In the Matter of John Maurice Plummer
In the Matter of John Maurice Plummer
Opinion
IN THE
Indiana Supreme Court
FILED
Supreme Court Case No. 26S-JD-115 May 20 2026, 10:45 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
In the Matter of the Honorable Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
John M. Plummer III, Judge of the
Lawrence Superior Court I,
Respondent.
Decided: May 20, 2026
Judicial Discipline Action
Per Curiam Opinion
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter concur.
Per curiam.
We find that Respondent, the Honorable John M. Plummer III, Judge of
the Lawrence Superior Court, committed judicial misconduct by ingesting
marijuana over a four-month period, causing his impairment at a county
council meeting and his otherwise erratic and agitated demeanor.
This matter is before us on the Indiana Commission on Judicial
Qualifications’ (“Commission’s”) “Notice of the Institution of Formal
Proceedings and Statement of Charges” against Respondent. The parties
jointly tendered a “Statement of Circumstances and Conditional
Agreement for Discipline” stipulating to the below facts and agreed
sanction—a 60-day unpaid suspension.
Procedural Background and Facts
Respondent took office as judge of the Lawrence Superior Court I in
2018. He presided over a general jurisdiction docket that included
criminal and civil cases, as well as the county’s domestic violence court.
Respondent has been on a paid leave of absence since September 2025.
Between February and May 2025, Respondent consumed cannabis-
infused gummies and vaped marijuana. A family member purchased the
products in Michigan for Respondent and brought them to Respondent’s
Indiana home.
On April 30, 2025, Respondent appeared impaired and erratic at a
county council meeting. While discussing court-related budget matters,
Respondent spoke at length, exhibited pressured speech, and made
comments that were tangential to the matters under consideration.
Allegations arose that Respondent had been acting in an erratic and
agitated manner. On May 14, Respondent disclosed to another judicial
officer that he had been consuming marijuana. He told others that he
vaped “five puffs daily.”
On June 27, the Commission issued its Notice of Investigation. It
advised Respondent that it was investigating concerns relating to his
alleged substance use. In response to the Commission’s notice,
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Respondent admitted to telling another judicial officer that he had
occasionally used a small amount of THC to help him sleep. During its
investigation, the Commission discovered that Respondent’s substance
use was more extensive than he acknowledged in his initial response.
The Commission deposed Respondent in November 2025. He provided
contradictory, equivocal testimony regarding his substance use, including
the following statements:
• “I can’t remember if I told [a judicial officer] it was a vape or if it
was a gummy or whatever, but – I can’t remember.”
• “I don’t remember what [the family member] gave me. I think it
was – I thought it was a gummy.”
• “[The family member] might have” given Respondent a vape.
• “[I vaped] in college, but it was just that one time … that I told [a
judicial officer] about.”
• When asked whether he had ever vaped before, Respondent
replied, “No. I don’t think we had a vape in college.”
• When asked whether Respondent uses alcohol or other substances,
“No. In fact – and I was just trying to tell you that no, I do not.”
• When asked directly if he had ever vaped marijuana, “Like I said
earlier, no.”
• When asked whether he purchased marijuana in Michigan, “No. I
never did.”
And while Respondent did not dispute the authenticity of the
Commission’s records documenting his marijuana use, he stated he had
“reason to dispute that that actually happened.” Respondent now agrees
that his deposition testimony reflected a materially inconsistent and
incomplete account of his marijuana use during the relevant period.
Discussion
Respondent agrees that his conduct violated the following Code of
Judicial Conduct provisions:
• Rule 1.1, requiring judges to comply with the law, including the
Code of Judicial Conduct;
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• Rule 1.2, requiring judges to act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety; and
• Rule 2.16(A), requiring judges to cooperate and be candid and
honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.
The parties believe that a 60-day unpaid suspension from judicial
service is warranted. We agree.
