Evans v. Watson
Evans v. Watson
Opinion of the Court
The opinion of the court was delivered by
On May 20, 1889, the board of statehouse commissioners accepted the bid of George H. Evans & Co. to do certain work in completion of the state capitol. A contract was afterward made for said work and a bond given, signed by all the plaintiffs in error herein, conditioned for the carrying out of said contract and the payment of all indebtedness incurred for labor and material. On this bond the action now before us was instituted to recover $257.70 for personal services rendered by the plaintiff below,
Afterward the defendants answered as follows : (1) A general denial; (2) that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; (3) pendency of another action on each of said claims by the assignors as plaintiffs ; (4) that the bond sued on did not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff so as to enable a suit thereon by him for his individual benefit; (5) that by agreement the part of the contract under which the plaintiff and his assignors performed any labor was eliminated from the contract of George H. Evans & Co. and became a direct contract of P. E. Lane, for which Evans & Co. and their sureties were not liable ; (6) that the bond had been altered after its execution without the consent of the sureties; (7) that the contract for the performance of which the bond was given was mate-i-ially changed by the board of state-house commissioners after the execution of the bond, thus materially affecting the work to be performed by George H. Evans & Co. thereunder, without the consent of the sureties. To these answers the plaintiff replied by general denials. The case was tried to the court and a jury, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and the matter is now before us for review.
The claim that P. E.Lane, the subcontractor under whom the services were performed, ought to have been made a party defendant is without merit, as the act under which this condition of the bond was made expressly provides for an action on the bond, and had the defendants desired a personal adjudication as to Lane, sufficient authority is given by sections 24 and 27, chapter 95, General Statutes of 1897 (Gen. Stat. 1889, ¶ ¶ 4113, 4118), to have brought him in. As to the objection that the claim was not for labor doné under said contract within the meaning of the term labor, as used in the statute, we think the evidence was sufficient to sustain the finding of the court in that respect.
It is next contended that the objection to the introduction of evidence ought to have been sustained. J. T. Botkin, recording clerk in the office of the secretary of state, identified the papers, of the first of which exhibit “A” attached to plaintiff's petition is a copy, as being a part of the files of that office. The
Complaint is made that the court refused and failed to instruct the jury as to the different attitudes of sureties and principals. As there was no question involving' the distinction between principals and sureties in this case, such instruction was not necessary. So far as the liability upon this bond to the plaintiff was concerned they were simply obligors.
It is next claimed that neither the bond nor the contract contains any reservation of the right to make changes, and the court should have so instructed the jury. The bond, so far as this case is concerned, provides for the payment of all indebtedness incurred for labor and material furnished in the construction of the improvements provided for by plans and specification No. 2 and. addenda No. 2. Specification No. 2 provides : “All general clauses in specification No. 1 not specially modified by specification No. 2, will b.e in full force the same as if they were in specification No. 2. Reference is had chiefly to the general clauses of specification No. 1.” Among the general clauses
It is claimed that by the transactions of July 7 and 11, 1892, between the state and George H. Evans & Co., said firm was released from the work for which recovery is sought. We do not think that such was the necessary or legal effect of these transactions. The contractors sublet the iron work to P. E. Lane, and, desiring to go to El Paso, Tex., they separated as far as possible the sublet work from the balance of the contract, and for the purpose of enabling the subcontractor to deal directly with the owner, executed an irrevocable power of attorney for said subcontractor to sign and execute all vouchers for material furnished and work done and to indorse all warrants that might be allowed by the state board of public works and the state architect, and to receive and receipt for all sums so allowed, to the full sum of $19,000, said sum being the amount due from said “George H. Evans & Co. to said Philander E. Lane as P. E. Lane upon a subcontract made with him under the contract of George H. Evans & Co. date May 20, 1889, with the state of Kansas for the construction of the state-house building. And the said P. E. Lane, in consideration of this power of attorney, hereby agrees to release the said George H. Evans and J. J. Cox from all liability arising out of the above-mentioned subcontract.”
We see no intimation here, much less conclusive proof, that P. E. Lane had contracted -with the state of Kansas for said work, or that the state 'of Kansas had accepted the said P. E. Lane as solely responsible therefor, and had released George H. Evans & Co.
We see no reversible error in this case ; on the contrary, we think the judgment of the court below was right. It will be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.