premiums are paid. The representation of the limit of liability for bodily injury
for each person on the declarations page is consistent with the language of the
antistacking provision. It is also consistent with the language in the policy that
the antistacking provision would apply ‘regardless of the number of covered
autos.’ ” Id. at 193-94.
¶ 19 In discussing the arrangement of information on the declarations page, we also
stated:
“Understanding the arrangement of entries in the columns is important in
determining the effect of what is not there included. Specifically, the limits of
liability are not set out within the column arrangement in the same manner as
the page lists the premium amounts and totals. That is, there is no column for
which the limit of liability for bodily injury is to be listed like a premium
amount so that the $100,000 limit for each person would appear in both
sentence-like lines for the pickup trucks.
It would not be difficult to find an ambiguity created by such a listing of the
bodily injury liability limit for each person insured. It could easily be interpreted
that an insured should enjoy a total limit of $200,000 in coverage because a
figure of $100,000 would be shown for each pickup truck. There would be little
to suggest in such a listing that the parties intended that coverage was to be
limited to that provided for only one of the two pickup trucks. It would be more
reasonable to assume that the parties intended that, in return for the two
premiums, two $100,000 coverage amounts were afforded. See Squire, 69 Ill.
2d at 179-80 (holding that the existence of two declarations pages, both setting
$10,000 limits for liability for each person, created an ambiguity permitting the
aggregation of those coverage amounts).” Id. at 192.
-8-
The second paragraph of this quoted material, which appellants have labeled the
“Bruder dicta,” has been the subject of much debate in the appellate court.
¶ 20 This court revisited the subject of antistacking clauses in Hobbs v. Hartford
Insurance Co. of the Midwest, 214 Ill. 2d 11 (2005). Hobbs was a consolidated case
in which both underlying cases involved underinsured-motorist coverage for
multiple vehicles in a single policy. Id. at 14. We discuss only the first consolidated
case, which is germane here. The antistacking clause stated:
“ ‘LIMIT OF LIABILITY
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for
Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all
damages, including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of
bodily injury sustained by any one person in any one accident. *** This is the
most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. Insureds;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the accident.’ ” Id. at 18.
¶ 21 We stated that the case was similar to Bruder in that the antistacking clause tied
the limit of liability to the limit shown on the declarations page, the declarations
page listed the premiums for the two vehicles separately, the declarations page
listed the relevant limit of liability only once, and the antistacking clause stated that
the provision applied regardless of the number of covered vehicles. Id. at 21. We
therefore held that the underinsured-motorist coverage in the policy could not be
stacked. Id.
¶ 22 The appellate court in Hobbs had relied on two other appellate court cases,
Yates v. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass’n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 797 (2000), and
Hall v. General Casualty Co. of Illinois, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655 (2002), in determining
that ambiguity resulted from the policy statement “ ‘COVERAGE IS PROVIDED
ONLY WHERE A PREMIUM IS SHOWN FOR THE AUTO AND
COVERAGE.’ ” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 24. We disagreed with the appellate court’s
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assessment. We stated that, although Yates had similar disputed language, the
policy was already ambiguous because the declarations page listed the
underinsured-motorist limits once for each covered vehicle. Id. at 25. We reiterated
our remark in Bruder that it would not be difficult to find an ambiguity where the
antistacking clause limits liability to the limit shown on the declarations page and
the declarations page lists the limit of liability twice. Id. at 26. We circumscribed
our statement by adding that, “[i]n the absence of other qualifying language in the
antistacking clause, ‘[t]here would be little to suggest in such a listing that the
parties intended that coverage was to be limited to that provided for only one of the
two [vehicles].’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id.at 25 (quoting Bruder,156 Ill. 2d at 192
).
We further cautioned that our discussion “should not be construed as establishing
a per se rule that an insurance policy will be deemed ambiguous as to the limits of
liability anytime the limits are noted more than once on the declarations. Variances
in policy language and, in particular, antistacking clauses, frequently require case-
by-case review.” Id. at 26 n.1.
¶ 23 In Hall, the other case that the appellate court in Hobbs cited, the policy
contained an antistacking clause that the plaintiff conceded was unambiguous. Id.
at 26 (citing Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d 655). The declarations page listed separate bodily
injury premiums for the two covered vehicles but listed the limit of liability only
once. Id. The Hall court reasoned that the statement “ ‘insurance is provided where
a premium is shown’ ” (id. (quoting Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 657)) was directly
contradictory to the antistacking clause, thus creating an ambiguity that permitted
stacking (id. (citing Hall, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 660)). We overruled Hall as being
wrongly decided because the disputed clause did not address the subject of stacking
and could not reasonably be read to conflict with the antistacking clause. Id. at 27.
