plaintiff did not have an abso lute right to file a supplemental complaint. Under the Code it was within the discretion of the trial court to-grant or refuse leave to file the proposed pleading. §408 Burns 1914, §399 R. S. 1881; *127 1 Watson, Revision Works Practice §861 et seq. That is the general rule. 21 R. C. L. 503; 31 Cyc 502.

The office of a supplemental complaint is to bring forward facts that have transpired since the institution of the action and which may tend to strengthen or reinforce the cause of action stated in the complaint. 1 Watson, Revision of Works Practice §865; 21 R. C. L. 503. In effect a supplemental complaint becomes a part of the original complaint and the whole matter is to be determined by one trial and one judgment. Muncie, etc., Traction Co. v. Citizens Gas, etc., Co. (1912), 179 Ind. 322. A separate and distinct cause of action may not be brought into the case by a supplemental complaint. Barker v. Prizer (1897), 150 Ind. 4.

It should be noted that the proposed supplemental complaint does not aver that the alleged conveyance is fraudulent. Its only purpose was to inform the court that a conveyance had been made while the litigation was pending. The contention is that the deed is void merely because it was executed while the land was involved in pending litigation, and that it was the duty of the court to cancel the deed without a hearing. The contention cannot be sustained. Of course, the grantee took the land subject to the result of the litigation. Truitt v. Truitt (1871), 38 Ind. 16; Wild v. Noblesville Building, etc., Institution (1899), 153 Ind. 5. But the litigation resulted in favor of the grantee and her deed is not affected by the judgment. It is apparent that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing leave to file the proposed supplemental complaint.

It is not the function of a judgment to show facts. The motion to modify the judgment was properly overruled. We have examined the evidence and it tends fairly to sustain the finding.

Judgment affirmed.