Carter v. Jones
Cases that cite this one
3 later published cases cite this decision.
- Parks v. Indiana (Supreme Court of the United States 2002)
- Capehart v. Capehart (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)
- Carter v. Jones (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
Case Summary
Mary Carter, defendant below, appeals the trial court's grant of additur in favor of Tracy and Monty Jones, plaintiffs below, and the court's denial of Carter's motion to enforce a qualified settlement offer. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issue
Carter presents several issues, the following of which is dispositive: Did the trial court's failure to rule on the Joneses's motion to correct error in a timely manner render its belated order granting additur a ° nullity?
Facts and Procedural History
On July 29, 1994, Tracy Jones was driving in her car when it was rear-ended by Carter's vehicle. The Joneses sued Carter for Tracy's alleged personal injuries, and Monty's alleged loss of consortium. On May 5, 2000, Carter offered to settle Tracy's claim for $7,500.00, and Monty's claim for $1.00. The offers were apparently rejected, and the case went to trial on June 15, 2000. Carter conceded her lability, but contested the Joneses's damages. The jury awarded Tracy $5,000.00, but found against Monty. (R. 7.) On June 22, 2000, the Joneses filed their "Motion to Correct Error/Additur," asking the court to either enter judgment greater than that contemplated by the jury, or to grant a new trial. The court held hearings on the motion on July 14 and August 11, 2000. (R. 7, 562.) On October 3, 2000, the court purportedly granted the Joneses's motion for additur, finding that the jury's award was inadequate as a matter of law, and adding $50,000.00, for a total judgment of $55,000.00. Carter filed her praccipe on October 28, 2000, and now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
A. Standard lof Review
A trial court has considerable discretion to grant or deny motions to correct
B. Analysis
Carter argues that the court's order granting additur is void because it was not issued in a timely manner. The Joneses appropriately sought additur under Trial Rule 59, which provides that a motion to correct error is a prerequisite for appeal "when a party seeks to address ... [a] claim that a jury's verdict is excessive or inadequate." Trial Rule 53.8(A) provides that
[in the event a court ... fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed denied. An appeal shall be initiated by filing the notice of appeal under [former] Appellate Rule 2(A) [now Appellate Rule 9] within thirty (80) days after the Motion to correct Error is deemed denied.
"A trial court has no power to rule on a motion to correct error after the time designated by the rule has passed, and any subsequent ruling is a nullity." Johnson v. Johnson County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 732 N.E.2d 865, 865-866 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000). The court heard the Joneses's motion on July 14 and August 11, 2000, but did not rule on it until October 2, 2000. The motion was therefore "deemed denied" under Trial Rule 53.3 as of September 11, 2000, thirty days after the August 11 hearing. Carter thus asserts that the court's October 2, 2000 ruling granting additur was a nullity and must be reversed.
The Joneses respond by asserting that the court's order granting additur is not a nullity, but is simply voidable under the exception to the Trial Rule 58.3 deadlines delineated in Cavinder Elevators, Inc. v. Hall, 726 N.E.2d 285, 289 (Ind. 2000)
The Joneses claim that they promptly appealed the deemed denial of their motion to correct error, and thus fall within the Cavinder exception, by characterizing their status before this court as "cross-appellants" under Trial Rule 59(G) with regard to the issues raised by Carter. This argument misunderstands and misconstrues both Cavinder and the applicable trial rules. First, the Joneses are not cross-appellants under Trial Rule 59(G). That rule permits a party responding to an
As a result, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. Former Appellate Rule 2(A), in effect until December 31, 2000, required a party seeking an appeal to file a pracecipe within thirty days of the entry of final judgment. As noted above, however, when a party files a motion to correct error, Trial Rule 58.3 provides that the appeal must be commenced within thirty days from the date the court rules on the motion, or within thirty days after the motion is deemed denied. In either case, the filing of the praecipe in a timely manner is a jurisdictional prerequisite to any appeal, and the failure to commence an appeal in a timely manner deprives us of jurisdiction over the remainder of the appeal, and mandates dismissal. See Roscoe v. Roscoe, 673 N.E.2d 820, 821 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (dismissing appeal for lack of jurisdiction after holding the trial court's belated ruling on a motion to correct errors a nullity, because the party commene-ing appeal failed to file a praccipe within thirty days of the deemed denial of the motion to correct errors). Here, neither party commenced an appeal within thirty days after the Joneses's motion to correct errors was deemed denied by virtue of the trial court's failure to rule upon it, and both parties' rights to an appeal were waived. We accordingly lack jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
751 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
DISPOSITION OF CASES BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
INDIANA RULES OF PROCEDURE, APPELLATE RULE 15(A)(3) PROVIDES:
"Unless specifically designated 'For Publication’, memorandum decisions shall not be published in the official reporter of the Indiana Court of Appeals nor shall they be regarded as precedent nor cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case.”
