UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

CHRISTOPHER MCCORKER,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:24-CV-489 DRL-AZ

D. HAWKINS,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Christopher McCorker, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 2. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus,

(2007) (quotations and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Mr. McCorker alleges that, following a shakedown, D. Hawkins destroyed his property, including all his legal materials. He claims that he was denied access to the courts because he was unable to file a petition for post-conviction relief or a habeas petition without his legal materials. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” But a state tort claims act that provides a method by which a person can seek reimbursement for the negligent loss or intentional deprivation of property meets the requirements of the due process

clause by providing due process of law. Hudson v. Palmer,

(1984) (“For intentional, as for negligent deprivations of property by state employees, the state’s action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable post deprivation remedy.”) Indiana’s Tort Claims Act, Indiana Code § 34-13-3-1 et seq., and other laws provide for state judicial review of property losses caused by government employees, and provide an adequate post deprivation remedy to redress state officials’

accidental or intentional deprivation of a person’s property. See Wynn v. Southward,

(7th Cir. 2001) (“Wynn has an adequate post deprivation remedy in the Indiana Tort Claims Act, and no more process was due.”). Even the destruction of legal materials is merely a property loss if the papers are replaceable. Hossman v. Spradlin,

(7th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, legal papers are not deemed irreplaceable merely

because there is a cost associated with obtaining them. Mr. McCorker asks that he be compensated for the cost of replacing his legal documents. Therefore, it cannot be plausibly inferred that the documents he needed to seek post-conviction relief or file a habeas petition were irreplaceable. Thus, Mr. McCorker has not stated a due process claim.

Additionally, prisoners are entitled to meaningful access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith,

(1977). The right of access to the courts is the right of an individual, whether free or incarcerated, to obtain access to the courts without undue interference. Snyder v. Nolen,

(7th Cir. 2004). The right of individuals to pursue legal redress for claims that have a reasonable basis in law or fact is protected by the First Amendment right to petition and the Fourteenth Amendment right to

substantive due process.

(citations omitted). Denial of access to the courts must be intentional; “simple negligence will not support a claim that an official has denied an individual of access to the courts.”

at 291 n.11 (citing Kincaid v. Vail,

(7th Cir. 1992)). To establish a violation of the right to access the courts, an inmate must show that unjustified acts or conditions (by defendants acting under color of law) hindered the inmate’s efforts to pursue a non-frivolous legal claim, Nance v. Vieregge,

(7th Cir. 1998), and that actual injury (or harm) resulted, Lewis v. Casey,

(1996) (holding that Bounds did not eliminate the actual injury requirement as a constitutional prerequisite to a prisoner asserting lack of access to the courts); see also Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, 8.02 (rev. 2017). In other words, “the mere denial of access to a prison law library or to other legal materials is not itself a

violation of a prisoner’s rights; his right is to access the courts,” and only if the defendants’ conduct prejudices a potentially meritorious legal claim has the right been infringed. Marshall v. Knight,

(7th Cir. 2006). Mr. McCorker alleges only that he was prevented from filing a petition for post- conviction relief or habeas petition, but his right to access the courts can only be violated

if those petitions were meritorious. Mr. McCorker must provide more details about the petition or petitions he would have filed if he had access to his legal files. Based on the complaint, it cannot be plausibly inferred that any meritorious legal claim was prejudiced by the destruction of his property. This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Mr. McCorker believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events

described in this complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States,

(7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form, which is available from his law library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the

title “Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form. For these reasons, the court: (1) GRANTS Christopher McCorker until June 2, 2025, to file an amended complaint; and (2) CAUTIONS Christopher McCorker that, if he does not respond by the deadline,

this case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. SO ORDERED.

May 2, 2025 s/ Damon R. Leichty Judge, United States District Court