Beech & Fuller Co. v. Lane
Beech & Fuller Co. v. Lane
Opinion of the Court
This is an action by the appellee Daniel N. Lane to foreclose ah indemnifying mortgage executed by Leona S. Tryon and her husband, Ira D. Tryon, to Daniel N. Lane and Richard Ready. The court on request found the facts specially and stated its conclusions of law thereon.
The facts as found by the court are as follows: In October, 1912, Ira D. Tryon borrowed $894.87 from the Farmers’ and Merchants’ Bank of Decker, Indiana, and as evidence thereof gave his note due in six months, signed with Lane and Ready as sureties. Before maturity of the note, Mr. Tryon paid enough to reduce the principal to $750. This note was not paid off in cash until in January, 1918, but was evidenced by a series of notes executed from time to' time as follows: As each note came due a new note was taken by the bank for $750, and each up to the one executed August 13, 1916, was signed by Ira D. Tryon as principal and by Lane and Ready as sureties, and the various notes as taken up were stamped “PAID,” by the bank and delivered to Tryon.
In 1914, Ira D. Tryon arid his wife,° Leona, conveyed the real estate described in the indemnifying mortgage to appellee Lane, with the understanding that Lane should convey it to Mrs. Tryon and that she should assume the payment of said $750 and also a note of $900 given by her husband to the People’s State Bank of Carlisle, which had also been signed by Lane and Ready as sureties. In accordance with this agreement
In September, 1916, Mrs. Tryon and her husband executed an indemnifying mortgage to Lane and Ready on the said real estate to secure and indemnify Lane and Ready against any loss because of the payment of said notes herein before mentioned, or any renewal thereof. The mortgagors expressly agreed to pay the sum of money therein mentioned.' This mortgage was recorded September, 1916.
Mrs. Tryon paid $300 on the $900 note due the People’s State Bank, the appellee Lane paying the balance of the note. The $750 note dated August 13, 1916, described in said mortgage was signed by Mrs. Tryon as principal and by Ira D. Tryon, Lane and Ready as sureties and fell due on February 13, 1917. The bank demanded payment and Mrs. Tryon informed the bank that she was unable to pay it and asked to have it renewed. She paid the interest on the note of August 13, 1916, signed a renewal note and requested the bank to have the sureties come in and sign it. Mr. Ready was then a resident of Texas. The bank notified Mr. Lane and he came and signed such note as surety. No other person signed this note of February 13, 1917. After Lane had signed this new note, the bank marked the note, dated August 13, 1916, which was signed by Mrs. Tryon as principal and by- Ira D. Tryon, Lane and
On January 19, 1918, appellee Lane, paid the Farmer’s and Merchant’s Bank the sum of $770.13, that being the amount of the principal and interest due on the note dated February 13, 1917, said note being the note given in renewal of the note due said bank and described in the mortgage. On January 21, 1918, Lane paid the People’s State Bank $617 in full of the note due it. All the notes mentioned were payable in a bank in this state and were negotiable instruments under the law of this state.
At the time of execution of said mortgage, Mrs. Tryon was the owner of the real estate described therein and continued the owner thereof until February 2, 1918, when she and her husband conveyed said land by warranty deed to the appellant subject to said indemnifying mortgage. Appellant, at the time when the deed was made to it, knew all of the facts relative to the execution and renewal of said notes to both banks.
Upon these facts the court concluded as a matter of law: (1) That Lane was entitled to a judgment against Mrs. Tryon for $1,477.18; (2) that he was entitled to a foreclosure of his mortgage against all of the defendants. . Other conclusions of law were stated but it is not necessary to set them out in this opinion. Judgment was rendered in accordance with the conclusions of law, after which appellant filed a motion to- modify
Appellee insists that the motion to modify the decree is not in the record, and that no question is presented by the second assignment.
We do not question the correctness of the law as stated by appellant as to the effect of the giving of a negotiable promissory note for a pre-existing indebtedness of the maker. The law upon this subject is clearly and correctly stated in Sutton v. Baldwin (1896), 146 Ind. 361, 45 N. E. 518, and Bradway v. Groenendyke (1899), 153 Ind. 508, 55 N. E. 434.
The mortgage in question, as found by the court, was given to secure and indemnify Lane and Ready against any loss because of the payment of either of the notes mentioned therein or of any renewal of said notes. The court found that the note which appellee Lane paid to the Farmers’ and' Merchants’ Bank, had been given in renewal of the note described in the mortgage. Appellant, however, contends that the court should have found that the parties did not intend that the note of February 13, 1917, should be a, payment of the note described in the mortgage, and that the ■ statement that it was given in renewal of the former note is a conclusion that must be disregarded.
While the court found that Ready was insolvent and Lane solvent, there is no finding as to the solvency of Mr. and Mrs. Tryon. The bank did not surrender or deliver the old note to any one, but kept it in its possession and, in keeping with its custom, stamped the note “PAID.” It is clear from these facts that it was not the intention of Mrs. Tryon that the new note was to be taken as a payment of the old note. She asked that she be permitted to renew .it, after which she signed the new note with the request that the three sureties come in and sign it. The court was fully justified in finding as an ultimate fact that the note of February 13,1917, was given in renewal of the former note.
The facts in Knight v. Kerfoot (1915), 184 Ind. 31, 110 N. E. 206, cited by the appellant, are materially different from the facts in this case. There one of the solvent sureties on the former note refused to sign a renewal note, after which the principal and the other surety, who was solvent, executed their note to the bank.
In the case now under consideration it is found as a fact that the note of February 18, 1917, was given in renewal of the former note. This finding is sufficient to overcome the presumption of payment arising from the fact that the last note was negotiable under the statute. The court did not err in its conclusion of law. Judgment affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.