Candace Wilson-Love As executrix of the estate of William Martin Love, deceased...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION CANDACE WILSON-LOVE As executrix of the ) estate of William Martin Love, deceased and as ) Next Friend of C.W., K.L., and T.L., minors, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01084-SEB-TAB ) DEALER'S CHOICE TRUCKAWAY SYSTEM ) INC. d/b/a TRUCK MOVERS, ) STEVEN BURKE, ) DAIMLER TRUCK NORTH AMERICA LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Plaintiff Candace Wilson-Love, executrix of the estate of William Martin Love ("Mr. Love") and next of friend of C.W., K.L., and T.L., brought this wrongful death action against Defendants Dealer's Choice Truckaway System Inc. d/b/a TruckMovers ("Truck- Movers"); Steven Burke ("Mr. Burke"); and Daimler Truck North America LLC ("Daim- ler") (collectively, "Defendants"), asserting that Defendants' negligence was a proximate cause in a single-vehicle pedestrian collision that resulted in Mr. Love's death.1 (We shall refer to Plaintiff as the "Estate" without distinguishing between the decedent and the estate and/or personal representative unless specified otherwise.)

Now before the Court are the following motions: TruckMovers's (first) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. 97; Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt.

103; and TruckMovers's (second) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, dkt. 139. As de- scribed in greater detail below, these motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

STANDARD OF REVIEW "After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). Much "[l]ike Rule 12(b) mo- tions, courts grant Rule 12(c) motions only if 'it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim for relief.' " N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Craigs, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 12 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)). The moving party must, therefore, "demonstrate that there are no material issues of fact to be resolved." Id. In reviewing "the complaint, the answer, and any written instruments attached as exhibits," we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.; e.g., Unite Here Local 1 v. Hyatt Corp., 862 F.3d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 2017). Likewise, a "complaint need not identify a legal theory, and specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal." Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). In the interests of construing the pleading "so as to do justice," as directed by Federal Rule of Civil Proce- dure 8(e), we must "disregard labels and treat pleadings for what they are." Lengacher v. Wayne, No. 3:23-cv-547 DRL-MGG, 2024 WL 728050, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 22, 2024) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 782 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir. 1986)).

BACKGROUND The following averments are drawn from the Estate's Second Amended Complaint (the "SAC"), dkt. 66, which we accept as true for purposes of ruling on the instant motions for judgment on the pleadings. Bielanksi v. Cnty. of Kane, 550 F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).

I. Factual Background Defendants are each involved in the domestic trucking industry. TruckMovers is an interstate motor carrier that transports goods to customers across the United States. At all relevant times, Mr. Burke was employed by TruckMovers as a commercial driver. Daimler is a shipper who, in this case, selected TruckMovers to transport its (then) recently pur- chased 2020 Cascadia Freightliner tractor (the "tractor") to a designated location across state lines.

The SAC avers that, on September 14, 2023, at approximately 9:50 p.m., Mr. Burke was operating the tractor (owned by Daimler) in a residential area of Indianapolis, Indiana.

As Mr. Burke approached a stop sign at the intersection of North Centennial Street and West 10th Street, he allegedly failed to come to a complete stop before executing a left turn. In so doing, the tractor collided with Mr. Love as he was crossing on foot through the intersection. Mr. Love's injuries proved fatal, resulting in his tragic and untimely death.

The Estate alleges, and TruckMovers admits, that Mr. Burke was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the collision. The Estate also alleges that, at the time of the accident, Mr. Burke was unlawfully operating the tractor in a residential area while under the influence of cocaine, in violation of state and local law.

II. Procedural History On May 22, 2024, the Estate filed this wrongful death action against Defendants in state court. Shortly thereafter, on June 26, 2024, Defendants removed it to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See dkts. 313, 314 (confirming complete diversity of citizenship). The SAC consists of seven counts, reflecting myriad legal theories against varying subsets of Defendants, including negligence, negligence per se, vicarious liability, and joint enterprise. Dkt. 66. The Estate seeks damages for pecuniary losses, loss of com- panionship, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, physical impairment, lost wages, and loss of inheritance.

On June 27, 2025, TruckMovers moved for judgment on the pleadings, seeking the dismissal of all direct negligence and joint enterprise claims as well as the Estate's "claims" for damages relating to physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impair- ment. Dkt. 97. On July 16, 2025, Daimler moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the Estate's state-law claims are preempted by the Federal Aviation Administra- tion Authorization Act (the "FAAAA"), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Dkt. 103. Several months later, TruckMovers filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, this time arguing that the Estate failed to plead facts to support relief under Indiana's wrongful death statutes.

Dkt. 139. Although Mr. Burke has not individually moved for judgment on the pleadings, he has joined TruckMovers's motions and supporting briefs in certain limited respects, which we shall note below as relevant. Dkt. 102, 206. TruckMovers's two motions and Daimler's motion for judgment on the pleadings are fully briefed and ripe for ruling.

