Allen v. Mill-Tel, Inc.
Opinion of the Court
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court upon plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and, in the Alternative, for Leave to Serve Additional Interrogatories (ECF No. 45). For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.
I. Procedural Conference Requirement
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this district’s local rules require a moving party to confer with opposing counsel about the discovery dispute at issue before filing a motion to compel.
II. Background
Plaintiffs to this potential class action and collective action allege defendant Mill-Tel, Inc. failed to pay earned overtime compensation in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. Plaintiffs also allege defendant wrongfully withheld or deducted earned wages in violation of the Kansas Wage Payment Act (KWPA), K.S.A. 44-313, et seq.
The court previously directed that discovery leading up to certification motions should focus on certification issues or issues related to the named plaintiffs.
III. Discussion
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) provides that “[f]or good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” When a party fails to make disclosure or discovery, the opposing party may file a motion to compel. When a party files a motion to compel and asks the court to overrule certain objections, the objecting party must specifically show in its response to the motion how each discovery request is objectionable.
The bulk of the defendant’s arguments about this discovery dispute concern relevance and the scope of discovery in the precertification stage of a potential Rule 23 class action and potential FLSA collective action— essentially, that the discovery plaintiffs seek is either not relevant, or that it is merits discovery that should not be allowed before the court has ruled on the certification motions. Notably, the court did not strictly limit pre-certification discovery to class issues. The scheduling order states that discovery should “focus on issues relating to the named plaintiffs and conditional and/or class certification of a putative class in this matter” but that “discovery is not strictly limited to these topics.”
There are two reasons for this. First, the distinctions between class discovery and merits discovery are not always obvious or easily discernable.
Generally, pre-certification discovery should pertain to the requirements of Rule 23 or what is required for to conditionally certify an FLSA collective action.
In the absence of more guidance from the parties, the court is inclined to allow what appears to be merits discovery when it is likely plaintiffs would be entitled to the information at some point and when the discovery request is not subject to a supported objection. Even if this case is not certified, the named plaintiffs’ claims will remain, and those plaintiffs would be entitled to discovery regarding defendant’s compensation policies and practices and the like—information tending to support or negate the claims or defenses. At this stage, however, the court is not inclined to allow broad discovery regarding the individual employees who may be members of FLSA or KWPA class when the plaintiffs have not explained how this discovery would bear on certification issues. If this case is not certified, it is doubtful the plaintiffs would be entitled to the scope and breadth of the information these requests
A. Putative Class Members’ Identities and Related Documents
A number of plaintiffs’ discovery requests seek information pertaining the putative class, including the identities of these individuals—specifically, Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, and 13 and Request for Production Nos. 4, 10, 11, and 24. The parties devote a considerable portion of their briefs to discussing whether discovery of this information is appropriate before class certification. The court holds that the names and contact information for the putative class members are discoverable. But without a more specific explanation of the relevance of more detailed information about the individual putative class members, the court will not allow broader discovery during this stage of litigation.
Relevant information need not be admissible at trial so long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Plaintiffs’ discovery requests regarding putative class members fall into two categories. Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4 are aimed at gathering the names, contact information, and the location where individual members of the putative class worked. This district has previously allowed disclosure of this type of information before certification,
Defendant’s other argument in opposition to this discovery is also unavailing. Defendant contends that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a), it is only required to disclose the names of individuals who likely have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses. Defendant is correct that Rule 26(a)(1) provides certain requirements for initial disclosures. But this provision does not limit the scope of discovery or prohibit the proponent of discovery from seeking additional information.
Defendant has not carried its burden to support its objections, and so they are overruled. The motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 4. In response to Interrogatory No. 2, defendant states it has already identified 503 individuals who were employed as installation technicians during the specified period. So, it appears the motion to compel is moot as to this interrogatory. Nevertheless, to the extent defendant has not fully responded it shall do so.
