[1] This appeal stems from a controversy arising out of the Adams County
Drug Court. Presiding Judge Patrick Miller initiated a lawsuit against Adams County
Auditor Mary Beery ("the Auditor") and, on June 7, 2017, ordered her to make certain
tax and retirement benefit payments in connection to the employment of Drug Court
Coordinator Kelly Sickafoose. The Auditor made the payments at issue in July of
2017. Despite the Auditor having made full payment, in August of 2017, Sickafoose
moved for a rule to show cause, alleging that the Auditor was in contempt of the
June 7, 2017 order. The trial court denied Sickafoose's motion and awarded attorney's
fees in favor of the Auditor., [2] Upon review, we conclude that any possible contempt
by the Auditor was cured by payment of the funds at issue. Further, because Sickafoose
filed numerous motions after payment was made despite knowing that she was not a
party to the lawsuit, we agree with the trial court's determination that Sickafoose's
filings were frivolous. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in
denying Sickafoose's motion for rule to show cause, granting the Auditor's motion
to dismiss, and awarding $16,463.50 in attorney's fees to the Auditor. In addition,
because we find this appeal to be frivolous, we conclude that an award of appellate
attorney's fees is warranted, and we remand to the trial court for a determination
of the amount of appellate fees that should be awarded to the Auditor., [4] Sickafoose
was paid for work completed in 2016 as an independent contractor and was provided
with an IRS form indicating such status. In early 2017, Judge Miller resolved that
Sickafoose should no longer be an independent contractor but rather an employee
of the court. The Adams County Board of Commissioners approved Sickafoose's employment
in March of 2017. After Sickafoose was hired as an employee of the court, a dispute
arose between Judge Miller and Sickafoose and the Adams County Board of Commissioners,
County Council, Auditor's Office, and Auditor (collectively, "the County") regarding
retroactive application of employee status. Specifically, Judge Miller and Sickafoose
wanted the County to treat Sickafoose's hire date as the day she began providing
services as an independent contractor and to make retroactive tax and retirement
benefits payments on her behalf. After the County rejected this request, Judge Miller
initiated the underlying lawsuit against the Auditor over which he initially presided.,
[6] The next day, the Auditor filed a motion to vacate Judge Miller's order, arguing
that as the plaintiff to the action, Judge Miller did not have jurisdiction to issue
the order. On June 9, 2017, the Auditor filed a petition for an emergency writ of
mandamus and prohibition with the Indiana Supreme Court. That same day, the Supreme
Court issued an emergency *490writ and ordered Judge Miller to stay the proceedings
pending its review of the Auditor's petition. On June 29, 2017, the Supreme Court
denied the Auditor's request for a permanent writ and dissolved the previously-issued
emergency writ. Judge Miller then issued an order lifting the stay.3 At some point,
Sickafoose filed an appearance as an "Interested Party." Appellant's App. Vol.
II p. 74., [9] In August, Sickafoose, again acting as an interested party, moved
for a rule to show cause, alleging that the Auditor "appears to be in Indirect Criminal
Contempt of Court, as well as in Civil Contempt of Court." Appellant's App. Vol.
II p. 80. She further claimed that "As of the date of this motion, [the Auditor]
has failed and refused to comply with the Honorable Judge Miller's Order issued
June 7, 2017." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 81. Claiming that Judge Miller's June
7, 2017 order was made for her benefit, Sickafoose requested that Judge Hakes find
the Auditor in indirect criminal and civil contempt of the court and order her to
"immediately and fully comply with the Order issued by the Honorable Patrick R.
Miller on June 7, 2017." Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 82., [10] On September 7,
2017, the Auditor responded to Sickafoose's motion for a rule to show cause, asserting
that the motion was moot as the claims at issue had been paid. The Auditor alternatively
argued that Sickafoose did not have standing to file the motion as she was not a
party to the lawsuit and had not sought to intervene. The Auditor requested that
Judge Hakes deny Sickafoose's motion, award attorney's fees to the Auditor, and
dismiss the case with prejudice., [11] The Auditor also contemporaneously moved
to dismiss, asserting that the lawsuit had been initiated by Judge Miller for the
purpose of ordering the Auditor to make certain retroactive tax and PERF payments
in connection to Sickafoose's employment as Drug Court Coordinator. The Auditor
further asserted that the order to pay the funds in question was the only component
of the lawsuit and that she had "fully complied with the payment and written notification
requirements of" Judge Miller's order. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84. As such,
the Auditor argued that there was "no action left to be taken" in the lawsuit. Appellant's
App. Vol. II p. 84., [12] On September 13, 2017, Judge Miller sent a letter to Judge
Hakes requesting that Judge Hakes continue a scheduled pre-trial conference to grant
him the opportunity to respond to the Auditor's motion to dismiss and response
in opposition to Sickafoose's motion to show cause. In this letter, Judge Miller
acknowledged that the Auditor had paid all claims included in the June 7, 2017 order.