Fortunately, this Court has not needed to discipline many judicial
officers for illicit substance use. But our sister states offer insight. We
agree with the consensus that “[a] criminal act for which any citizen may
be punished … is much more serious when the conduct is that of a judge.”
In re King, 857 So.2d 432, 448 (La. 2003). Indeed, hypocrisy abounds when
a judge “sit[s] in judgment of others” for conduct that he himself commits.
In re Gilbert, 668 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Mich. 2003), Weaver, J., dissenting. We
have concluded similarly when disciplining prosecutors, as they are
officers charged with the administration of law. See, e.g., Matter of Oliver,
493 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. 1986) (noting that the behaviors of judges and
prosecutors have “the capacity to bolster or damage public esteem for the
system different than that of attorneys otherwise in practice”); Matter of
Sims, 665 N.E.2d 584, 585 (Ind. 1996) (“When those whose job it is to
enforce the law break it instead, the public rightfully questions whether
the system itself is worthy of respect.”).
Judicial discipline proceedings are not only remedial in nature but
intended to preserve the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
system. Matter of Cox, 275 N.E.3d 883, 889 (Ind. 2026). Here, witnesses
grew concerned when Respondent appeared visibly impaired at a county
council meeting. And others around him described his behavior during
the relevant period as erratic and agitated. Respondent does not dispute
that his possession and use of marijuana—at all relevant times, crimes in
the state of Indiana—threatened the public’s confidence in the judiciary.
We further note that Respondent was less than forthcoming regarding
his marijuana use. See Matter of Brown, 4 N.E.3d 619, 629 (Ind. 2014)
(observing that, despite her duty to cooperate with the investigative
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process, the judge-respondent “provided factually inaccurate
information” in her response to the Commission’s complaint). Initially,
Respondent minimized, equivocated, and provided half-truths about his
substance use, a clear violation of Jud. Cond. R. 2.16(A).
Suspensions longer than 30 days reflect extremely serious judicial
misconduct, just shy of what might warrant removal from office. Matter of
Cichowicz, 213 N.E.3d 1022, 1024 (Ind. 2023) (quotations and citation
omitted). Here, we allow Respondent to return to the bench for reasons
outlined in the parties’ agreement. Respondent’s substance use occurred
during a time of personal stress and instability, and he voluntarily sought
therapeutic and psychiatric treatment. After examination, a
neuropsychologist determined that Respondent does not have a substance
use disorder. Respondent has not faced prior judicial or attorney
discipline. And he has accepted—though, perhaps belatedly—
responsibility for his misconduct. We believe these factors point to
Respondent’s ability to regain the public’s confidence. Matter of Hawkins,
251 N.E.3d 1062, 1065 (Ind. 2025).
Finally, “we cannot overlook the fact that we are considering this
matter following the parties’ submission of a conditional agreement. Such
agreements are often the product of lengthy negotiations and may merit a
less severe sanction than might otherwise be imposed after a trial on the
merits.” Matter of Meade, 200 N.E.3d 448, 451–52 (Ind. 2023) (citations
omitted).
Conclusion
The Honorable John M. Plummer III shall be suspended without pay
from judicial service for sixty (60) days commencing at 12:01 a.m. on May
21, 2026. The suspension shall terminate and Respondent shall
automatically be reinstated to office at 12:01 a.m. on July 20, 2026. This
discipline terminates the disciplinary proceedings relating to the
circumstances giving rise to this case.
Rush, C.J., and Massa, Slaughter, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-JD-115 | May 20, 2026 Page 5 of 6
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
Glen E. Koch II
Boren Oliver & Coffey, LLP
Martinsville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA COMMISSION ON
JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS
Adrienne L. Meiring, Counsel to the Commission
Stephanie K. Bibbs, Deputy Director of Litigation
Conner R. Dickerson, Staff Attorney
Indianapolis, Indiana
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-JD-115 | May 20, 2026 Page 6 of 6
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.