During the pendency of these motions for judgment on the pleadings, TruckMovers and Daimler, respectively, have also moved for summary judgment. Dkt. 141, 146. (Nota- bly, Truckmovers moved for summary judgment on the same day that it filed its second motion for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 141.) Additionally, the parties have filed eleven separate motions to exclude expert witnesses as well as several motions to strike. We shall not resolve all of these motions in this order; they will be resolved in due course.

DISCUSSION The parties' substantive arguments are analyzed below in the context of TruckMov- ers's and Daimler's motions for judgment on the pleadings.

I. TruckMovers's First Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings TruckMovers argues that: (1) all direct negligence claims fail as a matter of Indiana law because it has admitted that Mr. Burke was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident; (2) the "joint enterprise" claim fails as a matter of Indiana law; and (3) Indiana's wrongful death statutes foreclose the availability of damages for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impairment. Mr. Burke has joined TruckMovers's motions as to the second and third arguments. Dkt. 102. We turn to each challenged aspect of the SAC seriatim.

A. Direct Negligence Claims against TruckMovers The SAC identifies various theories of liability against TruckMovers, including vi- carious liability (based upon Mr. Burke's alleged negligence) and direct negligence (based upon TruckMovers's own negligence in hiring, training, and supervising Mr. Burke). Vi- carious liability, on one hand, imputes responsibility to an employer for an employee's negligent conduct that occurs within the scope of employment. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185 N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022). Direct forms of liability, on the other hand, arise when an employee's negligent conduct occurs outside the scope of employment. Id. Pursuant to either theory, "the plaintiff seeks the same result—employer liability—and re- covery is based on the same negligent act—the employee's." Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1178 (Ind. 2017) (citing Tindall v. Enderele, 320 N.E.2d 764, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)). "[W]hen an employer admits that an employee was acting within the course and scope of his or her employment, absent special circumstances, negligent hiring claims are precluded," id. at 1179, because "[p]roof of additional elements of negligent hiring . . . would not be relevant to the issues in dispute, would be wasteful of the court's time, and may be unnecessarily confusing to the jury." Levinson v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville, 644 N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).

Relying on these principles of Indiana law, TruckMovers contends that the Estate's direct negligence claims (i.e., for negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and/or entrustment) must be dismissed because TruckMovers has admitted that Mr. Burke was acting within the scope of his employment. TruckMovers's Am. Answer ¶ 10, dkt. 85. A straightforward application of well-established Indiana law compels us to agree that Truck- Movers's admission concerning the scope of Mr. Burke's employment requires the dismis- sal of the Estate's direct negligence claims. The Estate raises several arguments to the con- trary, though none is availing.

First, the Estate asserts that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) permits alternative pleading, regardless of consistency. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3). Notwithstanding the permissibility of alternative pleading, however, the Indiana Supreme Court has clearly ex- plained that a negligent hiring theory "is of no value where," as here, "an employer has stipulated that [its] employee was within the scope of his employment. The doctrine of respondeat superior provides the proper vehicle for a direct action aimed at recovering the damages resulting from a specific act of negligence committed by an employee within the scope of his employment." Tindall, 320 N.E.2d at 768.

Next, the Estate contends that its direct liability claims need not be dismissed be- cause TruckMovers has admitted only that Mr. Burke's conduct occurred within the course and scope of his employment—not that Mr. Burke's conduct amounted to negligence for which TruckMovers is vicariously liable. (Notably, TruckMovers does agree that, if Mr. Burke "is found negligent, [it] would be vicariously liable." Dkt. 106 at 4.) Because Mr. Burke's underlying negligence has not yet been conclusively established, the Estate argues, dismissal of its direct negligence claims is premature. Indiana law requires no such admis- sion, however. Indiana law is clear: "When an employer admits that an employee was act- ing within the course and scope of his or her employment, the employer may only be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, and thus the plaintiff is precluded from also bringing a negligent hiring claim in most circumstances." Sedam, 84 N.E.3d at 1175– 76. Accordingly, that the Estate's negligence claim against Mr. Burke remains pending does not, as a matter of law, preclude the dismissal of the Estate's direct negligence claims against his employer, TruckMovers.

As noted above, a plaintiff might be permitted to proceed under both vicarious and direct theories of liability in "special circumstances," such as "when an employee commits an intentional tort, [when] an employee is incapable of being negligent, . . . when an em- ployer is a charitable institution," or when a plaintiff seeks punitive damages. Id. at 1177 n.3 (citing Lange v. B & P Motor Exp., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 319, 323 (N.D. Ind. 1966); Tin- dall, 320 N.E.2d at 768). Here, the Estate asserts that special circumstances exist prevent- ing the dismissal of its direct negligence claims, because the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (the "FMCSRs") "set a federal floor for motor carrier safety, [and] any state rule that would prevent juries from considering a carrier's independent negligence is preempted and unenforceable." Dkt. 100 at 5. According to the Estate, the FMCSRs impose nondelegable duties that federal motor carriers, like TruckMovers, cannot evade simply by admitting that its employee's alleged negligence occurred within the scope and course of his employment.

The FMSCRs, at most, supply an alternative basis for establishing TruckMovers's direct negligence. Indeed, according to the Estate, the FMSCRs require motor carriers to "ensur[e] driver qualifications, training, regulatory compliance," and the like, all of which overlaps with the Estate's theories that TruckMovers acted negligently in hiring, training, and supervising Mr. Burke. That the FMSCRs might supply an additional avenue through which to impose direct liability upon TruckMovers does not, however, undermine the ra- tionale for the dismissal of redundant direct negligence claims against an employer who has conceded the scope-of-employment element of vicarious liability.

The Estate's final argument is that its negligent entrustment claim need not be dis- missed because resolution of that claim does not depend upon the existence (or nonexist- ence) of an employment relationship. Dkt. 100 at 6. Negligent entrustment claims hinge upon "the supplying of [ ] chattel for probable negligent use." Johnson v. Patterson, 570 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). A person may be liable to another when an "instrument is entrusted to one who is incompetent or irresponsible or who lacks the capacity to safely use or operate the instrumentality." Id. As noted by the federal district court on our sister jurisdiction, "[n]egligent entrustment claims are generally not brought against a defendant employer, as 'respondeat superior provides the proper vehicle for a direct action aimed at recovering the damages resulting from a specific act of negligence committed by an em- ployee within the scope of his employment.' " Davis v. Macey, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1112 (N.D. Ind. 2012) (quoting Tindall, 320 N.E.2d at 768). Where, as here, the employer has conceded that its employee was acting within the scope of his employment, "the employer is already responsible for the negligent acts of the employee[,] and any additional theory of liability under negligent entrustment [is] unnecessary," duplicative, and potentially prej- udicial. Id. For these reasons, the Estate's negligent entrustment claim against TruckMovers fails as a matter of Indiana law and shall be dismissed accordingly.

TruckMovers's first motion for judgment on the pleadings shall therefore be granted with respect to the Estate's direct negligence claims.

B. Joint Enterprise Liability In Count VII of the SAC, the Estate avers as follows: In addition or alternatively to the foregoing, Truck Movers, Daimler and Burke, or any combination thereof, operated as a joint venture or joint enter- prise where there were various agreements, whether express or implied, among the entities and/or individuals, a common pecuniary interest, and var- ious contractual and/or actual rights of control over the enterprise. Each of these defendants contributed resources and/or skills to achieve the common purpose of transporting goods in interstate commerce. Accordingly, each of these Defendants are [sic] liable for all negligence and negligence per se herein under a theory of joint venture or joint enterprise as a result of the negligent acts and/or omissions alleged in this Complaint.

SAC ¶ 88, dkt. 66.

TruckMovers seeks the dismissal of the Estate's "joint enterprise" claim on three grounds. First, TruckMovers argues, the doctrine of joint enterprise is entirely inapplicable to the facts of this case, since the doctrine pertains to situations in which the negligence of a driver can be imputed to the passenger—not to situations where a plaintiff is attempting to make all defendants liable for the conduct of one defendant. Second, according to Truck- Movers, the Estate's invocation of joint enterprise liability reflects an attempt to impose joint and several liability upon Defendants, in contravention of Indiana's Comparative Fault Act, which requires damages to be allocated among responsible parties according to their degree of fault. See Ind. Code § 34-51-2-1 et seq. Third, to the extent that the Estate's joint enterprise averments pass legal muster, TruckMovers asserts that they are unfairly cumu- lative and should be dismissed as such. The Estate responds that TruckMovers has "misap- plied the applicable law" in its motion and contends that its allegations of a "joint venture" (as an alternative to "joint enterprise") should proceed as pleaded. Dkt. 100 at 6–7.

A joint enterprise exists where the parties share joint control over the management, operation, course, and conduct of their activity; joint financial interest in their activity; an equal right to direct and govern each other's movements; and an express or implied agree- ment regarding that activity. See, e.g., Benson v. Sorrell, 627 N.E.2d 866, 868–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994); McKinney v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Indiana, 597 N.E.2d 1001, 1009 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (outlining the elements of a "joint venture" and noting that "at least one jurist . . . has advocated the abandonment of the doctrine of imputed negligence in view of his state's adoption of comparative fault"). Similarly, "[i]n a joint venture, the parties must be bound by an express or implied contract providing for (1) a community of interest, and (2) joint mutual control" as well as a profit-sharing agreement. Linares v. El Tacarajo, 119 N.E.3d 591, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation modified). Indiana courts describe "the doctrine of imputed negligence through joint enterprise" as "limited to actions against a third party, [ ] where an injured passenger may have his own recovery against a third party diminished or defeated because of negligence on the part of his own driver with whom he is engaged in a joint enterprise. Gilmer v. Carney, 608 N.E.2d 709, 711 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).

Given the overlapping legal elements between joint "enterprises" and "ventures," it is not entirely clear to us how one theory of liability is necessarily an "alternative" to the other, as alleged by the Estate. In any event, whether a joint venture exists such that one defendant's liability may be imputed to another2 is ultimately a question of fact, which we are not prepared to resolve on the basis of the pleadings alone. See DLZ Indiana, LLC v. Greene Cnty., 902 N.E.2d 323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Although we agree with Truck- Movers that the Estate will not be entitled to "double recovery," we find that TruckMovers's request for the dismissal of the Estate's joint enterprise/venture claim is premature. Thus, TruckMovers's motion shall be denied.

Ct. App.), trans. denied, 267 N.E.3d 979 (Ind. 2025) (unpublished).

C. Damages for Physical Pain and Suffering, Mental Anguish, & Physical Impairment TruckMovers seeks the dismissal of the Estate's "damages claims" for physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and physical impairment on the basis that Indiana's wrongful death statutes do not permit such remedies. "Because wrongful death actions are purely creatures of statute, they are strictly construed." Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), opinion adopted, 678 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. 1997). Indi- ana law is clear that "[o]nly those damages prescribed by the applicable wrongful death statute are recoverable . . . ." Edna Martin Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 202 N.E.3d 1118, 1121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).

Here, the SAC enumerates several categories of damages allegedly caused by De- fendants' negligence. SAC ¶ 90, dkt. 66. However, prayers for relief do not constitute in- dependent "claims" subject to dismissal on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. Sis-Bro Inc., No. 24-cv-968-JPG, 2024 WL 3845359, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2024) (denying motion to dismiss requests for damages because "[m]otions to dismiss . . . are for claims, not prayers for relief") (emphasis in orig- inal). Accordingly, TruckMovers's request for the dismissal of the Estate's "damages claims" shall be denied with the caveat that the Estate's damages, if any, are necessarily limited to those allowed by Indiana law.

II. Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Daimler's motion seeks the dismissal of the Estate's negligence claims against it (including negligence, negligence per se, negligent selection, vicarious liability, and joint enterprise) on the grounds of express preemption. Insofar as express preemption does not impel the dismissal of all claims against it, Daimler argues, the Estate's negligent selection and joint enterprise claims as well as of any requests for damages that are not permitted under Indiana law must be dismissed.

At the outset, we can quickly dispose of Daimler's argument relating to allegedly unrecoverable damages for the same reasons outlined above: to wit, a prayer for relief is not a standalone claim subject to dismissal. We address Daimler's remaining arguments below.

A. Express Preemption under the FAAAA "The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution establishes a rule of decision precluding courts from 'giv[ing] effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.' " Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Com. Comm'n, 784 F.3d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)). "Of the three recog- nized types of preemption, it is express preemption that is at issue in this case, as the FAAAA states explicitly what states may and may not do with respect to motor carriers of property." Id. at 372–73 (citation modified). Our task, therefore, "is one of statutory con- struction," as we must determine whether the Estate's claims against Daimler fall within the ambit of the FAAAA, or whether any of the FAAAA's exceptions apply. Ye v. Global- Tranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 457 (7th Cir. 2023).

Congress enacted the FAAAA in 1994 "as part of a greater push to deregulate inter- state transportation industries" based on its "finding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property had become unreasonably burdensome to free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers." Id. (quoting Dan's City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013)) (citation modified). To effectuate this goal, the FAAAA bars "burdensome state regulations." Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1)).

In this case, Daimler invokes the express preemption provision under § 14501(c), which addresses "Motor Carrier of Property." Section 14501(c)(1) provides that states "may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). "Several exceptions then follow," Ye, 74 F.4th at 457, though only one, the "safety exception," is relevant to the case at bar. Under the safety exception, § 14501(c)(1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to mo- tor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or lim- itations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.

Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). Altogether, §§ 14501(c)(1) and 14501(c)(2)(A) reveal "the overarch- ing statutory structure: Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, but it made a specific carveout for laws within a state's 'safety regulatory author- ity . . . with respect to motor vehicles,' even though such laws may burden interstate com- merce." Ye, 74 F.4th at 458.

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we address whether the Estate's negligence claims against Daimler fall within the scope of the FAAAA's express preemption provision prohibiting the enforcement of state laws "related to a . . . service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property." 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). If so, our next step is to determine whether the safety exception applies.

Before conducting these inquiries, we briefly note that, although Daimler seeks the dismissal of the Estate's negligence claims in their entirety, the delineation among the Es- tate's various theories is not entirely clear to us nor whether the preemption rationale rele- vant to negligent selection (and/or hiring) claims is directly applicable to claims of imputed liability (e.g., vicarious liability and joint enterprise). This lack of clarity in the parties' arguments requires us to focus principally on the Estate's negligent selection claim, as the (binding) legal authorities cited by the parties and referenced herein provide direct guid- ance only as to this specific theory.