Counsel for both the Auditor and Sickafoose were copied on Judge Miller's letter.,
[14] On March 29, 2018, Judge Kiracofe issued an order denying Sickafoose's motion
for rule to show cause and granting the Auditor's motion to dismiss. On April 27,
2018, Sickafoose filed a motion to correct error and a motion for a change of judge.
Judge Kiracofe denied these motions in an order dated June 7, 2018., [15] On June
25, 2018, Judge Kiracofe conducted a hearing on the Auditor's request for attorney's
fees. Finding that Sickafoose's ongoing litigation was frivolous both because the
claims at issue had been paid and Sickafoose lacked standing as she was not a party
to the lawsuit, Judge Kiracofe awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $16,463.50
to the Auditor., I. Motion for a Rule to Show Cause, [16] Sickafoose contends that
the trial court erred in denying her motion for a rule for the Auditor to show cause
why she is not in contempt of court. "It is soundly within the discretion of the
trial court to determine whether a party is in contempt, and we review the judgment
under an abuse of discretion standard." Steele-Giri v. Steele , 51 N.E.3d 119, 124
(Ind. 2016) (internal quotation omitted). "We will reverse a trial court's finding
of contempt only if there is no evidence or inference therefrom to support the finding."
Id. (internal quotation omitted). Sanctions in a contempt proceeding "may seek both
to coerce behavior and to compensate an aggrieved party."5 MacIntosh v. MacIntosh
, 749 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied ., [19] Sickafoose claims
for the first time on appeal that Indiana Trial Rule 71 grants her standing to join.
Generally, arguments not made before the trial court are waived on appeal. See Fox
v. Rice , 936 N.E.2d 316, 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Waiver notwithstanding, we conclude
that Sickafoose's reliance on Trial Rule 71 is misplaced. Trial Rule 71 provides
as follows:, Even if we were to assume that Judge Miller's June 7, 2017 order was
made on Sickafoose's behalf, Trial Rule 71 did not grant Sickafoose standing to
participate in an unlimited fashion as if she were a party to the lawsuit. Pursuant
to the plain language of the rule, the enforcement powers provided for by Trial
Rule 71 extended only so far as to allow Sickafoose to enforce obedience with the
June 7, 2017 order. Thus, any enforcement power Sickafoose may have had was extinguished
by the Auditor's compliance with Judge Miller's order. The record demonstrates
that the Auditor complied with Judge Miller's order in July of 2017. Sickafoose
did not file her motion to show cause until August of 2017. As such, by the time
Sickafoose filed her motion to show cause, no enforcement power remained as the
funds at issue had been paid.7, [23] Alternatively, Sickafoose contends that the
trial court erred in awarding fees incurred in preparing and defending the Auditor's
request for fees. "The trial court's decision to award attorney fees and any amount
thereof is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." GEICO , 7 N.E.3d at 305. "A trial
court abuses its discretion if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect
of the facts and circumstances or if the trial court has misinterpreted the law."
Id., [24] Sickafoose challenges $4,978.50 of the $16,463.50 award, arguing that
the fees were incurred in relation to the preparation and defense of the Auditor's
request for fees. In making this challenge, Sickafoose acknowledges that she "has
found no case specifically holding whether attorney fees awarded under [ Indiana
Code section] 34-52-1-1 may include fees for seeking fees." Appellant's Br. p.
23. She also acknowledges authority indicating that, at least under some circumstances,
such an award is permissible. See Appellant's Br. p. 23 (acknowledging Walton v.
Claybridge Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. , 825 N.E.2d 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ). She
nevertheless argues that the trial court abused its discretion by including such
fees. The Auditor asserts that it "is nonsensical for Sickafoose to acknowledge
that she is unaware of any law which prohibits the Court from awarding fees to the
Auditor for preparing for and participating in the [June 25, 2018] Hearing, yet
implies that it 'misinterpreted the law' by doing so." Appellee's Br. p. 26.
We agree with the Auditor and conclude that in the absence of relevant authority
clearly indicating that it was inappropriate for the trial court to award the fees
in question, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by doing so., [25] The
Auditor seeks to recover attorney's fees for funds expended *495responding to what
it characterizes as a frivolous appeal., [26] While we are generally reluctant to
grant an award of appellate attorney's fees, we conclude that given the specific
facts of the case before us, such an award is warranted. Sickafoose has continued
to pursue this matter, at great taxpayer expense, even after her actions had been
deemed frivolous. We therefore remand to the trial court for a hearing to determine
the appropriate appellate award of the attorney's fees.