The court finds the remainder of the discovery requests—as they pertain to putative class members'—seek information that does not appear facially relevant at the precertification stage of the case. Therefore, plaintiffs bear the initial burden of establishing relevance. The discovery plaintiffs seek is broad. It includes information about deductions from individual putative class members’ compensation, documents evidencing the number of hours these individuals worked, and agreements to permit deductions of the putative class members’ compensation. Plaintiffs fail to explain precisely how this information may bear upon plaintiffs’ forthcoming motion for Rule 23 class certification or how it would further support their pending motion seeking conditional certification of an FLSA collective action. The court finds plaintiffs have not met their burden to show relevance. Because of this, the motion to compel is denied in part as to Interrogatory No. 13 and Request for Production Nos. 4, 10, 11, and 24—as they pertain to putative class members. To the extent it has not done so, defendant shall respond to these discovery requests as to the named plaintiffs. As discussed below, with respect to Interrogatory No. 13, defendant must also disclose information about its policies and practices, but it need not provide information that is specific to individual members of the putative class.
B. Company-Wide Policies or Practices
Interrogatory Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 13 seek information about defendant’s policies and practices regarding payroll matters. This information clearly pertains to the claims that defendant was engaged in unlawful payment practices. Because the court finds this information appears facially relevant, defendant bears the burden to show the discovery is outside the scope of relevance as defined by Rule 26(b) or is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad discovery.
Defendant makes no attempt to support any of its objections. Instead, defendant argues plaintiffs did not adequately confer about these discovery requests prior to filing their motion to compel, and states plaintiffs mischaracterized defendant’s position regarding many of the interrogatories. The court finds defendant has not carried its burden to support its objections. They are overruled. That said, Interrogatory No. 13 seeks infor
C. Defendant’s Contracts with Customer Cable TV Companies
Interrogatory No. 15 and Request for Production No. 23 are aimed at gathering information about defendant’s relationships and contracts with the cable television customers its employees serviced. Plaintiffs state this information is relevant because of defendant’s alleged custom, policy, or practice of deducting money from installation technicians’ paychecks for failed “quality checks” the cable companies performed to ensure satisfaction with defendant’s work. Plaintiffs additionally state this information will allow them to evaluate whether the cable companies are in possession of records that would show when installation technicians arrived and departed from service sites. The court finds this information appears facially relevant. Therefore, defendant bears the burden to show the discovery is outside the scope of relevance as defined by Rule 26(b), or (2) is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad discovery.
Defendant argues its contracts do not bear on the ultimate issue of whether plaintiffs were properly compensated or whether defendant had a company-wide policy regarding deductions. Defendant states the allegedly failed “quality checks” are only relevant to the extent they affected defendant’s employment relationship with plaintiff. Yet, that is exactly plaintiffs’ theory. Plaintiffs contend defendant passed along this “charge-back” to its employees in the form of unlawful payroll deductions. Defendant also states it has already provided information that should answer this question. Even so, this does not mean plaintiffs are not entitled to discover other relevant information. Defendant’s objections are overruled, and the motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory No. 15 and Request for Production No. 23.
D. The Number of Interrogatories Served
The scheduling order in this case provides that plaintiffs collectively may serve twenty-five interrogatories, including all discrete subparts.
In response to Interrogatory Nos. 13 and 15, defendant initially objected on the ground that plaintiffs had exceeded their allowable number of interrogatories. In response to the motion to compel, however, defendant simply argues the court should not permit plaintiffs to serve additional interrogatories because plaintiffs have already exceeded their limit—in essence, that plaintiffs’ request is moot. Defendant also takes issue
The court is unclear whether defendant continues to rely upon its objection. For one, the arguments concerning the topic appear under the section of defendant’s brief entitled, “The Court should Deny Plaintiffs’ Request for Additional Interrogatories.”
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiffs motion to compel is granted as to Interrogatory Nos. 2, 4, and 15 and as to Request For Production Nos. 23. Plaintiffs’ motion to compel is granted in part as to Interrogatories Nos. 6, 7, 8, and 13 and as to Request for Production Nos. 4, 10, 11, and 24. To the extent defendant has not already done so, it must respond to these discovery requests as to the named plaintiffs and as to defendant’s policies and procedures that governed both the named plaintiffs and members of the putative class. In light of this ruling, defendant may need to supplement its response to Request for Production No. 1, which seeks all documents identified and/or referenced in response to the first set interrogatories. The court finds the parties should bear their own costs incurred as a result of the briefing on this motion.
Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and, in the Alternative, for Leave to Serve Additional Interrogatories (ECF No. 45) is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within fourteen (14) days from the date of this order, defendant shall supplement its responses to the discovery requests as directed in this memorandum and order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1); D. Kan. Rule 37.2.
. Compl. at 3, ECF No. 1-1.
. See Scheduling Order at 3, ECF No. 12.
. Id.
. Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670-71 (D.Kan. 2004).
. Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 230 F.R.D. 611, 615 (D.Kan. 2005); Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v. Seaboard Corp., 189 F.R.D. 655, 662 (D.Kan. 1999).
. Cardenas, 230 F.R.D. at 621.
. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kirk’s Tire & Auto Servicenter of Haverstraw, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 658, 663 (D.Kan. 2003) (citing Steil v. Humana Kan. City, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 442, 445 (D.Kan. 2000)).
. See Scheduling Order at 3, ECF No. 12.
. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.14.
. See Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 255 F.R.D. 678, 688 (D.Kan. 2009) (stating that the Tenth Circuit "has recognized that a decision on class certification is not always immune from consideration of issues that overlap with the merits of the cause of action.") (citing Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of El Paso (Shook II), 543 F.3d 597, 612 (10th Cir. 2008)); Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.14 (4th ed. 2004) (“Generally, application of the Rule 23 criteria requires the judge to examine the elements of the parties’ substantive claims and defenses in order to analyze commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a) as well as the satisfaction of Rule 23(b)’s maintainability requirements.”).
. Manual for Complex Litigation § 21.14.
. Id.
. Id.
. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1).
. Presbyterian Manors, Inc. v. Simplexgrinnell, L.P., No. 09-2656-KHV, 2010 WL 3880027, at *7 (D.Kan. Sept. 28, 2010) (citing Thompson v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 05-1203-WEB, 2007 WL 608343, at *8 n. 20 (D.Kan. Feb. 22, 2007)).
. Id. (citing Thompson, 2007 WL 608343, at *8 n. 20).
. Id. (citing Thompson, 2007 WL 608343, at *8 n. 20; Pulsecard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., 168 F.R.D. 295, 309 (D.Kan. 1996)).
. See id. at *8 (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lear Corp., 215 F.R.D. 637, 640 (D.Kan. 2003)).
. See In re Bank of Am. Wage and Hour Emp’t Practices Litig., 275 F.R.D. 534, 544 (D.Kan. 2011); Hammond v. Lowe’s Home Ctrs., Inc., 216 F.R.D. 666, 672 (D.Kan. 2003).
. See In re Bank of Am., 275 F.R.D. at 542 (noting that the reasons for limiting pre-certification discovery are less compelling when responding to the discovery was not unduly burdensome).
. Hammond, 216 F.R.D. at 672.
. In re Bank of Am., 275 F.R.D. at 539; Hammond, 216 F.R.D. at 672.
. See Linnebur v. United Tel. Ass’n, No. 10-1379-RDR, 2011 WL 5103300, at *5 (D.Kan. Oct. 27, 2011) (explaining the requirements to support an undue burden objection).
. See Mot. to Preclude Pls. from Seeking Certification of Certain FLSA and KWPA Claims, ECF No. 26.
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) (governing the scope of discovery).
. See Presbyterian Manors, 2010 WL 3880027, at *8 (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 215 F.R.D. at 640).
. See id. (citing Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 215 F.R.D. at 640).
. Scheduling Order at 4, ECF No. 12.
. Pouncil v. Branch Law Firm, 277 F.R.D. 642, 646 (D.Kan. 2011).
. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting 8B Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2168.1 (3d ed. 2010) at 39-40).
. Def.’s Mem. in Opp'n to Pl.’s Mot. to Compel at 10, ECF No. 52.
. See Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 670-71 (D.Kan. 2004) (explaining an objecting party’s burden).
. See, e.g. Pouncil, 277 F.R.D. at 646-48 (addressing a specific arguments about why each disputed interrogatory’s subparts should be treated as separate interrogatories); High Point SARL v. Sprint Nextel Corp., No. 09-2269-CM-DJW, 2011 WL 4036424, at *4-*9 (D.Kan. Sept. 12, 2011) (same); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, No. 06-2376-KHV-DJW, 2008 WL 1924945, at *4-*5 (D.Kan. Apr. 28, 2008) (same).
. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(5)(C) (stating that when a motion to compel is granted in part and denied in part, the court may apportion expenses).
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.