¶ 24 The subject of antistacking clauses arose again in this court in Hess, 2020 IL
124649, this time in the context of bodily injury liability limits instead of uninsured-
or underinsured-motorist coverage. The clause in Hess provided:
“ ‘LIMIT OF LIABILITY
A. The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each person for
Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all damages,
including damages for care, loss of services or death, arising out of “bodily
injury” sustained by any one person in any one auto accident. Subject to this
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limit for each person, the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for each
accident for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of liability for all
damages for “bodily injury” resulting from any one auto accident.
***
This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of:
1. “Insureds”;
2. Claims made;
3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or
4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.’ ” Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 25 The first page of the declarations listed three covered autos and listed the bodily
injury limit only once. Id. ¶ 6. The second declarations page listed a fourth covered
vehicle and again listed the limits for bodily injury coverage. Id. ¶ 7. The circuit
court ruled that the liability limits could be stacked four times, once for each
vehicle, and the appellate court held that it could be stacked twice, based on the
liability limits being listed two times. Id. ¶ 25. We stated that the only reasonable
explanation for the liability limits appearing for a second time on the second
declarations page was that the information for all four covered vehicles could not
fit on one physical page. Id. We held that, “[w]hen read together with the
declarations, *** the antistacking clause unambiguously prohibits stacking of
bodily injury liability coverage.” Id.
¶ 26 We further stated that the appellate court had improperly compared the case to
Cherry v. Elephant Insurance Co., 2018 IL App (5th) 170072, and Johnson v.
Davis, 377 Ill. App. 3d 602 (2007), both of which allowed the stacking of
underinsured-motorist coverage in multivehicle policies. Hess, 2020 IL 124649,
¶ 26. We pointed out that those policies listed the liability limits separately for each
covered vehicle, unlike the policy before us. Id. 5
5
Appellants argue that we distinguished Cherry and Johnson solely on the basis of the
declarations pages, thus determining that the antistacking clauses in those cases were not sufficient
to overcome the ambiguity created by declarations pages that listed the limits of liability separately
for each of multiple autos insured. To be clear, we distinguished Cherry’s and Johnson’s
- 11 -
¶ 27 Addressing our prior discussion in Bruder and Hobbs of ambiguity arising from
multiple liability limits, we stated that we were referring to liability limits that were
listed separately for each of the covered vehicles. Id. ¶ 27. We repeated our
statement in Hobbs that there was no per se rule that an insurance policy will be
construed as being ambiguous regarding the limits of liability any time that the
limits are listed more than once in the declarations. Id. ¶ 22. We stated that, instead,
the issue must be determined on a case-by-case basis and that the declarations page
must be construed together with other policy provisions rather than being read in
isolation. Id. Based on our resolution of the case, we did not address the defendant’s
alternative argument that automobile liability coverage, as distinguished from
uninsured- and underinsured-motorist coverage, should never be stacked as a
matter of law. Id. ¶¶ 17, 30.
¶ 28 Returning to the instant case, we begin by examining section II. Section II(A)
provides general language that Owners “will pay all sums an insured legally must
pay as damages” caused by an accident involving a covered auto. Section II(C),
titled “LIMIT OF INSURANCE,” contains the antistacking language. Like the
insurance policies discussed in other cases, it references the declarations pages,
stating that Owners “will pay damages for bodily injury *** up to the Limit of
Insurance shown in the Declarations for this coverage.” Further:
“When combined liability limits are shown in the Declarations, the limit
shown for each accident is the total amount of coverage and the most we will
pay for damages because of or arising out of bodily injury, property damages
and covered pollution cost or expense in any one accident.”
¶ 29 The section later continues:
“5. The Limit of Insurance for this coverage may not be added to the limits
for the same or similar coverage applying to other autos insured by this policy
to determine the amount of coverage available for any one accident or covered
pollution cost or expense, regardless of the number of:
declarations pages simply to explain why the appellate court erred in relying on them to stack the
insurance coverage. We did not discuss or even mention the antistacking clauses in those cases,
much less pass judgment on the ultimate outcomes reached.
- 12 -
a. Covered autos;
b. Insureds;
c. Premiums paid;
d. Claims made or suits brought;
e. Persons injured; or
f. Vehicles involved in the accident.”
