Neely v. Boyce
Neely v. Boyce
Opinion of the Court
The appellee James Boyce brought this suit by filing his complaint in the court below against Charles F. W. Neely, Sarah E. Neely, his wife, and Mary A. Neely, in which it is alleged"that on the 7th day of November, 1885, Charles F. "W. Neely, by his promissory note, promised to pay to the order of N. F. Ethel, one year after date, the sum of $1,500, with 8 per cent, interest and 5 per cent, attorney’s fees; that on said date, by his certain other note, he promised to pay to said Ethel, two years after date, the sum of $2,000, with 8 per cent, interest, and 5 per cent., thereon for attorney’s fees, and that each of said notes was endorsed by the plaintiff, James Boyce, under and by the name and style of James Boyce & Co.; that on said same date said defendant Charles F. W. Neely, by his certain other note, promised to pay the plaintiff, Boyce, in four years after date, the sum of $2,500, with five per cent, thereon for attorney’s fees, and eight per cent, interest thereon, payable annually from date; that each of said notes was made payable at the Citizens’ National Bank of Muncie, Indiana — copies of each are filed with and made a part of the complaint, marked, respectively, exhibits A, B, and C; that at the time of the execution of the notes said defendant Charles F. W. Neely executed a mortgage to the plaintiff, Boyce, to secure the payment of said note, for $2,500, when the same should become due, and to indemnify him and secure him against any and all loss he might sustain by reason of having become indorser for said defendant Charles F. W. Neely on said two notes payable to the order of said Ethel — a copy of the mort
On their own application and motion, Laura C. Friend, Lenora J. Bergenthal, Sarah F. Russey, Cary O. Neely, Emma Neely, Cyrus G. Neely and Kate Neely were made parties defendant, and permitted to defend the suit.
The defendants Charles F. ~W. Neely and wife did not appear, and were defaulted.
Cyrus G. Neely and Sarah F. Russey each lile a separate answer.
The first paragraph of the answer of Sarah F. Russey is a general denial. The second paragraph is an answer to so much of the complaint as seeks a foreclosure of the mortgage against the one undivided tenth part of said real estate, and she alleges that on the — day of January, 1868, one Moses L. Neely died at the county of Delaware, the owner in fee and in full possession of the real estate described in the complaint, leaving Mary A. Neely, his widow, and ten children him surviving, of whom said Sarah F. Russey is one, his only children and heirs at law; that said Moses L. Neely, at his death, left his last will and testament, duly executed, signed, sealed, published, and declared by him to be such, and attested on the 7th day of January, 1868, Which will and testament was duly proved and admitted to probate on the 18th day of January, 1868, and recorded, etc., which will and probate thereof remain in full force
“I give, bequeath and devise to my wife, Mary Ann Neely, as follows [describing the same]. For and during the time of her natural life, I give to her all my real estate, and I devise and direct that she shall conduct the farm operations upon my farm in the same manner as I should do Avere I still living, with that view, keeping our children together at home so long as they may be under the age of twenty-one years, and may desire to remain : that I give to her all the interest upon my money, and all other annual profits of my estate, for her maintenance and the support of our family so long as she shall live.” And he appointed his wife, Mary A. Neely, and his son, Cyrus G. Neely, joint executor and executrix of his said last will.
It was further provided by the will that “ at the death of his wife all his estate, real and personal, remaining, shall be divided between their children, share and share alike,” the child, or children, of such as may be deceased at that time to take the respective shares of their parents. It was also provided that., in order to pay debts, expenses of administration, or for the payment of any sum provided by the will, it should not be necessary for the executors, or either of them, to procure an order of sale of property from any court, or authority whatever, but they are fully authorized, in any manner, and at any time that they may deem fit, and on such terms as they may prescribe, to make sale of any of the real estate, or personal property, for such purpose; but the home farm shall not, nor shall any part of it, be sold, except in case of the most absolute necessity.
The will further provided that the executors, and the survivors of them should remain such in order to hold the surplus of the personal estate until the decease of his widow. It is further alleged that the widow, Mary A. Neely, is yet living, and that in and by said will, and under the several devises and directions therein contained, and under the
The first paragraph of the answer of the defendant Cyrus G. Neely is a general denial. The second alleges the same general facts that are alleged in the second paragraph of answer of the defendant, Sarah F. Russey, and follows with the averments that on June 25th, 1884, Laura C. Friend and Lenora J. Bergenthal, two of the children of said testator, jointly with their husbands, executed a deed purporting to convey to the said Mary A. Neely the undivided two-tenths of said real estate, and, on July 1st, 1884, Sarah F. Russey, one of the children of said testator, who then was and now is the wife of James H. Russey, jointly with Cary O. Neely, Emma Neely, Kate Neely and Charles F. W. Neely, four of the other children of said testator, executed a deed purporting to convey to the said Mary A. Neely the undivided five-tenths of the real estate named in said complaint, and purporting to convey one-tenth hereof from each of the five persons so executing said conveyance, as one of the ten equal heirs of said testator; that the said husband of Sarah F. Russey did not join with his said wife in the execution of said conveyance, nor did he execute the same, whereby the said deed as to the said Sarah F. Russey was and is wholly void and conveyed no real estate from her to the said Mary A. Neely; that afterwards, on the 9th day of August, 1884, the said Charles F. W. Neely caused to be recorded upon page 60 of book 54 of the deed record of said county of Delaware, a pretended deed, bearing date of July 31st, 1884, purporting to have been executed by said Mary A. Neely to convey to the said Charles F. W. Neely the undivided seven-tenths of said real estate named in the complaint, together with her life-estate therein; that no more than six-tenths of said real estate had ever been conveyed to the said Mary A.