The Estate's contention that a preemption analysis is premature at this stage of the litigation due to the lack of factual development can be disposed of without difficulty.

Courts in our circuit (and beyond) routinely decide FAAAA preemption on motions for judgment on the pleadings, and the Seventh Circuit itself has affirmed those determinations on more than one occasion. E.g., Ye, 74 F.4th 457; Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th 1053, 1055 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025). The Estate's argument in favor of delay is unavailing.

1. Whether the Estate's Negligent Selection Claim Against Daimler Is Expressly Preempted by § 14501(c)(1) Daimler, as the party seeking to establish preemption, must demonstrate: (1) that a state "enacted or attempted to enforce a law"; and (2) that the state law "relate[s] to carrier rates, routes, or services 'either by expressly referring to them, or by having significant economic effect on them.' " Nationwide Freight, 764 F.3d at 373–74 (quoting Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996)).

There is no dispute that the first element is satisfied here: "Common law tort claims," like those interposed by the Estate, "fall comfortably within the language of the preemption provision that, by its terms, applies to state laws, regulations, or other provi- sions having the force and effect of law." Ye, 74 F.4th at 459 (citation modified). At issue, therefore, is whether the Estate's "proposed enforcement of [Indiana's] common law of negligence would have a significant economic effect on" motor carrier services. Id. The disagreement between the Estate and Daimler occurs at two levels: First, the Estate maintains that § 14501(c)(1) cannot preempt its claims against Daimler because Daimler is a shipper—not a motor private carrier, broker, or any other entity specifically named in § 14501(c)(1). Second, the Estate argues that because shippers are not listed in § 14501(c)(1), enforcing Indiana common law against Daimler does not "relate to" any "ser- vice of a motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property." 29 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). We address each argument in turn.

Whether the FAAAA preempts state law claims against shippers, as distinct from brokers and the like, is a matter of first impression in our circuit. The facts presented in this litigation differ from other cases involving express preemption under the FAAAA, which predominately involve negligent hiring and/or selection claims against brokers—i.e., "the person who connects the shipper and carrier" and "acts as the middleman between the two to arrange for the transportation of the shipper's goods by the carrier . . . ." Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1264–65 (11th Cir. 2023). Here, by contrast, a shipper (Daimler) selected a motor carrier (TruckMovers) without the assistance of an in- termediary.

In the Estate's view, the distinction between brokers and shippers is dispositive be- cause § 14501(c)(1) expressly includes the former but not the latter. If Congress intended to include "shippers" within § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive scope, the Estate argues, it easily could (and would) have done so, given that the term "shippers" is defined elsewhere within Title 49 of the United States Code. Dkt. 114 at 4 (citing, inter alia, 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13)).3 Thus, the Estate reasons, the omission of any explicit reference to "shippers" evinces Con- gress's intent to exempt shippers from the FAAAA's preemptive breadth. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 589 U.S. 8, 14 (2019) ("A textual judicial supplementation is particularly inappro- priate when . . . Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision.").

However, the Estate's position—that the FAAAA does not preempt state law claims against shippers—is squarely at odds with the Supreme Court's holding in Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364 (2008). In Rowe, a trade association of air and motor carriers challenged a Maine statute requiring, in relevant part, that licensed

At bottom, however, "the effect of the regulation [wa]s that carriers w[ould] have to offer tobacco delivery services that differ significantly from those that, in the absence of the regulation, the market might dictate. And that being so, 'treating sales restrictions and pur- chase restrictions differently for pre-emption purposes would make no sense.' " Id. at 372 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 255 (2004)).

A straightforward application Rowe forecloses the Estate's argument that shippers lie beyond the scope of FAAAA preemption. Thus, we reject the Estate's argument to the contrary and turn to the issue of whether the Estate's negligent selection claim against Daimler relates to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier with respect to the trans- portation of property. Upon careful review of Daimler's and the Estate's competing argu- ments, we answer this question in the affirmative.

The Seventh Circuit's 2023 decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc. is partic- ularly instructive. 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023). Ye arose out of a fatal vehicular collision involving a motorcyclist and a commercial truck driver. The motorcyclist's surviving spouse brought a negligence action against the driver's employer, a motor carrier, as well as the broker who selected the motor carrier. The district court dismissed the claims against the broker on grounds of FAAAA preemption. Id. at 456. In affirming the dismissal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff's negligent hiring theory "str[uck] at the core of [the defendant's] broker services by challenging the adequacy of care the company took—or failed to take—in hiring [a motor carrier] to provide shipping services." Id. at 459. Continuing, the Seventh Circuit explained: [E]nforcement of such a claim—and the accompanying imposition of li- ability—would have a significant economic effect on broker services. By recognizing common-law negligence claims, courts would impose in the name of state law a new and clear duty of care on brokers, the breach of which would result in a monetary judgment. . . . To avoid these costly dam- ages payouts, . . . brokers would change how they conduct their services— for instance, by incurring new costs to evaluate motor carriers. Then, by changing their hiring processes, brokers would likely hire different motor carrier than they would have otherwise hired without the state negligence standards. Id. at 459.

Read together, Rowe and Ye impel the conclusion that § 14501(c)(1) preempts the Estate's state law negligent selection claim against Daimler. Although Daimler differs from the defendant in Ye in that Daimler is a shipper rather than a broker, the likely consequences of imposing tort liability are similar: shippers "would change how they conduct their" op- erations, likely altering their selection processes and hiring different motor carriers or ex- pending additional resources to hire brokers in order to distance themselves from potential liability. Ye, 74 F.4th at 459. As with the negligent hiring claim in Ye, the Estate's negligent selection claim here necessarily implicates the deregulatory purposes of the FAAAA. As such, we hold that the state law negligent selection claim against Daimler is preempted by the FAAAA.

2. Whether the Safety Exception Applies Having determined that FAAAA preemption applies, we next assess whether the Estate's claim "may be saved" by the safety exception. Id. at 460. As noted above, § 14501(c)(2)(A) excepts "laws within a state's 'safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles . . . .' " Id. (citation modified). The Seventh Circuit has conclusively re- solved the meaning of the key phrase "with respect to motor vehicles," holding that it " 'massively limits the scope' of the safety exception" by "requir[ing] a direct link between a state's law and motor vehicle safety." Id. (quoting Dan's City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261).4 Applying this statutory interpretation to the facts presented in Ye, the Seventh Cir- cuit held that the plaintiff's negligent hiring claim against the defendant broker did not implicate the safety exception. Id. "Absent unusual circumstances, the relationship between brokers and motor vehicle safety will be indirect, at most." Id. at 461. Indeed, the plaintiff's allegations in Ye "mirror[ed] practical realities"; to wit, that brokers typically do "not own We recognize that the scope of the FAAAA's safety exception is the source of a circuit split: The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, on one hand, hold that state tort claims against brokers do not implicate the safety exception, Ye, 74 F.4th at 460–66; Aspen Am. Ins. Co., 65 F.4th at 1268–72, and the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, hold that such state tort claims do fall within the safety exception, Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F.4th 847 (6th Cir. 2025); Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020). The Supreme Court is poised to resolve this circuit split in Montgomery v. Caribe Transp. II, LLC, 124 F.4th 1053, 1055 (7th Cir.), cert. granted, 146 S. Ct. 79 (2025), though, at the time of the issuance of this order, no deci- sion has been handed down. or operate motor vehicles" in the same manner that motor carriers do. Id. To see "the con- nection between . . . a broker and motor vehicle safety requires an extra link to connect the alleged chain of events: [the broker]'s negligent hiring of [the motor carrier] resulted in [the motor carrier]'s negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to a negligent driver who, in turn, caused a collision that resulted in [the victim]'s death." Id. at 462. This "additional link . . . between a broker hiring and motor vehicles," in the Seventh Circuit's view, was "too atten- uated to be saved under § 14501(c)(2)(A)." Id. Here, Daimler contends that its role in the underlying events mirrors that of the broker in Ye, meaning that an "additional link" is logically necessary to relate the Estate's negligent selection claim to motor vehicle safety. Dkt. 104 at 7–8. The Estate rejoins that, unlike the defendant broker in Ye, who neither owned nor operated motor vehicles, Daimler admittedly does own the tractor involved in the underlying accident. In the Estate's view, Daimler's ownership of the motor vehicle in this case creates a "direct link" that places the Estate's claims against it naturally within the FAAAA's safety exception.

Certainly, as the Estate contends, Daimler has conceded its ownership of the tractor.

However, we fail to see how its ownership alone is a sufficient basis on which to except the Estate's negligent selection claim from the FAAAA's preemption, especially since the Estate does not allege that a defect in the tractor itself caused or contributed to the accident.5

Whether or to what extent Daimler's ownership of the tractor supports an indirect theory of liability Daimler's conduct giving rise to the Estate's negligent selection claim is, at bottom, indis- tinguishable from that alleged in Ye: to wit, the alleged negligent selection of a motor car- rier, which the Seventh Circuit has described as requiring an "additional link [that] goes a bridge too far" in its relation to motor vehicle safety. Ye, 74 F.4th at 462.

We therefore conclude that the Estate's negligent selection claim against Daimler falls within the ambit of § 14501(c)(1)'s preemptive scope and that the § 14501(c)(2)(A)'s safety exception is inapplicable. Because the FAAAA preempts the Estate's negligent se- lection claim, Daimler's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in this respect.

The Estate's negligent selection claim, as asserted in Count VI of the SAC, must and there- fore shall be dismissed.

III. TruckMovers's Second Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings On October 30, 2025 (on the same day that it moved for summary judgment), Truck- Movers filed a second motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Estate failed to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for relief under any of Indiana's wrongful death statutes, thus warranting the dismissal of "all claims with prejudice." Dkt. 140 at 6. "At common law, there was no tort liability for killing another 'because personal injury actions did not survive the injured party's death.' " Smith, 202 N.E.3d at 1121 (quot- ing Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d at 911). "Actions for wrongful death are [thus] purely statutory in Indiana." Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d at 911. "The purpose of [Indiana's] wrongful death statutes is has not been presented to us at this juncture. As such, we decline to dismiss the Estate's vicarious liability and joint enterprise theories against Daimler. See Montgomery, 124 F.4th at 1055–58 (af- firming summary judgment ruling on the merits of a vicarious liability claim brought against freight broker). to compensate surviving dependents for pecuniary losses but not for loss of life." Smith, N.E.3d at 1121.

Indiana's General Wrongful Death Statute ("GWDS"), Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1, "de- lineates two separate categories of decedents." SCI Propane, LLC v. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d 675, 678 (Ind. 2015). The first encompasses "all decedents generally" and allows an estate to recover "a fixed list of death-related expenses," including medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses. Id. (quoting I.C. § 34-23-1-1) (citation modified). "The remaining dam- ages, if any, must 'inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower . . . and to the dependent children, if any, or dependent next of kin . . . ." Id. (quoting I.C. § 34-23-1-1) (citation modified). "The second includes only those decedents who 'depart this life leaving no such widow or widower, or dependent children or dependent next of kin," in which case "the damages inure to the exclusive benefit of the person or persons furnishing services related to the decedent's death, and the personal representative is expressly entitled to recover rea- sonable attorneys' fees in prosecuting or compromising the action." Id. (quoting I.C. § 34- 23-1-1) (citation modified). "[E]very decedent in the second GWDS category also satisfies the conditions to bring suit under either" of two additional wrongful death provisions: the Adult Wrongful Death Statute ("AWDS"), Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2; or the Child Wrongful Death Statute ("CWDS"), id. § 34-23-2-1. Frederick, 39 N.E.3d at 679. The AWDS "governs actions for the wrongful death of unmarried adult persons with no dependents," whereas the CWDS "permits parents or guardians to obtain damages for the wrongful death of unmarried children with no legal dependents and who were under twenty years of age (or under twenty-three and still in school)." Smith, 202 N.E.3d at 1122.

These three avenues—the GWDS, the AWDS, and the CWDS—allow for different forms of recovery, depending upon which category the decedent falls into. Most relevant for our purposes is the distinction between the GWDS and the AWDS: the GWDS allows an estate to recover damages for lost earnings as well as loss of love and companionship, as determined by a court or jury upon consideration of, inter alia, the value of future sup- port and continued care that the dependent children could reasonably have expected to receive from the decedent. See Ind. Model Civil Jury Instructions 725 (2026). Under the AWDS, damages for lost earnings are disallowed entirely, Ind. Code § 34-23-1-2(g); and damages for the loss of love and companionship (in an aggregate amount no greater than $300,000) may inure to the benefit of nondependent children only upon a showing of a "genuine, substantial, and ongoing relationship with the adult person . . . ." Id. § 34-23-1- 2(e)–(f). "[T]he determination of dependency controls which statute (the GWDS or the AWDS) applies." Hubbard v. City of Bedford, Indiana, No. 4:24-cv-00103-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 1939879, at *4 (S.D. Ind. July 11, 2025) (citing Est. of Sears v. Griffin, 771 N.E.2d 1136, 1138–39 (Ind. 2022)).

In our case, TruckMovers argues that the Estate cannot avail itself of any potential recourse under Indiana's wrongful death statutes due to its failure to aver whether Mr. Love "left behind a widow or widower, dependent child(ren), and/or dependent next of kin" within the meaning of the GWDS as well as whether Mr. Love "was an 'adult person' or a 'child' " within the meaning of the AWDS to the CWDS, respectively. Dkt. 140 at 1.

Beginning with the latter, we are entirely unpersuaded by TruckMovers's argument that the Estate's apparent failure to explicitly specify whether Mr. Love was an "adult per- son" or a "child" merits the wholesale dismissal of this action. Our review of the relevant pleadings reveals no support whatsoever for the contention that the Estate sought relief pursuant to the CWDS. Likewise, TruckMovers's own prior submissions to the Court acknowledge that this action arises under either the GWDS or the AWDS. See, e.g., Truck- Movers's Am. Answer ¶ 14, dkt. 85 at 26 (citing to the AWDS); Dkt. 98 at 12 (recognizing that either the GWDS or the AWDS applies to the Estate's claims). TruckMovers's request that we foreclose all potential avenues of recovery on the basis of (what amounts to nothing more than) a technicality is thus contrary to the letter and spirit of our procedural rules, which arc towards "ensuring each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim or defense." Federated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Coyle Mech. Supply Inc., 983 F.3d 307, 313 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).