¶ 30 Section II(C)(5) is somewhat similar to the antistacking clauses in Hobbs and
Hess, but it more directly prohibits stacking by stating that the “Limit of Insurance
for this coverage may not be added to the limits for the same or similar coverage
applying to other autos insured by this policy to determine the amount of coverage
available for any one accident.” That is, section II(C) states that the “Limit of
Insurance shown in the Declarations for this coverage” may not be added to the
limits of coverage that apply to other autos that the policy insures to determine the
amount of coverage in a single accident, regardless of factors such as the number
of covered autos and premiums paid. This prohibition against stacking is
underscored by section II(C)(3), which provides that, in the particular scenario that
a trailer insured by the policy is connected to an auto insured by the policy, the auto
and the trailer “are considered one auto and do not increase the Limit of Insurance.”
¶ 31 Appellants argue that, pursuant to the Bruder dicta, “the multiple listing of
liability limits for each vehicle insured renders the otherwise clear anti-stacking
clause in Owner’s policy ambiguous.” Appellants seem to take the position that,
regardless of the specific antistacking language used in an insurance policy, the
declarations pages alone will render the policy ambiguous if the limits of liability
are listed in conjunction with each insured vehicle. However, we have repeatedly
emphasized there is no “per se rule that an insurance policy will be deemed
ambiguous as to the limits of liability anytime the limits are noted more than once
on the declarations.” Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 26 n.1. We further stated in Hobbs that
“[v]ariances in policy language and, in particular, antistacking clauses, frequently
require case-by-case review.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Like any contract, we construe
an insurance policy in its entirety and give effect to each provision where possible.
Sanders v. Illinois Union Insurance Co., 2019 IL 124565, ¶ 23. Therefore, an
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“antistacking clause must be read in conjunction with the policy as a whole.” Hess,
2020 IL 124649, ¶ 24; see Hobbs,214 Ill. 2d at 23
(uncertainty can arise if a
declarations page is read in isolation, so we must examine the complete document
in interpreting an insurance policy).
¶ 32 Thus, we keep the provisions of the antistacking clause in mind as we turn to
the declarations pages. “ITEM TWO” lists a “Combined Liability” of “$1 Million
each accident” as the “LIMIT OF INSURANCE FOR ANY ONE ACCIDENT OR
LOSS,” in exchange for a premium of $6311.69. The policy does not define
“Combined Liability,” but its meaning can be determined by referring to sections
II(C)(1) and II(C)(2). Section II(C)(1) begins with the situation of when “combined
liability limits are shown in the Declarations,” whereas section II(C)(2) contrasts
this with when “separate bodily injury and property damage limits are shown in the
Declarations.” Therefore, a plain reading of the policy shows that “Combined
Liability” means combined bodily injury and property damage limits. The
“Combined Liability” lists a single limit of “$1 Million each accident” and a
premium of $6311.69. As such, “ITEM TWO” lists the relevant liability limit of $1
million just once, which under Bruder and Hobbs would mean that the coverages
could not be stacked.
¶ 33 However, “ITEM THREE” contains separate listings for each of the seven
covered vehicles. The listings delineate the type of coverage, the limits of insurance
for each type of coverage, and the premium charged for the coverage. The types of
coverage differ among the vehicles. For example, the trailers do not have
uninsured- or underinsured-motorist coverage, or “Medical Payments,” and one
vehicle does not have comprehensive or collision coverage. Each vehicle has a
listing of “Combined Liability” coverage of “$1 Million each accident,” with a
corresponding premium on the same line.
¶ 34 Appellants again point to the Bruder dicta in arguing that declarations pages
that list limits of liability separately for each of multiple insured vehicles give rise
to the reasonable interpretation that the policy provides separate limits for each
vehicle. However, unlike the scenario described in the Bruder dicta, we must
consider both sections (“ITEM TWO” and “ITEM THREE”) of the declarations
pages. Further, as discussed, there is no bright-line rule that an insurance policy is
ambiguous as to the limits of liability any time the limits are listed more than once
- 14 -
on the declarations. Instead we must consider each case individually, construing the
applicable policy as a whole.