The defendants Laura C. Friend, Lenora J. Bergenthal. Sarah F. Russey, Cary O. Neely, Emma Neely, Cyrus G. Neely, Mary A. Neely, and Kate W. Neely, filed a joint answer in two paragraphs, the first being a general denial, and the second alleges substantially the same facts that are alleged in the second paragraph of the separate answer of said Cyrus G. Neely.
The plaintiff filed a separate demurrer to the second paragraph of each of said several answers for want of facts, which demurrer was overruled and exceptions reserved.
The plaintiff Boyce filed a reply to the second paragraph of the answers of the several defendants, in which he admits that on the-day of January, 1868, one Moses L. Neely died, at Delaware county, Indiana, the owner in fee, and in possession, of all the real estate described in the complaint; leaving the defendant, Mary A. Neely, his widow, and ten. children him surviving, of whom defendants are seven, his only heirs at law; that said Moses L. Neely died testate, and left his last will and testament, which was duly probated January 18th, 1868, a copy of which will is set forth in defendant’s joint answer, but avers that under the terms and provisions of said will said widow received a life estate in said real estate, and said children a vested interest in fee therein, subject only to said life estate; that on the 25th day of June, 1884, said Laura C. Friend and Lenora Bergenthal, together with their husbands, by warranty deed, conveyed to defendant Mary A. Neely the undivided two-tenths part of said land for a consideration of one dollar, as expressed in said deed; that said deed was duly recorded in the recorder’s office of said county, in book 54, p. 56, on the 9th day of August, 1884; that on the 11th day of July, 1884, the defendants Charles F. W. Neely, Sarah F. Russey, Cary O. Neely, Emma Neely, and Kate W. Neely,
Plaintiff also filed a second paragraph of answer in general denial.
The defendants demurred to the first paragraph of the reply for want of facts, which demurrer was overruled and exceptions reserved. Plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint, after the note for the two thousand dollars became due, asking judgment for the two thousand dollars and interest.
There was a trial and finding, and judgment for the plaintiff against all of the defendants, except Sarah F. Eussey; the finding was only for the amount paid by the appellee as indorser, with six per cent, interest, and not for the eight per cent, interest and attorney’s fees on said notes, as stated in the notes.
Cyrus G. Neely and Mary A. Neely filed a separate motion for a new trial. The other defendants against whom
The complaint, it will be noticed, charges nothing against any of the appellants. It is a complaint against Charles F. W. Neely and his wife, and Mary A. Neely, for personal judgment against Charles, and for foreclosure of the mortgage against all of the defendants named in the complaint. The appellants, on their own motion, were made parties to defend against the action. They do not ask that any averments be made against them in the complaint, and none are made.
The answers are pleaded as a defence to the complaint against the foreclosure of the mortgage. There is no affirmative relief asked. The answers set out the conveyances made by the defendants, and, if good, must be so on the theory that the fee to the real estate did not vest in the children under and by virtue of the will.
By the terms of the will the widow was given a life-estate in the land, and at her death it was devised to his children, share and share alike; the child or children of such as are dead to take the share of their parent. It specially enjoins upon the wife that she should keep the home farm, and farm it the same as the testator would do if still living. It grants to the executors the right to sell any portion of the estate which may be necessary to pay debts, costs of administration and any sum to be paid by the will, without order of court. The will, as we construe it, vested in the widow a life-estate and the fee in the children, subject to being divested only in case a sale became necessary to pay debts, costs of administration, or any sum provided by the will to be paid. Jenkins v. Compton, 123 Ind. 117; Levengood v. Hoople, 124 Ind. 27; Koons v. Mellett, 121 Ind. 585.
The children were all of ago, and seven of them conveyed
It is well settled that any subsequently acquired title by a grantor in a warranty deed to the premises conveyed inures to the benefit of the grantee. If the grantors in the several deeds had title at the time of the conveyance it passed by the deeds, or if they acquired any afterwards and before suit, it inured to the benefit of their grantees, and if they have not had any title at all to the real estate, then they have no interest in the result of the suit whereby they can prevent a foreclosure of the mortgage.
In any event, there is no error in the rulings upon the pleadings of which they can complain. Nor is there any error in the amount of the recovery, of which appellants can complain. They having no interest in the real estate, it is immaterial to them for what, amount judgment was rendered. The complaint alleges the facts, and we see no reason why the appellee was not entitled to judgment for the amount he paid as indorser, with interest, even if he had no right of recovery upon the note. He was indorser on the note, and
What we have said disposes of the case upon the evidence, as the disposition of the case upon the evidence depends upon the construction placed upon the will, and effect to be given to the deeds.
There is no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
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