As for whether the SAC sufficiently alleges that Mr. Love had minor dependent children at the time of his death such that the Estate may pursue recovery under the GWDS, as opposed to the AWDS, the Estate's response in opposition notably does not defend the adequacy of its pleading. Rather, the Estate argues that "a minimal review of the record" belies TruckMovers's contentions, as evidence produced in discovery apparently estab- lishes that Mr. Love did in fact have minor dependent children at the time of his death. Dkt.

176 at 1. To support the veracity of its position, the Estate has submitted documentary evidence, including two deposition testimonies of the minors' respective mothers as well as K.L.'s (unredacted) birth certificate.6 In so doing, the Estate asks that we convert Truck- Movers's motion to a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), and deny it as such. "A district court has discretion as to whether to convert a motion for judgment on the pleadings into a motion for summary judgment." Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 983 F.3d at 313. "If, however, a court chooses to consider materials outside the pleadings, the discre- tion ends, and the court 'must' treat the motion as one for summary judgment." Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)). In this case, the Estate has not shown that our consideration of mat- ters beyond the pleadings is either necessary or appropriate. Accordingly, we decline to consider the materials submitted by the Estate and thus need not convert TruckMovers's motion for judgment on the pleadings to one for summary judgment.

Returning to the SAC, the relevant inquiry is whether the Estate has alleged facts from which we can plausibly draw an inference that minors C.W., K.L., and T.L. were Mr. Love's dependent children. The ultimate determination of dependency entails "proof of . . . a need or necessity of support on the part of the person alleged to be dependent . . . coupled with the contribution of such support by the deceased." New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 127 N.E.2d 603, 607 (Ind. 1955) (emphasis added). Beyond inclusion of the minors' initials in the caption and three bareboned paragraphs introducing each as "a minor," see SAC ¶¶

3–5, dkt. 66, the SAC contains no averments whatsoever concerning the nature and extent of the minors' relationship to Mr. Love, never mind their alleged dependency. "[F]ederal courts require notice pleading, not fact pleading complete with all the minutiae." Auto Driveaway Franchise Sys., LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2019). Here, the SAC's sparse references to C.W., K.L., and T.L can hardly be said to surpass this minimal threshold. Because the SAC lacks sufficient allegations from which we can plausibly draw an inference of dependency, we have little trouble concluding that the Estate has failed to state a claim under the GWDS.

Accordingly, TruckMovers's second motion for judgment on the pleadings shall be granted insofar as the Estate has failed to state a claim for relief under the GWDS; and denied insofar as the Estate has successfully pleaded a claim under the AWDS. Whether the Estate can marshal evidence to support an award of damages for nondependent chil- dren, pursuant to the AWDS, shall be determined at the appropriate juncture.

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows: • TruckMovers's (first) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the Estate's direct negligence claims; and DENIED as to the Estate's joint enterprise claim and prayers for relief. Dkt. 97. • Daimler's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the Estate's negligent selection claim; and DENIED as to the Estate's joint enterprise and vicarious liability claims and prayers for relief. Dkt. 103. e TruckMovers's (second) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED as to the Estate's recovery under the GWDS; and DENIED as to the Estate's recovery under the AWDS. Dkt. 139.

Additionally, the Clerk is DIRECTED to place K.L.'s unredacted birth certificate UNDER SEAL, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2. Dkt. 176-3. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to correct C.W.'s initials on the docket.

No partial final judgment shall issue. This matter shall proceed accordingly. □□ □□ SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/21/2026 Tuk, Bous Biker SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE United States District Court Southern District of Indiana Distribution: Aaron C. Cox [email protected] Ramona Frazier The Witherspoon Law Group [email protected] Christina Laun Fugate ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis) [email protected] Tiffany R. Guthrie Kightlinger & Gray, LLP [email protected] Andrea Howell Ice Miller LLP andrea. [email protected] Thomas J. Jarzyniecki, Jr. KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLP (Indianapolis) [email protected] Paul K Leary, Jr Cozen O'Connor [email protected] Jeremy D. Lemon HUNT SUEDHOFF & KALAMAROS LLP (Fort Wayne) [email protected] Derek Harold MacKay Knight MacKay Morrow, LLC [email protected] Kathleen Meara Knight MacKay Morrow, LLC [email protected] Aubrey Nick Pittman The Pittman Law Firm, P.C. [email protected] Carolyn E. Riggs ICE MILLER LLP (Indianapolis) [email protected] Linje Rivers The Witherspoon Law Group [email protected] Tasha Rebecca Roberts ROBERTS LITAGATION GROUP [email protected] Nuru Witherspoon Nuru Witherspooon [email protected]