¶ 35 Appellants additionally argue that “ITEM THREE” is the only section that we
should consider in the declarations because it is an “amended” declarations sheet,
in that “ITEM THREE” states: “This policy is amended in consideration of the
additional or return premium shown below. This Declarations [sic] voids and
replaces all previously issued Declarations bearing the same policy number and
premium term.” Appellants maintain that “ITEM THREE” amends the policy’s
declarations section by indicating that the insured had purchased separate $1
million combined liability limits on each of the seven vehicles listed. Appellants
argue that the coverages have changed from those listed in “ITEM TWO,” in that
some but not all of the vehicles listed have $100,000 per person/$100,000 per
accident in uninsured/underinsured-motorist coverage and $5000 per person in
medical payments coverage, which is a change from “ITEM TWO,” where all
“Scheduled Autos” (symbol “7”) are listed as having uninsured/underinsured-
motorist coverage and medical payments coverage. Appellants contend that it is
reasonable to interpret “ITEM THREE” as not subject to any terms in “ITEM
TWO” and view it as the policy’s controlling declarations.
¶ 36 Appellant’s argument that “ITEM THREE” was intended to take the place of
“ITEM TWO” is contradicted by the policy documents. The policy has a page that
states “DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES EFFECTIVE 11-27-2018” and states that
a lienholder was added for one of the trailers. “ITEM TWO” and “ITEM THREE”
both list a policy term of June 22, 2018, to June 22, 2019, and an endorsement
effective date of “11-27-2018.” Accordingly, both “ITEM TWO” and “ITEM
THREE” were active portions of the policy.
¶ 37 Appellants additionally argue that “ITEM THREE” lists “Combined Liability”
in the singular, whereas the antistacking provision refers to “combined liability
limits” (emphasis added) in the plural, such that the individual liability amounts can
be “combined” or stacked to constitute “combined liability limits.” The trial court
engaged in a similar analysis. We note that “ITEM THREE” lists “Combined
Liability” under the heading “COVERAGES” and “$1 Million each accident”
under the heading “LIMITS,” such that “ITEM THREE” also references
“Combined Liability” limits. More importantly, as discussed, a plain reading of the
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policy illustrates that “Combined Liability” means combined bodily injury and
property damage limits. See also Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 16 (we “will not strain
to find ambiguity in an insurance policy where none exists” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Hobbs, 214 Ill. 2d at 31 (“We will not *** ‘torture ordinary words
until they confess to ambiguity.’ ” (quoting Western States Insurance Co. v.
Wisconsin Wholesale Tire, Inc., 184 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1999))).
¶ 38 Taking a wide-angled view of the declarations pages, the only logical and
reasonable interpretation is that “ITEM THREE” provides a more specific
breakdown of the information summarized in a chart in “ITEM TWO,” including
the differing coverages applicable to each vehicle and the corresponding premium
for each vehicle. As the coverages varied greatly, it was necessary for Owners to
provide the information over multiple pages. Significantly, the distinct premium
amounts listed individually in “ITEM THREE” for “Combined Liability” add up to
the same $6311.69 total for “Combined Liability” in “ITEM TWO,” which clearly
states a $1 million per accident maximum just once. The fact that the total premium
amounts are identical indicates that both sections are intended to provide the same
coverage.
¶ 39 It is true that “ITEM THREE” lists a combined liability limit of “$1 Million
each accident” for each vehicle, but this may be viewed as consistent with the
“ITEM TWO” combined liability limit of “$1 Million each accident.” The
antistacking clause likewise ties the maximum liability to “the limit shown for each
accident.” Moreover, when the declarations pages are considered in light of the
antistacking provision, including the language that the “Limit of Insurance for this
coverage may not be added to the limits for the same or similar coverage applying
to other autos insured by this policy to determine the amount of coverage available
for any one accident” regardless of the number of covered autos, it is clear that the
limits may not be aggregated. In other words, the insurance policy as a whole is
subject to only one reasonable interpretation, which unambiguously provides a $1
million per accident liability limit and prohibits stacking the liability limits of each
insured vehicle.
¶ 40 Owners additionally argues that, unlike uninsured- and underinsured-motorist
coverage, liability insurance by its nature cannot be stacked. Owners did not raise
this issue in the trial court, and as appellants highlight, in the appellate court Owners
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stated in its reply brief that, “[u]nlike the insurer in Hess, Owners does not ask this
Court to adopt a per se rule that primary liability limits can never be stacked.”
Regardless of whether Owners waived the argument, we do not consider whether
the per se rule is warranted because, as in Hess, 2020 IL 124649, ¶ 30, we have
determined that the policy as a whole clearly shows that the parties’ intent was not
to allow aggregation of the limits of liability coverage for the individual vehicles
insured.
¶ 41 IV. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which
reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to enter
summary judgment for Owners.
¶ 43 Appellate court judgment affirmed.
¶ 44 Circuit court judgment reversed.
¶ 45 Cause remanded with directions.
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