NAME OF CASE
CAUSE
NUMBER DATE JUDGES DISPOSITION
Janitz v. Greene
Horn v. Horn
Lucero v. Lewis
Fenwick v. State
Morris v. State
Howard v. State
Record v. State
Jones v. State
29A04-
0012-CV-
529
77A04-
0101-CV-12
46A04-
0101-CV-33
65A01-
0101-PC-33
49A04-
0012-CR-
561
49A02-
0012-CR-
815
55A01-
0012-PC-
422
49A02-
0012-CR-
788
07/03/2001 ROBB, J.
BROOK, J. VAIDIK, J.
07/03/2001 FRIEDLANDER, J. SULLIVAN, J. RILEY, J.
07/03/2001 BARNES, J.
DARDEN, J. NAJAM, J.
07/03/2001 ROBB, J.
BROOK, J. VAIDIK, J.
07/03/2001 ROBB, J.
BROOK, J. VAIDIK, J.
07/05/2001 BROOK, J.
ROBB, J. VAIDIK, J.
07/05/2001 BROOK, J.
ROBB, J. VAIDIK, J.
07/05/2001 BARNES, J.
DARDEN, J. NAJAM, J.
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed Concurs Concurs in Result
Reversed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
751 NORTH EASTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES
DISPOSITION OF CASES BY UNPUBLISHED MEMORANDUM DECISION—Continued
NAME OF CASE
CAUSE
NUMBER DATE JUDGES
Penrose v. Penrose
Wilson v. Slate
Dorn v. Phair
Dickman v. Stale
64A04-
0009-CV-
386 07/10/2001
18A02-
0008-PC-
493 07/10/2001
07A04-
0002-CV-78 07/10/2001
03A04-
0009-CR-
393 07/10/2001
BAKER, J. BAILEY, J. MATHIAS, J.
MATTINGLY-MAY,
J.
FRIEDLANDER, J. BAILEY, J.
MATTINGLY-MAY,
J.
FRIEDLANDER, J. BAILEY, J.
SHARPNACK, C.J.
Cover v. State
State v. Riding
Hogan v. State
Williams v. State
Gillard v. State
Cunningham v. State
J.C. v. State
20A03-
0011-CR-
403 07/10/2001
49A02-
0012-CR-
764 07/10/2001
49A02-
0012-CR-
8-26 07/10/2001
06A01-
0104-CR-
124 07/10/2001
49A02-
0012-CR-
799 07/10/2001
77A04-
0101-CR-38 07/10/2001
49A02-
0012-JV-
784 ' 07/10/2001
KIRSCH, J.
MATTINGLY-MAY,
J.
MATTINGLY-MAY,
J.
SHARPNACK, C.J. KIRSCH, J.
DARDEN, J. NAJAM, J. BARNES, J.
ROBERTSON, SR. J.
BAILEY, J. MATHIAS, J.
ROBERTSON,
MATTINGLY-MAY,
J.
KIRSCH, J.
SHARPNACK, C.J. KIRSCH, J. MATTINGLY-MAY,
BAKER, J. BAILEY, J. MATHIAS, J.
FRIEDLANDER, J. RILEY, J. SULLIVAN, J.
DISPOSITION
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed and Remanded Concurs Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Reversed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
Affirmed
Concurs
Concurs
. Because we lind this issue dispositive, we do not reach Carter's other issues regarding the propriety of the trial court's grant of addi-tur, or the enforcement of a qualified settlement offer.
. The deadlines for ruling on a motion to correct error are expressly subject to the exceptions set out under subsection (B) of Trial Rule 53.3, and may be extended by the court under subsection (D) of the rule. The Joneses do not claim that the exceptions in subsection (B) apply, and the trial court does not appear to have extended its deadline.
. Because we lack jurisdiction over this matter, we do not have the authority to remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdict pursuant to Trial Rule 58, which the trial court is now plainly required to do.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.