Strauss v. Carpenter

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

EDWARD MICHAEL STRAUSS, )

Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CAUSE NO.: 2:20-CV-62-JVB-JEM )

JAMES CARPENTER, et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss filed on May 20, 2020: one by Defendant Sonya Morris [DE 19] and one by Defendants Anthony Copeland, City of East Chicago, and Sandra Favela [DE 23]. Plaintiff Edward Strauss filed a single response on July 17, 2020, and Morris filed a reply on July 23, 2020. For the reasons described below, the motions are granted. BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a seven-count complaint against six defendants, arising from an incident at the East Chicago City Court. In brief, the complaint alleges as follows: On February 10, 2020, Strauss went to the East Chicago City Court to attend court for his own cases and to “report the happenings of the court for a journalistic publication.” On a previous visit to the courthouse, Strauss had been prevented from bringing audio and video recording devices into the courtroom. This time, Strauss brought a clipboard, pen, and legal documents and sat in the public gallery. Defendant James Carpenter, a bailiff, approached Strauss and told him that per the judge’s orders, there is “no reading or writing in the courtroom.” Carpenter told Strauss to put the materials away or leave the courtroom, or else he would be arrested. Strauss objected and argued with Carpenter. Ultimately, Strauss “plac[ed] his clipboard down next to him and abandon[ed], under duress and threat of arrest, his review of his case and his ability to take notes.” Strauss alleges that because of this incident, he sustained “compensatory damages” and “ongoing extreme emotional distress.”

Strauss sued the City of East Chicago, Anthony Copeland (the Mayor of East Chicago), Sandra Favela (a city employee1), Sonya Morris (a judge), Carpenter (the bailiff), and James Crawford (Carpenter’s supervisor). Moving defendants seek to dismiss the following counts pled against them: • Count 3, alleging pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that Morris, Crawford, Copeland, and Favela maintained a policy of “deliberate indifference” toward judicial misconduct and unlawful behavior by city employees; • Count 5, alleging liability for the City of East Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for the allegations above; • Count 6, alleging liability for Morris, Crawford, Copeland, and Favela under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for the allegations above; • Count 7, alleging willful and wanton misconduct against all defendants based on the bailiffs’ treatment of Strauss.

ANALYSIS

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the pleading, not to decide the merits of the case. See Gibson v. City of Chi., 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” However, “recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 661, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

In Counts 5 and 6, Strauss alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against Copeland, Favela, and the City. Section 1985 prohibits depriving a person of equal protection under the law through a conspiracy motivated by “racial, or other class-based discriminatory animus.” Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)). “To establish the existence of a conspiracy, a plaintiff must show that the conspirators agreed to inflict

In Count 7, Strauss adds a claim of willful and wanton misconduct against all defendants for failing to address an “unreasonable risk of physical and/or emotional injury to Strauss.” Willful or wanton misconduct consists of either: “1) an intentional act done with reckless disregard of the natural and probable consequence of injury to a known person . . . or 2) an omission or failure to act when the actor has actual knowledge of the natural and probable consequence of injury and [ ] opportunity to avoid the risk.” Ellis v. City of Martinsville, 940 N.E.2d 1197, 1204-05 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides immunity from tort liability to government employees acting within the scope of their employment. I.C. 34-13-3-5(a).

Even if the Indiana Tort Claims Act did not provide immunity to the individual defendants, Strauss has not pled facts that state a claim for willful or wanton misconduct against Copeland, Favela or the City.3 Strauss does not point to a specific action or omission by any of these

Assuming Strauss’s factual allegations are true, it is not clear why his prior run-in with the bailiffs – in which he was prevented from bringing recording devices into the courtroom – would have put the defendants on notice of a probable future injury to Strauss. Nor has Strauss shown why Copeland, Favela, or the City had any reason to think the bailiffs were performing inadequately. Accordingly, the claims of willful and wanton misconduct must be dismissed against these defendants.

2. Defendant Morris [DE 19]

Strauss brings the same § 1983, § 1985 and willful and wanton misconduct claims against Judge Sonya Morris. Although the Complaint does not clearly allege that Strauss was in Judge Morris’s courtroom, the Court infers from his allegations that he was, and that it was Judge Morris who allegedly imposed a rule of “no reading or writing” in the courtroom. Judges are immune from lawsuits based on judicial acts unless the acts were in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The power to set the rules of court is well within Judge Morris’s jurisdiction. See Ind. Code 33-35-2-1(a)(1) (“A judge of a city or town court . . . may adopt rules for conducting the business of the court”); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978) (immunity applies to acts “normally performed by a judge” in her judicial capacity). Strauss cannot sue Judge Morris for creating or enforcing these rules.

To the extent Strauss claims that Judge Morris deprived him of his rights based on some non-judicial act, any such claim fails for the reasons previously described in this order. Judge Morris is an officer of the state judicial system, and like the City employees, she cannot be sued in her official capacity. See Woods v. City of Michigan City, Ind., 940 F.2d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 1991). Regarding the § 1985 conspiracy claim, there is no allegation that Judge Morris targeted Strauss because of his membership in a particular class and no facts suggesting that she conspired with anyone to target him directly. There is no allegation of any non-judicial act by Judge Morris toward Strauss at all, let alone one that deprived Strauss of a constitutional right or demonstrated indifference to injury. Therefore, all of Strauss’s claims against Judge Morris are dismissed. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Court GRANTS the motions to dismiss [DE 19, 23], as described below: (1) The Court DISMISSES Count 3 as to Defendants Copeland, Favela, and Morris. Count remains pending as to Defendant Crawford; (2) The Court DISMISSES Count 5 in its entirety; (3) The Court DISMISSES Count 6 as to Defendants Copeland, Favela, and Morris. Count remains pending as to Defendant Crawford; (4) The Court DISMISSES Count 7 as to Defendants Copeland, Favela, Morris, and the City of East Chicago. Count 7 remains pending as to Defendants Crawford and Carpenter.

The Court therefore DISMISSES Defendants Copeland, Favela, and Morris, as no claims remain pending against them.

SO ORDERED on February 1, 2021. s/ Joseph S. Van Bokkelen

JOSEPH S. VAN BOKKELEN, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT