The provision of the compensation law, as originally enacted, concerning the duty of an employer to furnish treatment to an injured employee during the first thirty days after the injury, is familiar. §25, Acts 1915 p. 392, §8020il Burns’ Supp. 1918. By an amendment to that section the following has been inserted:

“If, by reason of the nature of the injury or the process of recovery, treatment is necessary for a longer period than thirty days, the Industrial Board may require the employer to furnish such treatment for an additional period, not exceeding thirty days.” §25, Acts 1919 p. 158, §8020il Burns’ Supp. 1921.

The compensation law gives recognition to the principle that it is to the interest of everyone concerned (including the public) that a disabled workman shall be restored, if possible, without unnecessary delay, so that he may engage in some wholesome and profitable employment whereby he may provide for himself and his dependents. To that end, the. law as originally enacted imposed upon an employer the absolute duty to furnish to an injured em *149 ployee such medical and surgical treatment and hospital service as may be necessary during the first thirty days. The amendment confers upon the Industrial Board the power to require an employer to furnish treatment for an additional period not exceeding thirty days if in the judgment of the board a recovery probably will be accelerated thereby. The board has made no finding on this feature, but from the uncontroverted evidence concerning the nature and prognosis of the injury it is apparent that the board has not abused its discretion by giving Lunte the benefit of the additional thirty-day period, if in fact the board has exercised that discretion.

The employer contends that the law contemplates that the Industrial Board shall determine in advance whether or not it will require an employer to furnish treatment beyond the first thirty-day period; and that the board had no authority to include in the award the cost of the hospital service for the reason that the service was rendered after the first thirty-day period and no order requiring the employer to furnish that service had previously been made. The contention rests on the assumption that the hospital service was in truth furnished after the first thirty-day period. Is the assumption valid?

If Lunte had been injured by some external and violent means—some mishap in his environment—and if the nature of his injury had been such as that it was visible and open to observation or readily ascertainable by a surgeon at the time it occurred, then there would have been no difficulty in determining the right of the employee and the duty of the employer with respect to medical and surgical treatment. In that class of cases the treatment period begins at the time the injury is inflicted. But Lunte’s injury was not one of that class. While engaged in *150 heavy lifting he suddenly experienced severe pain in his abdomen. He thought the pain was in his bowels. That evening he made his way home with difficulty. He consulted a physician. The physician found a swelling, but was unable to determine the precise nature of the ailment. He was inclined to the opinion that his patient was suffering from a swollen gland. After some days, suppuration appeared; and the physician thought he was dealing with a suppurating gland. At that time and on that state of facts no one could know the right of the employee and the duty of the employer with respect to treatment. If the employer had furnished treatment during the first thirty days and afterward it had developed that Lunte’s ailment was in no sense due to his employment, then the employer would have incurred an expense which the law did not require him to incur. The truth is that from the day on which the injury occurred until the nature thereof could be ascertained with reasonable certainty, was a period of suspense. During that period, the right of the employee and the duty of the employer with respect to treatment were suspended. In other words, during that period, it would have been impossible to have determined the question of right and duty for the simple reason that legal proof could not have been adduced. Finally, on July 12, by a decisive test, the surgeons established beyond controversy that Lunte’s ailment was a femoral hernia. That fact having been established, it then became possible to establish by legal proof that his injury was due to his employment. Thereupon, it became the duty of the employer to furnish treatment. Then, and not until then, did the treatment period begin.

The facts of this case illustrate the wisdom of the rule that the legal rights of the employee and the corresponding 4, 5. duties of the employer become enforceable when the injury has developed so *151 that it may be diagnosed with reasonable certainty, thus making it possible to establish the facts on which those rights and duties depend, by that degree of proof required by law. John A. Schumaker Co. v. Kendrew (1918), 68 Ind. App. 466, 120 N. E. 722. See Hornbrook-Price Co. v. Stewart (1918), 66 Ind. App. 400; In re McCaskey (1917), 65 Ind. App. 349, 117 N. E. 268; Johansen v. Union Stock, etc., Co. (1916), 99 Nebr. 328, 156 N. W. 511; Johnson's Case (1914), 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735 . It follows that the hospital expense was incurred during the first thirty-day period and that the employer's liability for the payment thereof is absolute.

By specifying in the award that compensation shall continue “so long as the plaintiff is totally disabled to perform the work in which he was engaged at the time of his injury,” the Industrial Board exceeded its authority. That proposition is so clear that it is not debatable. But we would not be justified in reversing the award as a whole on that account. If Lunte becomes able to engage in remunerative employment of any kind, even though it be not the identical work in which he was engaged at the time of his injury, that fact may be presented to the board by a proper petition, and, on proof thereof, it would be the duty of the board to modify the award accordingly. The rights of the employer cannot be forestalled by inserting the objectionable provision in the award. However, we deem it advisable that the award should be amended by expunging the words above quoted and inserting in lieu thereof the words “during total disability.”

The Industrial Board is directed to make the amendment above indicated; and, when so amended, the award is affirmed.