In re Expert South Tulsa, LLC
In re Expert South Tulsa, LLC
Opinion of the Court
Chapter 11
FINAL ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO ENFORCE AUTOMATIC STAY AND DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS
Debtor moves to enforce the automatic stay, requests a declaration voiding a post-
Background
On March 30, 2010, another of Debtor’s creditors, Team Viva, filed an involuntary Chapter 7 petition, which Debtor later voluntarily converted to Chapter 11. Debt- or’s business is to own, develop, and sell commercial property located in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Debtor’s financial difficulties stem primarily from a failed real estate development known as Memorial Commons. The project was to include retail shopping, restaurants, and office space. Edwin H. Hawes III and Lawrence B. McLellan II are Debtor’s sole members. Debtor is an Oklahoma limited liability company. Debtor’s primary place of business and its principals are located in Kansas.
Plaintiffs purchased from Debtor an undeveloped hotel site at what was to be Memorial Commons. Prior to bankruptcy, Plaintiffs filed suit against Debtor, alleging breach of contract and misrepresentation regarding the sale of the hotel site (the “Oklahoma Litigation”).
Upon initiation of Debtor’s involuntary bankruptcy, the Oklahoma Litigation was stayed against Debtor.
A. The Alter Ego Doctrine
Limited liability company members, like corporate shareholders, may be held liable for debts of the company under the alter ego doctrine. The alter ego doctrine allows a plaintiff “to reach a second corporation or individual upon a cause of action that otherwise would have existed only against the first corporation.”
B. The Automatic Stay
Section 362(a)(1) stays any action or proceedings against the debtor. Generally, the stay applies only to the debtor and not to non-debtor co-defendants.
While an alter ego action may be an action against a non-debtor third-party, it is also an action “to recover a claim against the debtor” because absent a claim against the debtor, there is no independent basis for the action against the principal.
C. Does the Automatic Stay Apply to the Alter Ego Claims Against Non-Debtors?
Case law is divided as to whether an alter ego action, or an action to pierce the corporate veil, becomes property of the estate upon the corporate debtor’s bankruptcy. Some cases hold an alter ego action against shareholders does not constitute property of the corporate debtor’s estate because an alter ego action is personal to each of the corporation’s creditors, since a corporate entity will be disregarded only if the entity has been abused to the detriment of a third party.
Although federal bankruptcy law determines what is property of a bankruptcy estate, it is state law that determines property rights. Generally, the law of the state of incorporation of the debtor is the law that applies with regard to the alter ego claim. Likewise, it is probably state law that determines whether the debtor has standing to bring an action under the alter ego theory and, implicitly, whether this Court has jurisdiction over the claim. Not lost in the analysis is that the debtor is a separate entity from the pre-petition fictitious entity and that the driving purpose of bankruptcy is to benefit the bankruptcy estate and all of the creditors of that estate, to include an equal distribution of assets for all those similarly situated creditors in conformity with the directives of the Bankruptcy Code.
Whether an alter ego action will be included in a corporate debtor’s estate depends upon state law.
Oklahoma law does not provide a clear answer, but it is likely to follow Koch Refining and hold the corporation has standing to pursue an alter ego claim which benefits its creditors generally.
In this case, Plaintiffs allege un-dercapitalization and Debtor’s inability to complete Memorial Commons as promised. These are general claims any creditor transacting business with the Debtor could assert. Accordingly, the claim is property of the estate to be administered or abandoned.
D. Violation of the Automatic Stay
The Court finds that the Plaintiffs violated the bankruptcy automatic stay under § 362(a)(1) and (a)(3) from and beginning with any and all actions taken in the Oklahoma Litigation and the Alter Ego Litigation since the date that the involuntary bankruptcy was filed for this Debtor on March 30, 2010; further, the Court finds that any and all actions in said litigation on or after March 30, 2010, are void and of no legal effect. The Oklahoma Litigation and the Alter Ego Litigation remain stayed. However, considering the complexity of the Oklahoma Litigation and the divergence of pertinent case law, the Court does not impose monetary sanctions upon the Plaintiffs.
Conclusion
Debtor’s Motion to Enforce the Automatic Stay is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 362.03 362.03[1] at 362-23 and 24 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. 2010).
. Bankers Trust Co. v. Lee Keeling & Assocs., Inc., 1992 WL 602830 (N.D.Okla. 1992), quoting 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 41.28 at 658 n.10 (1990).
. Bankers Trust, at *I, citing Home-Stake Production Co. v. Talon Petroleum, 907 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1990); Wallace v. Tulsa Yellow Cab Taxi & Baggage Co., 178 Okla. 15, 61 P.2d 645 (1936); and Tara Petroleum Corp. v. Hughey, 630 P.2d 1269, 1275 n. 20 (Okla. 1981).
. Fanning v. Brown, 85 P.3d 841, 846-48 (Okla. 2004).
. 1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 41.10 (1990); Sautbine v. Keller, 423 P.2d 447, 451 (Okla. 1966); Sampson v. Hunt, 233 Kan. 572, 579, 665 P.2d 743 (1983).
. Dixie Aire Title Services, Inc. v. SPW, L.L.C., 389 B.R. 222, 225 (W.D.Okla. 2008).
. Id. citing A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 1986).
. Thomas v. Vertigo, Inc., 900 P.2d 458, 460 (Okla.App. 1995).
. Dixie Aire Title Services, 389 B.R. at 225.
. See, e.g., In re Ozark Restaurant Equipment, Co., Inc., 816 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
. See, e.g., Koch Refining v. Farmers Union Cent. Exchange, Inc., 831 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1987).
. See, e.g., Baillie Lumber Co., LP v. Thompson, 413 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2005).
. Delgado Oil Co., Inc. v. Torres, 785 F.2d 857, 861 (10th Cir. 1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 920-21 (4th Cir. 1973).
. Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1346; In re Schimmelpenninck, 183 F.3d 347, 359 (5th Cir. 1999).
. Ozark Restaurant Equipment, 816 F.2d at 1225 (interpreting Arkansas law).
. Koch Refining, 831 F.2d at 1349.
. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Greer, 911 P.2d 257, 264 (Okla. 1995); Transportation Alliance Bank, Inc. v. Arrow Trucking Co., 766 F.Supp.2d 1188 (N.D.Okla. 2011). Kansas law holds the alter ego remedy belongs to creditors generally and should not inure to the benefit of a single creditor to the prejudice of others. Commerce Bank, N.A. v. Liebau-Woodall & Assocs., L.P., 28 Kan.App.2d 674, 680-81, 20 P.3d 88 (2001), citing Pemco, Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 258 Kan. 717, 723, 907 P.2d 863 (1995).
. See, e.g., Transportation Alliance Bank, Inc. v. Arrow Trucking Co., 766 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1999-1200 (N.D.Okla. 2011); S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Service, Inc. (In the Matter of S.I. Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142, 1153 (5th Cir. 1987).
. Mather v. G.K. Pipe Corp., (In re Moran Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.), 130 B.R. 588 (Bankr. E.D.Okla. 1991); Helena Chemical Co. v. Circle Land and Cattle Corp., (In re Circle Land and Cattle Corp.), 213 B.R. 870 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1997).
.In re Moran Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 130 B.R. at 593.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- IN RE: EXPERT SOUTH TULSA, LLC, Debtor
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published