Sean D. Gates v. Jane Doe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION SEAN D. GATES, Plaintiff, v. CAUSE NO. 3:25-CV-1025-PPS-AZ JANE DOE, Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Sean D. Gates, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 2. “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Nevertheless, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court must review the merits of a prisoner complaint and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

Gates sues the “Jane Doe” dentist at Indiana State Prison, alleging that on December 11, 2023, the dentist burned his bottom lip twice while cleaning his teeth. He says the burn caused him pain for quite a while, yet medical staff would not provide him treatment for it.

Under the Eighth Amendment, inmates are entitled to constitutionally adequate medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To establish liability, a prisoner must satisfy both an objective and subjective component by showing: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and (2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that medical need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference is a high standard. “Deliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’” Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent evidence of “callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “[C]onduct is deliberately indifferent when the official has acted in an intentional or criminally reckless manner, i.e., the defendant must have known that the plaintiff was at serious risk of being harmed and decided not to do anything to prevent that harm from occurring even though he could have easily done so.” Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up).

For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he must make a decision that represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). “[I]n the context of medical professionals, it is important to emphasize that medical malpractice, negligence, or even gross negligence does not equate to deliberate indifference.” Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1012–13 (7th Cir. 2006). In the case of a “botched” medical procedure, to show more than negligence, a plaintiff may allege the doctor “maliciously intended to cause [the plaintiff] pain or otherwise performed the procedure in a way that he knew would create a substantial risk of complications.” McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010).

Here, the complaint does not plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of the prison dentist. Gates alleges his lip was burned while his teeth were being cleaned. The complaint contains no facts to support an inference that the dentist did this purposely to cause harm. “[A] plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Instead, the reasonable inference from the complaint is that the dentist negligently performed the cleaning, which does not rise to the level of a constitutional claim. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”)

This complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If Gates believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described in this complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at least where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number on a Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his law library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title “Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.

For these reasons, the court: (1) GRANTS Sean D. Gates until June 25, 2026, to file an amended complaint; and (2) CAUTIONS Sean D. Gates if he does not respond by the deadline, this case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: May 22, 2026. /s/Philip P. Simon PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT